Monica Here are the articles by Tobias Schlicht & Evan Thompson Tobias describes 4 types of intentionality. The distinction between his 1st and 2nd types [dyadic intentionality & triadic joint attenion] I found helpful. However, reading Tobias 4th level, positing cognitive mental representations, can be challenged. Acquiring the skill of positing beliefs and desires ABOUT objects [as propositional] may not be internal cognitive mental activity [in the head] but actually be skillful "narrative compositions" ABOUT mental beliefs and desires. [ I can send articles by Daniel Hutto on this distinction, who is still working within an enactive model.] Monica, I'm also attaching Evan Thompson's first 60 pages of his new book *Mind In Life* which is extending his work with Varela and Rosch. I would be interested in others who may know more about the 3 types of phenomenology [static, genetic, and generative] as they may help me tease out the place of subjectivity and agency in cultural historical theory. Larry On Tue, Mar 20, 2012 at 12:07 PM, monica.hansen < monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote: > I am interested in the paper on enactive apporoach. Larry. Incidentally, > am working on a critical discourse analysis right now discussing use of > point of view as indication of agency in participants' poetry in content > literacy class. > > Consciousness and understanding are two very different phenomena. Of > course they are related in mental functioning, the how of it being still > much debated in scientific communities. Did anyone see the articles about > free will in yesterdays online Chronicle of Higher Ed? I have often > wondered if the initial focus of understanding learning shouldn't have been > aimed at attention all along, rather than what generally pass for higher > level cognitive abilities. The phenomenon we call attention is more messy > and less easily defined; it is also more inricately interwoven in aspects > of the social interrelationtionships, more so than aspects of the > individual (as consciousness is). The work being done on joint attention > then yields some interesting analyses at all ages. > > Monica > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on behalf > of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 11:20 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [xmca] 2nd person perspective > > Martin > > My understanding of Reddy's 2nd person approach is informed by my > understanding of the "enactive" approach to consciousness and > intentionality. > Infants are first aware that they are the focus of mother's intentional > directedness towards them. This experience of primary intersubjectivity > calls forth infant expressions that are intentionally directed at mother. > >From an enactve standpoint this context of "joint attention" is a form of > consciousness and is best characterized as an ACT of attending rather than > a form of information exchange. Focal attention is a continuous process > EXECUTED by a human agent at 2 months of age. The alternation of attention > between the object and the other subject is an active engagement involving > coordinated joint attention. > > Martin, within the theory of enactive embodied expression, sensorimotor > intentionality IS a form of consciousness because it is a form of ACTING > intentionally sharing joint attention. > The term *understanding* does not apply at this sensorimotor level of > agentic action [within enactive theory] > > The developmental emergence of 1st and 3rd person forms of intentionality > [and forms of consciousness] develop from being immersed in this 2nd person > *form of life*. > > Evan Thomson who worked with Varela suggests there 3 distinct approaches to > understanding phenomenology as it applies to enactive approches. > > 1] STATIC - consciousness constitutes [brings to awareness or discloses] > the world. Objects are taken as GIVEN synchronically. > 2] GENETIC - Intentional structures and objects EMERGE through time [NOT > given] For example HOW implicit and prereflective experiences develop > attentive and reflective experiences. Experience has a SEDIMENTED > structure in relation to the living body and time-consciousness. > 3] GENERATIVE - whereas for genetic phenomenology time-consciousness and > the lived body are key concepts, for generative phenomenology the guiding > thread is *the life world*. The focus shifts to our cultural, historical, > and intersubjective constitution of the human world. > > These ideas from E. Thompson are in his book "Mind In Life" > > If interested I can attach a 6 page article on "Enactive Social Cognition" > or the first chapter of E. Thompson's new book extending his work with > Varela and Rosch. > > Larry > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 2:26 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: > > > Larry, Rod, Monica et al. > > > > I've been reading Reddy's article, and while I think she's completely > > correct in her identification of a complex and subtle relatedness during > > the first year of life, or even the first months (I've always been a fan > of > > Colwyn Trevarthen's work), I'm having trouble getting some things clear. > > > > Reddy writes that "the self is emotionally aware of being an object to > > others before it is an object to itself." We are talking, then, about at > > least two forms of self-consciousness - namely consciousness of self as > an > > object to other people, plus consciousness of self as an object to > oneself. > > Add to that the consciousness that a child comes to have of self as an > > agent, a subject.... > > > > Recognition of self in a mirror seems to be Cs of self as an object, no? > > Secondary emotions such as shame would be evidence for Cs of self as an > > agent (and hence as having responsibility for some action or event) - or > > would they be evidence of Cs of self as an object in the eyes of others > > (who hold one accountable)? Or both? > > > > See, I'm hopelessly confused! Has anyone figured out Reddy's position? Or > > have a coherent account of when children acquire these different forms of > > Cs? Add to the mix the fact that for LSV the crisis at 12m is the child > > differentiating biologically from the mother, while the crisis at 30m is > > the child differentiating psychologically. Each of these is evidently a > new > > kind of self/other distinction. Do they align with Reddy's account? > > > > Martin > > > > On Mar 18, 2012, at 7:31 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > > David and Monica > > > > > > The central question is still how we get from empathy to objectivity; > > from > > > 2nd person to 3rd person perspectives. > > > > > > David, I will pause at the recognition that 2nd person lived experience > > may > > > be a basic form of experience and therefore a central mode of > interaction > > > throughout the life span. That re-cognition is a difference which may > > make > > > a difference. > > > > > > David, you wrote > > > > > > "Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists; > > > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely > > "you-me" > > > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of > > word > > > meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are > > > inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings upon > > > yourself." > > > > > > The last sentence, > > > "both are inextricably bound up with the activity of USING verbal > meaning > > > upon yourself." > > > > > > seems to be a central point. > > > > > > As I understand Wittgenstein he is making this exact point. Using > verbal > > > meanings is "another form" of interaction [distinct from 2nd person > > > engagements] that also follow specific rules of engagement. These 3rd > > > person narrative genres are culturally and historically situated and > > appeal > > > to our current notions of "common" sense. The "contents" used to > compose > > > these 3rd person narrative accounts that we learn to "tell ourselves" > use > > > 2nd person lived experiences as basic phenomena to be explained. > > > However, we come to confuse the 2nd person and 3rd person forms of life > > > which may actually evolve within different rules and patterns of > > > engagement. 2nd person and 3rd person perspectives may share a family > > > resemblance but not dentity. > > > > > > This in no way diminishes 1st person or 3rd person narratives. It is > > merely > > > an attempt to also draw attention to the basic ways 2nd person lived > > > experiences contribute to our compositions of forms of life. [Not unity > > but > > > composition which implies aggregates] 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person accounts > > > may intertwine but not within a systematic pre-determined sequence. > Each > > > type of account may follow its own path of development and whether 1st, > > > 2nd, or 3rd person perspectives are priviledged and legitimated may be > > > culturally and historically constituted. > > > > > > Very tentative speculations on my part but it does at least introduce > > some > > > doubt about 2nd person lived experience as possibly continuing to be a > > > central form of life throughout the life span. > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:42 PM, monica.hansen < > > > monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote: > > > > > >> I like what you write, David, at the end of this post. It is more > like a > > >> movie because multiple modes of perception and the experience of > > >> consciousness of self ARE more like a movie than a book. Images are > > >> multimodal, not just visual. They are direct links to our feelings and > > >> emotions. Words are just a subset of possible signs for meaning. > > >> > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu > ] > > On > > >> Behalf Of David Kellogg > > >> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 3:40 PM > > >> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings > > >> > > >> Larry: > > >> > > >> Three things I noticed in perusing the article: > > >> > > >> a) Like you, I noticed that the "you-me" relationship is "one possible > > >> perspective" on the development of reflected upon experience. > > >> > > >> b) But I also noticed, with faint annoyance, that the author seemed to > > be > > >> be claiming universality, despite clear evidence in her own data (e.g. > > >> "Show mommy the potty, Nanny") that her conclusion might be very child > > >> specific. > > >> > > >> c) I noticed, with some relief, a minimum of 'theory of mind" > > >> discussion. I guess we are finally getting it through our thick skulls > > that > > >> a theory of mind is going to develop as long as the mind that > > >> contemplates and the mind that is contemplated does so. > > >> > > >> Let's assume that Reddy is right, and that the "you-me" interaction is > > the > > >> essential source of all joint intersubjectivity in later life. That > > still > > >> leaves us an essential problem--and for Brecht, and for Chinese opera, > > as > > >> well as for my ruminations on murders witnessed but not experienced, > it > > is > > >> the essential problem--of how we get from empathy to objectivity, from > > the > > >> second to the third person. > > >> > > >> I think Rod is right. On the one hand, Vygotsky refers to word meaning > > as > > >> the microcosm of consciousness in the conclusion to "Thinking and > > Speech" > > >> and on the other he clearly lists "perizhvanie" as the unit of child > > >> consciousness in "The Problem of the Environment" (p. 342 of the > > Vygotsky > > >> Reader). > > >> > > >> Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists; > > >> neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely > > "you-me" > > >> relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of > > word > > >> meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are > > >> inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings > upon > > >> yourself. > > >> > > >> And that, to me, explains why when we observe some horrific incident > and > > >> we immediately notice, whether with relief or with guilt, the > > unmistakeable > > >> fact of our own non-involvement, we often say "It was just like a > movie" > > >> but we never say "It was just like a book". > > >> > > >> David Kellogg > > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >> > > >> > > >> --- On Sun, 3/18/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings > > >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> > > >> Date: Sunday, March 18, 2012, 6:23 AM > > >> > > >> > > >> Rod, David, Peter > > >> > > >> The relationship between perezhivanie and reflecting on *second hand* > > >> experience. How does this relationship manifest? What sequences > > unfold > > >> in this process. > > >> Rod, a year ago you recommended a book by V. Reddy who was exploring > the > > >> negotiation of feelings as well as understandings within what is > > referred > > >> to as primary intersubjectivity developing within 2nd person > > communicative > > >> expressions. > > >> > > >> I recently came across this 6 page summary of V. Reddy's *2nd person* > > >> perspective on lived experience as the basic process from which > emerges > > the > > >> derived 3rd person perspectives which are *borrowing* the processes > > >> previously lived through within 2nd person engagements. > > >> The article uses charts which clearly distinguish her perspective from > > >> more cognitively oriented accounts > > >> > > >>> From Reddy's perspective, these borrowed 2nd person processes are > > >> profoundly transformed within language games [Wittgenstein's term] > > >> acquired as culturally informed skilled practices expressing the > giving > > of > > >> reasons. Reddy posits the skill of offering justifications in the 3rd > > >> person as derived from 2nd person *I-YOU* encounters previously lived > > >> through. Derived justifications borrow the content from 2nd person > > lived > > >> through experiences and use this derived content within the activity > of > > >> giving reasons. > > >> > > >> I also noticed she posits two *basic* movements within our emotional > 2nd > > >> person engagements: *hiding* & *revealing* our selves. As I understand > > >> Reddy's position these basic intersubjective orientations continue to > > play > > >> out within more complex cultural-historical informed engagements. > > >> Reddy's 2nd person perspective offers one possible approach into the > > >> relationship between perhezivanie and activity. > > >> > > >> Larry > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees < > > >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > >> > > >>> Many thanks for this, David - a really valuable clarification of the > > >>> relationship between perezhivanie and activity. I wonder what you > > >>> would have to say about the extent to which your second type of > > >>> reflection is > > >>> actually a culturally mediated process of mediation. In other words, > > >>> when we practise the activity of reflecting on a 'second-hand' > > >>> experience, in order to colour it with the 'body and vitality' of > our > > >>> own spontaneous concepts, are we 'borrowing' processes which we have > > >>> picked up, absorbed or internalised from our experiences of > engaging > > >>> with others (and negotiating the sharing of feelings as well as > > >>> understandings)? When we reflect in tranquility on observed second > > >>> hand (second body) experiences do we not have to draw on > internalised > > >> sociocultural processes to be able to do this? > > >>> > > >>> All the best, > > >>> > > >>> Rod > > >>> ________________________________________ > > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > > >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com] > > >>> Sent: 18 March 2012 03:33 > > >>> To: xmca > > >>> Subject: [xmca] Reflective Meanings > > >>> > > >>> We have been worrying about how to correctly render the word > > >> "переживаний" > > >>> in Korean, and above all how to link it to "activity" (because it is > > >>> clear to me that Vygotsky saw the one as a reflection upon the > other). > > >>> At the same time, I have been following the news from Syria, where I > > >>> witnessed, in the early nineteen eighties, a similar bloody uprising > > >>> against the current leader's father. > > >>> > > >>> It has been estimated that by the time a child is twelve or thirteen > > >>> years old the child has witnessed, on television, several hundred, > > >>> possibly many thousands, of simulated murders. We didn't have a > > >>> television when I was a kid, but when I first witnessed real murders > > >>> as a twenty-year-old I remember thinking that it was "like a movie". > > >>> > > >>> Of course, when you say that, what it means is that you are > undergoing > > >>> the visual experience of observing something but that the acutal > > >>> переживаний, the lived experience or the feeling of what is happening > > >>> to you, is somehow missing. It means almost the same thing as when > you > > >>> say that something is a dream (I still dream a lot about Syria, and > > >>> sometimes I dream things that are very disturbing, but I know that > the > > >>> dreams feel very different from the way the reality felt). > > >>> > > >>> Here, it seems to me, we have an almost complete contrast of the two > > >>> meanings of reflection. For on the one hand, the scene that you see > > >>> before your eyes is a clear reflection; when you say that you feel > > >>> like a particularly gruesome or traumatic scene is like a movie or > > >>> like a dream, you do not in any way have the sense of watching a > movie > > >>> or dreaming. What you mean is that you are seeing the sights but not > > >>> feeling the feelings of what happens to you; you are lacking the > > >> переживаний. > > >>> > > >>> And it seems to me that there are two ways to interpret that lack > that > > >>> corresond to the two meanings of the word "reflection". One is to say > > >>> that you are not feeling and thinking the experience because you are > > >>> too busy directly experiencing it, reflecting it like a mirror or a > TV > > >>> screen or a flickering image on the back of your dreaming eyelids. > > >>> > > >>> But the other is that you are not participating in the experience, > and > > >>> that your first reaction is that you yourself are neither the > murderer > > >>> nor the murdered one. In other words, it is an experience, but it is > > >>> not an activity. And an experience that is not an activity is not a > > >>> lived > > >>> experience: it is like a movie or like a dream. > > >>> > > >>> It's that SECOND meaning of reflection, which I am almost sure really > > >>> is a type of activity, even though it involves no actions and only > > >>> indirectly involves verbal meanings, that converts an experience > which > > >>> is not an activity, into переживаний, or what Wordsworth would call > > >>> emotion reflected upon in tranquility. > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg > > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> __________________________________________ > > >>> _____ > > >>> xmca mailing list > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > >>> __________________________________________ > > >>> _____ > > >>> xmca mailing list > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > >>> > > >> > > >> -----Inline Attachment Follows----- > > >> > > >> > > >> __________________________________________ > > >> _____ > > >> xmca mailing list > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > >> __________________________________________ > > >> _____ > > >> xmca mailing list > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > >> > > >> > > >> __________________________________________ > > >> _____ > > >> xmca mailing list > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > >> > > >> > > > __________________________________________ > > > _____ > > > xmca mailing list > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > > __________________________________________ > > _____ > > xmca mailing list > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >
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SCHLICHT TOBIAS Enacti.pdf
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MARCH 18 2012 THOMPSON EVAN Mind in Life Biology and Phenomenology FREE.pdf
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