Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice

[Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>]

Carol --

Certainly. And this difference has implications. For example: Learning.
When one learns a job that one does for art's sake, one learns it
differently (or is taught it differently) than when one learns a job for
the utilitarian motive of receiving money. Or, another example: social
context.  The place where one practices a job that one does for art's sake
is likely to be unregulated, whereas the place where one practices a job
that one does to earn money is going to be -- or is supposed to be
regulated. These regulations govern the relationship between the worker
and the person/s who employ him/her/. Etc.

Helena

On 3/27/13 9:40 PM, "Carol Macdonald" <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:

>Helena
>
>Andy points out in his book (An interdisciplinary theory of activity) that
>people may work for arts sake, but they may have a utilitarian motive for
>their work, for example working for the money. I think you may be in
>agreement with this.
>
>Carol
>
>On 28 March 2013 00:20, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Martin --
>>
>> Apologies for lurking, following by cryptic/petulant message.
>>
>> The point being that the same action can, depending on what activity
>> system you're looking at it from, mean two very different things. And
>>they
>> can be in conflict, ranging from a cool, subdued conflict, to a very hot
>> one. Specifically (since my interest lies in how people negotiated
>>decent
>> conditions of work), someone can be doing a job for the purpose of
>>earning
>> a living, and care not one whit about what the industry is (could be
>> weaving cloth, making bombs, dumping garbage pails in a restaurant,
>> grading papers). Or the person can be doing a job for the purpose of
>>doing
>> the job. Most studies of the workplace assume that people at work are
>> working for the purpose that the firm/company/enterprise/industry is set
>> up for. When they overlook the possibility that two very different,
>> sometimes conflicting activities are taking place (an activity system
>> defined by motive/purpose), then they can't discern how people are
>> feeling, how they're learning to do the job, how they're managing their
>> effort, etc etc.
>>
>> Thanks for asking.
>>
>> Helena
>>
>> On 3/27/13 1:42 PM, "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>
>> >Hi Helena,
>> >
>> >Which point are you referring to? There have been so many!
>> >
>> >Martin
>> >
>> >On Mar 27, 2013, at 1:13 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
>> >wrote:
>> >
>> >> Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study
>>work.
>> >>
>> >> Helena Worthen
>> >> Hworthen@illinois.edu
>> >>
>> >> On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
>> >> <manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Dear colleagues,
>> >>>
>> >>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
>>There
>> >>>are
>> >>> a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to
>> >>>follow
>> >>> all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to the
>> >>> following:
>> >>>
>> >>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
>> >>> activity.
>> >>>
>> >>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
>> >>>focused
>> >>> especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its
>>levels
>> >>>of
>> >>> activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to
>>goals
>> >>> and operations that are related to the conditions under which an
>>action
>> >>> is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated
>> >>>that
>> >>> my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the
>> >>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
>>of an
>> >>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
>>one
>> >>> action can realize different activities.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> May I quote Andy's words:
>> >>>
>> >>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have
>>to
>> >>>be
>> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
>> >>>success,
>> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
>>both
>> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>>is
>> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
>>an
>> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
>>""actions
>> >>> activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally
>>and
>> >>> externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's
>>furthering
>> >>> an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
>> >>> connection between action and activity, for both the
>> >>>observer/participant
>> >>> and the individual subject.
>> >>>
>> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
>>or
>> >>> intelligent infants, etc."
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
>>behavior.
>> >>> What's the goal?
>> >>>
>> >>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
>> >>>greet
>> >>> his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the
>> >>>activity?
>> >>>
>> >>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech
>>is a
>> >>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
>> >>>victory.
>> >>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
>> >>>there
>> >>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
>> >>>personally
>> >>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
>>he
>> >>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
>> >>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
>>societal
>> >>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal
>> >>> sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
>> >>>framed
>> >>> this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able
>>to
>> >>> fulfill the leadership.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
>>about
>> >>>an
>> >>> advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
>> >>>infants
>> >>> who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a
>>future
>> >>> state of affairs.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
>> >>>level
>> >>> in older children:
>> >>>
>> >>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
>> >>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
>> >>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
>> >>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
>> >>>desired
>> >>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
>>system
>> >>> which enables the person to evoke and  imagine a future state in the
>> >>>here
>> >>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
>>not
>> >>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
>>them
>> >>> and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play
>>that
>> >>> color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
>>striving
>> >>>for
>> >>> and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
>> >>>
>> >>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform
>> >>>them
>> >>> into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges
>>in
>> >>>a
>> >>> long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of
>> >>>goals
>> >>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
>> >>> children are
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
>>of an
>> >>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
>> >>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Best
>> >>>
>> >>> Manfred
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
>> >>>
>> >>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
>> >>>
>> >>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
>> >>>
>> >>> Fliednerstr. 21
>> >>>
>> >>> D-48149 Münster
>> >>>
>> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
>> >>>
>> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
>> >>>
>> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
>> >>>
>> >>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>> >>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>> >>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
>> >>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
>> >>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than
>> >>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
>> >>>
>> >>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So
>> >>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
>>how
>> >>> the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
>>Because
>> >>> motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
>> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
>> >>>success,
>> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
>>both
>> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
>>is
>> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
>>an
>> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
>>actions.
>> >>>It
>> >>> is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
>>success,
>> >>> etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it
>>is
>> >>> this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action
>>and
>> >>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
>>subject.
>> >>>
>> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
>>or
>> >>> intelligent infants, etc.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> It's all in there.
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> Andy
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> mike cole wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
>>were
>> >>>
>> >>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
>>views in
>> >>>
>> >>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important
>> >>>
>> >>>> for me to get clear about!
>> >>>
>> >>>> Mike
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>>    Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
>> >>>
>> >>>>    window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
>>the
>> >>>
>> >>>>    meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a
>>part,
>> >>>
>> >>>>    which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
>> >>>
>> >>>>    "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
>> >>>
>> >>>>    signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
>> >>>
>> >>>>    activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
>>activity -
>> >>>
>> >>>>    is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state
>>and
>> >>>
>> >>>>    intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
>> >>>
>> >>>>    fundamental.
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>>    Andy
>> >>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> __________________________________________
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>> >>
>> >>
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>
>
>
>-- 
>Carol A  Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
>Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
>Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
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