Hi Andy
Varela is the scholar often credited with introducing the approach
that I am trying to "understand" as "embodied. I want to say that I
also am not clear about these distinctions, but will use this forum
to "think out loud".
Andy, all acts or actions [organisms] are embodied. Therefore a dog
pursuing a cat up a tree is anembodied act. We as humans can account
for this act by creating a narrative that gives"reasons" for this
activity [a clear cultural historical act [general] activity as a
special case of acts] As a language game we can "explain" and
"interpret" the dog's acts AS IF they were activities and needs when
in fact they are embodied actions [a different case of embodied acts]
Giving reasons for acts [actions/wants AND activity/needs] is clearly
a language game but the act of the dog chasing the cat is not a
representational cognitive activity altothough giving a reason for the
act is clearly an activity [cultural/historical] The dogs actions
[more generally acts] can be "explained" or "understood" as perceptual
actions at a sensory-motor level. It is at this level of DIRECT
perception that Varela is exploring.
Turning our attention to new born infants. They have intentional acts
and actions which are intentional, DIRECTED and embodied [as I agree
are all activity [as well as actions and acts]. However the
infant does not act for "reasons" when RESPONDING to SIGNIFICANT
others [significant as outlined in attachment and intersubjectivity
accounts]. Her acts or actions are at the perceptual sensory-motor
level of responding intentionally and purposefully. At this HUMAN
level of responding perceptually AND DIRECTLY [mediated by significant
other its possible to consider the mother acting as activity while the
infants acts are considered acts or actions. These acts or actions
when observed by a significant other are INFERRED to be activities of
the infant but I suspect the infants embodied acts needs further
elaboration and Varela's scholarship is one discourse language game
attempting to elaborate how to understand direct on-line human acts
and actions within sociocultural activity.
Andy, if the infants human acts and actions are not activities [from
the perspectives of the infant] then developmentally we must explain
how primary enactments become activities [from the infants
perspective. This is a question of transformations but the continuing
place of "embodied" [as primary and basic] acts may continue to
exist in a transformed structure as the infant develops the capacity
to participate in activities.
Andy this direct perceptually based "stuff" or "essences" is
considered not like dogs chasing cats or acting for reasons. It is
posited to be human but ontologically socially situated
RESPONDING [intentional & purposeful but not with content]
I'm not sure where Varela's perspectives of "embodied mind" fit or can
be bridged with cultural historical accounts. However, it is a
sociocultural developmental account. Whether it is a coherent account
or just another shape-shifting language game I'm not sure. It does
seem to attempt to bridge phenomenological continental philosophy with
analytic accounts
Larry
On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 12:10 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Larry, I will just make a series of points which may clarify
something.
I know that "embodied" notions of enactment is referring to some
current of thought which you are asking me to comment on, but I
really don't know what an act which is not embodied would be.
Perhaps you could clarify that for me?
I think the "activity theory notions of wants and needs" is in
need of further thought. I don't think it is sufficient to (kind
of) simply say that "we all do things for a reason."
I don't know what alternative notions of substance or essence you
have in mind. I know that most people use the word "substance" in
the naive realist sense of "stuff" and "essence" in the sense
which is the object of feminist criticism.You would have to spell
out what you have in mind. I use these words in quite a different
sense.
I don't understand what you mean by counterposing "just cultural
language game" to "biological components of wants."
And I don't understand the distinction you are imputing to me
between "object-oriented activity" that is perceptual and "activity."
Sorry, Larry. To get through my thick head you need to be very
specific.
Andy
Larry Purss wrote:
Andy, what is your thoughts on "embodied" notions of
enactment. This
tradition talks about DIRECT "on-line" pre-conceptual
pre-linquistic
expressions of INTENTIONALITY without understanding [as
interpretive].
Where do the concepts of "embodied mind" as PERCEPTUALLY based
sensory-motor
directedness, fit within activity theory notions of wants and
needs? This
seems to be a question which points to alternative notions of
substance or
essence? Is it just a cultural language game or is there a
biological
component of wants involved. Or is it another special case of
object-oriented activity that is perceptual but not activity
as you define
it?
I hope this question is clear ?
Larry
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