Re: [xmca] Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Sarah

Welcome to XMCA.  Your bringing in the writings of the "enactivists" is a
perspective that I also agree is a line of inquiry that can deepen our
reflections on dwelling in the world.
Could you tell us a bit more about McGilchrist's new book. How does it link
up to notions of dwelling-in-the-world?

Your reference to Ingold's articles on the archives [google "ingold XMCA"
and the archives are the first item. Then go to 2001 discussion papers] was
a lead [line] that I followed up and I agree that his critique of the
"complimentary thesis" and the alternative perspective of developing "skills
in attention" or "tuning" is exploring the theme of dwelling in the world.
As Mike mentioned, Merleau-Ponty's perspective on "knowing" as "expression"
[not to be confused with Husserlian expression] is explorinf this realm of
paying attention and tuning as a way to be at home or dwell in the world.
I also hope that this line of inquiry, [Ingold is an example, and so is John
Shotter's article I posted from his website are exploring and re-searching
the links and relations BETWEEN the visible [perceptual] and invisible
[thought and language] that is NON-reductive to either empirial OR
phenomenological accounts but rather is a REVERSIBLE intertwining. The
example of binocular vision [Bateson and M-P both use this metaphor] and
Bernstein's example of the smith [in Ingold's article in archives] are
paradigmatic of this line of inquiry.  At the center of this line of inquiry
is the exploration of "anticipation" "responsiveness to the other" AND the
irreducability of the difference-separation of the other..

One possible way to bring this line of inquiry into the discussion of
Vygotsky's exploration of the levels of thought and language is to focus on
the level of motivation which Vygotsky suggests [at the end of the book] is
foundational for the EMERGENCE of thought and language.  This notion of
motivation [a key concept in Vygotsky's project] points to the notion of "to
motivate" [self and others] "to move" to "dwell-in-the-world", to be "at
home in the world" as a process of RELATIONAL BEING and BECOMING that is
always about EXCESS and OVERFLOWING and OVERLAPPING intertwining [REVERSIBLE
ECART as separation-difference which is NOT difference as opposition]
"Self" "other", "world" are always aspects of a single activity of
expression that produce cultural historical objects.

Larry
On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 2:31 AM, Sarah Eagle <s.eagle@bristol.ac.uk> wrote:

> I notice there are a couple of Ingold papers on the lchc Archive and that
> there was a discussion of his work some years back on xmca. I've enjoyed
> those papers and been dipping into the essays in his book *"The Perception
> of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill*" (2000) at
> the
> same time as reading the work of the enactivists (Maturana, Varela,
> Thompson) plus Iain McGilchrist's  *The Master and His Emissary: The
> Divided
> Brain and the Making of the Western World* (2009).
>
> It's quite a heady mix. Merleau-Ponty is a common thread across all.
> Ingold's *flow* and *dwelling *finds parallels in both the other texts. I'm
> not sufficiently well versed in Thought and Language to begin even to
> phrase
> questions about the connections with Vygotskian ideas, but I can see that
> they are there. So I hope the Merleau-Ponty / Ingold thread continues and
> helps at least this xmca reader to  begin to articulate her own queries and
> lines of thought!
>
> Sarah Eagle, Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, UK
>
> On 18 July 2011 07:19, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Mike, I do find this "line of inquiry" fascinating.
> >  I googled Tim Ingold and notice he has written a book on how we "orient"
> to
> > the world through taking a particular "line".   I also notice he is
> > exploring a concept labelled "dwelling-in-the-world".  Samuel Todes [who
> > John Shotter has written about] wrote a book which he wrote as his thesis
> in
> > 1963. [It was finally published in 2001.] It is titled "Body and World".
> In
> > that book a central notion is the need to find a sense of being "at home
> in
> > the world".  My hunch is that Todes and Ingold are exploring similar
> > themes.
> > These notions of "dwelling-in-the-world" or "being at-home-in-the-world"
> > point to what may be a central MOTIVATION of all persons.  If this is
> > possible, then Vygotsky's summary statements of chapter seven of "thought
> &
> > world" where he transitions from "inner thought" to the more deeply
> personal
> > level of "motivation" may be the link or intertwining between  Vygotsky
> and
> > Merleau-Ponty [and Ingold, Todes, and Shotter]  M-P, Todes, Ingold, and
> > Shotter are all exploring the notion of "expression" or "expressive
> > cognition" as the concept linking [intertwining]  "sedimented"
> > discourses [systems of meaning] and the living microgenetic movement of
> > creative novel embodied expressive cognition.  In other words, a central
> > motivation for persons may be the process of orienting or coordinating
> > activities in order to feel at home in the world.
> > Since expessive cognition for M-P IS this movement of orienting or
> dwelling
> > in the world, his particular notion of expressive cognition [as a master
> > concept] needs to be elaborated.  The first step is to distinguish M-P's
> > notion of expression from Husserl's notion of expression. They are
> radically
> > different.  Following is Lawrence Hass' acount of the differences.
> >
> >  Husserl  was articulating a "platonic" perspective of searching for the
> > NECESSARY property [eidos] that is inherent to and defines an object.
>  For
> > M-P the goal was to articulate how the world is illuminated through open
> > ambiguous gestalts that with expression  form along one line of
> possibility
> > [among multiple potential possibilities]  Phenomenology as articulated by
> > Husserl's notion of "expression" was a search for the differentiation of
> the
> > empirical from expression [subjectivity]
> >  This position is often taken to be the central idea of all
> phenomenology.
> > However M-P's phenomenology is distinctly non-Husserlian and
> > anti-transcendental. For M-P "knowledge" is NOT re-presentation of what
> has
> > come before or a search for transcendental objects outside history. For
> M-P
> > "expression" is a creative transformation [sublimation] of the given
> field
> > into new novel forms. Lawrence Hass compares M-P's insights on expression
> as
> > similar in many respects to Deleuze's notion that centralizes expression
> as
> > an operation through which univocal being perpetually unfolds,
> multiplies,
> > and differentiates itself.
> >
> > Hass points out how M-P's project had a developmental history. In his
> > earlier work M-P focused on the priority of "origins" and talked of
> > expression as "originating" thought. Thought was secondary or derived
> from
> > expression. Living perception was also primary to thought.  Hass agrees
> that
> > M-P's earlier work is open to this line of critique or "nostalgia for
> > origins" and a search for what is primary. In his earlier works living
> > perception was more primary than scientific discourse.  But in M-P's
> later
> > writings he came to understand this line of understanding phenomenology
> was
> > flawed.  He came to realize that phenomenology is only one important mode
> or
> > level of discourse ABOUT the world, but not more fundamental than all the
> > other possible modes and he stopped talk of what is primary.  For M-P the
> > phenomenon of expression requires a radical re-vision [re-search] of the
> > whole notion of "primary"
> >
> > M-P  acknowledges secondary, derived, ready-made thoughts as the upshot
> of
> > expressions that have SETTLED into habits. However, new, novel expressive
> > thinking and speaking always emerge amid sedimented thoughts, memories,
> and
> > language WITHOUT BEING REDUCIBLE TO THEM.  The relation between
> expressive
> > and sedimented thought and language is mutually informing, symbiotic,
> > non-reductive, intertwining. I will quote M-P to highlight this important
> > point.
> >
> > "We must therefore say about sedimented language in relation to meaning
> > [that is expression] what Simone de Beauvoir says of the body in relation
> to
> > the mind: it is neither primary or secondary... there is no subordination
> > ... between them.  What we have to SAY is only the EXCESS of what we live
> > over what has already been said"
> >
> > Expressive thought is not derived in any deductive or causal sense FROM
> > sedimented language as GIVEN but neither is it more primary than or
> > foundational than sedimented language. The relationship is MARKED not by
> > empiricist or phenomenological REDUCTION but rather by excess and
> > creativity.  M-P is not denying the originality of the order or system or
> > discourse of knowledge vis-a-vis the perceptual order.  M-P is only
> trying
> > to loosen the web that ties them to one another, to re-discover the paths
> of
> > sublimation which transform the perceived world into the spoken world.
> [This
> > style of writing seems to have parallels to chapter 7 of Thought and
> > Language]  M-P's perspective on this relation between perception and
> > word highlights its non-reductive REVERSIBILITY between the visible and
> > invisible [perception and thought and language]  For M-P expression,
> > thinking, and language are intertwined aspects of the invisible.
> >
> > This line of thinking explores the deepest  level [of motivation as
> > expression] as a way to dwell-in-the-world or be at home in the world.  I
> > wonder if this line of inquiry has the potential to delve deeper into the
> > links between the levels of motivation and inner thought and word meaning
> in
> > Vygotsky's project?  Chapter 7 of Vygotsky's Thought and Language ends
> with
> > his reflecting on the level of motivation as fundamental and primary to
> the
> > forming of thought and language.  Merleau-Ponty, Todes, Ingold, and
> Shotter
> > are scholars who are exploring a particular aspect of motivation within a
> > cultural-historical perspective.  Motivation as orienting and
> coordinating
> > [expression] as a WAY to be at home in the world.
> >
> > A final comment is that this line of thinking may add to the relections
> on
> > discourse and activity that Anna Sfard and Andy were discussing as a
> search
> > for an intertwining "discursive activity"  Lawrence Hass in his book
> reviews
> > Husserl's views on mathematical objects that adds other perspectives to
> > understanding math objects. Anna's theory of reification as communication
> > shares many points of agreement with M-P.  However, he adds a perceptual
> > level of intertwining to add another dimension to the discussion.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 9:57 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > I figured you would be interested in the way M-P is circulating around
> this
> > > and related discussions, Larry.
> > >
> > > Right now my wife has our copy of *Metaphysical Club* with the turned
> down
> > > pages.
> > > She has picked out some other relevant passages. I asked Tony a while
> back
> > > about
> > > the book because, in addition to finding it fascinating and relevant to
> > > xmca
> > > discussions, I was uncertain of the interpretation of Pierce .
> > >
> > > This speaks to the complaints about relying on interpreters, as Anton
> and
> > > Miller are advocating. Terrible to rely on interpreters, I agree. Just
> hard
> > > to avoid relying on them all the time. I fear wading into Pierce.
> > >
> > > With Merleau-Ponty I was so caught by his talk on people seen from the
> > > outside, I have been pondering over that text ever since. The new
> Ingold
> > > book, suggested by
> > > Joe Glick, really interests me because it brings Gibson together with
> M-P
> > > in
> > > such an
> > > interesting way. This overlaps work I have been doing trying to
> understand
> > > the affinities between Gibson and Russian followers of the Vygotsky
> group,
> > > fractured as it may have been, in the 30 years following his death.
> > >
> > > (The first American to go on the psychology exchange that Jim Wertsch
> and I
> > > eventually went on was a gibsonian, as well as a developmentalist, Herb
> > > Pick, and his wife, who also worked in that tradition).
> > >
> > > I am not sure how to take the discussion. There are a lot of
> affinities,
> a
> > > lot of overlaps, a lot of incomplete knowledge on all sides. It is not
> easy
> > > to discuss in any organized way. Perhaps, just enticing invitations to
> > > check
> > > things out? (John Shotter would be great to include in the discussion,
> why
> > > not try enticing him!?).
> > >
> > > Whither?
> > > mike
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, Jul 16, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Mike
> > > >
> > > > I was interested in your brief comments on The Metaphysical Club and
> also
> > > > on
> > > > Merleau-Ponty.
> > > > I have almost finished Lawrence Hass' book "Merleau-Ponty's
> Philosophy"
> > > and
> > > > am seeing many intertwinings with CHAT discussions.
> > > >
> > > > The central place of experience as gestalt [figure/ground] that is
> OPEN
> > > and
> > > > creative and NOT representative, is a central notion.
> > > > M-P is often confused as sharing Husseral's transcendental
> perspective
> of
> > > > bracketing subjective experience but Hass points out for M-P the
> world
> > > and
> > > > perception of the world as getalten  OVERFLOWS all conceptual forms.
> > > > Gestalten have multiple possibilities and potentials which our minds
> try
> > > to
> > > > grasp and perceive. At the moment of re-cognition the multiple
> > > overflowing
> > > > possibilities crystallize into a figure/ground gestalt that is
> perceived
> > > > and
> > > > in the NEXT moment in the sequence the person subjectively
> experiences
> > > THAT
> > > > PARTICULAR perception as a RESULT of NECESSITY.  The act of
> expressive
> > > > cognition is an act of ECART [separation-differentiation which is NOT
> > > > difference as OPPOSITION.]
> > > > In the act of grasping the world the world is simultaneously grasping
> > > > the perceiver. There is an irreducible difference but not dichotomy
> of
> > > > opposites.
> > > > This notion of difference as fundamental and that this difference can
> > > never
> > > > be reduced to identity is central to M-P's project.  He shares with
> > > Levinas
> > > > an understanding of the irreducuible otherness of the other and the
> world
> > > > BUT he does not frame this difference of otherness as opposition.
> > > > This style of writing shares similarities to the notions of
> "dialogue"
> as
> > > > intertwining fabric that is separate but not in opposition.  Lawrence
> > > Hass
> > > > suggests we read M-P with Levinas to achieve an intertwining of their
> > > > notions of the otherness of the other.  Hass points out their
> "styles"
> > > are
> > > > different. Whereas M-P recognizes ECART [separation-difference] as a
> > > > fundamental process that allows us to "sing the world" as carnal
> > > expression
> > > > Levinas is concerned with recognition as a form of totalizing of the
> > > other
> > > > to the same. Basically Hass suggests that M-P and Levinas offer
> > > > "complementary" perspectives on separation-difference that together
> offer
> > > > an
> > > > intertwining of recognition that is deeper than either monological
> > > > perspective.
> > > >
> > > > Another central idea from M-P is that ALL representational knowledge
> is
> > > an
> > > > abstraction that is experienced cognitively as a NECESSITY [after the
> > > fact
> > > > of expressive cognition]  This necessity can be understood as primary
> and
> > > > conceptual but in actuality is derivative of primary expressive
> > > cognition.
> > > > Hass in Chapter 6 discusses mathematical objects and his views share
> with
> > > > Anna Sfard a notion of mathematical objects as expressive movements
> in
> > > > cultural-historical time.  M-P rejects the notion of mathematical
> objects
> > > > as
> > > > transcendental existants that are discovered in historical time
> > > [Husserl's
> > > > perspective]
> > > > Hass says M-P has been understood as sharing Husserl's transcendental
> > > > phenomenology when n actual fact his phenomenology is deeply
> > > > cultural-historical and ideas such as mathematical objects SOURCE is
> in
> > > > expressive cognition.
> > > >
> > > > Mike I may want to read the book by Ingold if you recommend it.
> > > > Also, has John Shotter's recent writings been discussed on XMCA.  I
> know
> > > he
> > > > is often situated as a social constructionist [like Kenneth Gergen]
> but
> > > his
> > > > incorporating ideas from M-P. Bateson, and a perso named Todes [wrote
> > > Body
> > > > &
> > > > World, 2001] suggest he is working in an overflowing, overlapping
> > > grasping
> > > > of new and novel ways to "know".
> > > >
> > > > Larry
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