[xmca] Space, neighbourhood, dwelling in, in*formation as notions with a "family resemblance"

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Ivan

You wrote, "what is had/felt/done/thought "in" what is, after all, CENTRAL
to our enterprise here.
When you put it that way, it moves me to take up your suggestion that this
theme, with family resemblances, probably belongs in a new post.
To start the post I've copied your last comments:

PS (This probably belongs in a separate post, but I think that in*formation
and dwelling-in, and some other evocative notions that have sprouted here on
xmca in recent months can be connected to "space" as it appears here, and to
experience.  What is had/felt/done/thought "in" what is, after all, central
to our enterprise here.  I've attached an article I shared with Mike, who
suggested I share with you, *Alan David Rayner (2011) Space Cannot Be
Cut—Why Self-Identity Naturally Includes Neighbourhood* , which appeared
recently in Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science.  It
problematizes, in my opinion, the distinction between individual and
collective experience, by way of the notion that any identity (and other
things besides) "naturally include" a "neighborhood" which identity includes
in itself and in which it is included at the same time.  The abstract is
below.)

Ivan, I think this general theme of identity withIN neighbourhoods [Rayner's
phrase] that points to a radically different notion of natural INclusion is
also relevant to the contrasting notions of "context" or "con-text" as
notions of "surround" or notions of "interweaving" that Mike discusses.

To add to this line of inquiry, I'm going to bring in Wittgenstein's
thoughts on "subjectivity"  Wittgenstein thought we confused the use of "I"
as object [the container of mental representations] with "I" as subject.
Donna Orange points out that Wittgenstein saw subject I as a limit of the
world, not an ITEM within it. Donna Orange, in translating Wittgenstein's
perspetive, writes,

"Just as the physical eye cannot exist within its own visual field, but
precisely LIMITS this field, the subjective I is not an existing thing, an
object... He [Wittgenstein] needed to deny subjectivity an objective
existence in the world in order to save it AS SUBJECTIVITY." [Donna Orange}

Donna then quotes Wittgenstein directly,
"There are two different cases in the use of the word "I" ( or "my") which I
might call the "the USES as object" and "the USES as subject" [Wittgenstein
in the Blue book 1930]

Examples of the first kind are 'my arm is broken' or 'the wind blows my hair
about'.  Examples of the second kind are 'I SEE so-and-so', 'I HEAR
so-and-so', 'I THINK it will rain'.

These examples point to the objectifying language games that tends to
obscure the subjective "I". Scientific language games of describing events
objectively are one type of language game that obscures subjectivity.
 Wittgenstein points out that "I" and "L.W." are not the same. In other
words,  "I" and "L.W." exist in different language games. However,
"subjectivity" as a limit on the field [consciousness] DOES exist as
eperience and expression. When "disclosed" to others dialogically, the other
can alternatively be experienced objectively [as an object in an
I-IT con-text] or alternatively the other can be experiencd withIN an
"I-YOU" con-text.  As Buber points out we may exist most of the time in
I-IT contexts but it is the I-YOU dialogical experiences and expressions
which give life a felt sense of vitality and aliveness. Taylor would say the
disclosive realm grounds the giving and asking for reasons. Shotter would
express this felt movement as "con-scientia"

Donna Orange summarizes by pointing out that subjectivity is neither
interiority or exteriority, but LIFE IN THE WORLD [Ingold's steps to an
ecology of life as dwelling in]  This is a shift from talking about
interiority or exteriority to talking about  "living and speaking withIN
what Wittgenstein referred to as 'forms of life' "

This is a shift FROM dualism TO a philosophy of EXPERIENCE & EXPRESSION. The
theme Donna Orange, John Shotter, Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor, Rayner  and
others are exploring and bringing into the world as an alternative to the
"natural exclusion" narrative. From this perspective "representational"
descriptions and understandings are DERIVED FROM experience and expression
that is always dialogical and interweaves withIN neighbourhoods or con-texts
or life worlds.

Ivan
I want to end by returning to your phrase "what is had/felt/donethought 'in'
what is", as the CENTRAL enterprise in which we are engaged. tThe "had"
"done" "thought" often oershadow the "felt" in our narratives. Framing the
"felt" as movement, engagement, expression brings this fouth aspect of the
world back to the neighbourhood.

Larry
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