Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Yep, it gets so confusing that we have to keep communicating, chasing the
firebird of
perfect understanding! And then there is the problem of what happens if, by
some
odd chance, you catch it?
mike



2012/3/19 monica.hansen <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>

> Thanks, Mike. This just makes the further point that levels of meaning,
> literal and figurative, can overlap for individuals and between
> individuals, in both word and experience :).
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of mike cole
> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 9:27 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
>
> Ooooh, that was a very interesting way of phrasing matters, Monica. I LOVE
> re-
> words, including all of yours. But given the topic of lung resection how
> could you keep yourself from writing re-membering??
>
> :-)
> mike
>
> 2012/3/18 monica.hansen <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>
>
> > Larry and David,
> > The path from empathy to objectivity is not a directional task sequence.
> > Consider the possibility that empathy and objectivity can occur in the
> > same instance, experienced simultaneously, like in the case of a
> > surgeon doing a lung resection on a patient, knowing he may have to
> > have a similar operation himself. And this re-cognition, the going
> > over of thoughts, the reconceptualization, the re-examination, the
> > re-analysis, the remembering of an event, might be affective or
> > intellectual, or both. It can be first person, it can be second
> > person, it can be third person on any of these occasions, or it might
> > be a combination of activated states triggered, one by another. Our
> > sense of self and consciousness are not constructed merely by rational
> > objective thought, but always and at the same time by implicit
> > processes in a dynamic system that works beneath the surface of what
> > we experience consciously. All modes of social interaction through the
> > life span. All with different levels of activation in different
> > individuals. It does make a qualitative difference in the narratives we
> can comprehend and the narratives we can imagine.
> >
> > Monica
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 5:32 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> >
> > David and Monica
> >
> > The central question is still how we get from empathy to objectivity;
> > from 2nd person to 3rd person perspectives.
> >
> > David, I will pause at the recognition that 2nd person lived
> > experience may be a basic form of experience and therefore a central
> > mode of interaction throughout the life span. That re-cognition is a
> > difference which may make a difference.
> >
> > David, you wrote
> >
> > "Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> "you-me"
> > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> > word meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> > inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings
> > upon yourself."
> >
> > The last sentence,
> > "both are inextricably bound up with the activity of USING verbal
> > meaning upon yourself."
> >
> > seems to be a central point.
> >
> >  As I understand Wittgenstein he is making this exact point. Using
> > verbal meanings is "another form" of interaction [distinct from 2nd
> > person engagements] that also follow specific rules of engagement.
> > These 3rd person narrative genres are culturally and historically
> > situated and appeal to our current notions of "common" sense. The
> > "contents" used to compose these 3rd person narrative accounts that we
> > learn to "tell ourselves" use 2nd person lived experiences as basic
> phenomena to be explained.
> > However, we come to confuse the 2nd person and 3rd person forms of
> > life which may actually evolve within different rules and patterns of
> > engagement. 2nd person and 3rd person perspectives may share a family
> > resemblance but not dentity.
> >
> > This in no way diminishes 1st person or 3rd person narratives. It is
> > merely an attempt to also draw attention to the basic ways 2nd person
> > lived experiences contribute to our compositions of forms of life.
> > [Not unity but  composition which implies aggregates] 1st, 2nd, and
> > 3rd person accounts may intertwine but not within a systematic
> > pre-determined sequence.  Each type of account may follow its own path
> > of development and whether 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person perspectives are
> > priviledged and legitimated may be culturally and historically
> constituted.
> >
> > Very tentative speculations on my part but it does at least introduce
> > some doubt about 2nd person lived experience as possibly continuing to
> > be a central form of life throughout the life span.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:42 PM, monica.hansen <
> > monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > I like what you write, David, at the end of this post. It is more
> > > like a movie because multiple modes of perception and the experience
> > > of consciousness of self ARE more like a movie than a book. Images
> > > are multimodal, not just visual. They are direct links to our
> > > feelings and emotions. Words are just a subset of possible signs for
> meaning.
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > > Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 3:40 PM
> > > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > >
> > > Larry:
> > >
> > > Three things I noticed in perusing the article:
> > >
> > > a) Like you, I noticed that the "you-me" relationship is "one
> > > possible perspective" on the development of reflected upon experience.
> > >
> > > b) But I also noticed, with faint annoyance, that the author seemed
> > > to be be claiming universality, despite clear evidence in her own data
> (e.g.
> > > "Show mommy the potty, Nanny") that her conclusion might be very
> > > child specific.
> > >
> > > c) I noticed, with some relief, a minimum of 'theory of mind"
> > > discussion. I guess we are finally getting it through our thick
> > > skulls that a theory of mind is going to develop as long as the mind
> > > that contemplates and the mind that is contemplated does so.
> > >
> > > Let's assume that Reddy is right, and that the "you-me" interaction
> > > is the essential source of all joint intersubjectivity in later life.
> > > That still leaves us an essential problem--and for Brecht, and for
> > > Chinese opera, as well as for my ruminations on murders witnessed
> > > but not experienced, it is the essential problem--of how we get from
> > > empathy to objectivity, from the second to the third person.
> > >
> > > I think Rod is right. On the one hand, Vygotsky refers to word
> > > meaning as the microcosm of consciousness in the conclusion to
> > > "Thinking and
> > Speech"
> > > and on the other he clearly lists "perizhvanie" as the unit of child
> > > consciousness in "The Problem of the Environment" (p. 342 of the
> > > Vygotsky Reader).
> > >
> > > Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> > "you-me"
> > > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use
> > > of word meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both
> > > are inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal
> > > meanings upon yourself.
> > >
> > > And that, to me, explains why when we observe some horrific incident
> > > and we immediately notice, whether with relief or with guilt, the
> > > unmistakeable fact of our own non-involvement, we often say "It was
> > > just
> > like a movie"
> > > but we never say "It was just like a book".
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >
> > >
> > > --- On Sun, 3/18/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Date: Sunday, March 18, 2012, 6:23 AM
> > >
> > >
> > > Rod, David, Peter
> > >
> > > The relationship between perezhivanie and reflecting on  *second
> > > hand* experience.  How does this relationship manifest?  What
> > > sequences unfold in this process.
> > > Rod, a year ago you recommended a book by V. Reddy who was exploring
> > > the negotiation of feelings as well as understandings within what is
> > > referred to as primary intersubjectivity developing within  2nd
> > > person communicative expressions.
> > >
> > > I recently came across this 6 page summary of V. Reddy's *2nd
> > > person* perspective on lived experience as the basic process from
> > > which emerges the derived 3rd person perspectives which are
> > > *borrowing* the processes previously lived through within  2nd person
> engagements.
> > > The article uses charts which clearly distinguish her perspective
> > > from more cognitively oriented accounts
> > >
> > > >From Reddy's perspective, these borrowed 2nd person processes are
> > > profoundly transformed within language games [Wittgenstein's term]
> > > acquired as culturally informed skilled practices expressing the
> > > giving of reasons.  Reddy posits the skill of offering
> > > justifications in the 3rd person as derived from 2nd person *I-YOU*
> > > encounters previously lived through. Derived justifications  borrow
> > > the content from 2nd person lived through experiences and use this
> > > derived content within the activity of giving reasons.
> > >
> > > I also noticed she posits two *basic* movements within our emotional
> > > 2nd person engagements: *hiding* & *revealing* our selves. As I
> > > understand Reddy's position these basic intersubjective orientations
> > > continue to play out  within more complex cultural-historical
> > > informed
> > engagements.
> > > Reddy's 2nd person perspective offers one possible approach into the
> > > relationship between perhezivanie and activity.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Many thanks for this, David - a really valuable clarification of
> > > >the relationship between  perezhivanie and activity. I wonder what
> > > >you would  have to say about the extent to which your second  type
> > > >of reflection is
> > > >  actually  a culturally mediated process of mediation. In other
> > > >words,
> > > >  when we practise the activity of reflecting on a 'second-hand'
> > > >experience,  in order to colour it with the  'body and vitality' of
> > > >our own spontaneous  concepts, are we 'borrowing' processes which
> > > >we have picked up, absorbed or  internalised from our  experiences
> > > >of engaging with others (and negotiating  the sharing of feelings
> > > >as well as understandings)?  When we reflect in  tranquility on
> > > >observed second hand (second body) experiences do we not  have to
> > > >draw on internalised
> > > sociocultural processes to be able to do this?
> > > >
> > > > All the best,
> > > >
> > > > Rod
> > > > ________________________________________
> > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> > > > Behalf Of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com]
> > > > Sent: 18 March 2012 03:33
> > > > To: xmca
> > > > Subject: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > > >
> > > > We have been worrying about how to correctly render the word
> > > "переживаний"
> > > > in Korean, and above all how to link it to "activity" (because it
> > > > is clear to me that Vygotsky saw the one as a reflection upon the
> other).
> > > > At the same time, I have been following the news from Syria, where
> > > > I witnessed, in the early nineteen eighties, a similar bloody
> > > > uprising against the current leader's father.
> > > >
> > > > It has been estimated that by the time a child is twelve or
> > > > thirteen years old the child has witnessed, on television, several
> > > > hundred, possibly many thousands, of simulated murders. We didn't
> > > > have a television when I was a kid, but when I first witnessed
> > > > real murders as a twenty-year-old I remember thinking that it was
> "like a movie".
> > > >
> > > > Of course, when you say that, what it means is that you are
> > > > undergoing the visual experience of observing something but that
> > > > the acutal переживаний, the lived experience or the feeling of
> > > > what is happening to you, is somehow missing. It means almost the
> > > > same thing as when you say that something is a dream (I still
> > > > dream a lot about Syria, and sometimes I dream things that are
> > > > very disturbing, but I know that the dreams feel very different
> > > > from the way the reality
> > felt).
> > > >
> > > > Here, it seems to me, we have an almost complete contrast of the
> > > > two meanings of reflection. For on the one hand, the scene that
> > > > you see before your eyes is a clear reflection; when you say that
> > > > you feel like a particularly gruesome or traumatic scene is like a
> > > > movie or like a dream, you do not in any way have the sense of
> > > > watching a movie or dreaming. What you mean is that you are seeing
> > > > the sights but not feeling the feelings of what happens to you;
> > > > you are lacking the
> > > переживаний.
> > > >
> > > > And it seems to me that there are two ways to interpret that lack
> > > > that corresond to the two meanings of the word "reflection". One
> > > > is to say that you are not feeling and thinking the experience
> > > > because you are too busy directly experiencing it, reflecting it
> > > > like a mirror or a TV screen or a flickering image on the back of
> > > > your
> > dreaming eyelids.
> > > >
> > > > But the other is that you are not participating in the experience,
> > > > and that your first reaction is that you yourself are neither the
> > > > murderer nor the murdered one. In other words, it is an
> > > > experience, but it is not an activity. And an experience that is
> > > > not an activity is not a lived
> > > > experience: it is like a movie or like a dream.
> > > >
> > > > It's that SECOND meaning of reflection, which I am almost sure
> > > > really is a type of activity, even though it involves no actions
> > > > and only indirectly involves verbal meanings, that converts an
> > > > experience which is not an activity, into переживаний, or what
> > > > Wordsworth would call emotion reflected upon in tranquility.
> > > >
> > > > David Kellogg
> > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
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