RE: [xmca] Concept of Activity

[Monica Hansen <monica.hansen@vandals.uidaho.edu>]

Larry,
With all due respect to both you and Andy, I am going to join in "thinking
aloud". I did not read Andy's article to which you referred earlier, but I
will go back and look for it after I throw a few other thoughtful questions
onto the table of this discussion. Is the difference between action (or
response as in stimulus-response, or reflex, or reflexive action) and
activity for an individual organism--human of any age or animal-- conscious,
mindful, deliberate, intentionality?

And if so, what of the individual actions that are classified as habitual or
done with automaticity? Driving, for example. And then for a more tricky
example, Let's use speaking. When an educated person speaks to a topic
he/she is educated about, maybe talked about in many lectures over the years
to students, is each part of the activity of speaking mindful, conscious,
and intentional? If once an activity was intentional and conscious, what
does it become when it ceases to be done intentionally but with skilled,
fluidity? Does it then become unintentional action? Should it be reduced
back in our thinking to physiological reflex? Which part of speaking is
reduced to reflex and which is a higher level activity? 

Still thinking.

Monica
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: Friday, January 07, 2011 8:22 AM
To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Concept of Activity

Hi Andy

As I mentioned I "think out loud" and through discourse try to clarify my
point of view. In reading your article on the concept of activity I
interpreted activity as existing within a cultural space of artifacts such
as the deaf and blind girl who uses a spoon experiencing her first activity
which transforms her relations to material and social reality. The spoon
structures her biological actions  and tranforms these BASIC acts which
become activities.

Andy, lets try substituting the term "mammals" for "organisms" to approach
the level of sensory-motor perceptual acts [actions] as primary and basic
interactions with the world that are directed, intentional enactments.  When
we attempt to culturally "interpret" or "read" these mammalian biological,
perceptual actions AS IF they are activity  we are entering into language
games with concepts and cognition. The "embodied mind" tradition [see D.
Hutto]  suggests using terms such as "knowing" and "cognition" for this
level of cultural activity.  Now moving up the evolutionary scale, a case
can be made that "embodied mind" in its earliest formation [at birth] is not
cognitive but BECOMES cognitive with development as a process of activity
[in the interdisciplinary sense you articulate as both psychological and
social]

Andy, the term organism may be too general a term for biological life forms
that confuse my main point. By moving up to the level of "explaining" the
actions of dogs by giving reasons for actions [creating conceptual
explanations ] using terms such as "perceptually
directed intentionality" enters into a discourse tradition. This "embodied
mind" discourse is being elaborated by usinf terms such as "embodied mind"
or "primary intersubjectivity" as suggesting acts that are clearly actions
but can they be considered activity [from the perspective of the new born
HUMAN infant?

Larry

On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> Jeez Larry, give me a change here. Can you tell me in sentences? And
things
> like "all acts or actions [organisms] are embodied", I just just parse.
What
> is the meaning of the word "organism" in square brackets after "actions".
I
> just can't understand what you are saying.
> Andy
>
> Larry Purss wrote:
>
>> Hi Andy
>>  Varela is the scholar often credited with introducing the approach that
I
>> am trying to "understand" as "embodied.  I want to say that I also am not
>> clear about  these distinctions, but will use this forum to "think out
>> loud". Andy, all acts or actions [organisms] are embodied. Therefore a
dog
>> pursuing a cat up a tree is anembodied act.  We as humans can account for
>> this act by creating a narrative that gives"reasons" for this activity [a
>> clear cultural historical act [general] activity as a special case of
acts]
>>  As a language game we can "explain" and "interpret" the dog's acts AS IF
>> they were activities and needs when in fact they are embodied actions [a
>> different case of embodied acts]  Giving reasons for acts [actions/wants
AND
>> activity/needs] is clearly a language game but the act of the dog chasing
>> the cat is not a representational cognitive activity altothough giving a
>> reason for the act is clearly an activity [cultural/historical]  The dogs
>> actions [more generally acts] can be "explained" or "understood" as
>> perceptual actions at a sensory-motor level.  It is at this level of
DIRECT
>> perception that Varela is exploring.
>>  Turning our attention to new born infants.  They have intentional acts
>> and actions which are intentional, DIRECTED and embodied [as I agree are
all
>> activity [as well as actions and acts]. However the infant does not act
for
>> "reasons" when RESPONDING to SIGNIFICANT others [significant as outlined
in
>> attachment and intersubjectivity accounts].  Her acts or actions are at
the
>> perceptual sensory-motor level of responding intentionally and
purposefully.
>>  At this HUMAN level of responding perceptually AND DIRECTLY [mediated by
>> significant other its possible to consider the mother acting as activity
>> while the infants acts are considered acts or actions. These acts or
actions
>> when observed by a significant other are INFERRED to be activities of the
>> infant but I suspect the infants embodied acts needs further elaboration
and
>> Varela's scholarship is one discourse language game attempting to
elaborate
>> how to understand direct on-line human acts and actions within
sociocultural
>> activity.
>>  Andy, if the infants human acts and actions are not activities [from the
>> perspectives of the infant] then developmentally we must explain how
primary
>> enactments become activities [from the infants perspective.  This is a
>> question of transformations but the continuing place of "embodied" [as
>> primary and basic] acts may continue to exist in a transformed structure
as
>> the infant develops the capacity to participate in activities.   Andy
this
>> direct perceptually based "stuff" or "essences" is considered not like
dogs
>> chasing cats or acting for reasons.  It is posited to be human but
>> ontologically socially situated RESPONDING [intentional & purposeful but
not
>> with content]
>>  I'm not sure where Varela's perspectives of "embodied mind" fit or can
be
>> bridged with cultural historical accounts. However, it is a sociocultural
>> developmental account.  Whether it is a coherent account or just another
>> shape-shifting language game I'm not sure.  It does seem to attempt to
>> bridge phenomenological continental philosophy with analytic accounts
>>  Larry
>>
>>
>>   On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net<mailto:
>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>
>>    Larry, I will just make a series of points which may clarify
>>    something.
>>
>>    I know that "embodied" notions of enactment is referring to some
>>    current of thought which you are asking me to comment on, but I
>>    really don't know what an act which is not embodied would be.
>>    Perhaps you could clarify that for me?
>>
>>    I think the "activity theory notions of wants and needs" is in
>>    need of further thought. I don't think it is sufficient to (kind
>>    of) simply say that "we all do things for a reason."
>>
>>    I don't know what alternative notions of substance or essence you
>>    have in mind. I know that most people use the word "substance" in
>>    the naive realist sense of "stuff" and "essence" in the sense
>>    which is the object of feminist criticism.You would have to spell
>>    out what you have in mind. I use these words in quite a different
>>    sense.
>>
>>    I don't understand what you mean by counterposing "just cultural
>>    language game" to "biological components of wants."
>>
>>    And I don't understand the distinction you are imputing to me
>>    between "object-oriented activity" that is perceptual and "activity."
>>
>>    Sorry, Larry. To get through my thick head you need to be very
>>    specific.
>>
>>    Andy
>>
>>    Larry Purss wrote:
>>
>>        Andy, what is your thoughts on "embodied" notions of
>>        enactment.  This
>>        tradition talks about DIRECT "on-line" pre-conceptual
>>        pre-linquistic
>>        expressions of INTENTIONALITY without understanding [as
>>        interpretive].
>>        Where do the concepts of "embodied mind" as PERCEPTUALLY based
>>        sensory-motor
>>        directedness, fit  within activity theory notions of wants and
>>        needs?  This
>>        seems to be a question which points to alternative notions of
>>        substance or
>>        essence?  Is it just a cultural language game or is there a
>>        biological
>>        component of  wants involved.  Or is it another special case of
>>        object-oriented activity that is perceptual but not activity
>>        as you define
>>        it?
>>        I hope this question is clear ?
>>
>>        Larry
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>>    --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>    *Andy Blunden*
>>    Joint Editor MCA: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/
>>    Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/<http://home.mira.net/~andy/>>
>>
>>
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> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
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