Re: [xmca] Paradigms, Hyperdigms, Hypodigms

[Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>]

>
> Mike,
>
   To answer your question about the Dewey quote. It was written in
   Dewey, J. (1916). *Democracy and education*. New York: Free Press.

   Since then there have been many CHAT examples of how that has "worked"
and how it has not .

   Right?

   Robert



> Also, reading about Europe between 1918-1940 its hard to believe your Dewey
> quote below. The first part seems true enough but the second?
>
> mike
>
>
> On Mon, Jan 17, 2011 at 6:21 AM, Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> >wrote:
>
> > Happy MLK day to David K. and Everyone!
> >
> > Does pluralism equate with a reduction to the lowest common denominator
> or
> > does it mean  an interdependent yet distinct set of approaches that
> > welcomes
> > difference without expecting each practitioner to be a "jack of all
> > trades"?
> >
> > RL
> > On Sun, Jan 16, 2011 at 10:08 PM, David Kellogg <
> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > I'm with him; with the other David K. The generic approach really
> demands
> > > too much Jack-of-all-tradesmanship of the teacher, and the Jack of all
> > > trades, while very useful in pioneer times, is ultimately a master of
> > none.
> > >
> > > Yes, in Chapter ONE of T&S Vygotsky is defining the problem and the
> > > approach. But even there he doesn't exactly want to let a hundred
> flowers
> > > blossom and a hundred schools of thought content. The problem he
> > addresses
> > > is quite specific, and within this problem there is really only
> > legitimate
> > > method, and it's not the tried and true method of analysis into
> elements
> > > that forms the basis of the extant genre.
> > >
> > > In Chapter TWO Vygotsky is even less eclectic, if possible. He BEGINS
> by
> > > saying that Piaget (actually Claparede) associates himself with Freud,
> > > Blondel, and Levy-Bruhl as a great pioneer of an entirely new field.
> But
> > > then he says that this is not at all an enviable position: Freud,
> > Blondel,
> > > and Levy-Bruhl created their psychologies from problem to paradigm, and
> > this
> > > is exactly what is wrong with them, and why their psychologies
> inevitably
> > > end up with that peculiarly metaphysical smell imparted by an
> > overambitious
> > > bottom-upmanship. (It's a familiar problem for painters: when you frame
> > the
> > > painting according to the subject you end up making your picture too
> > small,
> > > but when you want to include enough background to make sense of it, you
> > > always end up making your picture too big.)
> > >
> > > When LSV talks about "general" psychology and the necessity to "unify"
> > > psychology, he's not just making the point that individual psychology
> has
> > to
> > > be seen, contra Wundt, as an instantiation of social psychology. He's
> > also
> > > calling for what in applied linguistics has come to be called "theory
> > > culling", the falsification and the destruction of some entirely wrong
> > > paradigms (e.g. Bergson, elan vital, Mach, Freud, Levy-Bruhl, Blondel,
> > and
> > > Piaget too.).
> > >
> > > I think he would say that "general psychology", in which he would
> include
> > > sociology (see Chapter Four) and semiology, must become the hyperdigm.
> > What
> > > we now call psychology is really what he calls "individual psychology",
> > and
> > > that is the paradigm. Education would be a hypodigm of psychology
> dealing
> > > with teaching/learning and microgenetic change.
> > >
> > > One way to look at this is to think of the subordination of paradigms
> to
> > > hyperdigms and their superordination to hypodigms in terms of the TIME
> > > variable. Social psychology, the hyperdigm, is really the study of
> > > sociogenesis, the functional differentiation of societies and their
> > > resultant structure, just as biology is the study of biogenesis, the
> > > evolutionary differentiation of species, and the resulting structures.
> > >
> > > Individual psychology, for Vygotsky, is the study of ontogenesis,
> > > functional differentiation between and within individuals, and the
> > > psychological structures that come out of this, and of course the
> > > hypodigm, education, is the study of microgenesis. That's OUR cue;
> > > it's where we (teachers) come in!
> > >
> > > David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > > --- On Sun, 1/16/11, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu>
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" <
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Date: Sunday, January 16, 2011, 10:43 AM
> > >
> > >
> > > Andy,
> > >
> > > The question of whether you, Vygotsky, I, or anyone else thinks
> multiple
> > > paradigms are a good idea needs to be separated from the question of
> > > whether psychology is preparadigmatic in the sense of questing toward
> > > paradigmatic consensus. Kuhn's sociology of science analysis does not
> > > imply that every, or indeed any, particular scientist interprets their
> > > work in terms of this sociological imperative. But in the case of
> > > psychology, we can see certain historical processes that are not easy
> to
> > > account for otherwise. I'm thinking, particularly, of the dynamic of
> > > paradigmatic ambitions presented as solid (or immanent)
> accomplishments,
> > > only to be beaten back by proponents of other schools. Think for
> > > Skinner's (1958) attempt to extend behavioral psychology from
> unmediated
> > > response conditioning to verbal behavior beaten back by Chomsky's
> (1959)
> > > famous book review, or the counterattack of Anderson, Reder, and Simon
> > > (1996) in the face of defections by notable cognitivists like Brown,
> > > Collins, and Duguid (1989), Greeno (1993), Hirst and Manier (1995)
> > > dissatisfied with cognitivist attempts to account for the problem of
> > > "context." I argue this kind of discourse is not characteristic of
> > > paradigmatic science, but instead supports the thesis that psychology
> is
> > > preparadigmatic.
> > >
> > > If, as you suggest, multiple paradigms--not competing, but co-existing
> > > peacefully--is a happy steady-state for psychology, then we'd expect a
> > > genres approach for education to have arisen long ago as an alternative
> > > to saddling educational practitioners with the need to grapple with
> > > dialectical syntheses across paradigms. On the other hand, if
> > > preparadigmatic psychology is ever questing toward paradigmatic
> > > consensus, then expect psychologists to resist a genres approach
> through
> > > many different sorts of explanations, including, possibly, denying the
> > > preparadigmatic status of their science.
> > >
> > > David
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: Sunday, January 16, 2011 7:12 AM
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > >
> > > I certainly don't see the problematic you pose, David, as indicating a
> > > need for us to "grow up" and actually I find "genre" as you present it,
> > > a very fruitful way of characterising the problem. Shortly before your
> > > earlier message arrived I had been reading LSV's "Thinking and Speech,"
> > > Chapter 1. I can't for the life of me find a suitable succinct quote,
> > > but as I recall it, he was saying that Psychology was, as you say, not
> > > yet able to form a unified theory, and that (something like) every new
> > > observation or problem launched a new theory. Now, I don't read
> Vygotsky
> > >
> > > as attempting to create a master theory. On the contrary he argues
> > > against this, as I see it. His piece about the "unit" in that chapter
> > > says that we have to form a concept of the class of phenomena or
> > > *problem* that we want to solve and unfold a theory from there, as
> > > opposed to subordinating that definite class of problem to a more
> > > general one which lacks the special characteristics of the special
> > > probem we want to solve.Confusion has arisen I think from trying to
> read
> > >
> > > LSV's theory of the relation of thinking and speaking as a grand theory
> > > of consciousness.
> > >
> > > So it seems to me that in any very general field of phenomena multiple
> > > genre are quite OK, fruitful and just as useful as they are in everyday
> > > life. (Imagine trying to get by in everyday life with one genre!) Only
> > > each "genre" needs to have a clear concept of the class of problems
> that
> > >
> > > it covers. That's why I raise the question of stepping back one step
> > > from a genre and ask: how does this genre frame the phenomena, as a
> > > problem, as a unit or concept of its subject matter.
> > >
> > > I think if we do that the messy competition between currents of
> thinking
> > >
> > > could be presented in a way which was productive.
> > >
> > > What do you think?
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > David H Kirshner wrote:
> > > > Larry and Andy,
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for kind words.
> > > >
> > > > Andy, I don't have the philosophical background to be able to address
> > > > your question as formulated. But I read the intent of the question as
> > > > probing the utility of the paradigm construct, and hence the genres
> > > > solution: If all differences of opinion are ultimately paradigm
> > > > differences, then shouldn't we just grow up, accept differences in
> > > > framing as inevitable, and get on with debating issues and acting on
> > > the
> > > > basis of our best judgment following from the debate? Why should we
> > > > regard differences of opinion that emerge in psychological framings
> of
> > > > learning as different from other disagreements, and requiring its own
> > > > new kind of solution, namely a "genres" solution?
> > > >
> > > > Let me address that concern directly. Take as a major instance the
> > > > difference between sociogenetic and ontogenetic (i.e., individualist)
> > > > approaches to learning. These approaches construe the world of
> > > learning
> > > > in very different terms, each highlighting certain questions as
> > > crucial,
> > > > while other questions are incidental. Not coincidently, each can
> > > answer
> > > > certain questions, to wit the ones it considers important, much more
> > > > effectively than the other questions.
> > > >
> > > > We have the following usual choices: Adopt one perspective based on
> > > the
> > > > promise that it (eventually) will be able to answer the full set of
> > > > questions adequately; or construct a new theory as a dialectical
> > > > synthesis of the original two. (I think socioculturalists straddle
> the
> > > > two choices by sometimes claiming they are sociogenetic and other
> > > times
> > > > that they are inherently dialectic.)
> > > >
> > > > In the behaviorist era and subsequently the cognitive area, the first
> > > > choice was more appealing. The desire to be "scientific" (i.e.,
> > > > uni-paradigmatic), in conjunction with shameless hawking by
> > > proponents,
> > > > gave those approaches some time to adequately address the concerns of
> > > > the other school. As neither succeeded in unifying the field, in this
> > > > post-cognitive era, we opt more for dialectical approaches.
> > > >
> > > > The problem is that these dialectical alternatives, rather like the
> > > > particle/wave dialectic of quantum physics, don't really help us make
> > > > sense of the world in a way that is actionable. Our intuitions about
> > > > learning are not able to encompass both sides of the dialectic in
> such
> > > a
> > > > way as to constitute a synthesis. As a result, a dialectic approach
> > > puts
> > > > on the table the diverse and discordant pieces that somehow have to
> be
> > > > coordinated. Paul Cobb (1994) addressed this problem of
> constructivist
> > > > and sociocultural approaches in a widely read ER piece recommending
> > > > precisely that: a coordination of perspectives.
> > > >
> > > > Well, obviously a coordination of perspectives is exactly what is
> > > > needed. The issue at hand is who does the coordinating? In Cobb's
> > > > approach--as in all other academic approaches that have been
> > > offered--it
> > > > is the researcher's challenge to figure out the coordination. In this
> > > > way, the work of coordination can take place in the academy in
> concert
> > > > with efforts to forge a dialectical synthesis that eventually could
> > > > serve to unify the science of learning under a single theorization.
> > > This
> > > > is why a genres approach is so disruptive. A genres approach says,
> > > > instead, let's focus within each paradigm on figuring out what that
> > > > framing has to offer teaching. Then leave it to teachers, to the
> world
> > > > of professional practice, to figure out how (or if) to coordinate.
> > > >
> > > > For the researcher, this genres approach is a disaster. It constructs
> > > > what is most important for researchers--an eventual dialectical
> > > > synthesis that unites the field--as irrelevant to the world of
> > > practice.
> > > > Our theoretical musing no longer are projected into the world of
> > > > educational practice as relevant, they become just our private
> > > concern,
> > > > with possible long-term payoff for the world, but no immediate
> > > > relevance. For teachers, the genres approach finally provides for
> > > > emancipation from the intellectual tyranny of theory. Because the
> > > > individual paradigms are grounded in accessible metaphors for
> > > learning,
> > > > it becomes possible to articulate pedagogical principles in ways that
> > > > are coherently available to teachers. And then it becomes the purview
> > > of
> > > > professional practice to determine how best to coordinate the genres
> > > of
> > > > teaching.
> > > >
> > > > This is truly a moral dilemma for researchers.
> > > >
> > > > David
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > > Sent: Saturday, January 15, 2011 6:51 PM
> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > > >
> > > > Thank you David for your truly enlightening post.
> > > >
> > > > Can I ask this question: when two subjects are engaged in a dialogue
> > > > over some issue, and are positing the issue in two different genres,
> > > is
> > > > it true to say that they are explicitly or implicitly asserting
> > > > different frames. For example, if two parties are arguing over
> whether
> > >
> > > > to increase unemployment benefit, they may disagree over the frame
> > > being
> > > >
> > > > lazy people ripping off the community or disadvantaged people who
> > > > deserve the support of the community. So isn't there always a frame
> > > > around a genre where rational contest is possible? Every specialism
> > > > exists within a lingua franca of shared concepts, doesn't it?
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > David H Kirshner wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Larry, Andy, Michael, and Monica.
> > > >>
> > > >> Sorry for the delay in responding. Let me first address the
> > > technology
> > > >> tie-in, and then turn to the pedagogical question about how to deal
> > > >>
> > > > with
> > > >
> > > >> the multi-paradigmatic theorization of learning.
> > > >>
> > > >> I'm sympathetic to the perspective that it is "the current
> > > >>
> > > > technologies
> > > >
> > > >> being used and developed which transforms our guiding metaphors [for
> > > >> learning] and not the internal debates among scholars." If we look
> at
> > > >> the whole ball of wax, psychology certainly does seem a chaotic
> > > tangle
> > > >> that may well be led by technological happenstance rather than by
> > > >> intellectual coherence. But the proliferation of new schools and new
> > > >> approaches based on technological developments should not obscure
> the
> > > >> kinds of processes of development that go within each paradigmatic
> > > >> school. Certainly, paradigmatic differences are not settled by
> > > debate.
> > > >> As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is inescapably
> > > >>
> > > > sociological
> > > >
> > > >> rather than purely intellectual. What about within a paradigm? As
> > > >> sociohistorical institutions schools of research persist over time
> > > >> because of mutually shared projects that often are experienced as
> > > >> intellectually coherent. Certainly technological developments can
> > > >> influence the basic understandings pursued within a school. For
> > > >> instance, psychologists moved on from the telephone switchboard
> > > >>
> > > > metaphor
> > > >
> > > >> of cognitive processing to the serial digital computer metaphor
> which
> > > >> afforded much more dynamic possibilities for theorization, but with
> > > >>
> > > > much
> > > >
> > > >> basic conceptual continuity. I don't think it's "wrong" to regard
> > > >>
> > > > intra
> > > >
> > > >> paradigmatic development as led by technological developments.
> > > >>
> > > > However,
> > > >
> > > >> I imagine most of the time, for example in thinking about our own
> > > >> progress as sociocultural or CHAT researchers, we find it useful to
> > > >>
> > > > view
> > > >
> > > >> progress in terms of intellectual coherence. In any case, in my work
> > > >>
> > > > in
> > > >
> > > >> harvesting insights from the diverse branches of psychology for the
> > > >> purpose of framing a multi-paradigmatic pedagogy, I find it useful
> to
> > > >> regard the work within paradigms as progressing through rational
> > > >>
> > > > debate
> > > >
> > > >> (or at least attempting to).
> > > >>
> > > >> A Multi-paradigmatic Pedagogical Framework:
> > > >>
> > > >> How do we advance pedagogical theory taking seriously the
> > > >> multi-paradigmatic status of learning theory?
> > > >>
> > > >> Let me warn that this is a theme I've pursued before on xmca without
> > > >> much uptake--I think for very good reasons. The path leads to
> > > >> delegitimization of education as a co-participant with psychology in
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> scientific enterprise. Alternatively, it leads to the repudiation by
> > > >> education of psychology's scientific pretensions. Given how deeply
> > > >> enmeshed educational and psychological communities are with one
> > > >>
> > > > another
> > > >
> > > >> (e.g., xmca) this is not an easy or appealing path for either party.
> > > >>
> > > >> The first step on this path is the hardest to take, though it is
> > > >>
> > > > simple
> > > >
> > > >> to articulate. If we accept that learning is diversely conceived
> > > >>
> > > > across
> > > >
> > > >> varied paradigms, and we also regard the purpose of teaching as
> > > >> promoting learning, then there is only one sensible path to take if
> > > >>
> > > > one
> > > >
> > > >> desires pedagogical theory to be grounded in learning theory: A
> > > genres
> > > >> approach to pedagogical theorizing, with each genre of teaching
> > > >> addressing learning in a particular paradigmatic sense. To date, a
> > > >> genres approach has not been advanced. However, there are two
> > > >> alternative approaches that have been attempted, in each case with
> > > >> disastrous consequences. One method is to focus on a single paradigm
> > > >>
> > > > and
> > > >
> > > >> deny the legitimacy of any others (e.g., the behaviorist era in
> > > >> education). The other is to fashion a holistic vision of "good
> > > >>
> > > > teaching"
> > > >
> > > >> that somehow is to address learning in its various interpretations.
> > > >>
> > > > This
> > > >
> > > >> is the current Zeitgeist in educational theorizing, and I'll devote
> a
> > > >> couple of paragraphs, below, to explaining its multifaceted ill
> > > >>
> > > > effects
> > > >
> > > >> on education, the most immediate and debilitating of which is
> > > systemic
> > > >> de-intellectualization of pedagogy. For if teaching practice is to
> be
> > > >> understood in terms of learning theory, it can only be in terms of a
> > > >> single theory at a time, given the multi-paradigmatic character of
> > > >>
> > > > this
> > > >
> > > >> branch of knowledge.
> > > >>
> > > >> I have been teaching an Education doctoral course on the genres
> > > >>
> > > > approach
> > > >
> > > >> for about 15 years, and I've ALMOST NEVER succeeded in making this
> > > >>
> > > > first
> > > >
> > > >> step comprehensible. So entrenched in our discourse are the ideas of
> > > >> holistic pedagogy--"good teaching" as a set of practices that
> > > >>
> > > > addresses
> > > >
> > > >> learning conceived as a complex and multifaceted whole--that the
> > > >> language of genres just doesn't register for my students. Typically,
> > > >> when I present a framework for teaching for Skills, Concepts, and
> > > >> Dispositions as distinct genres of teaching, this gets assimilated
> > > >>
> > > > into
> > > >
> > > >> a "learning styles" frame in which the different pedagogical
> > > >>
> > > > approaches
> > > >
> > > >> provide different routes to learning conceived as a complex and
> > > >> multi-faceted whole. Indeed, our discourse typically intermixes
> these
> > > >> learning goals as we talk of "understanding the skill," "practicing
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> concept," or "inculcating thinking skills." Students almost never
> > > come
> > > >> to grasp the motive of differentiating, rather than integrating,
> > > these
> > > >> notions of learning as a comprehensible agenda.
> > > >>
> > > >> The cost we pay for maintaining an integrative or holistic discourse
> > > >> about "good teaching" in education is staggeringly high. First, is
> > > the
> > > >> impossibility of articulating pedagogical principles, which, as
> > > >> discussed above would require that learning be conceived locally,
> > > >> relative to the independently conceived notions of learning. Because
> > > >>
> > > > in
> > > >
> > > >> the standard discourse "good teaching" is somehow simultaneously to
> > > >> address learning in its many various senses, we end up instead with
> > > >> generalities and platitudes, with intractably dense dialectical
> > > >>
> > > > analyses
> > > >
> > > >> attempting to span disparate local theories, and with vignettes that
> > > >>
> > > > are
> > > >
> > > >> meant to illustrate good teaching, but that don't articulate its
> > > >> principles. In short, we provide almost no usable intellectual
> > > >>
> > > > resources
> > > >
> > > >> that can serve to guide development of teaching practice.
> > > >>
> > > >> Second is the politicized character of our pedagogical discourse
> > > >> stemming from the interpenetration of values issues with issues of
> > > >> efficacy. Given the varied notions of learning that motivate
> > > >>
> > > > educators,
> > > >
> > > >> it is to be expected that values issues will arise as to which
> > > sort(s)
> > > >> of learning ought to be pursued with students. But since our
> > > discourse
> > > >> constructs good teaching as a holistic set of practices, there's no
> > > >> discursive space for this variation. One's opponent's construction
> of
> > > >> good teaching is not just wrong on values, but also misguided about
> > > >>
> > > > what
> > > >
> > > >> is effective practice (e.g., the Reading Wars and the Math Wars). A
> > > >> discourse framed in genres of teaching would enable values issues to
> > > >>
> > > > be
> > > >
> > > >> separated from issues of efficacy, thereby protecting the
> > > professional
> > > >> integrity of the field of teaching practice.
> > > >>
> > > >> Finally, with so little to offer professional teaching practice,
> > > >> learning theory is easily subject to being dismissed as irrelevant.
> > > If
> > > >> Teaching is defined in terms of promoting Learning, then learning
> > > >>
> > > > theory
> > > >
> > > >> ought to be THE theoretical discourse through which teaching
> practice
> > > >>
> > > > is
> > > >
> > > >> articulated. We see our growing irrelevance in the current
> prominence
> > > >>
> > > > of
> > > >
> > > >> "brain" perspectives on teaching--which is what started this
> > > >>
> > > > thread--but
> > > >
> > > >> also in other cognitive mechanisms approaches like "learning styles"
> > > >> research, as well as in pedagogical framings based on critical
> > > theory,
> > > >> values theory, philosophical commitments, or metaphysical or
> > > spiritual
> > > >> bases. In the end what we have is an open-ended pedagogical
> discourse
> > > >>
> > > > in
> > > >
> > > >> which each new proposal for "good teaching" can create its own
> > > >>
> > > > universe
> > > >
> > > >> of discourse within which it is to be analyzed and evaluated. The
> > > >> marketplace of pedagogical ideas resembles much more a bazaar than a
> > > >> professional knowledge base. A genres approach, while featuring a
> > > >> theoretically heterogeneous set of framings for learning,
> nonetheless
> > > >> would enable us to capture the essential interests that motivate the
> > > >> pedagogical enterprise within a finite and determinate set of
> > > >> theoretical approaches.
> > > >>
> > > >> Genres: Why Not?
> > > >>
> > > >> One excellent reason to dismiss the genres approach is because it is
> > > >>
> > > > so
> > > >
> > > >> obvious. After all, it is immediately apparent that learning is
> > > >> diversely conceived in varied psychological paradigms. So
> > > >>
> > > > theorizations
> > > >
> > > >> of good teaching that really come to grips with learning theory
> would
> > > >> need to be constructed locally, relative to a specific notion of
> > > >> learning. Surely, if a genres approach had any merit it would have
> > > >>
> > > > been
> > > >
> > > >> adopted, or at least explored, a long time ago.
> > > >>
> > > >> The alternative is that there are powerful interests arrayed against
> > > >> recognizing and dealing with the preparadigmatic status of
> > > psychology.
> > > >>
> > > > I
> > > >
> > > >> propose that the genres approach has not previously been advanced
> > > >> because it is in psychologists' self interest that it not be.
> > > >>
> > > >> To understand these interests, we need to delve a bit into how
> > > >> preparadigmatic science functions. Preparadigmatic science consists
> > > of
> > > >> multiple schools each in competition with the others to the unify
> the
> > > >> field under its own banner. However, paradigmatic differences are
> > > >>
> > > > never
> > > >
> > > >> settled by debate. As Kuhn pointed out, the competitive process is
> > > >> inescapably sociological rather than purely intellectual. Viewed
> > > >>
> > > > through
> > > >
> > > >> divergent paradigmatic lenses, different aspects of observed
> > > phenomena
> > > >> become highlighted as problematic. So one paradigm cannot invalidate
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> perspectives of another. Instead, a paradigm succeeds against others
> > > >>
> > > > by
> > > >
> > > >> addressing the concerns of the other paradigms in ways that are
> > > >> sufficiently appealing and powerful as to attract established
> > > >> researchers from other schools, and especially new researchers just
> > > >> entering the field. Like old soldiers, old paradigms never die, they
> > > >> just fade away.
> > > >>
> > > >> Viewed in this way, we see that psychologists must lead double
> lives.
> > > >> Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that of
> > > >> most other scientists. They are involved in deliberate and careful
> > > >> elaboration and extension of the basic perspectives that initiated
> > > the
> > > >> school. However, externally, they are hucksters extraordinaire.
> > > Claims
> > > >> are exaggerated. Hoped for/planned developments are presented as
> > > faits
> > > >> accomplis. After all, one wins in the broader game by attracting
> > > >> researchers, especially neophyte researchers, to your school.
> > > >>
> > > >> One could castigate psychologists for being duplicitous or
> dishonest,
> > > >> but I think this freights individual psychology too heavily. What we
> > > >> have is best viewed not as individual misrepresentation, but a
> > > >> discursive form reflecting the sociological imperative of
> > > >> preparadigmatic science to achieve paradigmatic consensus. The
> ironic
> > > >> result is that across the broad diversity of psychology, there is
> > > only
> > > >> one tenet espoused by learning theorists of every persuasion: a
> > > single
> > > >> perspective (eventually) encompasses all of the relevant phenomena
> of
> > > >> learning. Thus a genres approach to pedagogy, building on discrete
> > > >> accomplishments across paradigmatic divisions, would subvert
> > > >> psychologists' active self-interest in promoting the problem of
> > > >> paradigmatic division as (imminently) solved.
> > > >>
> > > >> But what about educators? If psychologists prefer to deny the
> > > >> preparadigmatic status of their field, why is it that educators
> > > >>
> > > > haven't
> > > >
> > > >> pressed on with a genres approach on their own? Again, a
> sociological
> > > >> perspective can help, this time explaining the client status of
> > > >> Education with respect to Psychology. One of the first
> preoccupations
> > > >>
> > > > of
> > > >
> > > >> Psychology, dating back to its emergence as a scientific enterprise,
> > > >>
> > > > was
> > > >
> > > >> investigation of the transfer of training assumptions of faculty
> > > >> psychology (e.g., Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). These early studies
> > > >> found the prevailing belief in broad transfer of learning to be
> > > >> unwarranted. Through preceding centuries, the classical
> > > (Aristotelian)
> > > >> theory of faculty psychology, and its associated theory of
> > > >> mental-disciplines, had served as the basis for pedagogical thought.
> > > >>
> > > > So,
> > > >
> > > >> psychology's attack upon transfer of training effectively dislodged
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> existing foundations for educational practice. As a result,
> education
> > > >> attached itself to the new science, not as a separate and
> independent
> > > >> field of inquiry, but as a client discipline, dependent upon
> > > >>
> > > > psychology
> > > >
> > > >> for our legitimacy and intellectual authority. In that role, we have
> > > >> tended to see the world as the psychologists do. We have not
> > > construed
> > > >> psychology independently, as we would need to do to adopt a genres
> > > >> approach.
> > > >>
> > > >> Marshalling Preparadigmatic Psychology for Educational Purposes:
> > > >>
> > > >> I'm going to conclude this post with a description of how
> > > >>
> > > > psychological
> > > >
> > > >> theory gets appropriated and reworked in genres scholarship. (This
> > > >> really is where the psychologists get mad.) I mentioned, above, that
> > > >> "Within their paradigm, the psychologist's life is similar to that
> of
> > > >> most other scientists." Similar, but not identical. I want to argue
> > > >>
> > > > that
> > > >
> > > >> paradigmatic science develops more organically based on insights
> that
> > > >> bubble up from within the paradigm, in comparison with
> > > preparadigmatic
> > > >> science that is more teleologically driven by a felt need to address
> > > >> concerns that have emerged in other schools. For instance,
> > > >>
> > > > cognitivists
> > > >
> > > >> exploring the computational metaphor might eventually have decided,
> > > on
> > > >> their own, to extend from decontextualized problem solving to
> > > >>
> > > > encompass
> > > >
> > > >> social and cultural context. But the need to be positioned as
> > > >> competitive with sociogenetic approaches like sociocultural
> > > psychology
> > > >> forced this development earlier. In this respect, we can see a
> > > >> trajectory of preparadigmatic science that is not quite parallel
> with
> > > >> paradigmatic science. Preparadigmatic schools tends to evolve from
> > > >> simple and powerful, but local, initial insights toward complex and
> > > >> opaque interpretations intended to bridge disparate intuitions. And
> > > >>
> > > > then
> > > >
> > > >> again, some preparadigmatic schools--e.g., social constructivism and
> > > >> perhaps situated cognition theory, in psychology--initially are
> > > formed
> > > >> as a synthesis of diverse perspectives precisely in order to be
> > > >> competitive players in the preparadigmatic game, but without a clear
> > > >>
> > > > and
> > > >
> > > >> simple local insight. The result is that use of psychology to inform
> > > a
> > > >> genres approach must be highly selective, calling only on those
> > > >>
> > > > theories
> > > >
> > > >> that most effectively highlight a single metaphorical notion of
> > > >> learning, often relying on earlier, more narrow, versions of the
> > > >>
> > > > theory
> > > >
> > > >> over contemporary forms.
> > > >>
> > > >> In my own "crossdisciplinary"* effort to found a genres approach for
> > > >> education that builds on insights from diverse psychological
> schools,
> > > >> I've found it convenient to identify the metaphors for learning that
> > > I
> > > >> see as framing education's diverse interests, and then to hunt
> around
> > > >> for psychological approaches that help to fill out that metaphorical
> > > >> interpretation. In this approach, I am guided by the perspective
> that
> > > >> psychology often draws from our culturally shared metaphors for its
> > > >> basic images and intuitions (Fletcher, 1995; Leary, 1994; Olson &
> > > >> Bruner, 1996; Sternberg, 1997). For instance, my "habituation"
> > > >>
> > > > metaphor
> > > >
> > > >> for learning-as-skill-attainment draws somewhat on behaviorist
> > > >> psychology, but also on a branch of cognitive theory known as
> > > >>
> > > > "implicit
> > > >
> > > >> learning theory." My "construction" metaphor for
> > > >> learning-as-concept-attainment draws somewhat on the Piagetian based
> > > >> radical constructivist, but also on the conceptual change
> literature.
> > > >>
> > > > My
> > > >
> > > >> "enculturation" metaphor for learning-as-disposition-attainment
> draws
> > > >> partly on sociocultural theory, but also on social psychology. For
> > > >> although sociocultural theory is predominantly sociogenetic
> Vygotsky,
> > > >> along with those who have undertaken to extend his legacy, resisted
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> complete social determinism that I see as needed to articulate a
> > > >> coherent "enculturation pedagogy." As Penuel and Wertsch (1995) put
> > > >>
> > > > it:
> > > >
> > > >> "Sociocultural processes on the one hand and individual functioning
> > > on
> > > >> the other [exist] in a dynamic, irreducible tension rather than a
> > > >>
> > > > static
> > > >
> > > >> notion of social determination. A sociocultural approach ...
> > > considers
> > > >> these poles of sociocultural processes and individual functioning as
> > > >> interacting moments in human action, rather than as static processes
> > > >> that exist in isolation from one another" (p. 84). (Emphasizing
> > > social
> > > >> determinism, my prototypical exemplar of enculturational learning is
> > > >> "proxemics" drawn from social psychology, the study of how
> individual
> > > >> comes to embody the "personal body space" conventions of their
> > > >>
> > > > national
> > > >
> > > >> culture.)
> > > >>
> > > >> I think this serves to establish how psychological science is
> > > >>
> > > > marshaled
> > > >
> > > >> within a genres agenda. Resisting what is everywhere present in
> > > >> psychology--the attempt to develop a comprehensive account of
> > > learning
> > > >> that suffices for all purposes--the genres approach seeks after
> > > >>
> > > > partial
> > > >
> > > >> accounts that correspond with what I see as coherently forming the
> > > >> discrete interest of educators in teaching skills, concepts, and
> > > >> dispositions. It's not "wrong" for socioculturalists to agree, as
> did
> > > >> Larry a couple of posts ago, "that we must account for processes at
> > > >>
> > > > the
> > > >
> > > >> neurological level from a CHAT perspective." Indeed, such
> initiatives
> > > >> are vital to enable CHAT/sociocultural psychology to remain viable,
> > > >>
> > > > and
> > > >
> > > >> perhaps eventually prevail, within the competitive game of
> > > >> preparadigmatic psychology. But the broader designs of the various
> > > >> schools will not help us, today, to support educational practice.
> The
> > > >> psychology of TODAY is a preparadigmatic psychology, and that
> reality
> > > >> must be embraced in order to discern and support the discrete
> agendas
> > > >> for learning that motivate education.
> > > >>
> > > >> *I use the term crossdisciplinary in contrast with interdisciplinary
> > > >>
> > > > to
> > > >
> > > >> signal the coordination, rather than integration, of existing
> > > >> theoretical frameworks.
> > > >>
> > > >> David
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> -----Original Message-----
> > > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > >> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > > >> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2011 7:35 AM
> > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > > >>
> > > >> David
> > > >> Another quick thought on the competing models of learning and how
> > > >>
> > > > these
> > > >
> > > >> models become common sense or taken for granted folk psychological
> > > >>
> > > > ways
> > > >
> > > >> of
> > > >> orienting to the world. The  power of metaphors to conventionalize a
> > > >> cultural imaginary seems to be  central to this transformative
> > > process
> > > >> that
> > > >> develops various cognitive models at the implicit or tacit level.
> > > >>
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > >> points to the historical processes that lead to a particular
> metaphor
> > > >> structuring our cognition [the zeitgeist]. As I read his comments
> > > >> he suggests it is the current technologies being used and developed
> > > >> which
> > > >> transforms our guiding metaphors and not the internal debates among
> > > >> scholars.  If technological transformation  "constitutes"
> > > >>
> > > > metaphorical
> > > >
> > > >> transformation [stronger term than influences] then how do we
> > > >> consciously
> > > >> engage with these transformative technological processes to
> influence
> > > >> the
> > > >> zeitgeist [as a dialogue among models] ? At the level of common
> sense
> > > >> folk
> > > >> psychological metaphors of learning are university debates leading
> > > the
> > > >> way
> > > >> or charting where the technology has taken us?
> > > >> The underlying question is, How do we get teachers to incorporate
> > > >> alternative models of learning and cognition which run counter to
> > > >>
> > > > common
> > > >
> > > >> sense
> > > >>
> > > >> Larry
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >> On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 4:37 AM, Michael Glassman
> > > >> <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> Hi David,
> > > >>>
> > > >>> I sort of feel like the human relationship with information has
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> changed in
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> very fundemental ways over the last ten years.  Phenomena like the
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> Web,
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> Google, FaceBook, the Open Source movement have moved incredibly
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> quickly.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>>  Some academic urban legends are rising up, such as the idea that
> > > the
> > > >>> computer in some way changes the structure of wiring of the brain
> > > >>> (absolutely no evidence, or even proto-evidence for this I can.)
> > > But
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> I
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> think it is a combination of fear and confusion.  You have first
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> amendment
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> lawyers like Floyd Abrams arguing against free speech on the
> > > >>>
> > > > Internet.
> > > >
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> You
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> have brutal authoritarians like Putin signing executive orders
> > > making
> > > >>> Russian government completely Open Source by 2015 (my guess is he
> > > has
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> no
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> idea what Open Source actually is).  The whole thing is mind
> > > >>>
> > > > boggling.
> > > >
> > > >>> I think of cognitivist, behaviorists socio cultural theorists, etc,
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> etc.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> arguing over who bats next, not realizing that the rules of the
> game
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> are
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> completely changing.  Changing in ways we don't even have a
> > > >>>
> > > > vocabulary
> > > >
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> to
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> talk about yet.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Michael
> > > >>>
> > > >>> ________________________________
> > > >>>
> > > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of David H Kirshner
> > > >>> Sent: Tue 1/11/2011 10:45 PM
> > > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Larry,
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Here's my sociology of science account of the rise of brain studies
> > > >>>
> > > > as
> > > >
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> a
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> substitute for learning theory.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> 1. In Kuhnian terms, psychology is a preparadigmatic science. For
> > > >>> instance, learning is variously studied in behavioral, cognitive,
> > > >>> developmental, and sociocultural schools that conceive of learning
> > > in
> > > >>> fundamentally distinct ways.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> 2. The grand motive of preparadigmatic science is establishment of
> > > >>> paradigmatic consensus. Each school is in competition with the
> > > others
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> to
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> unify the field under its umbrella by coming to accommodate the
> > > >>> interests of the other schools while still preserving the essence
> of
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> its
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> own unique perspective. Most often this competition is implicit,
> but
> > > >>> periodically it leads to open conflict as in Chomsky's repudiation
> > > of
> > > >>> Skinner's effort to account for "Verbal Behavior," or in the flare
> > > up
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> in
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> the late '90s between James Greeno and John Anderson and company
> > > over
> > > >>> cognitivist efforts to account for the situated character of
> > > >>>
> > > > learning.
> > > >
> > > >>> 3. The dominant paradigm in any period always is the one to most
> > > >>> strenuously pursue hegemonic designs on the field. The
> cognitivists'
> > > >>> embracing of the rhetoric of situativity has cost them dearly: they
> > > >>>
> > > > no
> > > >
> > > >>> longer can forefront the technical machinery of information
> > > >>>
> > > > processing
> > > >
> > > >>> theory and artificial intelligence computer simulation as their
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> central
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> technical method and theoretical thrust. This is really a crisis
> > > >>>
> > > > point
> > > >
> > > >>> for cognitivists. They gained prominence through the Information
> > > >>> Processing approach, and are coasting along on their reputation.
> > > >>> Embracing brain science enables them to maintain the surface
> > > features
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> of
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> dynamic "science," while providing a convenient disguise for the
> > > fact
> > > >>> that there's no longer a central metaphor for learning that is
> being
> > > >>> elaborated and developed by that community.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> 4. Projecting this forward a decade or so, we have the likelihood
> of
> > > >>> diminishment of the importance of the cognitivist umbrella, and
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> renewed
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> opportunity for the other schools to push toward the front of the
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> pack.
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> ...should be lots of fun.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> David
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>>
> > > > [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > >
> > > >>> On Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > > >>> Sent: Tuesday, January 11, 2011 7:37 AM
> > > >>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Brains, Computer, and the Future of Education
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Mike,
> > > >>>
> > > >>> The band wagon may not be a strong enough metaphor.  The image of a
> > > >>> steam
> > > >>> roller seems more accurate.  I mentioned earlier that the term ZPD
> > > is
> > > >>> now a
> > > >>> recognized term in many school settings [as scaffolding].  However
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> this
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> alternative metaphor of mind as computer or mind  as brain is a far
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> more
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> powerful metaphor in schools. Often school staffs are fascinated
> > > with
> > > >>> these
> > > >>> explanations and believe that neuroscience is finally getting to
> the
> > > >>> "heart"
> > > >>> of the matter [couldn't resist the contradictary metaphor]. Brain
> > > >>> science as
> > > >>> an explanation of learning is becoming   the dominant narrative in
> > > >>> many school debates.  I was wondering if there are any "simplified'
> > > >>> articles
> > > >>> for a general audience that engage with these neuro/brain metaphors
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> that
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> would lead to school staffs possibly having a dialogue [by
> > > >>>
> > > > introducing
> > > >
> > > >>> dought]  I have shared a few articles with interested staff who
> love
> > > >>> ideas
> > > >>> but they were too "theoretical" for a staff discussion.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> With this steam roller comes the call for justifying your practice
> > > in
> > > >>> schools by using "best practices" which are "evidence based".  This
> > > >>> evidence often is dominated by evidence from neuroscience
> > > >>>
> > > >>>  I have attempted to introduce sociocultural perspectives into the
> > > >>> debate in
> > > >>>  response to the neuro/brain social representations of learning but
> > > I
> > > >>> would
> > > >>> appreciate an  article for a general audience that I could hand out
> > > >>>
> > > > to
> > > >
> > > >>> start
> > > >>> a dialogue among school staffs.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Mike, I believe this frame of reference is not a "fad" or a "band
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> wagon"
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>> but is developing into a "conventionalized" metaphor which most
> > > >>> educators
> > > >>> may use to explain "learning" in  schools.  Fad indicates a
> > > >>>
> > > > transitory
> > > >
> > > >>> phenomena and neuroscience seems a longer lasting  phenomena.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> I am looking for an article that does not refute or contradict the
> > > >>> neuroscience explanations but rather LINKS the  ideas to
> > > >>>
> > > > sociocultural
> > > >
> > > >>> concepts.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> One of the principals in a school I work in is attending this
> > > >>> conference,
> > > >>> and principals do have influence in school cultures.  I hope to
> > > >>> influence
> > > >>> her.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> Larry
> > > >>>
> > > >>> On Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 8:07 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > > >>>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>> The bandwagon is visible coming over the horizon!
> > > >>>> Check it out at http://www.learningandthebrain.com/brain28.html.
> > > >>>> Join for just the price of a click and a clack.
> > > >>>> mike
> > > >>>> __________________________________________
> > > >>>> _____
> > > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>> __________________________________________
> > > >>> _____
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>> __________________________________________
> > > >>> _____
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>> __________________________________________
> > > >>> _____
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >>>
> > > >> __________________________________________
> > > >> _____
> > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >> __________________________________________
> > > >> _____
> > > >> xmca mailing list
> > > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > Hegel Summer School: The New Atheism: Just Another Dogma?
> > > <http://ethicalpolitics.org/seminars/hss2011.htm>
> > >
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > *Robert Lake  Ed.D.
> > *Assistant Professor
> > Social Foundations of Education
> > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > Georgia Southern University
> > P. O. Box 8144
> > Phone: (912) 478-5125
> > Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > Statesboro, GA  30460
> >
> >  *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> > midwife.*
> > *-*John Dewey.
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> __________________________________________
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> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>


-- 
*Robert Lake  Ed.D.
*Assistant Professor
Social Foundations of Education
Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
Georgia Southern University
P. O. Box 8144
Phone: (912) 478-5125
Fax: (912) 478-5382
Statesboro, GA  30460

 *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
midwife.*
*-*John Dewey.
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