Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Ooooh, that was a very interesting way of phrasing matters, Monica. I LOVE
re-
words, including all of yours. But given the topic of lung resection how
could
you keep yourself from writing re-membering??

:-)
mike

2012/3/18 monica.hansen <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>

> Larry and David,
> The path from empathy to objectivity is not a directional task sequence.
> Consider the possibility that empathy and objectivity can occur in the same
> instance, experienced simultaneously, like in the case of a surgeon doing a
> lung resection on a patient, knowing he may have to have a similar
> operation himself. And this re-cognition, the going over of thoughts, the
> reconceptualization, the re-examination, the re-analysis, the remembering
> of an event, might be affective or intellectual, or both. It can be first
> person, it can be second person, it can be third person on any of these
> occasions, or it might be a combination of activated states triggered, one
> by another. Our sense of self and consciousness are not constructed merely
> by rational objective thought, but always and at the same time by implicit
> processes in a dynamic system that works beneath the surface of what we
> experience consciously. All modes of social interaction through the life
> span. All with different levels of activation in different individuals. It
> does make a qualitative difference in the narratives we can comprehend and
> the narratives we can imagine.
>
> Monica
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 5:32 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
>
> David and Monica
>
> The central question is still how we get from empathy to objectivity;
>  from 2nd person to 3rd person perspectives.
>
> David, I will pause at the recognition that 2nd person lived experience
> may be a basic form of experience and therefore a central mode of
> interaction throughout the life span. That re-cognition is a difference
> which may make a difference.
>
> David, you wrote
>
> "Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely "you-me"
> relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of word
> meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings upon
> yourself."
>
> The last sentence,
> "both are inextricably bound up with the activity of USING verbal meaning
> upon yourself."
>
> seems to be a central point.
>
>  As I understand Wittgenstein he is making this exact point. Using verbal
> meanings is "another form" of interaction [distinct from 2nd person
> engagements] that also follow specific rules of engagement.  These 3rd
> person narrative genres are culturally and historically situated and appeal
> to our current notions of "common" sense. The "contents" used to compose
> these 3rd person narrative accounts that we learn to "tell ourselves" use
> 2nd person lived experiences as basic phenomena to be explained.
> However, we come to confuse the 2nd person and 3rd person forms of life
> which may actually evolve within different rules and patterns of
> engagement. 2nd person and 3rd person perspectives may share a family
> resemblance but not dentity.
>
> This in no way diminishes 1st person or 3rd person narratives. It is
> merely an attempt to also draw attention to the basic ways 2nd person lived
> experiences contribute to our compositions of forms of life. [Not unity but
>  composition which implies aggregates] 1st, 2nd, and 3rd person accounts
> may intertwine but not within a systematic pre-determined sequence.  Each
> type of account may follow its own path of development and whether 1st,
> 2nd, or 3rd person perspectives are priviledged and legitimated may be
> culturally and historically constituted.
>
> Very tentative speculations on my part but it does at least introduce some
> doubt about 2nd person lived experience as possibly continuing to be a
> central form of life throughout the life span.
>
> Larry
>
> On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:42 PM, monica.hansen <
> monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu> wrote:
>
> > I like what you write, David, at the end of this post. It is more like
> > a movie because multiple modes of perception and the experience of
> > consciousness of self ARE more like a movie than a book. Images are
> > multimodal, not just visual. They are direct links to our feelings and
> > emotions. Words are just a subset of possible signs for meaning.
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2012 3:40 PM
> > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> >
> > Larry:
> >
> > Three things I noticed in perusing the article:
> >
> > a) Like you, I noticed that the "you-me" relationship is "one possible
> > perspective" on the development of reflected upon experience.
> >
> > b) But I also noticed, with faint annoyance, that the author seemed to
> > be be claiming universality, despite clear evidence in her own data (e.g.
> > "Show mommy the potty, Nanny") that her conclusion might be very child
> > specific.
> >
> > c) I noticed, with some relief, a minimum of 'theory of mind"
> > discussion. I guess we are finally getting it through our thick skulls
> > that a theory of mind is going to develop as long as the mind that
> > contemplates and the mind that is contemplated does so.
> >
> > Let's assume that Reddy is right, and that the "you-me" interaction is
> > the essential source of all joint intersubjectivity in later life.
> > That still leaves us an essential problem--and for Brecht, and for
> > Chinese opera, as well as for my ruminations on murders witnessed but
> > not experienced, it is the essential problem--of how we get from
> > empathy to objectivity, from the second to the third person.
> >
> > I think Rod is right. On the one hand, Vygotsky refers to word meaning
> > as the microcosm of consciousness in the conclusion to "Thinking and
> Speech"
> > and on the other he clearly lists "perizhvanie" as the unit of child
> > consciousness in "The Problem of the Environment" (p. 342 of the
> > Vygotsky Reader).
> >
> > Neither unit is "activity" in the sense used by activity theorists;
> > neither has an outcome in production. Neither inheres in a purely
> "you-me"
> > relationship which can be and often is carried out without any use of
> > word meaning or any self-reflection. But, as Rod points out, both are
> > inextricably bound up with the "activity" of using verbal meanings
> > upon yourself.
> >
> > And that, to me, explains why when we observe some horrific incident
> > and we immediately notice, whether with relief or with guilt, the
> > unmistakeable fact of our own non-involvement, we often say "It was just
> like a movie"
> > but we never say "It was just like a book".
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> >
> >
> > --- On Sun, 3/18/12, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Sunday, March 18, 2012, 6:23 AM
> >
> >
> > Rod, David, Peter
> >
> > The relationship between perezhivanie and reflecting on  *second hand*
> > experience.  How does this relationship manifest?  What  sequences
> > unfold in this process.
> > Rod, a year ago you recommended a book by V. Reddy who was exploring
> > the negotiation of feelings as well as understandings within what is
> > referred to as primary intersubjectivity developing within  2nd person
> > communicative expressions.
> >
> > I recently came across this 6 page summary of V. Reddy's *2nd person*
> > perspective on lived experience as the basic process from which
> > emerges the derived 3rd person perspectives which are *borrowing* the
> > processes previously lived through within  2nd person engagements.
> > The article uses charts which clearly distinguish her perspective from
> > more cognitively oriented accounts
> >
> > >From Reddy's perspective, these borrowed 2nd person processes are
> > profoundly transformed within language games [Wittgenstein's term]
> > acquired as culturally informed skilled practices expressing the
> > giving of reasons.  Reddy posits the skill of offering justifications
> > in the 3rd person as derived from 2nd person *I-YOU* encounters
> > previously lived through. Derived justifications  borrow the content
> > from 2nd person lived through experiences and use this derived content
> > within the activity of giving reasons.
> >
> > I also noticed she posits two *basic* movements within our emotional
> > 2nd person engagements: *hiding* & *revealing* our selves. As I
> > understand Reddy's position these basic intersubjective orientations
> > continue to play out  within more complex cultural-historical  informed
> engagements.
> > Reddy's 2nd person perspective offers one possible approach into the
> > relationship between perhezivanie and activity.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 4:45 AM, Rod Parker-Rees <
> > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote:
> >
> > > Many thanks for this, David - a really valuable clarification of
> > >the relationship between  perezhivanie and activity. I wonder what
> > >you would  have to say about the extent to which your second  type of
> > >reflection is
> > >  actually  a culturally mediated process of mediation. In other
> > >words,
> > >  when we practise the activity of reflecting on a 'second-hand'
> > >experience,  in order to colour it with the  'body and vitality' of
> > >our own spontaneous  concepts, are we 'borrowing' processes which we
> > >have picked up, absorbed or  internalised from our  experiences of
> > >engaging with others (and negotiating  the sharing of feelings as
> > >well as understandings)?  When we reflect in  tranquility on observed
> > >second hand (second body) experiences do we not  have to draw on
> > >internalised
> > sociocultural processes to be able to do this?
> > >
> > > All the best,
> > >
> > > Rod
> > > ________________________________________
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> > > Behalf Of David Kellogg [vaughndogblack@yahoo.com]
> > > Sent: 18 March 2012 03:33
> > > To: xmca
> > > Subject: [xmca] Reflective Meanings
> > >
> > > We have been worrying about how to correctly render the word
> > "переживаний"
> > > in Korean, and above all how to link it to "activity" (because it is
> > > clear to me that Vygotsky saw the one as a reflection upon the other).
> > > At the same time, I have been following the news from Syria, where I
> > > witnessed, in the early nineteen eighties, a similar bloody uprising
> > > against the current leader's father.
> > >
> > > It has been estimated that by the time a child is twelve or thirteen
> > > years old the child has witnessed, on television, several hundred,
> > > possibly many thousands, of simulated murders. We didn't have a
> > > television when I was a kid, but when I first witnessed real murders
> > > as a twenty-year-old I remember thinking that it was "like a movie".
> > >
> > > Of course, when you say that, what it means is that you are
> > > undergoing the visual experience of observing something but that the
> > > acutal переживаний, the lived experience or the feeling of what is
> > > happening to you, is somehow missing. It means almost the same thing
> > > as when you say that something is a dream (I still dream a lot about
> > > Syria, and sometimes I dream things that are very disturbing, but I
> > > know that the dreams feel very different from the way the reality
> felt).
> > >
> > > Here, it seems to me, we have an almost complete contrast of the two
> > > meanings of reflection. For on the one hand, the scene that you see
> > > before your eyes is a clear reflection; when you say that you feel
> > > like a particularly gruesome or traumatic scene is like a movie or
> > > like a dream, you do not in any way have the sense of watching a
> > > movie or dreaming. What you mean is that you are seeing the sights
> > > but not feeling the feelings of what happens to you; you are lacking
> > > the
> > переживаний.
> > >
> > > And it seems to me that there are two ways to interpret that lack
> > > that corresond to the two meanings of the word "reflection". One is
> > > to say that you are not feeling and thinking the experience because
> > > you are too busy directly experiencing it, reflecting it like a
> > > mirror or a TV screen or a flickering image on the back of your
> dreaming eyelids.
> > >
> > > But the other is that you are not participating in the experience,
> > > and that your first reaction is that you yourself are neither the
> > > murderer nor the murdered one. In other words, it is an experience,
> > > but it is not an activity. And an experience that is not an activity
> > > is not a lived
> > > experience: it is like a movie or like a dream.
> > >
> > > It's that SECOND meaning of reflection, which I am almost sure
> > > really is a type of activity, even though it involves no actions and
> > > only indirectly involves verbal meanings, that converts an
> > > experience which is not an activity, into переживаний, or what
> > > Wordsworth would call emotion reflected upon in tranquility.
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
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