[Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po russkii

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

I am curious about perspective taking as sociocultural and how the
sociocultural relates to the intersubjective.

For example bildung can be translated as *culture* and *cultivated*
[sociocultural]
Within *bildung* is the root *bild* which translates to form, image, and in
particular *picture* [perspective]

Cultivation is a process [systems metaphor] or a product of *forming* the
self in accordance with an *image or picture* [representations]

The interrelations of ur-bild [original], vor-bild [model], ab-bild [copy],
bild [picture] and ein-bild-dungskraft [imagination] within
inter-subjective perspective-taking that is related to bild-ung [socio
cultural]

Also in German are two distinct meanings of *experience*.

erlebnis = experience AS moments lived in immediacy
erfahrung = experience AS related to other persons and to our cultural
historical past. This KIND of experience is intersubjective and mediated as
an ongoing developmental process which is a process of overturning an
existing perspective [picture or image] which is not simply *knowledge* [as
adding information] but develops *culture*

Erlebnis is experience that you *have* [possess].
Erfahrung is experience you undergo so subjectivity is mediated and DRAWN
INTO AN EVENT of meaning. [socio cultural]
Erlebnis is experienceS [plural] the subject possesses whereas *erfahung*
is normally singular [experience OF an event] .

I'm not sure how these terms get translated into Russian, but they seem to
be linked to *character formation* and also to notions of the *will* as
intentional and directed.

Greg, this returns us to the conversation on *recognition* and the notion
that we must *claim* recognition* [assertive, possessive finding one's
*voice*  as possessive will] and a more *dialogical notion of *inviting*
the other into *voice*  [hearing the other into voice].
These alternative notions of *character* formation as *bild* [perspective
taking] do seem to be distinct attitudes towards *will* as possessive
[something we HAVE] or *will* as cultivated and imagined as developing
through mediated events which we *undergo*.

My final reflection is on the concept of *zone* of proximal development.
Is it possible to reflect on *zone* AS an analogy for *clearing*
[heidegger] or *holding environment* [Winnicott]. This *zone* is a
*space* [erfahrung] of shared *perspective* taking. THIS is a place or
event of reciprocal development. It is not merely *developing* concepts or
knowledge but is *developing* ways of life WITHIN the zone of proximal
development. Our relation to *possessive will* is *developed* within these
*zones* of proximal [intimate] development.
Larry






On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 5:19 PM, <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Charles, and I. Addition to getting smith via Hegel, pretty certain that
> mead would have had fairly direct contact with smith's looking glass theory
> of the self (from Theory of MorAl Sentiments) from Charles Horton Cooley
> (who is often cited as the origi ator of the looking glass theory of the
> self). Is the looking glass theory of the self an example of perspective
> taking?
> Still no closer to an answer to mikes original question!
> Greg
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Nov 30, 2013, at 4:14 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Yes, Charles, it is well known that Hegel read and admired the work of
> the political economists and he also gave prominant place to the Scots in
> his History of Philosophy, namely, Reid, Beattie, Oswald and Douglas
> Stewart.
> > And Mead wrote in a letter that his I/Me dialectic was based on Hegel.
> >
> > Andy
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> >
> >
> > Charles Bazerman wrote:
> >> Do any of you scholarly folk also know if there is a line of influence
> from the Scottish moralists to Hegel's views on perspective taking? Given
> the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on U.S. education, I wouldn't
> be  surprised if that work got to Mead as well.  Chuck
> >>
> >> ----- Original Message -----
> >> From: Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> >> Date: Saturday, November 30, 2013 1:27 pm
> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: intersubjectivity and perspective taking, po
> russkii
> >> To: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Mike,
> >>> Not so dumb, I would think, since this is a very central part of
> Hegel's
> >>> social ontology of the subject. (Too) Simply put, self-consciousness
> arises
> >>> from our awareness that others are subjects just like ourselves. Here
> is
> >>> what I take to be Hegel's description of perspective-taking:
> >>> "It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first
> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
> must
> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
> proceeds to
> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself."
> >>>
> >>> This is, of course, the second paragraph in the introduction to Hegel's
> >>> Master/Slave dialectic (all 5 paragraphs of the intro are below). In
> that
> >>> tale, perspective-taking fails b.c. although the slave takes the
> >>> perspective of the master, the master has no reason to take the
> perspective
> >>> of the slave. This is imperfect recognition and does not allow for the
> full
> >>> constitution (consummation, following Bakhtin) of the subjects as fully
> >>> self-conscious.
> >>>
> >>> [There is good evidence that this was part of G. H. Mead's inspiration
> in
> >>> his development of perspective taking (but this is both debatable and,
> to
> >>> my mind, of little consequence).]
> >>>
> >>> I also wonder if some variant of perspective taking can be found in
> Marx's
> >>> early concept of species being, or perhaps in the idea of the
> relations of
> >>> persons one to another. It would seem that Marx's writings on the
> commodity
> >>> fetish are precisely a problem of perspective taking - the individual
> >>> participants no longer see that there are others who are full and rich
> >>> individuals like themselves; instead, other people become tools for
> >>> accomplishing MY aims. And it is this that communism is supposed to
> >>> reconcile - bringing all people into a deep appreciation of not just
> our
> >>> deep dependence upon one another, but also of our universal kinship,
> i.e.
> >>> our "mutuality of being" as Rupert Stasch has so eloquently put it.
> >>> Mutuality of being requires an understanding that other people are
> "just
> >>> like us".
> >>> Isn't that perspective taking?
> >>>
> >>> But I have no clue how or in what linguistic forms this would have
> made its
> >>> way from Hegel's and Marx's German to Vygotsky's Russian (if at
> all...).
> >>> -greg
> >>> p.s. psychological anthropologist Doug Hollan has been seriously
> looking
> >>> into "empathy" along with fellow psyc anth scholar C. Jason Throop.
> One of
> >>> Doug's pieces is listed in the email that just I'll forward in just a
> >>> minute to XMCA.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Full text of paras 179-184 from Phenomenology of Spirit:
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 179 <
> >>> . Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has
> come
> >>> outside itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its
> own
> >>> self, since it finds itself as an *other* being; secondly, it has
> thereby
> >>> sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as essentially
> real,
> >>> but sees its own self in the other.
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 180 <
> >>> . It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that
> first
> >>> double meaning, and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it
> must
> >>> set itself to sublate the other independent being, in order thereby to
> >>> become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it thereupon
> proceeds to
> >>> sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 181 <
> >>> . This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense
> is at
> >>> the same time a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly,
> >>> through sublation, it gets back itself, because it becomes one with
> itself
> >>> again through the cancelling of *its *otherness; but secondly, it
> likewise
> >>> gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was
> >>> aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the
> other and
> >>> thus lets the other again go free.
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 182 <
> >>> . This process of self-consciousness in relation to another
> >>> self-consciousness has in this manner been represented as the action
> of one
> >>> alone. But this action on the part of the one has itself the double
> >>> significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
> other
> >>> as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself,
> and
> >>> there is nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first
> does
> >>> not have the object before it only in the passive form characteristic
> >>> primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
> independently
> >>> for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for
> its own
> >>> behalf, if that object does not *per se *do what the first does to it.
> The
> >>> process then is absolutely the double process of both
> self-consciousnesses.
> >>> Each sees the other do the same as itself; each itself does what it
> demands
> >>> on the part of the other, and for that reason does what it does, only
> so
> >>> far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
> useless,
> >>> because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 183 <
> >>> . The action has then a *double entente* not only in the sense that it
> is
> >>> an act done to itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense
> that
> >>> the act *simpliciter* is the act of the one as well as of the other
> >>> regardless of their distinction.
> >>>
> >>> Φ <
> >>> 184 <
> >>> . In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as
> the
> >>> play of forces; in the present case, however, it is found in
> consciousness.
> >>> What in the former had effect only for us [contemplating experience],
> holds
> >>> here for the terms themselves. The middle term is self-consciousness
> which
> >>> breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme is this
> interchange of
> >>> its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
> While
> >>> *qua* consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being
> >>> outside itself, it is at the same time restrained within itself, it
> exists
> >>> for itself, and its self-externalization is for consciousness.
> >>> *Consciousness *finds that it immediately is and is not another
> >>> consciousness, as also that this other is for itself only when it
> cancels
> >>> itself as existing for itself , and has self-existence only in the
> >>> self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
> >>> through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is
> to
> >>> itself and to the other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at
> the
> >>> same time, exists thus for itself only through this mediation. They
> >>> recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 10:08 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Hi Larry-- You are almost certainly way ahead of me on these issues.
> >>> My
> >>>
> >>>> interest at present is on the development of social and relational
> >>>> perspective taking. From, say, a Vygotskian, or Bakhtinian point of
> >>> view
> >>>
> >>>> (perspective!) what are the socio-cultural contributions to
> interpersonal
> >>>> understanding that we associated with psychological perspective
> taking,
> >>>> perhaps just the ability to "stand in someone else's shoes"? Empathy
> >>> has to
> >>>
> >>>> be one potential contributor, and...... (in the Russian traditionS
> >>> we often
> >>>
> >>>> discuss)?
> >>>>
> >>>> Perhaps just a really dumb question. Wouldn't be the first time!!
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Sat, Nov 30, 2013 at 6:37 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>> Mike,
> >>>>> I am wondering if you could expand on your question that is
> >>> referring to
> >>>
> >>>>> perspective taking and its possible meanings. I believe this
> >>> question of
> >>>
> >>>>> perspective taking is also converging with your other question on
> >>> *kinds*
> >>>
> >>>>> or *types* of persons. [personhood like childhood]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I am asking for more clarity on your *bad question* which seems to
> >>> be
> >>>
> >>>>> central to the multiple discourses on *sociocultural* theory and
> practice
> >>>>> This *space* or *zone* of  questioning which opens up a clearing
> >>> for the
> >>>
> >>>>> multiple notions of the concept *intersubjectivity* and its
> convergence
> >>>>> with the concept of *perspective-taking* and how this topic is
> explored
> >>>> in
> >>>>
> >>>>> Russian translation is a topic I want to explore further.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I wanted to offer a quote which I found interesting exploring
> >>> notions of
> >>>
> >>>>> *identity* AS KINDS [categories]
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Oakeshott argues that "This distinction, then, between 'goings-on'
> >>>>> identified as themselves
> >>>>>
> >>>>> exhibitions of intelligence and 'goings-on' which may be made
> >>>> intelligible
> >>>>
> >>>>> but are not themselves
> >>>>>
> >>>>> intelligent, is not a distinction between mental and physical or
> between
> >>>>> minds and bodies regarded
> >>>>>
> >>>>> as entities. It is a distinction within the engagement of
> understanding,
> >>>> a
> >>>>
> >>>>> distinction between
> >>>>>
> >>>>> 'sciences' (that is, ideal characters) and the identities with
> >>> which they
> >>>
> >>>>> are concerned. And in
> >>>>>
> >>>>> calling it a categorial distinction what is being asserted is that
> >>> the
> >>>
> >>>>> understanding of identities
> >>>>>
> >>>>> recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence cannot be
> 'reduced'
> >>>>> to the understanding of
> >>>>>
> >>>>> identities no so recognized", *On Human Conduct*, pp. 14-15.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I was intrigued by Oakeshott's understanding of *sciences*
> >>> [multiple] AS
> >>>
> >>>>> RESPRESENTING IDEAL KINDS [categorical distinctions]. This realm
> >>> of KINDS
> >>>
> >>>>> AS perspective taking moves the question of intersubjectivity to
> converge
> >>>>> with *culture* and *history*.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I will pause, but this topic is endlessly fascinating.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Larry Purss
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Fri, Nov 29, 2013 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Dear Russian experts on XMCA
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I have been reading about the development of intersubjectivity and
> >>>>>> perspective taking, including an article by scholars who say they
> >>> are
> >>>
> >>>>>> working in the "sociocultural perspective." It got me to
> >>> wondering how
> >>>
> >>>>>> Russian scholars discuss these topics. No Russians are cited in the
> >>>> work I
> >>>>
> >>>>>> am reading, but Mead and
> >>>>>> Piaget.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> When looking at suggested translations into Russian from English
> >>> for
> >>>
> >>>> these
> >>>>
> >>>>>> terms, the cognate
> >>>>>> perspectiv seems to appear almost everywhere. The phrase for
> >>> "point of
> >>>
> >>>>>> view" is literally that,
> >>>>>> tochka-point  zreniya-seeing, genetive case.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I figure I am blind to something obvious here, but darned if I
> >>> know what
> >>>
> >>>>>> it
> >>>>>> is. Any help out there??
> >>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> P
> >>>>>> S-- Eugene wrote an interesting article in MCA a while back on
> >>>>>> intersubjectivity and there are Vygotsky
> >>>>>> refs but they do not seem to go to the question I am asking.
> >>> Perhaps its
> >>>
> >>>>>> just my bad question!
> >>>
> >>> --
> >>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> >>> Visiting Assistant Professor
> >>> Department of Anthropology
> >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> >>> Brigham Young University
> >>> Provo, UT 84602
> >>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>
>
Status: O