[xmca] Merleau-Ponty and Vygotsky

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Mike

I was interested in your brief comments on The Metaphysical Club and also on
Merleau-Ponty.
I have almost finished Lawrence Hass' book "Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy" and
am seeing many intertwinings with CHAT discussions.

The central place of experience as gestalt [figure/ground] that is OPEN and
creative and NOT representative, is a central notion.
M-P is often confused as sharing Husseral's transcendental perspective of
bracketing subjective experience but Hass points out for M-P the world and
perception of the world as getalten  OVERFLOWS all conceptual forms.
Gestalten have multiple possibilities and potentials which our minds try to
grasp and perceive. At the moment of re-cognition the multiple overflowing
possibilities crystallize into a figure/ground gestalt that is perceived and
in the NEXT moment in the sequence the person subjectively experiences THAT
PARTICULAR perception as a RESULT of NECESSITY.  The act of expressive
cognition is an act of ECART [separation-differentiation which is NOT
difference as OPPOSITION.]
In the act of grasping the world the world is simultaneously grasping
the perceiver. There is an irreducible difference but not dichotomy of
opposites.
This notion of difference as fundamental and that this difference can never
be reduced to identity is central to M-P's project.  He shares with Levinas
an understanding of the irreducuible otherness of the other and the world
BUT he does not frame this difference of otherness as opposition.
This style of writing shares similarities to the notions of "dialogue" as
intertwining fabric that is separate but not in opposition.  Lawrence Hass
suggests we read M-P with Levinas to achieve an intertwining of their
notions of the otherness of the other.  Hass points out their "styles" are
different. Whereas M-P recognizes ECART [separation-difference] as a
fundamental process that allows us to "sing the world" as carnal expression
Levinas is concerned with recognition as a form of totalizing of the other
to the same. Basically Hass suggests that M-P and Levinas offer
"complementary" perspectives on separation-difference that together offer an
intertwining of recognition that is deeper than either monological
perspective.

Another central idea from M-P is that ALL representational knowledge is an
abstraction that is experienced cognitively as a NECESSITY [after the fact
of expressive cognition]  This necessity can be understood as primary and
conceptual but in actuality is derivative of primary expressive cognition.
Hass in Chapter 6 discusses mathematical objects and his views share with
Anna Sfard a notion of mathematical objects as expressive movements in
cultural-historical time.  M-P rejects the notion of mathematical objects as
transcendental existants that are discovered in historical time [Husserl's
perspective]
Hass says M-P has been understood as sharing Husserl's transcendental
phenomenology when n actual fact his phenomenology is deeply
cultural-historical and ideas such as mathematical objects SOURCE is in
expressive cognition.

Mike I may want to read the book by Ingold if you recommend it.
Also, has John Shotter's recent writings been discussed on XMCA.  I know he
is often situated as a social constructionist [like Kenneth Gergen] but his
incorporating ideas from M-P. Bateson, and a perso named Todes [wrote Body &
World, 2001] suggest he is working in an overflowing, overlapping grasping
of new and novel ways to "know".

Larry
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