[Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community"

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Charles,
And this returns us to Mike and Sylvia's "The Psychology of Literacy" and
their introductory chapter. This book  [along with David Olson's project
exploring the world on paper] was my introduction to CHAT.
If interested in this theme I recommend returning to the introduction of
this wonderful book.
Larry


On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 9:09 AM, Charles Bazerman <
bazerman@education.ucsb.edu> wrote:

> Absolutely.  At least considered from the perspective of writing, at least
> in the Mid-East invention (separate from  independent inventions in several
> other places).  It all started with stones used to count agricultural
> products, which then transformed into little clay pebbles of various
> shapes, into impressions on a clay matrix, into cuneiform letters. These
> little stones of no particular meaning to anybody had to come to have
> shared meanings for the objects to be able to use them for communicative
> purposes, and not just individual mnemonic purposes--but that too means
> assigning meaning to the object,; it is just not yet shared. In the
> practices of coming to share assigning meaning to ever more elaborate
> artfully produced signs among groups using texts in pursuit of their
> activities is the history of literacy.
> How is that for placing written language right in the heart of Vygotsky's
> and CHAT's experimental line?
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Date: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 10:00 pm
> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community"
> To: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>
> > Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of
> > "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the
> > word he
> > wanted to say, and thought,
> > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the
> > embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically
> > sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we
> > consider it, ART-i-ficial?
> >
> > perhaps?
> > mike
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> > > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared
> > > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive
> conclusion
> > > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities."
> > >
> > > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words
> > below:
> > > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that
> > we may
> > > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very
> > > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material
> > > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of
> > natural
> > > science is that matter exist independently of human activity,
> > obedient to
> > > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to
> > exist;
> > > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different
> > meanings to
> > > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human
> > > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of
> > it. This
> > > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal
> > > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a
> > > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the
> community.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > >
> > > Cliff O'Donnell wrote:
> > >
> > >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter,
> > or
> > >>> "unit of analysis" for a study;
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>     We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of
> > analysis we
> > >> use.
> > >>
> > >>  one would have to first select an artefact or combination of
> artefacts,
> > >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of
> > the said
> > >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not*
> > defined by
> > >>> shared *meanings*;
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>     So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings?
> > >>
> > >>  in fact, different components of the "community" may attach
> > >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol,
> > tool,
> > >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable.
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>     If community is defined by shared meanings, those with
> "diametrically
> > >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural
> > >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit).
> > >>
> > >>  But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever
> > way
> > >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts
> > is the
> > >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us
> > what is
> > >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one
> > and the
> > >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is
> > *individual* in
> > >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis.
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>     The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense
> > that
> > >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may
> > have very
> > >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite
> different
> > >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict.
> > >>
> > >>     Cliff
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > > --
> > >
> > >
>