RE: [xmca] 2nd person perspective

["monica.hansen" <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>]

I am interested in the paper on enactive apporoach. Larry. Incidentally, am working on a critical discourse analysis right now discussing use of point of view as indication of agency in participants' poetry in content literacy class.

Consciousness and understanding are two very different phenomena. Of course they are related in mental functioning, the how of it being still much debated in scientific communities. Did anyone see the articles about free will in yesterdays online Chronicle of Higher Ed? I have often wondered if the initial focus of understanding learning shouldn't have been aimed at attention all along, rather than what generally pass for higher level cognitive abilities. The phenomenon we call attention is more messy and less easily defined; it is also more inricately interwoven in aspects of the social interrelationtionships, more so than aspects of the individual (as consciousness is). The work being done on joint attention then yields some interesting analyses at all ages.

Monica
________________________________________
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Larry Purss [lpscholar2@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, March 19, 2012 11:20 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] 2nd person perspective

Martin

My understanding of Reddy's 2nd person approach is informed by my
understanding of the  "enactive" approach to consciousness and
intentionality.
Infants are first aware that they are the focus of mother's intentional
directedness towards them. This experience of primary intersubjectivity
calls forth infant expressions that are intentionally directed at mother.
>From an enactve standpoint this context of "joint attention" is a form of
consciousness and is best characterized as an ACT of attending rather than
a form of information exchange. Focal attention is a continuous process
EXECUTED by a human agent at 2 months of age. The alternation of attention
between the object and the other subject is an active engagement involving
coordinated joint attention.

Martin, within the theory of enactive embodied expression, sensorimotor
intentionality IS a form of consciousness because it is a form of  ACTING
intentionally sharing joint attention.
The term *understanding* does not apply at this sensorimotor level of
agentic action [within enactive theory]

The developmental emergence of 1st and 3rd person forms of intentionality
[and forms of consciousness] develop from being immersed in this 2nd person
*form of life*.

Evan Thomson who worked with Varela suggests there 3 distinct approaches to
understanding phenomenology as it applies to enactive approches.

1] STATIC - consciousness constitutes [brings to awareness or discloses]
the world. Objects are taken as GIVEN synchronically.
2] GENETIC - Intentional structures and objects EMERGE through time [NOT
given] For example HOW implicit and prereflective experiences develop
attentive and reflective experiences.  Experience has a SEDIMENTED
structure in relation to the living body and time-consciousness.
3] GENERATIVE - whereas for genetic phenomenology time-consciousness and
the lived body are key concepts, for generative phenomenology the guiding
thread is *the life world*. The focus shifts to our cultural, historical,
and intersubjective constitution of the human world.

These ideas from E. Thompson are in his book "Mind In Life"

If interested I can attach a 6 page article on "Enactive Social Cognition"
or the first chapter of E. Thompson's new book extending his work with
Varela and Rosch.

Larry








On Mon, Mar 19, 2012 at 2:26 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Larry, Rod, Monica et al.
>
> I've been reading Reddy's article, and while I think she's completely
> correct in her identification of a complex and subtle relatedness during
> the first year of life, or even the first months (I've always been a fan of
> Colwyn Trevarthen's work), I'm having trouble getting some things clear.
>
> Reddy writes that "the self is emotionally aware of being an object to
> others before it is an object to itself." We are talking, then, about at
> least two forms of self-consciousness - namely consciousness of self as an
> object to other people, plus consciousness of self as an object to oneself.
> Add to that the consciousness that a child comes to have of self as an
> agent, a subject....
>
> Recognition of self in a mirror seems to be Cs of self as an object, no?
> Secondary emotions such as shame would be evidence for Cs of self as an
> agent (and hence as having responsibility for some action or event) - or
> would they be evidence of Cs of self as an object in the eyes of others
> (who hold one accountable)? Or both?
>
> See, I'm hopelessly confused! Has anyone figured out Reddy's position? Or
> have a coherent account of when children acquire these different forms of
> Cs? Add to the mix the fact that for LSV the crisis at 12m is the child
> differentiating biologically from the mother, while the crisis at 30m is
> the child differentiating psychologically. Each of these is evidently a new
> kind of self/other distinction. Do they align with Reddy's account?
>
> Martin
>
> On Mar 18, 2012, at 7:31 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
>
> > David and Monica
> >
> > The central question is still how we get from empathy to objectivity;
>  from
> > 2nd person to 3rd person perspectives.
> >
> > David, I will pause at the recognition that 2nd person lived experience
> may
> > be a basic form of experience and therefore a central mode of interaction
> > throughout the life span. That re-cognition is a difference which may
> make
> > a difference.
> >
> > David, you wrote
> >
> > "Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> "you-me"
> > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> word
> > meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> > inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings upon
> > yourself."
> >
> > The last sentence,
> > "both are inextricably bound up with the activity of USING verbal meaning
> > upon yourself."
> >
> > seems to be a central point.
> >
> >  As I understand Wittgenstein he is making this exact point. Using verbal
> > meanings is "another form" of interaction [distinct from 2nd person
> > engagements] that also follow specific rules of engagement.  These 3rd
> > person narrative genres are culturally and historically situated and
> appeal
> > to our current notions of "common" sense. The "contents" used to compose
> > these 3rd person narrative accounts that we learn to "tell ourselves" use
> > 2nd person lived experiences as basic phenomena to be explained.
> > However, we come to confuse the 2nd person and 3rd person forms of life
> > which may actually evolve within different rules and patterns of
> > engagement. 2nd person and 3rd person perspectives may share a family
> > resemblance but not dentity.
> >
> > This in no way diminishes 1st person or 3rd person narratives. It is
> merely
> > an attempt to also draw attention to the basic ways 2nd person lived
> > experiences contribute to our compositions of forms of life. [Not unity
> but
> > composition which implies aggregates] 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person accounts
> > may intertwine but not within a systematic pre-determined sequence.  Each
> > type of account may follow its own path of development and whether 1st,
> > 2nd, or 3rd person perspectives are priviledged and legitimated may be
> > culturally and historically constituted.
> >
> > Very tentative speculations on my part but it does at least introduce
> some
> > doubt about 2nd person lived experience as possibly continuing to be a
> > central form of life throughout the life span.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:42 PM, monica.hansen <
> > monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:
> >
> >> I like what you write, David, at the end of this post. It is more like a
> >> movie because multiple modes of perception and the experience of
> >> consciousness of self ARE more like a movie than a book. Images are
> >> multimodal, not just visual. They are direct links to our feelings and
> >> emotions. Words are just a subset of possible signs for meaning.
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> >> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> >> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 3:40 PM
> >> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> >>
> >> Larry:
> >>
> >> Three things I noticed in perusing the article:
> >>
> >> a) Like you, I noticed that the "you-me" relationship is "one possible
> >> perspective" on the development of reflected upon experience.
> >>
> >> b) But I also noticed, with faint annoyance, that the author seemed to
> be
> >> be claiming universality, despite clear evidence in her own data (e.g.
> >> "Show mommy the potty, Nanny") that her conclusion might be very child
> >> specific.
> >>
> >> c) I noticed, with some relief, a minimum of 'theory of mind"
> >> discussion. I guess we are finally getting it through our thick skulls
> that
> >> a theory of mind is going to develop as long as the mind that
> >> contemplates and the mind that is contemplated does so.
> >>
> >> Let's assume that Reddy is right, and that the "you-me" interaction is
> the
> >> essential source of all joint intersubjectivity in later life. That
> still
> >> leaves us an essential problem--and for Brecht, and for Chinese opera,
> as
> >> well as for my ruminations on murders witnessed but not experienced, it
> is
> >> the essential problem--of how we get from empathy to objectivity, from
> the
> >> second to the third person.
> >>
> >> I think Rod is right. On the one hand, Vygotsky refers to word meaning
> as
> >> the microcosm of consciousness in the conclusion to "Thinking and
> Speech"
> >> and on the other he clearly lists "perizhvanie" as the unit of child
> >> consciousness in "The Problem of the Environment" (p. 342 of the
> Vygotsky
> >> Reader).
> >>
> >> Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> >> neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> "you-me"
> >> relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> word
> >> meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> >> inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings upon
> >> yourself.
> >>
> >> And that, to me, explains why when we observe some horrific incident and
> >> we immediately notice, whether with relief or with guilt, the
> unmistakeable
> >> fact of our own non-involvement, we often say "It was just like a movie"
> >> but we never say "It was just like a book".
> >>
> >> David Kellogg
> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>
> >>
> >> --- On Sun, 3/18/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Date: Sunday, March 18, 2012, 6:23 AM
> >>
> >>
> >> Rod, David, Peter
> >>
> >> The relationship between perezhivanie and reflecting on  *second hand*
> >> experience.  How does this relationship manifest?  What  sequences
>  unfold
> >> in this process.
> >> Rod, a year ago you recommended a book by V. Reddy who was exploring the
> >> negotiation of feelings as well as understandings within what is
> referred
> >> to as primary intersubjectivity developing within  2nd person
> communicative
> >> expressions.
> >>
> >> I recently came across this 6 page summary of V. Reddy's *2nd person*
> >> perspective on lived experience as the basic process from which emerges
> the
> >> derived 3rd person perspectives which are *borrowing* the processes
> >> previously lived through within  2nd person engagements.
> >> The article uses charts which clearly distinguish her perspective from
> >> more cognitively oriented accounts
> >>
> >>> From Reddy's perspective, these borrowed 2nd person processes are
> >> profoundly transformed within language games [Wittgenstein's term]
> >> acquired as culturally informed skilled practices expressing the giving
> of
> >> reasons.  Reddy posits the skill of offering justifications in the 3rd
> >> person as derived from 2nd person *I-YOU* encounters previously lived
> >> through. Derived justifications  borrow the content from 2nd person
> lived
> >> through experiences and use this derived content within the activity of
> >> giving reasons.
> >>
> >> I also noticed she posits two *basic* movements within our emotional 2nd
> >> person engagements: *hiding* & *revealing* our selves. As I understand
> >> Reddy's position these basic intersubjective orientations continue to
> play
> >> out  within more complex cultural-historical  informed engagements.
> >> Reddy's 2nd person perspective offers one possible approach into the
> >> relationship between perhezivanie and activity.
> >>
> >> Larry
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> >> R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Many thanks for this, David - a really valuable clarification of  the
> >>> relationship between  perezhivanie and activity. I wonder what you
> >>> would  have to say about the extent to which your second  type of
> >>> reflection is
> >>> actually  a culturally mediated process of mediation. In other words,
> >>> when we practise the activity of reflecting on a 'second-hand'
> >>> experience,  in order to colour it with the  'body and vitality' of our
> >>> own spontaneous  concepts, are we 'borrowing' processes which we have
> >>> picked up, absorbed or  internalised from our  experiences of engaging
> >>> with others (and negotiating  the sharing of feelings as well as
> >>> understandings)?  When we reflect in  tranquility on observed second
> >>> hand (second body) experiences do we not  have to draw on  internalised
> >> sociocultural processes to be able to do this?
> >>>
> >>> All the best,
> >>>
> >>> Rod
> >>> ________________________________________
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com]
> >>> Sent: 18 March 2012 03:33
> >>> To: xmca
> >>> Subject: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> >>>
> >>> We have been worrying about how to correctly render the word
> >> "переживаний"
> >>> in Korean, and above all how to link it to "activity" (because it is
> >>> clear to me that Vygotsky saw the one as a reflection upon the other).
> >>> At the same time, I have been following the news from Syria, where I
> >>> witnessed, in the early nineteen eighties, a similar bloody uprising
> >>> against the current leader's father.
> >>>
> >>> It has been estimated that by the time a child is twelve or thirteen
> >>> years old the child has witnessed, on television, several hundred,
> >>> possibly many thousands, of simulated murders. We didn't have a
> >>> television when I was a kid, but when I first witnessed real murders
> >>> as a twenty-year-old I remember thinking that it was "like a movie".
> >>>
> >>> Of course, when you say that, what it means is that you are undergoing
> >>> the visual experience of observing something but that the acutal
> >>> переживаний, the lived experience or the feeling of what is happening
> >>> to you, is somehow missing. It means almost the same thing as when you
> >>> say that something is a dream (I still dream a lot about Syria, and
> >>> sometimes I dream things that are very disturbing, but I know that the
> >>> dreams feel very different from the way the reality felt).
> >>>
> >>> Here, it seems to me, we have an almost complete contrast of the two
> >>> meanings of reflection. For on the one hand, the scene that you see
> >>> before your eyes is a clear reflection; when you say that you feel
> >>> like a particularly gruesome or traumatic scene is like a movie or
> >>> like a dream, you do not in any way have the sense of watching a movie
> >>> or dreaming. What you mean is that you are seeing the sights but not
> >>> feeling the feelings of what happens to you; you are lacking the
> >> переживаний.
> >>>
> >>> And it seems to me that there are two ways to interpret that lack that
> >>> corresond to the two meanings of the word "reflection". One is to say
> >>> that you are not feeling and thinking the experience because you are
> >>> too busy directly experiencing it, reflecting it like a mirror or a TV
> >>> screen or a flickering image on the back of your dreaming eyelids.
> >>>
> >>> But the other is that you are not participating in the experience, and
> >>> that your first reaction is that you yourself are neither the murderer
> >>> nor the murdered one. In other words, it is an experience, but it is
> >>> not an activity. And an experience that is not an activity is not a
> >>> lived
> >>> experience: it is like a movie or like a dream.
> >>>
> >>> It's that SECOND meaning of reflection, which I am almost sure really
> >>> is a type of activity, even though it involves no actions and only
> >>> indirectly involves verbal meanings, that converts an experience which
> >>> is not an activity, into переживаний, or what Wordsworth would call
> >>> emotion reflected upon in tranquility.
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> __________________________________________
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