[Xmca-l] Re: Volkelt's diagram (LSV's HMF Vol 4)
Andy Blunden
ablunden@mira.net
Sun Jan 10 17:59:36 PST 2016
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in sense 9.
"moment" means "An essential element or significant aspect
of a complex conceptual entity" first used in a translation
of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in 1838.
But the OED also refers to "moment" in meaning 8c as
"torque," so I guess that exposes a bit of Cole word play
going on there, yes?
Andy
------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
On 11/01/2016 12:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
> I found Martin's blog entry helpful, Andy. Still working
> on the phenomenology of the usage. I think the form of
> part-whole relation is what is at issue and "moments" in
> this sense are qualitatively distinct, marked, events.
> Events whose conventional meaning is torqued by the
> exception.
>
> still learning!
> mike
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 5:29 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>
> I am not at all clear about the context here, Mike.
> Huw mentioned Vygotsky using "instances" which he
> thought should have been "instants" and then David
> introduced "moments" and Hegel's use of "moments,"
> which was the subject of my comment.
>
> I did a search of "Thinking and Speech" and found that
> all bar one instance of the use of the word "moment"
> were in the sense of "at this moment in the story ..."
> The one odd reference is this one:
>
> "We have consistently taken a genetic approach to the
> analysis of our problem. We have, however, attempted to
> represent the *moments* of this genetic process in
> their
> mature, classic forms. The inevitable result is that we
> have diverged from the complex and twisting path that
> characterizes the actual development of the child’s
> concepts."
>
> It is possible that Vygotsky refers with "moment" here
> to the distinct modes of conception which were
> manifested in the child's activity, at different
> stages, but which are combined in the most developed
> pseudoconcept. It is a fact that associative
> complexes, collection complexes, chain complexes,
> diffuse complexes, and pseudocomplexes could not
> possibly manifest themselves as successive stages.
> Perhaps their *first appearance* in ontogenesis could
> form some kind of regular sequence, possibly, but it
> is also possible that Vygotsky saw these forms of
> association as "moments" of concept formation in the
> other sense of the word "moment" which is not
> interchangeable with "instant". But I couldn't say for
> sure.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> On 11/01/2016 11:23 AM, mike cole wrote:
>
> The theoretical point seems interesting and worth
> clarifying. The differing interpretations have
> quite different implications.
> mike
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden
> <ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
>
> Actually, Hegel does not use "moment" as meaning a
> stage, phase or step, David. He tends to use
> phase,
> category, stage or division for those concepts.
>
> Individual, Particular and Universal are typical
> examples of "moments" but these are not steps,
> phases
> or stages of the concepts, even though they
> are also
> exhibited in this way. Every concrete concept
> has all
> three moments. In a trade union, the members, the
> branches/divisions and the general secretary are
> individual, universal and particular moments. We
> cannot conceive of a union developing from an
> individual to a branch to a general secretary,
> can we?
>
> I will look into the origins of this expression. I
> have always just presumed it came from
> mathematics, as
> in the first, second, third, ... moments of a
> function, and I know Hegel did study this
> branch of
> mathematics, because he gives a lot of space
> to it in
> the Science of Logic in his critique of
> calculus. But
> I am probably quite wrong. I'll check.
>
> Andy
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
> <http://home.pacific.net.au/%7Eandy/>
>
> On 11/01/2016 4:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
> Huw:
>
> Yes, Vygotsky uses "instants" and even
> more often
> "moments", and the word
> "moment" sometimes means a stage, or a
> phase, or a
> step (as in the three
> "moments" of the formation of the concept in
> Hegel, as in "in itself", "for
> others", "for myself".
>
> One of the most difficult problems we had
> to solve
> in translating the
> Lectures on Pedology was that Vygotsky very
> clearly distinguishes three
> moments of speech development: indicative,
> nominative, and signifying.
> "Indicative" is often non-verbal, e.g. a
> pointing
> gesture. "Nominating" is
> ipso facto verbal, because it is the naming
> function: "every thing has a
> name". But "signifying" is much harder to pin
> down, and in one place
> Vygotsky actually says that it is
> synonymous with
> the adult understanding
> that anything can be named. So what is the
> difference between knowing that
> everything has a name and the knowledge
> that any
> thing can be named?
>
> I think that the distinction is just as
> subtle and
> just as significant
> as the distinction between pointing to
> something
> with a gesture, pointing
> to something with a word like "this" or
> "that",
> and pointing to something
> with a word like "apple" or "pear". If I
> say that
> "everything has a name",
> the name could be extremely general
> ("everything"
> or "thing") or it could
> be highly specific ("Huw" or "this
> computer"). But
> I don't yet have the
> idea that names are invented, and that
> therefore
> it is possible to name
> objects which do not exist, and therefore
> to bring
> into existence modes of
> pure abstract thinking through language.
> That's
> signifying, and it is
> indeed a new moment, or a new instant, in the
> lifelong process of speech
> development.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Huw Lloyd
> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
> wrote:
>
> Thank you, David. That helps to explain a
> particular aspect that I thought
> Vygotsky was overlooking in the narrative,
> which is that stimuli can not
> only signify but also symbolise, i.e. they
> afford the kind of dynamics you
> have elucidated from Volkelt's schema.
>
> I have also noted that the translation of
> phrases like "instances of a
> process" is probably off the mark
> too. What
> is really meant, I believe, is
> "instants of a process". These have two
> rather different meanings from the
> perspective of thinking about processes.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
> On 10 January 2016 at 06:02, David Kellogg
> <dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com
> <mailto:dkellogg60@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>
> Huw:
>
> Here's what Vygotsky really says:
>
> Если задача не превышает
> естественных сил
> ребенка, он справляется с ней
> непосредственным или примитивным
> способом.
> В этих случаях структура его
> поведения совершенно напоминает схему,
> нарисованную Фолькельтом.
>
> (Russian
>
> Collected Works, p. 117).
>
> This means (as nearly as I can
> make out):
> "If the task did not go beyond
> the natural capability of the
> child, he
> could deal with it in an
>
> unmediated
>
> or primitive method. In this
> cases, the
> structure of his behavior would
>
> be
>
> completely similar to the scheme as
> presented by Volkelt".
>
> I think there is no diagramme, at
> least
> not in the sense of a two
> dimensional graphic one can have a
> copy
> of. What Vygotsky is referring to
> is Volkelt's attempt to explain
> all child
> behavior as the result of an
> affectively tinged FUSION of
> perception
> and behavior, an affectively
> colored, unanalyzable, whole in which
> perception and behavior were
> absolutely inseparable. This was
> what Hans
> Volkelt concluded from a
>
> series
>
> of experiments that Vygotsky refers to
> repeatedly, both in HDHMF and in
>
> the
>
> Lectures on Pedology and elswhere.
>
> What Volkelt did was this: he had four
> baby bottles: one shaped like a
> triangle, one like a violin, one
> like a
> square, etc. They were all
> different colors as well. But three of
> them didn't have holes in the
>
> teat:
>
> you could see and smell the milk
> but you
> couldn't drink it. One did. He
> taught the infants to associate the
> drinking of milk and the feeling of
> satiation with one particular
> bottle, so
> that they would actually ignore
> the bottle unless it had all the
> characteristics: triangularity,
>
> blueness,
>
> etc. So Volkelt argued that from the
> child's point of view, he was not
> drinking milk but triangular blue
> milk.
> This kind of "affectively colored
> whole" is what Vygotsky refers to as
> "Volkelt's scheme", or "Volkelt's
> schemata".
>
> Volkelt's scheme came to a bad end. He
> eventually decided that we never
> grow out of unanalyzable affectively
> colored perception-behavior wholes,
> and this would explain the
> indivisible and
> inseparable devotion of the
> German volk to their Fuhrer. So in
> later
> work Vygotsky is very careful to
> distance himself from Volkelt even
> in his
> explanations of infant
>
> behavior:
>
> in the Lectures on Pedology he
> argues that
> ALL THREE layers of behavior
> (that is, instinct, habit, and
> intelligence) are present in infancy.
>
> David Kellogg
> Macquarie University
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 9, 2016 at 10:50 PM,
> Huw Lloyd
> <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> <mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>>
> wrote:
>
> Does anyone have a copy of
> "Volkelt's
> diagram" to hand that is referred
>
> to
>
> in The History of the
> Development of
> Higher Mental Functions (1997,
>
> p.85
>
> and onwards in ch. 4)? I
> don't think
> a reference is given.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a
> natural science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal as a natural
> science with an
> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch
>
>
>
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