[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
Huw Lloyd
huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
Mon Jan 11 04:08:12 PST 2016
Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon influences the tides?
E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum like things that, when, considered
together may appear as 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then
perhaps the meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one aspect
appearing as torque in another.
Best,
Huw
On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An
> essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity"
> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess
> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes?
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>
>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the
>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what
>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked,
>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception.
>>
>> still learning!
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>> thought should have been "instants" and then David
>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>> which was the subject of my comment.
>>
>> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
>> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
>> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
>> The one odd reference is this one:
>>
>> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
>> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
>> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
>> their
>> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
>> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
>> characterizes the actual development of the child’s
>> concepts."
>>
>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
>> to the distinct modes of conception which were
>> manifested in the child's activity, at different
>> stages, but which are combined in the most developed
>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
>> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>> association as "moments" of concept formation in the
>> other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
>> sure.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>
>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
>> clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>> quite different implications.
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
>> phase,
>> category, stage or division for those concepts.
>>
>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>> examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
>> phases
>> or stages of the concepts, even though they
>> are also
>> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
>> has all
>> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>> branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>> individual, universal and particular moments. We
>> cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>> individual to a branch to a general secretary,
>> can we?
>>
>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>> have always just presumed it came from
>> mathematics, as
>> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>> function, and I know Hegel did study this
>> branch of
>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
>> to it in
>> the Science of Logic in his critique of
>> calculus. But
>> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>
>> Huw:
>>
>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>> more often
>> "moments", and the word
>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>> phase, or a
>> step (as in the three
>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>> others", "for myself".
>>
>> One of the most difficult problems we had
>> to solve
>> in translating the
>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>> clearly distinguishes three
>> moments of speech development: indicative,
>> nominative, and signifying.
>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>> pointing
>> gesture. "Nominating" is
>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>> function: "every thing has a
>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>> down, and in one place
>> Vygotsky actually says that it is
>> synonymous with
>> the adult understanding
>> that anything can be named. So what is the
>> difference between knowing that
>> everything has a name and the knowledge
>> that any
>> thing can be named?
>>
>> I think that the distinction is just as
>> subtle and
>> just as significant
>> as the distinction between pointing to
>> something
>> with a gesture, pointing
>> to something with a word like "this" or
>> "that",
>> and pointing to something
>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
>> say that
>> "everything has a name",
>> the name could be extremely general
>> ("everything"
>> or "thing") or it could
>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>> computer"). But
>> I don't yet have the
>> idea that names are invented, and that
>> therefore
>> it is possible to name
>> objects which do not exist, and therefore
>> to bring
>> into existence modes of
>> pure abstract thinking through language.
>> That's
>> signifying, and it is
>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>> lifelong process of speech
>> development.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>> particular aspect that I thought
>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>> which is that stimuli can not
>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>> afford the kind of dynamics you
>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>
>> I have also noted that the translation of
>> phrases like "instances of a
>> process" is probably off the mark
>> too. What
>> is really meant, I believe, is
>> "instants of a process". These have two
>> rather different meanings from the
>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>
>> Huw:
>>
>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>
>> Если задача не превышает
>> естественных сил
>> ребенка, он справляется с ней
>> непосредственным или примитивным
>> способом.
>> В этих случаях структура его
>> поведения совершенно напоминает схему,
>> нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>>
>> (Russian
>>
>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>
>> This means (as nearly as I can
>> make out):
>> "If the task did not go beyond
>> the natural capability of the
>> child, he
>> could deal with it in an
>>
>> unmediated
>>
>> or primitive method. In this
>> cases, the
>> structure of his behavior would
>>
>> be
>>
>> completely similar to the scheme as
>> presented by Volkelt".
>>
>> I think there is no diagramme, at
>> least
>> not in the sense of a two
>> dimensional graphic one can have a
>> copy
>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>> all child
>> behavior as the result of an
>> affectively tinged FUSION of
>> perception
>> and behavior, an affectively
>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which
>> perception and behavior were
>> absolutely inseparable. This was
>> what Hans
>> Volkelt concluded from a
>>
>> series
>>
>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>
>> the
>>
>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>
>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>> baby bottles: one shaped like a
>> triangle, one like a violin, one
>> like a
>> square, etc. They were all
>> different colors as well. But three of
>> them didn't have holes in the
>>
>> teat:
>>
>> you could see and smell the milk
>> but you
>> couldn't drink it. One did. He
>> taught the infants to associate the
>> drinking of milk and the feeling of
>> satiation with one particular
>> bottle, so
>> that they would actually ignore
>> the bottle unless it had all the
>> characteristics: triangularity,
>>
>> blueness,
>>
>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>> child's point of view, he was not
>> drinking milk but triangular blue
>> milk.
>> This kind of "affectively colored
>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>> schemata".
>>
>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>> eventually decided that we never
>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>> colored perception-behavior wholes,
>> and this would explain the
>> indivisible and
>> inseparable devotion of the
>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>> later
>> work Vygotsky is very careful to
>> distance himself from Volkelt even
>> in his
>> explanations of infant
>>
>> behavior:
>>
>> in the Lectures on Pedology he
>> argues that
>> ALL THREE layers of behavior
>> (that is, instinct, habit, and
>> intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>> Huw Lloyd
>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Does anyone have a copy of
>> "Volkelt's
>> diagram" to hand that is referred
>>
>> to
>>
>> in The History of the
>> Development of
>> Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>
>> p.85
>>
>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I
>> don't think
>> a reference is given.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>> natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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