[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
mike cole
mcole@ucsd.edu
Sun Jan 10 18:11:28 PST 2016
just cole's intuitions as enacted at a crucial juncture by his fingers.
mike
On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:59 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9. "moment" means "An
> essential element or significant aspect of a complex conceptual entity"
> first used in a translation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
> But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as "torque," so I guess
> that exposes a bit of Cole word play going on there, yes?
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
>
>> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working on the
>> phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of part-whole relation is what
>> is at issue and "moments" in this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked,
>> events. Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the exception.
>>
>> still learning!
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
>> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
>> thought should have been "instants" and then David
>> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
>> which was the subject of my comment.
>>
>> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
>> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
>> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
>> The one odd reference is this one:
>>
>> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
>> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
>> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
>> their
>> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
>> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
>> characterizes the actual development of the child’s
>> concepts."
>>
>> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
>> to the distinct modes of conception which were
>> manifested in the child's activity, at different
>> stages, but which are combined in the most developed
>> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
>> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
>> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
>> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
>> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
>> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
>> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
>> association as "moments" of concept formation in the
>> other sense of the word "moment" which is not
>> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
>> sure.
>>
>> Andy
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>>
>> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
>> clarifying. The differing interpretations have
>> quite different implications.
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
>> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
>>
>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>>
>> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
>> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
>> phase,
>> category, stage or division for those concepts.
>>
>> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
>> examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
>> phases
>> or stages of the concepts, even though they
>> are also
>> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
>> has all
>> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
>> branches/divisions and the general secretary are
>> individual, universal and particular moments. We
>> cannot conceive of a union developing from an
>> individual to a branch to a general secretary,
>> can we?
>>
>> I will look into the origins of this expression. I
>> have always just presumed it came from
>> mathematics, as
>> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
>> function, and I know Hegel did study this
>> branch of
>> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
>> to it in
>> the Science of Logic in his critique of
>> calculus. But
>> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>>
>> Andy
>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>> *Andy Blunden*
>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>>
>> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>
>> Huw:
>>
>> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
>> more often
>> "moments", and the word
>> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
>> phase, or a
>> step (as in the three
>> "moments" of the formation of the concept in
>> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
>> others", "for myself".
>>
>> One of the most difficult problems we had
>> to solve
>> in translating the
>> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
>> clearly distinguishes three
>> moments of speech development: indicative,
>> nominative, and signifying.
>> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
>> pointing
>> gesture. "Nominating" is
>> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
>> function: "every thing has a
>> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
>> down, and in one place
>> Vygotsky actually says that it is
>> synonymous with
>> the adult understanding
>> that anything can be named. So what is the
>> difference between knowing that
>> everything has a name and the knowledge
>> that any
>> thing can be named?
>>
>> I think that the distinction is just as
>> subtle and
>> just as significant
>> as the distinction between pointing to
>> something
>> with a gesture, pointing
>> to something with a word like "this" or
>> "that",
>> and pointing to something
>> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
>> say that
>> "everything has a name",
>> the name could be extremely general
>> ("everything"
>> or "thing") or it could
>> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
>> computer"). But
>> I don't yet have the
>> idea that names are invented, and that
>> therefore
>> it is possible to name
>> objects which do not exist, and therefore
>> to bring
>> into existence modes of
>> pure abstract thinking through language.
>> That's
>> signifying, and it is
>> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
>> lifelong process of speech
>> development.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
>> particular aspect that I thought
>> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
>> which is that stimuli can not
>> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
>> afford the kind of dynamics you
>> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>>
>> I have also noted that the translation of
>> phrases like "instances of a
>> process" is probably off the mark
>> too. What
>> is really meant, I believe, is
>> "instants of a process". These have two
>> rather different meanings from the
>> perspective of thinking about processes.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
>> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
>>
>> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>
>> Huw:
>>
>> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>>
>> Если задача не превышает
>> естественных сил
>> ребенка, он справляется с ней
>> непосредственным или примитивным
>> способом.
>> В этих случаях структура его
>> поведения совершенно напоминает схему,
>> нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>>
>> (Russian
>>
>> Collected Works, p. 117).
>>
>> This means (as nearly as I can
>> make out):
>> "If the task did not go beyond
>> the natural capability of the
>> child, he
>> could deal with it in an
>>
>> unmediated
>>
>> or primitive method. In this
>> cases, the
>> structure of his behavior would
>>
>> be
>>
>> completely similar to the scheme as
>> presented by Volkelt".
>>
>> I think there is no diagramme, at
>> least
>> not in the sense of a two
>> dimensional graphic one can have a
>> copy
>> of. What Vygotsky is referring to
>> is Volkelt's attempt to explain
>> all child
>> behavior as the result of an
>> affectively tinged FUSION of
>> perception
>> and behavior, an affectively
>> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which
>> perception and behavior were
>> absolutely inseparable. This was
>> what Hans
>> Volkelt concluded from a
>>
>> series
>>
>> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
>> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>>
>> the
>>
>> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>>
>> What Volkelt did was this: he had four
>> baby bottles: one shaped like a
>> triangle, one like a violin, one
>> like a
>> square, etc. They were all
>> different colors as well. But three of
>> them didn't have holes in the
>>
>> teat:
>>
>> you could see and smell the milk
>> but you
>> couldn't drink it. One did. He
>> taught the infants to associate the
>> drinking of milk and the feeling of
>> satiation with one particular
>> bottle, so
>> that they would actually ignore
>> the bottle unless it had all the
>> characteristics: triangularity,
>>
>> blueness,
>>
>> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
>> child's point of view, he was not
>> drinking milk but triangular blue
>> milk.
>> This kind of "affectively colored
>> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
>> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
>> schemata".
>>
>> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
>> eventually decided that we never
>> grow out of unanalyzable affectively
>> colored perception-behavior wholes,
>> and this would explain the
>> indivisible and
>> inseparable devotion of the
>> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
>> later
>> work Vygotsky is very careful to
>> distance himself from Volkelt even
>> in his
>> explanations of infant
>>
>> behavior:
>>
>> in the Lectures on Pedology he
>> argues that
>> ALL THREE layers of behavior
>> (that is, instinct, habit, and
>> intelligence) are present in infancy.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
>> Huw Lloyd
>> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
>> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Does anyone have a copy of
>> "Volkelt's
>> diagram" to hand that is referred
>>
>> to
>>
>> in The History of the
>> Development of
>> Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>>
>> p.85
>>
>> and onwards in ch. 4)? I
>> don't think
>> a reference is given.
>>
>> Best,
>> Huw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
>> natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
--
It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural science with an
object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
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