Re: [xmca] Space, neighbourhood, dwelling in, in*formation as notions with a "family resemblance"

[Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu>]

I think it is pretty clear that "meaning" is being treated differently, but
how differently, and is it in a way that is incompatible with CHAT
perspectives, or a generalization of meaning as some third phenomenon that
is necessary whenever a connection between A<->B is brokered/mediated by
something else (in short, any time "causality" is not like billiard balls
smacking into each other).  It could be that if we accept this
generalization, that the question becomes one of types/grades of meaning,
and that one comes to accept (like biosemioticians argue) that there is
"meaning making" (necessarily) in the movement of potassium ions across
cellular membranes, and so on, "all the way up" to higher psychological
functions.  But one need not accept this cline, simply accept different
orders/domains of meaning making, and then wonder about their specific
articulation/construal for different forms/orders of "living things".  How
much is at stake in the specifically human "sociogenetic" third thing that
David K and others posit as the uniquely human ingredient in human
development.  Can *it* too be generalized in a productive way, without
either diminishing human semiosis nor dogmatically closing the door on other
kinds of meaning making?

ivan

On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 10:22 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

> The passage you quoted still has me thinking, Ivan.
> The following bit has me thinking about the fact that on Monday I start to
> conduct a grad course on "mediational theories of mind":
>
> *To avoid the contradictions entailed in assuming that human environmental
> relations are mediated by systems of symbolic meaning  – with its absurd
> corollary that non-human animals inhabit meaningless worlds – I consider
>  the sources of environmental meaning for non-humans and their possible
> availability to  humans as well.*
>
> I am anticipating further discussion of this issue in later essays (the
> book
> is a collection of essays wherin Ingold points ahead and back to common
> themes
> that run throughout the book). But, for now,
>
> i would hazard a guess that Ingold is using meaning in a different
> framework
> that we are used to using in LSV-connected (or Voloshinov connected) way.
> He
> seems to be criticizing those views which *replace *a "direct perception"
> relation with a "mediated, indirect" relation of organism and environment.
> To me it has always seemed, a la
> comments that David Ke made recently, that LSV/ARL (and from this morning's
> reading, Voloshinov) we seeking to insert a "thirdness" into human unwelt
> that is not present for other trailblazing wayfaring creatures. In Jim
> Wertsch's terms, this gives rise to an ineluctable tension between two
> structuring influences in human life.
>
> (its the virtue of having a bad cold that one has to stay at home where
> where listening to music and reading are about as healthy an alternative as
> circumstances permit!).
> (Whereas sitting at a computer writing is a bad idea-- so I'll sign off!).
>
> mike
>
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 9:18 AM, Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu> wrote:
>
> > With you, Larry, and Jay Lemke from recent conversations, one such
> burning
> > question is a "feeling-ful" framework for understanding activity.  How
> much
> > terra incognita is there here?  Others?
> >
> > Ivan
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 9:11 AM, Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu> wrote:
> >
> > > Hello Larry,
> > >
> > > Hopefully as a new post we can get others' wisdom on the Rayner article
> > and
> > > further discussion on the connections you're drawing.  Thanks for your
> > > comments.
> > >
> > > There seem to be countless ways in our neck of the woods to reassert
> the
> > > problems with dualistic views of mind and subjectivity.  It's not until
> I
> > > try to discuss these things with people outside our neck of the woods
> > that I
> > > (as subject, as L.W. would say) realize how thickly we here in-dwell in
> > > anti-dualism, even as we experience countless ways to disagree about
> > this.
> > >  Mike often expresses to me the hope that xmca can build more lastingly
> > on
> > > intense moments of discussion such as the one that this latest "new"
> post
> > is
> > > a part of.  You've been pushing hard for us to consider more tightly
> the
> > > links among a number of thinkers, expressed once again here:
> > >
> > > ------
> > >
> > > 'This is a shift FROM dualism TO a philosophy of EXPERIENCE &
> EXPRESSION.
> > > The theme Donna Orange, John Shotter, Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor,
> > Rayner
> > >  and others are exploring and bringing into the world as an alternative
> > to
> > > the "natural exclusion" narrative.'
> > >
> > > ------
> > >
> > > Mike has been reading Ingold recently, and everyday it seems he
> mentions
> > > some enticing line of inquiry which Ingold's views in "Being Alive"
> bring
> > to
> > > mind.  About materials and not merely "materiality", space, the
> > > "environment", and many many more that overlap overwhelmingly with your
> > > lines of inquiry Larry.  Consider just this paragraph of Ingold's:
> > >
> > > ------
> > > In Chapter 6, I return to the perennial problem of what it means to
> speak
> > > of the environment  of an animal or, more particularly, of a human
> being.
> > To
> > > avoid the contradictions entailed in assuming that human environmental
> > > relations are mediated by systems of symbolic meaning  – with its
> absurd
> > > corollary that non-human animals inhabit meaningless worlds – I
> consider
> > >  the sources of environmental meaning for non-humans and their possible
> > > availability to  humans as well. In psychology, James Gibson’s theory
> of
> > > affordances offers one possible  approach, though it is ultimately
> found
> > to
> > > privilege the environment as a site of meaning  vis-à-vis its
> > inhabitants,
> > > whether human or non-human. In ethology, Jakob von Uexküll’s  theory of
> > the
> > > Umwelt suggests, quite to the contrary, that meaning is bestowed by the
> > > organism  on its environment. In philosophy, and following von
> Uexküll’s
> > > lead, Martin Heidegger drew  a sharp distinction between the animal’s
> > > ‘captivation’ in its Umwelt and the way the world is  disclosed, or
> > opened
> > > up, to human beings. But the animal’s captivation also implies a sense
> >  of
> > > openness, in the manner in which its life flows along lines comparable
> –
> > in
> > > von Uexküll’s  terms – to those of polyphonic music. This sense has
> been
> > > taken up in the philosophy of  Gilles Deleuze. The living organism, for
> > > Deleuze, is a bundle of lines, a haecceity. Critically,  these lines do
> > not
> > > connect points but pass forever amidst and between. Considering the way
> >  in
> > > which this idea has been taken up in so-called actor-network theory,
> > > particularly associated  with the work of Bruno Latour, I return to the
> > > importance of distinguishing the network as  a set of interconnected
> > points
> > > from the meshwork as an interweaving of lines. Every such line
>  describes
> > a
> > > flow of material substance in a space that is topologically fluid. I
> > > conclude that the  organism (animal or human) should be understood not
> as
> > a
> > > bounded entity surrounded by  an environment but as an unbounded
> > > entanglement of lines in fluid space. (p. 64, Being Alive)
> > >
> > > ------
> > >
> > > AND, for kicks, how about the following xmca post, by Jay Lemke, from
> > 1998,
> > > in particular the second paragraph:
> > >
> > > ------
> > >  In thread "microcosm vs. hierarchy; units of analysis" (3), created
> > > 1998-09-17 19:46:58, by Jay Lemke
> > >
> > >  Bruce Robinson raises a very interesting aspect of vygotsky's views
> that
> > > seems to me relevant to a deeper consideration of issues of units of
> > > analysis and scales of organization and phenomena. Our usual view, and
> > the
> > > one that undergirds reductionism (but certainly does not require it),
> is
> > > that the relationship between more macro-scale and more micro-scale
> units
> > of
> > > analysis and phenomena is one of constituency: the smaller faster
> > goings-on
> > > are somehow parts of the larger slower ones. This fits with our
> tendency
> > to
> > > find spatial relationship metaphors more intuitive than other kinds
> > (perhaps
> > > part of our phylogenetic heritage, perhaps just a historically specific
> > > cultural bias). The image is russian dolls, the little ones inside the
> > > bigger ones, except that we usually imagine, as with cellular to
> > organismic
> > > organizational hierarchy in anatomy, that there are a lot of smaller
> ones
> > > making up each bigger one. But there is another semantic relationship
> > > possible here that we also believe in but which gets lost in the
> > spatialized
> > > view, and this is represented by vygotsky's suggestion that social
> > > psychology and indeed sociology can begin from the individual, because
> > the
> > > individual is a microcosm of society. We find this notion also in
> > Bakhtin,
> > > that individuals articulate and ventriloquate many social voices that
> > > ideally represent social viewpoints and positions in which they may or
> > may
> > > not participate: the whole social heteroglossia is implicit in the
> > > dialogicity of the utterance. The Dostoyevskyan novel is an
> > orchestration,
> > > and so also an artistic microcosm, of the society in which and of which
> > D.
> > > writes. Note that in this interpretation, the individual is a microcosm
> > of
> > > the society most fundamentally NOT in being a map or representation of
> > it,
> > > but in being an instance and a product of it. This semantics of
> > > instantiation, or of the indexical sign relation, gives quite a
> different
> > > view of the relation of the individual and the social. Not least, the
> > > individual, or the event, or the text, as an instance of a larger
> social
> > > system and social meaning system, inherits properties from that larger
> > > system.  The system now is in some sense a generalization over its
> > instances
> > > (rather than a composition from its parts), and instances do not have
> to
> > > seem as limited as they do in the whole-part way of talking. Our usual
> > view
> > > of a part is that it cannot share many characteristics with the whole;
> so
> > we
> > > imagine that the whole is either aggregated from diverse parts
> > > (reductionism) or that it is entirely and uniquely emergent with its
> own
> > > properties that cannot exist in the parts (extreme emergentism, perhaps
> > > Durkheim's view in the heat of rhetoric).
> > >
> > > But the whole-part view is only part of the story; we also need the
> > > system-instance view. Each person, event, text is an instance of a
> social
> > > order, a culture, a language. We bear the traces of our times, our
> > places,
> > > our relationships on many scales. We are examples and products of the
> > larger
> > > scale systems as well as parts of them, and as such we embody (our ways
> > of
> > > participating in and making activities _instance_) not just ONE PART of
> > the
> > > larger system, but many typical phenomena that are inherently
> relational
> > in
> > > character and so index OTHER parts of the larger system.  Like Leibniz'
> > > monads, we are not isolated atoms, but we reflect one another: my
> gender
> > > makes no sense apart from a system of genders, my social class habitus
> > > implies other class habitus, my utterance implies an addressee, my
> > rhetoric
> > > implies others' viewpoints, etc. Like the hologram metaphor for brain
> > > function (Pribram), each element, by deriving its nature from its
> > > connections to other elements, speaks (if less distinctly) of the
> whole.
> > In
> > > Latour's actant-network epistemology, each actant is only defined
> through
> > > its network of relations, and not ever prior to or outside all
> networks;
> > and
> > > so to know an actant (an individual, a text, an event) is to know it
> > > in-the-whole (on some scale, perhaps to some degree on every scale of
> > whole)
> > > and from-the-whole, and so as monad or microcosm. This view also
> implies,
> > of
> > > course, in complementary fashion that we cannot know the individual if
> we
> > do
> > > not understand the society ... much as Jerry Bruner concludes that you
> > can't
> > > say you know the individual as an individual unless you know him/her
> both
> > as
> > > instance of a culture, an epoch, a place, a family, and, perhaps only
> > > finally, as unique. JAY.
> > >
> > > ------
> > >
> > > I am in the beginning phases of my dissertation writing.  I've been
> > > wrestling, like we all seem to do here at various time, with the
> question
> > of
> > > what is in what, of in*formation of mind, subjectivity, activity, and
> > > learning.  But I'm not wrestling with these questions for lack of tools
> > and
> > > conceptual apparatuses, quite the contrary.  I'm wrestling with them
> > because
> > > I would like to communicate my experience in doing my research not in
> > "new"
> > > terms, but in in*formative ways to this (and other) communities.
>  Perhaps
> > > more to other communities than to this one.
> > >
> > > What are those "living things" that we younger generation can inhabit
> > today
> > > that can inform others in inviting/inclusionary ways?  Can you all give
> > us a
> > > list of "burning questions" to which we can address our research
> > > productively, and also use as guides to find "topologically fluid
> spaces"
> > > that we would all be happy to dwell in?
> > >
> > > Ivan
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Sep 22, 2011 at 5:49 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > >> Hi Ivan
> > >>
> > >> You wrote, "what is had/felt/done/thought "in" what is, after all,
> > CENTRAL
> > >> to our enterprise here.
> > >> When you put it that way, it moves me to take up your suggestion that
> > this
> > >> theme, with family resemblances, probably belongs in a new post.
> > >> To start the post I've copied your last comments:
> > >>
> > >> PS (This probably belongs in a separate post, but I think that
> > >> in*formation
> > >> and dwelling-in, and some other evocative notions that have sprouted
> > here
> > >> on
> > >> xmca in recent months can be connected to "space" as it appears here,
> > and
> > >> to
> > >> experience.  What is had/felt/done/thought "in" what is, after all,
> > >> central
> > >> to our enterprise here.  I've attached an article I shared with Mike,
> > who
> > >> suggested I share with you, *Alan David Rayner (2011) Space Cannot Be
> > >> Cut—Why Self-Identity Naturally Includes Neighbourhood* , which
> appeared
> > >> recently in Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science.  It
> > >> problematizes, in my opinion, the distinction between individual and
> > >> collective experience, by way of the notion that any identity (and
> other
> > >> things besides) "naturally include" a "neighborhood" which identity
> > >> includes
> > >> in itself and in which it is included at the same time.  The abstract
> is
> > >> below.)
> > >>
> > >> Ivan, I think this general theme of identity withIN neighbourhoods
> > >> [Rayner's
> > >> phrase] that points to a radically different notion of natural
> INclusion
> > >> is
> > >> also relevant to the contrasting notions of "context" or "con-text" as
> > >> notions of "surround" or notions of "interweaving" that Mike
> discusses.
> > >>
> > >> To add to this line of inquiry, I'm going to bring in Wittgenstein's
> > >> thoughts on "subjectivity"  Wittgenstein thought we confused the use
> of
> > >> "I"
> > >> as object [the container of mental representations] with "I" as
> subject.
> > >> Donna Orange points out that Wittgenstein saw subject I as a limit of
> > the
> > >> world, not an ITEM within it. Donna Orange, in translating
> > Wittgenstein's
> > >> perspetive, writes,
> > >>
> > >> "Just as the physical eye cannot exist within its own visual field,
> but
> > >> precisely LIMITS this field, the subjective I is not an existing
> thing,
> > an
> > >> object... He [Wittgenstein] needed to deny subjectivity an objective
> > >> existence in the world in order to save it AS SUBJECTIVITY." [Donna
> > >> Orange}
> > >>
> > >> Donna then quotes Wittgenstein directly,
> > >> "There are two different cases in the use of the word "I" ( or "my")
> > which
> > >> I
> > >> might call the "the USES as object" and "the USES as subject"
> > >> [Wittgenstein
> > >> in the Blue book 1930]
> > >>
> > >> Examples of the first kind are 'my arm is broken' or 'the wind blows
> my
> > >> hair
> > >> about'.  Examples of the second kind are 'I SEE so-and-so', 'I HEAR
> > >> so-and-so', 'I THINK it will rain'.
> > >>
> > >> These examples point to the objectifying language games that tends to
> > >> obscure the subjective "I". Scientific language games of describing
> > events
> > >> objectively are one type of language game that obscures subjectivity.
> > >>  Wittgenstein points out that "I" and "L.W." are not the same. In
> other
> > >> words,  "I" and "L.W." exist in different language games. However,
> > >> "subjectivity" as a limit on the field [consciousness] DOES exist as
> > >> eperience and expression. When "disclosed" to others dialogically, the
> > >> other
> > >> can alternatively be experienced objectively [as an object in an
> > >> I-IT con-text] or alternatively the other can be experiencd withIN an
> > >> "I-YOU" con-text.  As Buber points out we may exist most of the time
> in
> > >> I-IT contexts but it is the I-YOU dialogical experiences and
> expressions
> > >> which give life a felt sense of vitality and aliveness. Taylor would
> say
> > >> the
> > >> disclosive realm grounds the giving and asking for reasons. Shotter
> > would
> > >> express this felt movement as "con-scientia"
> > >>
> > >> Donna Orange summarizes by pointing out that subjectivity is neither
> > >> interiority or exteriority, but LIFE IN THE WORLD [Ingold's steps to
> an
> > >> ecology of life as dwelling in]  This is a shift from talking about
> > >> interiority or exteriority to talking about  "living and speaking
> withIN
> > >> what Wittgenstein referred to as 'forms of life' "
> > >>
> > >> This is a shift FROM dualism TO a philosophy of EXPERIENCE &
> EXPRESSION.
> > >> The
> > >> theme Donna Orange, John Shotter, Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor,
> Rayner
> > >>  and
> > >> others are exploring and bringing into the world as an alternative to
> > the
> > >> "natural exclusion" narrative. From this perspective
> "representational"
> > >> descriptions and understandings are DERIVED FROM experience and
> > expression
> > >> that is always dialogical and interweaves withIN neighbourhoods or
> > >> con-texts
> > >> or life worlds.
> > >>
> > >> Ivan
> > >> I want to end by returning to your phrase "what is
> had/felt/donethought
> > >> 'in'
> > >> what is", as the CENTRAL enterprise in which we are engaged. tThe
> "had"
> > >> "done" "thought" often oershadow the "felt" in our narratives. Framing
> > the
> > >> "felt" as movement, engagement, expression brings this fouth aspect of
> > the
> > >> world back to the neighbourhood.
> > >>
> > >> Larry
> > >> __________________________________________
> > >> _____
> > >> xmca mailing list
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>
> > >
> > >
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> >
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