[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Mon Jan 11 04:17:56 PST 2016
No all the science-related meanings are derived from either
Integral of f(x) * (x to power n). Torque is related to
angular momentum which is an integral of mass* distance from
axis.
The interpreation this leads to is that each "moment"
expresses a property of the whole function. A function can
be represented either by a series of values for each x, or
by the series of moments. The zero-th moment is the total
mass, the first moment is the "torque". Higher moments arise
when you are dealing with flexible systems, or dynamic
systems with inertia.
YOu also get the term arising with power series, I think,
which is a kind of inverse of the above.
yada yada yada,
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 11/01/2016 11:08 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote:
> Is torque being used here in the sense that the moon
> influences the tides? E.g. conceiving stages as pendulum
> like things that, when, considered together may appear as
> 'torque' applied to a base form. If so, then perhaps the
> meaning may be the same overall, i.e. a moment from one
> aspect appearing as torque in another.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 11 January 2016 at 01:59, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense
> 9. "moment" means "An essential element or significant
> aspect of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a
> translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as
> "torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word
> play going on there, yes?
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>
> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still
> working on the phenomenology of the usage. I think
> the form of part-whole relation is what is at
> issue and "moments" in this sense are
> qualitatively distinct, marked, events. Events
> whose conventional meaning is torqued by the
> exception.
>
> still learning!
> mike
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> I am not at all clear about the context here,
> Mike.
> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
> thought should have been "instants" and then David
> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
> which was the subject of my comment.
>
> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and
> found that
> all bar one instance of the use of the word
> "moment"
> were in the sense of "at this moment in the
> story ..."
> The one odd reference is this one:
>
> "We have consistently taken a genetic
> approach to the
> analysis of our problem. We have, however,
> attempted to
> represent the *moments* of this genetic
> process in
> their
> mature, classic forms. The inevitable
> result is that we
> have diverged from the complex and twisting
> path that
> characterizes the actual development of the
> child’s
> concepts."
>
> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with
> "moment" here
> to the distinct modes of conception which were
> manifested in the child's activity, at different
> stages, but which are combined in the most
> developed
> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
> Perhaps their *first appearance* in
> ontogenesis could
> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly,
> but it
> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
> association as "moments" of concept formation
> in the
> other sense of the word "moment" which is not
> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't
> say for
> sure.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>
> The theoretical point seems interesting
> and worth
> clarifying. The differing interpretations have
> quite different implications.
> mike
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>>> wrote:
>
> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment"
> as meaning a
> stage, phase or step, David. He tends
> to use
> phase,
> category, stage or division for those
> concepts.
>
> Individual, Particular and Universal
> are typical
> examples of "moments" but these are
> not steps,
> phases
> or stages of the concepts, even though
> they
> are also
> exhibited in this way. Every concrete
> concept
> has all
> three moments. In a trade union, the
> members, the
> branches/divisions and the general
> secretary are
> individual, universal and particular
> moments. We
> cannot conceive of a union developing
> from an
> individual to a branch to a general
> secretary,
> can we?
>
> I will look into the origins of this
> expression. I
> have always just presumed it came from
> mathematics, as
> in the first, second, third, ...
> moments of a
> function, and I know Hegel did study this
> branch of
> mathematics, because he gives a lot of
> space
> to it in
> the Science of Logic in his critique of
> calculus. But
> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg
> wrote:
>
> Huw:
>
> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
> more often
> "moments", and the word
> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
> phase, or a
> step (as in the three
> "moments" of the formation of the
> concept in
> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
> others", "for myself".
>
> One of the most difficult problems
> we had
> to solve
> in translating the
> Lectures on Pedology was that
> Vygotsky very
> clearly distinguishes three
> moments of speech development:
> indicative,
> nominative, and signifying.
> "Indicative" is often non-verbal,
> e.g. a
> pointing
> gesture. "Nominating" is
> ipso facto verbal, because it is
> the naming
> function: "every thing has a
> name". But "signifying" is much
> harder to pin
> down, and in one place
> Vygotsky actually says that it is
> synonymous with
> the adult understanding
> that anything can be named. So
> what is the
> difference between knowing that
> everything has a name and the
> knowledge
> that any
> thing can be named?
>
> I think that the distinction is
> just as
> subtle and
> just as significant
> as the distinction between pointing to
> something
> with a gesture, pointing
> to something with a word like
> "this" or
> "that",
> and pointing to something
> with a word like "apple" or
> "pear". If I
> say that
> "everything has a name",
> the name could be extremely general
> ("everything"
> or "thing") or it could
> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
> computer"). But
> I don't yet have the
> idea that names are invented, and that
> therefore
> it is possible to name
> objects which do not exist, and
> therefore
> to bring
> into existence modes of
> pure abstract thinking through
> language.
> That's
> signifying, and it is
> indeed a new moment, or a new
> instant, in the
> lifelong process of speech
> development.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM,
> Huw Lloyd
> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
> wrote:
>
> Thank you, David. That helps
> to explain a
> particular aspect that I thought
> Vygotsky was overlooking in
> the narrative,
> which is that stimuli can not
> only signify but also
> symbolise, i.e. they
> afford the kind of dynamics you
> have elucidated from Volkelt's
> schema.
>
> I have also noted that the
> translation of
> phrases like "instances of a
> process" is probably off the mark
> too. What
> is really meant, I believe, is
> "instants of a process".
> These have two
> rather different meanings from the
> perspective of thinking about
> processes.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02,
> David Kellogg
> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
>
> Huw:
>
> Here's what Vygotsky
> really says:
>
> Если задача не превышает
> естественных сил
> ребенка, он справляется с ней
> непосредственным или
> примитивным
> способом.
> В этих случаях структура его
> поведения совершенно
> напоминает схему,
> нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>
> (Russian
>
> Collected Works, p. 117).
>
> This means (as nearly as I can
> make out):
> "If the task did not go beyond
> the natural capability of the
> child, he
> could deal with it in an
>
> unmediated
>
> or primitive method. In this
> cases, the
> structure of his behavior
> would
>
> be
>
> completely similar to the
> scheme as
> presented by Volkelt".
>
> I think there is no
> diagramme, at
> least
> not in the sense of a two
> dimensional graphic one
> can have a
> copy
> of. What Vygotsky is
> referring to
> is Volkelt's attempt to
> explain
> all child
> behavior as the result of an
> affectively tinged FUSION of
> perception
> and behavior, an affectively
> colored, unanalyzable,
> whole in which
> perception and behavior were
> absolutely inseparable.
> This was
> what Hans
> Volkelt concluded from a
>
> series
>
> of experiments that
> Vygotsky refers to
> repeatedly, both in HDHMF
> and in
>
> the
>
> Lectures on Pedology and
> elswhere.
>
> What Volkelt did was this:
> he had four
> baby bottles: one shaped
> like a
> triangle, one like a
> violin, one
> like a
> square, etc. They were all
> different colors as well.
> But three of
> them didn't have holes in the
>
> teat:
>
> you could see and smell
> the milk
> but you
> couldn't drink it. One did. He
> taught the infants to
> associate the
> drinking of milk and the
> feeling of
> satiation with one particular
> bottle, so
> that they would actually
> ignore
> the bottle unless it had
> all the
> characteristics:
> triangularity,
>
> blueness,
>
> etc. So Volkelt argued
> that from the
> child's point of view, he
> was not
> drinking milk but
> triangular blue
> milk.
> This kind of "affectively
> colored
> whole" is what Vygotsky
> refers to as
> "Volkelt's scheme", or
> "Volkelt's
> schemata".
>
> Volkelt's scheme came to a
> bad end. He
> eventually decided that we
> never
> grow out of unanalyzable
> affectively
> colored
> perception-behavior wholes,
> and this would explain the
> indivisible and
> inseparable devotion of the
> German volk to their
> Fuhrer. So in
> later
> work Vygotsky is very
> careful to
> distance himself from
> Volkelt even
> in his
> explanations of infant
>
> behavior:
>
> in the Lectures on Pedology he
> argues that
> ALL THREE layers of behavior
> (that is, instinct, habit, and
> intelligence) are present
> in infancy.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at
> 10:50 PM,
> Huw Lloyd
> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>
>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>>
> wrote:
>
> Does anyone have a copy of
> "Volkelt's
> diagram" to hand that
> is referred
>
> to
>
> in The History of the
> Development of
> Higher Mental
> Functions (1997,
>
> p.85
>
> and onwards in ch. 4)? I
> don't think
> a reference is given.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
> natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
> natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>
>
>
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