RE: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious Awareness

[ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org]

Perhaps discussed prior.  I recall Lakoff being discussed but can't 
remember his Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM)as being the topic of why he 
was discussed. I tried a search on the LCHC website but didn't come across 
mention of the ICM theory.   Here is a brief summary:


http://www.steverhowell.com/lakoff.pdf


Wondering what others think,

eric


From:   Louise Hawkins <l.hawkins@cqu.edu.au>
To:     "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date:   11/02/2010 06:25 PM
Subject:        RE: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious 
Awareness
Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu



Thanks Robert I will read this article, it looks facinating

Regards

Louise Hawkins

Lecturer - School of Management & Information Systems
Faculty Business & Informatics
Building 19/Room 3.38
Rockhampton Campus
CQUniversity
Ph: +617 4923 2768
Fax: +617 4930 9729


-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On 
Behalf Of Robert Lake
Sent: Tuesday, 2 November 2010 11:24 PM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious 
Awareness

Louise,
I am fascinated by this story. Have you seen this article?
http://aut.sagepub.com/search?fulltext=metonymy&sortspec=date&submit=Submit&andorexactfulltext=phrase&src=selected&journal_set=spaut

RL

On Mon, Nov 1, 2010 at 9:17 PM, Louise Hawkins <l.hawkins@cqu.edu.au> 
wrote:

> Eric,
>
> Maybe it is the level of figurative language understanding??????
>
> I give an example: I have a son who has mild autism. One of his 
beautiful
> ways of seeing the world (can be called difficulties) is that he 
understands
> things very literally.
>
> Example: "That throws some light on the question." Throwing light is a
> metaphor: there is no actual light, and a question is not the sort of 
thing
> that can be lit up."
>
>        - My son would be looking for a light and something visible
> (question) for the light to hit.
>
> This also extends to idioms (figures of speech - figurative meaning)
>
> Example: A bookworm. Someone who reads a lot. My son would think you had
> called him a worm if you told him he was a bookworm.
>
> Although not an idiom or a metaphor, this last example is beautiful for
> showing how literal he can be:
>
>        - He used to be terrified of dogs. (gap in story to shorten
> example). We got a puppy, but he was still very scared. Then we told him
> that if the dog was on her lead he was in control..... what we did not
> realise that he would understand this to mean that if the puppy is 
running
> around with her lead on with no one holding it he is still in control :)
>
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Louise Hawkins
>
> Lecturer - School of Management & Information Systems
> Faculty Business & Informatics
> Building 19/Room 3.38
> Rockhampton Campus
> CQUniversity
> Ph: +617 4923 2768
> Fax: +617 4930 9729
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] 
On
> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> Sent: Tuesday, 2 November 2010 10:29 AM
> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> Awareness
>
> eric--
>
> I wonder...everybody, no matter how mentally disturbed, has to be 
capable
> of some figurative language. I remember once Halliday remarked that "I 
want
> you to stand up" is really an INTERPERSONAL metaphor, because you've got 
a
> command pretending to be a statement, and I asked him if it wasn't true 
to
> say that the whole of language was a phonological metaphor, because 
we've
> got words pretending to be statements, commands, questions, gestures, 
and so
> on.
>
> So I sometimes wonder if the distinction we make between figurative and
> non-figurative language is nothing but a formalism, like the distinction
> between, say, metaphor and metonymy, or even the distinction between
> metaphor and simile. Of course, as you say (and as Rod says) these
> formalisms can matter a lot. But they are nevertheless a lot more 
pervasive
> than the overt markings that we have bedecked them with, and so it seems
> they must also be found in the language of the mentally disturbed 
(perhaps
> as "literal" statements that are obvioiusly untrue).
>
> Choose the best (that is, the most developmentally sophisticated)
> continuation for the following utterance.
>
> Romeo: "Soft! What light from yonder window breaks! ...
>
> a) It is like the east and Juliet is like the sun."
> b) It is the east and Juliet is like the sun."
> c) It is the east and Julie is the sun."
> d) Juliet's eyes are nothing like the sun."
>
> I think Vygotsky would choose d) because a), b), and c) are merely
> generalizations from one object to another, while d) combines both
> generalization (from one object to another) and abstraction (the 
isolation
> of a single feature, namely Juliet's eyes).
>
> In Chapter Five of Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky points out that the
> function of abstraction, which is really a kind of metonymy, is
> ontogenetically very ancient. Every time the very young child undergoes 
a
> routine, the child is bound to feel on some level that "this is like 
that".
>
> But any "perizhvanie", any instance of the "feeling of what happens to 
you"
> is different in an almost infinite number of ways from any other
> "perizhvanie". So the belief that "today is just like yesterday" always
> involves privileging some features of an experience and discounting 
others.
> This is by no means a mechanical process; we are not talking about a 
Galton
> photograph; on the contrary, it is a most discriminating and subtle
> judgment.
>
> I think that ALL of the "complexes" we see in Chapter Five can actually 
be
> seen as just such abstractions from childly activities, although of 
course
> the resulting structure is thought of as a set of concrete experiences 
and
> not a concept.
>
> For example, the "associative complex" is really a meta-object, a set of
> objects each of which represents a projection of some different feature 
of
> the nuclear objects (the "brainstorming" "mind-maps" of which elementary
> school teachers are so proud are really just associative complexes).
>
> The "collection complex" is, as Vygotsky says, a tool kit abstracted 
from
> practical routines: brushing teeth, getting dressed, having meals, going 
to
> bed.
>
> The "chain complex" seems to me to be abstracted from games such as 
"tag",
> where the loser of a particular bout becomes the "hero" of the next 
bout.
>
> The "diffuse complex" is, as Vygotsky says, a result of the limitless
> diffusion of characteristics we see in imaginative tales.
>
> It's really only the pseudocomplex that is metaphorical rather than
> metonymic, because the child's word "stands for" a thinking process that 
is
> quite different, but given the exactly the same name. Of course, it is a
> metaphor-in-itself rather than a metaphor-for-others or a
> metaphor-for-myself (that is to say, nobody except maybe Vygotsky 
actually
> KNOWS that the child's pseudocomplex is a metaphor for the adult 
concept).
>
> In order to become a metaphor-for-myself, I have to abstract away all 
the
> features that make the metaphor work and resynthesize them as a concept. 
But
> of course a metaphor for a concept is not a metaphor: it's the concept
> itself, for a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
>
> David Kellogg
> Seoul National University of Education
>
> --- On Mon, 11/1/10, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> 
wrote:
>
>
> From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> Awareness
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date: Monday, November 1, 2010, 11:45 AM
>
>
> Hello all:
>
> This is such an interesting stream that has flowed into the different
> tributaries of a delta and then joined again as it has emptied into the
> vast ocean of communal knowledge.
>
> I do not have the linguistic knowledge to offer much in research based
> efforts of understanding the development of metaphorical knowledge. What
> I can offer is my observational data of working with severely mentally 
ill
> young adults.  Many do not grasp metaphorical speech and can become very
> agitated if a person continues on with a metaphor that has not been
> understood.  This explains why so many people who suffer mental health
> issues are unsuccessful in the academic world.
>
> my two cents for a million dollar topic
> eric
>
>
>
> From:   Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
> To:     Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Date:   11/01/2010 01:04 PM
> Subject:        Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of 
Conscious
> Awareness
> Sent by:        xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
> Hi Vera,
> The *Journal of Aesthetic Education* is interested in publishing it  and 
*
> Francine** *Smolucha says she is writing it.
> RL
>
> On Mon, Nov 1, 2010 at 1:42 PM, Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi Robert,
> >
> > We are looking for reviews and reviewers for Vygotsky and Creativity. 
Do
> > you think your publication would be interested and could you think of 
a
> > reviewer?
> >
> > Thanks, Vera
> > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Lake" <
> > boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 6:35 AM
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > Awareness
> >
> >
> > Thanks for the LSV Citations David as well as this:
> > *
> > "But that's the whole point; the emotional substratum of language is
> always
> > there and it never goes away; there is no point of entropy where
> thinking
> > and feeling are completely merged."
> > *I will be pondering and savoring this all weekend.
> >
> > RL
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 29, 2010 at 8:23 AM, Robert Lake
> <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> > >wrote:
> >
> >  Thanks for the Citation David!
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Thu, Oct 28, 2010 at 11:48 PM, David Kellogg
> <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> >> >wrote:
> >>
> >>  Rod:
> >>>
> >>> Yes, it seems nonaccidental that we say "I feel LIKE my brain is an
> >>> erogenous zone" (for example) but we have say "I think THAT my brain
> is
> >>> an
> >>> erogenous zone".  The obvious comparison is indirect reported speech
> for
> >>> feelings (and thus simile) but more direct forms for thoughts and
> words
> >>> (we
> >>> can say "Richard Shweder says, 'my brain is an erogenous zone'").
> >>>
> >>> But Vygotsky considers even the language of the Odyssey to be
> "lyrically
> >>> colored" and therefore emotional rather than ideational; when Homer
> says
> >>> "And they lay down by the shelving sea" or "When rosy fingered dawn
> >>> touched
> >>> the sky" we feel like we know what he means even though we cannot
> really
> >>> say
> >>> that what it is.
> >>>
> >>> Of course, in order to really understand this lyrical coloration, 
you
> >>> need
> >>> to be able to read hexameters in ancient Greek. But that's the whole
> >>> point;
> >>> the emotional substratum of language is always there and it never 
goes
> >>> away;
> >>> there is no point of entropy where thinking and feeling are 
completely
> >>> merged.
> >>>
> >>> The photo experiment is described in Volume Four, pp. 193-194, of
> >>> Vygotsky's Cllected Works, in a chapter called "Development of 
Speech
> and
> >>> Thinking". Here's the key passage.
> >>>
> >>> "(I)f one and the same picture (let us say, the prisoner in jail) is
> >>> shown
> >>> to a three-year-old, he will say 'a man, another man, a window, a 
mug,
> a
> >>> bench', but for a preschool child it would be 'a man is sitting,
> another
> >>> is
> >>> looking out of a window, and a mug is on the bench'. (...) A
> >>> five-year-old
> >>> establishes a connection between words in a single sentence, and an
> >>> eight-year-old uses complex additional sentences. A theoretical
> >>> assumption
> >>> arises: can the story about the picture describe the child's 
thinking?
> >>> (...)
> >>> We will ask two children not to tell a story, but to perform what 
the
> >>> picture shows. It develops that the children's play about the 
picture
> >>> sometimes lasts twenty or thirty minutes, and primarily and most of
> all
> >>> in
> >>> the play those relations are captured that are in the picture. (...)
> The
> >>> child understands very well that the people are in jail: here the
> complex
> >>> narration about how the people were caught, how they were taken, 
that
> one
> >>> looks out
> >>>  the window, and that he wants to be free is added. Here a very
> complex
> >>> narration is added about how the nanny was fined for not having a
> ticket
> >>> on
> >>> the trolley. In a word, we get a typical portrayal of what we see in
> the
> >>> story of a twelve-year-old. (1997, pp. 193-194)"
> >>>
> >>> We did a whole foreign language replication of this experiment with
> using
> >>> a video clip (with an added time element) and some second graders 
and
> >>> wrote
> >>> it up for MCA, but it was (violently) rejected so we gave up. I 
still
> >>> have a
> >>> copy of the paper if you are interested though.
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Seoul National University of Education
> >>>
> >>> --- On Wed, 10/27/10, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> >>> Awareness
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date: Wednesday, October 27, 2010, 3:55 AM
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Apologies for missing this, David
> >>>
> >>> I suspect that the relationships between affective metaphor and
> cognitive
> >>> metaphor are as messy and complicated (or rich and intricate) as any
> >>> other
> >>> form of (imagined) boundary between thinking and feeling.
> >>>
> >>> When we use a simile I think we invite listeners/readers to colour 
one
> >>> concept with features of another, often (though not always) in a
> rather
> >>> generalised way. When we use a metaphor I think there is more of an
> >>> invitation to the listener/reader to haul up associations from the
> murk
> >>> of
> >>> personal experience (what does a hot liquid feel like, what does it
> make
> >>> me
> >>> feel like). I realise as I write this that I am assuming that there 
is
> a
> >>> difference between a person's 'own' 'lived-in' associations with
> >>> particular
> >>> words/concepts and that person's sense of a 'common' or widely 
shared
> set
> >>> of
> >>> associations (what this can be assumed to mean to other people) -
> >>> actually
> >>> probably many different sets of 'common' meanings for different
> subgroups
> >>> of
> >>> 'other people' (people of my generation, people in my professional
> field,
> >>> 'kids today', people who have adolescent children .....).
> >>>
> >>> To a degree, our sense of how much like another person we are will
> depend
> >>> on how well that other person is able to find a fit with our own
> >>> meanings.
> >>> We can manage an academic conversation with a relative stranger but 
it
> >>> won't
> >>> feel the same as a conversation with a relative or with someone who
> likes
> >>> us
> >>> enough to bother to remember how we feel about things. For babies it
> is
> >>> quite easy to differentiate between 'people who like me' and 'people
> who
> >>> don't know me' because the former engage in a noticeably more
> >>> contingent/reciprocal way (they 'like' me both in the sense of 
caring
> >>> about
> >>> me and in the sense of adjusting to me) and this is surely a useful
> >>> distinction to be able to make. For adults it is more complicated
> because
> >>> there are so many gradations of liking to keep track of (guided by 
the
> >>> steer
> >>> from embarrassment when we get it wrong!) but I still think that 
most
> of
> >>> us
> >>> are highly skilled in (unconsciously) picking up cues about the 
degree
> to
> >>> which someone
> >>>  is adjusting to us (how much they like us). I also think that our 
own
> >>> awareness of the adjustments we make when we interact with others
> forms
> >>> an
> >>> important part of our knowledge about other people (we can even make
> >>> these
> >>> adjustments when they are not present so that we can imagine, for
> >>> example,
> >>> how they would feel about something we are considering suggesting to
> >>> them).
> >>>
> >>> I like the word 'graspture' but for me (and for those who like me
> enough
> >>> to know what I am like!) simile is less 'violent' than metaphor, a
> black
> >>> and
> >>> white diagram of the full colour collision.
> >>>
> >>> I would like to read more about Vygotsky's replication of Stern's
> >>> photograph experiment - something I know nothing about - where can I
> find
> >>> this?
> >>>
> >>> All the best,
> >>>
> >>> Rod
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [
mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >>> On
> >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> >>> Sent: 15 October 2010 04:55
> >>> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> >>> Subject: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> Awareness
> >>>
> >>> Rod:
> >>>
> >>> I agree that there is an AFFECTIVE difference between simile and
> >>> metaphor.
> >>> Actually, I think that the use of "like" as a preposition is related
> to
> >>> the
> >>> use of "like" as a verb; the prepositional form is an objectified
> version
> >>> of
> >>> the affective affinity we see in the verbal form. I think that the
> >>> existence
> >>> of these two quite different forms is a good example of the
> >>> DIFFERENTIATION
> >>> and PARTITIONING that language brings about in affect (the word
> >>> "articulation" springs to mind in this context).
> >>>
> >>> So I'm very interested in what you say about the "distancing" effect
> of
> >>> simile. Do you think grammatical metaphor has the same effect of
> >>> distantiation. Does "growth" suggest an objective view when we 
compare
> it
> >>> to
> >>> "grow", because "growth" does not have an identifiable subject or
> object?
> >>>
> >>> Of course, what Lakoff and Johnson are writing about is not affect 
but
> >>> COGNITIVE metaphor. The idea is that underlying a whole range of
> >>> linguistic
> >>> expressions is some kind of non-verbal IMAGE, e.g. "anger is a hot
> >>> liquid",
> >>> quite independent of its verbal expression. From that perspective,
> there
> >>> is
> >>> no difference between simile and metaphor, and there is also no
> >>> difference
> >>> between metonymy and metaphor (because metonymy is simply a special
> case
> >>> of
> >>> a linguistic realization of a cognitive metaphor). All stem from a
> >>> completely undifferentiated, unpartitioned, unarticulated mental
> >>> equivalence
> >>> (I think it's no accident that almost all of Lakoff's and Johnson's
> >>> cognitive metaphors can be expressed as mathematical equations,
> although
> >>> none of them are really reversible the way that equations are: we
> cannot
> >>> say
> >>> that a hot liquid = anger).
> >>>
> >>> Actually, I didn't say that Piaget believed that children are 
capable
> of
> >>> reasoning "What kind of thought would I be expressing if I were 
making
> >>> the
> >>> acoustic sounds/articulatory gestures that I am now hearing?" Quite
> the
> >>> contrary. This belief is the core of the "analysis by synthesis" 
views
> of
> >>> speech perception, whether they originate in New Haven (Liberman) or
> >>> Cambridge, MA (Halle). Piaget holds that the child's thinking does 
not
> >>> achieve the Copernican Revolution of decentration until seven or
> eight,
> >>> so
> >>> Liberman or Halle would have to argue for innate mechanisms that
> "think"
> >>> in
> >>> a decentred way quite against the child's grain.
> >>>
> >>> Vygotsky has no such problem. The child is a social being from 
birth,
> and
> >>> it is some time before children actually differentiate themselves 
from
> >>> the
> >>> "Ur-wir", the proto-we. It seems to me that this is completely
> consistent
> >>> with an ontogenetic "analysis by synthesis"; the child understands
> >>> because
> >>> the child has not really differentiated speaker from hearer. The
> >>> occasional
> >>> failures of this type of understanding, in fact, play a not
> >>> inconsequential
> >>> part in the process of the child's differentiation of "I" from "we",
> >>> which
> >>> is only expressed, not generated, in the child's use of negation.
> >>>
> >>> Vygotsky mentions his replication of the Stern photograph 
experiment,
> >>> where a three year old is given a photo and responds with a list of
> the
> >>> objects in it ("a man", "another man", "a window", "a mug") and a 
five
> >>> year
> >>> old can add processes ("the man is sitting" "the other man is 
looking
> out
> >>> the window") but only the twelve year old can tell the story of how
> the
> >>> men
> >>> came to be sitting in prison. When Vygotsky replicates this, he asks
> the
> >>> children to ROLE PLAY the picture. Since this forces the kids to add
> the
> >>> element of time, the five year olds come up with a twenty minute 
role
> >>> play
> >>> that is fully as complex as the narrative of the twelve year olds.
> >>>
> >>> When Vygotsky does this, he is trying to show that the idea that 
young
> >>> children see pictures as a whole and do not differentiate the life
> >>> stories
> >>> within it is simply wrong. But in interpreting his result, we risk
> >>> falling
> >>> into a rather Piagetian analysis, which holds that speech is really 
an
> >>> afterthought and not the cause of the child's thinking, because the
> child
> >>> is
> >>> capable of expressing in action so much more than what he can
> articulate
> >>> in
> >>> differentiated speech. I think this is part of what is bugging 
Martin.
> >>>
> >>> Two ways of debugging this occur to me. The first is that if we 
accept
> >>> Vygotsky's account that verbal thinking (not all thinking) develops
> from
> >>> the
> >>> "introvolution" of speech, we have to clearly differentiate between
> the
> >>> child's UNDERSTANDING of speech in the environment (which is 
semantic,
> >>> i.e.
> >>> NOT entirely dependent on a phasal, lexicogrammatical, partitioning 
of
> >>> speech) and the child's ability to "articulate" (which is).
> >>>
> >>> The second point is that Vygotsky's definition of speech changes. 
For
> the
> >>> very young child, speech includes the child's actions and in fact is
> more
> >>> about the child's gestures and the child's use of the affordances in
> the
> >>> environment than about vocabulary and grammar. Early speech is
> dominated
> >>> by
> >>> indication and nomination; signifying comes later.
> >>>
> >>> In the same way, metaphor comes first, because the child has to be
> able
> >>> to
> >>> accept that a gesture can "stand for" an object, and a word can 
"stand
> >>> for"
> >>> the idealized relationship between gesture and object. Similes are a
> kind
> >>> of
> >>> violent graspture of the conscious awareness of metaphor. So to 
speak.
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Seoul National University of Education
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --- On Wed, 10/13/10, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date: Wednesday, October 13, 2010, 1:08 AM
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> So many ideas to respond to and so little time!
> >>>
> >>> Isn't it more likely that our associations between 'mmm' and baby
> related
> >>> concepts may be more to do with the fact that this is one of the 
first
> >>> recognisable sounds produced by babies? Mamas, Moms, mothers and
> mummies
> >>> all
> >>> over the world have reason to like the idea that these first sounds
> refer
> >>> to
> >>> them (fathers are left with papa or dada). But how things may have
> begun
> >>> is
> >>> always only a part of the story - layers upon layers of cultural
> >>> associations and connotations are wrapped around the infant word as 
it
> is
> >>> used in particular kinds of situations and contexts.
> >>>
> >>> A Carol pointed out, phonemes are category labels rather than names 
of
> >>> 'things' - a way of splitting the infinite variations of sound into 
a
> >>> limited number of chunks. After the age of about 9 months we begin 
to
> >>> actively filter our perception of speech sounds to privilege
> meaningful
> >>> distinctions in the languages used around us so there are probably
> many
> >>> more
> >>> SPEECH sounds than any one of us thinks there are because we think
> only
> >>> of
> >>> the sounds we are still able to discriminate.
> >>>
> >>> Where J.G. differs from David's version of Piaget's view, that 'You
> have
> >>> to imagine what you would be thinking if you were making the noises
> that
> >>> you
> >>> are hearing', he seems to me to be closer to Reddy's 'second person
> >>> perspective' which has been aired here in the past - babies don't 
have
> to
> >>> 'imagine' or 'think' - they have only to engage or respond.
> >>>
> >>> Also, while there may be some very general, physiological, 
associative
> >>> principles in the affective force of sounds (large, grande, enorme
> versus
> >>> little, teensy weensy, petit, piccolo for example, and associations
> with
> >>> 'squeak' and 'roar') there is also space for enormous variation in 
the
> >>> effect that words have when they are spoken in different ways by
> people
> >>> with
> >>> different kinds of voice and by people in different moods (you 
really
> can
> >>> hear the difference between someone reciting letter of the alphabet
> while
> >>> smiling or while frowning).
> >>>
> >>> Here's an experiment - download the transcript of Vikram
> Ramachandran's
> >>> lecture 'Phantoms in the brain' from
> >>> http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/radio4/reith2003/lecture1.shtml?print
> >>>
> >>> Read the first paragraph or two before you click on the 'listen'
> button
> >>> and then compare the experience of your reading and hearing
> >>> Ramachandran's
> >>> voice (all of the lectures from this series are still well worth
> >>> listening
> >>> to).
> >>>
> >>> Sounds and words may 'have' some power of signification, whether
> because
> >>> of their/our physiological properties or because of the layers of
> >>> association they have accumulated (some of which may be forgotten by
> or
> >>> unknown to most of us) but this is a thin, diagrammatic sort of
> meaning.
> >>> It
> >>> is when they are performed by a speaker (or singer) that they can
> serve
> >>> as
> >>> an interface, allowing us to hear through them and engage 
with/respond
> to
> >>> the life of another person.
> >>>
> >>> So - apologies for my thin, diagrammatic contribution.
> >>>
> >>> All the best,
> >>>
> >>> Rod
> >>>
> >>> P.S. I still think there is a significant affective distinction
> between
> >>> the effect of a simile and the effect of a metaphor - a simile
> announces
> >>> itself while a metaphor can get to you more immediately.
> >>>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [
mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >>> On
> >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> >>> Sent: 13 October 2010 06:58
> >>> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> >>>
> >>> We can see that J.G. really does believe that vowels and consonants
> are
> >>> semantic, just as Khlebnikov did. Leonard Bernstein, in his Harvard
> >>> Lectures
> >>> on the "Semantics of Music" had a very similar theory about "mmm";
> >>> associating it with nursing, nipples, and micturation. It's the kind
> of
> >>> thing that the "perceptionists" that Vygotsky criticizes in
> "Psychology
> >>> of
> >>> Art" believed.
> >>>
> >>> Of course, there is some evidence to support this; we often find 
that
> >>> "milk" and "mammary glands" and "mothers" and "mommas" are 
associated
> >>> with
> >>> the first bilabial sounds that babies make: Korean, Chinese, Arabic,
> >>> Tibetan
> >>> and many other languages can provide us with examples, and it's easy
> to
> >>> imagine a world where babies are responsible for teaching mothers
> >>> Motherese
> >>> as an international language. It's our world, more or less.
> >>>
> >>> But there are many languages, including English, where the /m/ sound
> is
> >>> associated with NEGATIVES: "malady", "malevolent", "malefactor", 
etc.
> >>> Worse,
> >>> there are certain "things" or even "emotions" which by their very
> nature
> >>> cannot be directly expressed in a vowel or a consonant.
> >>>
> >>> Consider the number "zero" or the grammatical category of negation.
> It's
> >>> really NOT possible (IMpossible, to use an "em") to express 
something
> >>> that
> >>> does not exist by something that does exist in a direct, iconic
> manner.
> >>> Something that exists, exists. It doesn't not exist. The only way 
for
> it
> >>> to
> >>> mean something that does not exist is indirectly, that is,
> symbolically.
> >>>
> >>> We had a related problem in class. The kids are playing a game with
> >>> cards,
> >>> where they are supposed to ask "Can you swim?" and if the responder
> >>> answers
> >>> "Yes, I can" (because there is a sign on the back of the card
> indicating
> >>> "yes") the child is allowed to keep the card.
> >>>
> >>> But the teacher has to begin by explaining what the cards mean. And
> the
> >>> problem is that the card shows an actual child swimming, not a child
> who
> >>> "can" swim. So the solution is a process of what Robert Lake would
> call
> >>> metaphor, of having something stand for something else (e.g. "one
> minus
> >>> one
> >>> EQUALS zero").
> >>>
> >>> T: Look (indicating the card)! She is swimming. She's swimming.
> So...she
> >>> can swim. Now...(indicating himself). I am not swimming. I'm 
teaching,
> >>> right? BUT...I can swim. Can you swim?
> >>> S: Yes.
> >>> T: Good. Can she swim? Can he swim? Ask her. Ask him. How many
> swimmers
> >>> in
> >>> this group? How many swimmers in our class?
> >>>
> >>> You can see that the way the teacher handles the problem of 
presenting
> >>> POTENTIAL rather than ACTUAL swimming is to TRANSFER the meaning to
> >>> another
> >>> situation; to have the card stand for something else.
> >>>
> >>> I guess I would simply call this process semiosis, and that's why I
> think
> >>> that it is part of language development at every single point, bar
> none.
> >>> Every form of semiosis, without exception, is a form of metaphor,
> because
> >>> the creation of a sign is precisely the creation of something that
> stands
> >>> for something else that is not itself.
> >>>
> >>> BUT...phonemes really do not exist, except as abstractions (in fact, 
I
> >>> think they do not even exist as abstractions except for people who 
are
> >>> literate). They are like the spaces that we IMAGINE we hear (but do
> not
> >>> actually hear, except in quite special circumstances) between words.
> >>> Since
> >>> they don't exist, they can stand for other things that don't exist. 
As
> >>> Lear
> >>> says, "Nothing will come from nothing". He forgot to add that this
> >>> nothing
> >>> gives us everything!
> >>>
> >>> Never mind. Let's notice the form of Mike's question. He doesn't ask
> >>> whether phonemes exist or not. He simply asks whether one can 
produce
> a
> >>> particular sound (the example he gives is only an example; it's the
> >>> letter
> >>> "em") without there being more than one phoneme "there". Where? In 
the
> >>> mind,
> >>> of course.
> >>>
> >>> The simple, snotty answer is YES, because phonemes ONLY have
> >>> psychological
> >>> reality (and even then only in the minds of literate people, not in
> the
> >>> minds of illiterates and children).
> >>>
> >>> So there are as many sounds as you think there are: no more and no
> less,
> >>> and if you go "mmmmmmm" as J.G. suggests and ask how many sounds 
your
> >>> hearer
> >>> hears, he or she will probably say "one". We can easily find people
> who
> >>> will
> >>> say the same thing about the letter "em" in almost any first grade
> class.
> >>>
> >>> But the complex answer is much more interesting. It seems to me that
> >>> consonants DEPEND on vowels in a way that is not reciprocally true.
> You
> >>> CAN
> >>> pronounce the sound "a" without any vowel, and "a" is in fact a word
> (and
> >>> one of the most common words in our language).
> >>>
> >>> At the morphological level, we see the same non-reciprocal 
dependency
> >>> relation: In the word "reworked", both "re-" and "-ed" depend on
> "work"
> >>> for
> >>> their meaning, but not vice versa. Which can also be seen at the 
level
> of
> >>> relative clauses.
> >>>
> >>> In an exchange (which is where I think J.G. really needs to look for
> the
> >>> emotional fountainhead of his semantic system) we find that we can
> have
> >>> an
> >>> initiate ("Who are you?") without a response, but a response without
> an
> >>> initiate is not a response at all.
> >>>
> >>> Why? As far as I know, non-human systems of communication (e.g. bird
> >>> calls, whale songs, computer coding) do not have this kind of
> >>> non-symmetrical dependency at any level at all. It's one word = one
> >>> emotion,
> >>> more or less like the extremely impoverished view of language that
> J.G.
> >>> presents in his paper.
> >>>
> >>> It seems to me that non-symmetrical dependency is an essential
> resource
> >>> for making a very finite group of phenomena potentially stand for a
> >>> potentially infinite one (as is polysemy, or as Robert Lake says,
> >>> "metaphor").
> >>>
> >>> This super-productivity is what allows human languages to SIGNIFY
> rather
> >>> than simply SIGNAL. But of course this superproductivity brings with
> it
> >>> developmental crises, too.
> >>>
> >>> I have one other comment on the "reception by production" theories
> that
> >>> Joseph Gilbert, Liberman, and Chomsky and Halle are putting forward.
> ALL
> >>> of
> >>> these theories assume a kind of RECIPROCITY, an act of EMPATHY, a
> >>> DECENTRATION that Piaget rules out until the child is at least seven
> >>> years
> >>> old. You have to imagine what you would be thinking if you were 
making
> >>> the
> >>> noises that you are hearing. So if Piaget is right, children should
> not
> >>> be
> >>> able to learn to speak until they are seven or eight.
> >>>
> >>> David Kellogg
> >>> Seoul National University of Education
> >>>
> >>> --- On Tue, 10/12/10, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> From: Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> >>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Date: Tuesday, October 12, 2010, 9:55 PM
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Dear Mike Cole:
> >>> The sound of the voiced "M" is mmmmmmmmmm, commonly uttered to 
express
> >>> pleasure, as in the reaction to something good tasting. The name of
> the
> >>> letter is a peripheral issue.
> >>>
> >>>        J.G.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On Oct 12, 2010, at 6:44 PM, mike cole wrote:
> >>>
> >>> > David and Joseph.
> >>> >
> >>> > A question. The alphabetic character, M, may represent a phoneme.
> But
> >>> can
> >>> > one say the letter M without there being two phonemes there?
> >>> > mike
> >>> >
> >>> > On Tue, Oct 12, 2010 at 4:26 PM, David Kellogg <
> >>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> >>> >
> >>> >> I just want to pick up on ONE aspect of this (very long and 
almost
> >>> >> completely unsourced) document, and try to source it, because 
it's
> a
> >>> truism
> >>> >> in our field that none of us can stand alone.
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Even if this were not true in an epistemological sense (there is
> only
> >>> so
> >>> >> much brilliance a lone genius is capable of) it would be 
absolutey
> >>
> >>> true
> >>> in a
> >>> >> publishing sense (a long document is unpublishable without a long
> list
> >>> of
> >>> >> references, preferably including all of its potential reviewers).
> >>> >>
> >>> >> It's this:
> >>> >>
> >>> >> "The vocal sounds express/communicate states of the emotions 
first
> and
> >>> >> foremost, and as an afterthought, so to speak, they are used to
> refer
> >>> to
> >>> >> things. They communicate emotion by moving the auditory apparatus
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> hearer in a manner analogous to the movements of the vocal
> apparatus
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> speaker, thereby creating in the hearer an emotion analogous to 
the
> >>> emotion
> >>> >> present in the speaker. Just as the touch of the hands conveys 
the
> >>> intent of
> >>> >> the toucher, so the vocal motion of the vocalizer creates in the 
>>
> >>> hearer
> >>> an
> >>> >> emotional state analogous to that of the vocalizer."
> >>> >>
> >>> >> This is the "reception through production" theory of speech
> perception
> >>> that
> >>> >> was popular in the 1980s. It does have BIG advantages over 
passive
> >>> theories
> >>> >> of reception that preceded it(for one thing, it's much more
> >>> parsimonious;
> >>> >> the same system can be used for receiving speech and for
> transmitting
> >>> it).
> >>> >>
> >>> >>  There are really TWO variations of this theory:
> >>> >>
> >>> >> a) The "motor" theory, associated with Alvin Liberman and the
> Haskins
> >>> >> Laboratories. This theory relies on the idea of "articulatory
> >>> gestures". By
> >>> >> recognizing the kinds of "articulatory gestures" required by >>
> >>> particular
> >>> >> sounds, the hearer, through an act of empathy with the speaker,
> asks
> >>> >> himself/herself "What would I be saying if I were making gestures
> like
> >>> that
> >>> >> in this situation?"
> >>> >>
> >>> >> b) The "analysis by synthesis" theory, associated with Chomsky 
and
> >>> Halle at
> >>> >> MIT. This theory relies on pure unempbodied ACOUSTIC knowledge
> rather
> >>> than
> >>> >> articulatory gestures. By recognizing the acoustic patterns (see
> the
> >>> theory
> >>> >> of "distinctive features" laid out in Chomsky and Halle, The 
Sound
> >>> Patterns
> >>> >> of English), the hearer through an act of empathy with the 
speaker,
> >>> asks
> >>> >> himself/herself "What would I be saying if I were making gestures
> like
> >>> that
> >>> >> in this situation?"
> >>> >>
> >>> >> I think that BOTH of these variants of the theory have in common 
a
> >>> >> recognition that in perception we get a lot more than we hear;
> people
> >>> do NOT
> >>> >> rely on the stream of vowels and consonants as their sole source 
of
> >>> >> information. Perception is a supreme act of what Bruner calls
> "going
> >>> beyond
> >>> >> the information given".
> >>> >>
> >>> >> Contrary to this, all theories of perception which are based on 
an
> >>> analogy
> >>> >> with the ALPHABET assume that the stream of vowels and consonants
> >>> really
> >>> >> does carry the information (or, as Joseph Gilbert puts it,
> emotion).
> >>> >>
> >>> >> In Vygotsky's time, this theory was advocated by the brilliant >>
> >>> futurist
> >>> >> poet Khlebnikov, who wrote quite extensively on the "emotional >>
> >>> valence"
> >>> of
> >>> >> particular phonemes, and constructed whole poems on this
> association
> >>> (e.g.
> >>> >> "Zangezi", which was composed after a long series of experiments 
on
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> "semantics" of individual phonemes). As you can imagine, they 
don't
> >>> >> translate very well!
> >>> >>
> >>> >> David Kellogg
> >>> >> Seoul National University of Education
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> --- On Mon, 10/11/10, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> wrote:
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >> From: Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> >>> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] The Genetic Belly Button and the Functional
> Belly
> >>> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> >> Date: Monday, October 11, 2010, 11:03 PM
> >>> >>
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                                                                 1
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                      Language Creates Culture
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Language functions, in human society, as the generator of
> culture.
> >>> By
> >>> >> the effects on
> >>> >> us of the sounds we utter, we inform ourselves of the effects on 
us
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> things which
> >>> >> make up our world. Since the only sense of the meaning of any 
thing
> is
> >>> one
> >>> >> and the same
> >>> >> as the effect on us of the thing, and since we relate to our 
world
> >>> through
> >>> >> our words, language informs us of the meanings of things. This
> >>> informing
> >>> >> takes place when we use vocal sounds as words to refer to things.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We exist in a vacuous condition vis-à-vis any objective 
knowing
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> ultimate meaning of anything. We do not know the ultimate affect 
on
> us
> >>> of
> >>> >> anything. If we operated by instinct, our choices would not 
depend
> on
> >>> >> knowing, as our choices do. In this culls context, we are 
informed
> by
> >>> the
> >>> >> affects on us of the sounds of our words of the affects on us of
> the
> >>> things
> >>> >> to which our words refer.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     In the vacuum of outer space, a ship can be propelled by the
> >>> constant,
> >>> >> subtle force of an ion drive. In the outer space of our
> cluelessness
> >>> >> as
> >>> to
> >>> >> the meaning of anything, we are informed of that meaning by the
> affect
> >>> on us
> >>> >> of the sounds of our words.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Spoken language is sound made by the body and used to refer 
to,
> to
> >>> >> signify, things. We must thoroughly understand the basis of
> language
> >>> >> in
> >>> >> order to understand anything else about language. Why do we use 
>>
> >>> certain
> >>> >> words to signify certain things? Why are there similarities and
> >>> differences
> >>> >> among the various languages in how sound is used to refer to
> things?
> >>> >> Is
> >>> >> there a correlation between and among emotional states and vocal
> >>> sounds?
> >>> >> These and other questions must be answered if we are to know how
> >>> language
> >>> >> works.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We are born into a language-using group and learn the 
meanings
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> things that
> >>> >> make up our world simply by learning our group's language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We have a distinct and unique reaction to each vocal sound 
just
> as
> >>> we
> >>> >> do to
> >>> >> each facial expression and postural position. All forms of body
> >>> language,
> >>> >> postural, facial
> >>> >> and vocal, are expressions of states of our internal goings-on, 
are
> >>> born of
> >>> >> those feeling/emotional states. and recreate these states by
> resonant
> >>> >> entrainment.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>         The languages we humans speak currently are the results 
of
> the
> >>> >> experiential contributions of our ancestors. However they, (our 
>>
> >>> distant
> >>> >> relatives), felt about whatever they had words for, we now feel
> again
> >>> in the
> >>> >> present moment, when we utter the words they originally uttered.
> >>> Therefore
> >>> >> language functions somewhat as a seed: the experience of past
> peoples
> >>> was
> >>> >> represented in the words they spoke and now, when we voice those 
>>
> >>> words,
> >>> we
> >>> >> re-experience what they did.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Language is institutionalized perception. How we, as a 
society,
> >>> >> perceive our world, is
> >>> >>                                                     2
> >>> >>
> >>> >> determined by the the affects on us of our vocal sounds, (a form 
of
> >>> body
> >>> >> language), we use to refer to the things that make it up.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Our actions are determined by our perceptions. If we want to 
>>
> >>> change
> >>> the
> >>> >> way we act we must change the way we perceive our world. And we 
can
> >>> change
> >>> >> how we perceive our world by changing how we refer to the things
> that
> >>> >> constitute our world.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The feelings/emotions of actors on stage and of all of us, 
are
> >>> >> communicated by our actions. The way someone moves tells us much
> about
> >>> how
> >>> >> they feel. Our face conveys extensive and subtle information 
about
> our
> >>> >> emotional state. The sounds of our voices carry emotional 
content.
> >>
> >>> And,
> >>> >> although we normally are not aware of it, the articulate vocal
> sounds,
> >>> (the
> >>> >> sounds of our vowels and consonants), are loaded with information
> >>
> >>> about
> >>> our
> >>> >> emotional goings-on. The information that comes from the 
articulate
> >>> sounds
> >>> >> of our words rather than from the emotional overlay we place on
> them
> >>> due to
> >>> >> our transitory emotional states, is the same no matter what moods
> we
> >>> may be
> >>> >> experiencing while we speak. That aspect of information 
conveyance
> is
> >>> >> institutionalized/standardized. The tone of voice, cadence, and
> volume
> >>> >> dynamics can be unique to each situation without altering the
> >>> fundamental
> >>> >> referential communication.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     One can experience the effect on ourselves of the various 
vocal
> >>> sounds
> >>> >> by, while in a sensitive, receptive mode, saying those sounds out
> loud
> >>> and
> >>> >> sensing their effects. I have done that and have, it seems,
> discovered
> >>> their
> >>> >> meanings. You can do that also. Doing so oneself will give one a
> more
> >>> >> complete sense of the effects of vocal utterances than one could
> >>> experience
> >>> >> by reading what someone else has written about the effects of the
> >>
> >>> vocal
> >>> >> sounds on the emotions.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     This covert function of language must be brought to light  in
> >>
> >>> order
> >>> for
> >>> >> us to be able to understand the importance of recreating culture.
> We
> >>> must
> >>> >> understand that our behavior, as a society, is fundamentally 
linked
> to
> >>> our
> >>> >> culture, which is a result of our language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We do not objectively know the ultimate meaning of anything 
and
> >>> >> consequently experience our sense of the meanings of things from
> the
> >>> effects
> >>> >> on us of our words.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     These familiar phrases suggest a perception, perhaps a 
mystical
> >>> >> perception, of the importance of the spoken word.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The final word.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What's the word?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and 
the
> >>> word
> >>> >> was God.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The tongue is the rudder of the soul. It is not what passes
> into
> >>> our
> >>> >> lips that defiles us but
> >>> >>                                                     3
> >>> >>
> >>> >> every untoward utterance that proceeds out of our mouths.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Words, as sounds, affect us subliminally, supplying us with a
> >>> feeling
> >>> >> for whatever we name. It is that feeling that we experience from
> the
> >>> sounds
> >>> >> of our words that supplies us with a subliminal consensus for our
> >>> >> world-view.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We cannot realistically expect humans to act in a way >>
> >>> contradictory
> >>> to
> >>> >> their culture's bias. Marx's economic/social theory was used as a
> >>> rallying
> >>> >> standard to
> >>> >> enable regime change. After those individuals who had experienced
> the
> >>> >> tyranny of the czar had left the scene, the body-politic 
eventually
> >>> rejected
> >>> >> collectivism, (the transplanted economic organ). Russian culture 
is
> >>> >> fundamentally the same as it was when the roots of its present >>
> >>> language
> >>> were
> >>> >> established and Russian society naturally reverted to its 
cultural
> >>> default
> >>> >> mode after the revolution. After a short time, the czar was
> replaced
> >>> >> by
> >>> the
> >>> >> head commissar. Marx held that the economic relationships within
> >>> society
> >>> >> create all other human relations. It seems that culture is the
> cause
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> nature of human relationships within any society.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                                                       The Culture
> Made
> >>> Us
> >>> >> Do It
> >>> >>                                           "The unrecognized
> function
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> language"
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     As an iceberg exists mostly under the surface of the water
> which
> >>> >> supports it, the fundamental consequence of language tends to be 
>>
> >>> hidden
> >>> >> under the surface of our awareness. Most crucial human activities
> go
> >>> >> on
> >>> >> without awareness, for example, all of the bodily functions. Many
> >>> conscious
> >>> >> activities proceed without much deliberate awareness. Once one
> knows
> >>> well
> >>> >> how to drive a car, much less awareness is needed to operate the
> >>> vehicle.
> >>> >> The subconscious mind supports the same kinds of activities as 
does
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> conscious mind, however with less effort. Anything that can be
> >>> automated,
> >>> >> is.  Automating essential activities frees the conscious mind to
> focus
> >>> on
> >>> >> issues about which we feel we need to learn in order to more
> >>> effectively
> >>> >> cope, (those issues that require conscious attention until new
> >>> behavioral
> >>> >> patterns are in place). There is no need to be aware of processes
> that
> >>> take
> >>> >> place well enough without attention. It is only when a problem
> arises
> >>> that
> >>> >> we
> >>> >>  humans, in an attempt to solve it, focus our awareness on it. If
> we
> >>> are
> >>> >> coping well enough without awareness, why be aware? We don't fix
> >>> something
> >>> >> if it doesn't seem broken. We don't reinvent our wheel as long as
> it's
> >>> >> rolling. However, upon examination, our human condition appears 
to
> >>
> >>> have
> >>> been
> >>> >> painfully broken for as long as we can recall, and must be
> repaired.
> >>> How may
> >>> >> we fix it?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Could it be that our behavior is governed by something that 
we
> >>> cannot
> >>> >> see, something of which we are not cognizant? Is there anything 
in
> our
> >>> >> nature that would preclude such a possibility, the possibility 
that
> >>
> >>> our
> >>> >> behavior may be directed by influences not within the purview of
> our
> >>> >> everyday consciousness? What could such a force be?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The ability to produce simple vocal sounds made it's 
appearance
> on
> >>> the
> >>> >> scene before our
> >>> >>                                                     4
> >>> >>
> >>> >> progenitors made words of those sounds. The ability to vocalize
> >>> >> articulately is a prerequisite to the ability to verbalize. Words
> >>> appeared
> >>> >> when our ancient ancestors became cognizant of the relatedness of
> >>> stimuli to
> >>> >> their own vocal reactions to them. When they began deliberately
> using
> >>> >> vocalizations to bring to mind things, they made the transition 
>>
> >>> between
> >>> >> deriving their sense of the meaning of things by direct 
experience
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> things to deriving a sense of the meaning of things by 
experiencing
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> affects of the sounds of the words for the things. This
> supersession
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> primal world by the linguistic world was the start of culture.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Being able to talk about things was very advantageous to our
> >>> distant
> >>> >> relatives. They could confer and plan. More important, they >>
> >>> experienced
> >>> a
> >>> >> common sense of the meaning of the things in their world by using
> >>> common
> >>> >> symbols with which to refer to them.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Culture was advantageous to our ancestors in the ancient,
> >>> >> pre-industrial environment. Now our technology provides us with 
the
> >>> power to
> >>> >> create and reside in an artificial environment, however one made
> >>> according
> >>> >> to the values inherent in our primitive culture. Our culture
> provides
> >>> us
> >>> >> with marching orders and our technology enables us to march very
> >>> forcefully.
> >>> >> Are we marching toward the edge of a precipice?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     All action is preceded by a decision to act, be that decision
> >>> >> consciously or subconsciously made. All decisions are based on a
> >>> >> consideration of the consequences of those decisions. These 
effects
> on
> >>> us of
> >>> >> the consequences of our actions are the same as and identical 
with
> the
> >>> >> meanings of those actions. How do we know the meanings of things?
> How
> >>> do we
> >>> >> know the affects on us of any thing? Do we know the effects on us
> of
> >>> things
> >>> >> directly as a consequence of our direct experience with them or 
by
> >>> indirect
> >>> >> experience with them by using and experiencing the words for 
those
> >>> things?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Language is the factory and culture is the product. Culture 
is
> an
> >>> >> abstraction and language is the physical mechanism from which it
> >>> springs.
> >>> >> Language is emotionally evocative sounds used to represent 
things,
> >>> thereby
> >>> >> conveying to us a sense of the affects-on-us/the-meanings-of 
those
> >>> things.
> >>> >> Our sense of our own role in our culture provides us with our
> identity
> >>> and
> >>> >> therefore with guidance for our behavior. The cultural values,
> derived
> >>> from
> >>> >> our ancestors' experiences long ago, as represented in our
> language,
> >>> are
> >>> >> instilled in us and direct our behavior today. A body continues 
in
> its
> >>> state
> >>> >> of motion unless it is acted upon by an outside force. Human
> culture
> >>> will
> >>> >> remain fundamentally unchanged unless it is deliberately changed;
> and
> >>> that
> >>> >> will not happen unless we feel the need to do so and know how to 
do
> >>
> >>> it.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Culture resides in the subconscious mind. Many others have
> spoken
> >>> about
> >>> >> the need to change the way we, as a society, think: many have
> tried,
> >>> >> by
> >>> >> using means such as meditation, sleep deprivation, psychoactive
> >>> substances,
> >>> >> chanting, philosophical inquiry, etc. to accomplish this change 
and
> >>
> >>> may
> >>> have
> >>> >> been successful to a degree. However, it seems they were not able
> to
> >>> >> lastingly infuse into society at large their newfound vision, due
> to
> >>> not
> >>> >> addressing the status quo at the
> >>> >>                                                     5
> >>> >>
> >>> >> root/source, which is the culture. Understanding how language >>
> >>> functions
> >>> >> makes it possible to change our culture.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                        How did language arise?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     How did language arise? Originally, our progenitors' 
vocalizing
> >>> only
> >>> >> expressed internal-goings-on/emotion and did not refer to 
anything
> >>> external
> >>> >> to them. It was advantageous to members of the group to be 
informed
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> emotional conditions of other members. Much later, when
> consciousness
> >>> >> developed enough for them to see the connectedness of the sounds
> >>> uttered to
> >>> >> the things the sounds were uttered in reaction to, they realized
> that
> >>> they
> >>> >> could bring to mind the thought of the things by uttering their
> >>> associated
> >>> >> sounds, (names). The beginning of talking about things was the
> start
> >>> >> of
> >>> >> culture,and the talking about things refocused the talkers'
> conscious
> >>> >> attention away from the experience of the emotional reactions to
> the
> >>> sounds
> >>> >> of the words, and toward thoughts related to the things to which
> the
> >>> words
> >>> >> referred. While they were busy directing their attention to
> thoughts
> >>> related
> >>> >> to the things to which the words referred, they were being
> emotionally
> >>> >>  affected by the vocal sounds they were making to form their 
words.
> >>
> >>> So,
> >>> the
> >>> >> effects of the sounds they were making vocally were experienced
> >>> >> subliminally, while
> >>> >>
> >>> >> consciously, they were dealing with the thoughts of the things >>
> >>> referred
> >>> to
> >>> >> by their words. The affects-on-us/meanings-of things cannot be
> proven.
> >>> All
> >>> >> they had and all we have to go on are the effects on us of the
> things
> >>> and
> >>> >> the effects on us of the sounds of the words that represent the 
>>
> >>> things.
> >>> >> While the effects of the things are changeable through time and
> >>> somewhat
> >>> >> unique to each individual, the effects on us of the sounds of the
> >>
> >>> words
> >>> are
> >>> >> relatively consistent and universal. Having nothing else to go 
on,
> we
> >>> accept
> >>> >> the effects on us of the vocal sounds of words as
> >>> revealing/representing the
> >>> >> effects on us of the things referred to by the words. In this 
way,
> >>> culture
> >>> >> is formed and passed to succeeding generations. Our world views
> >>> typically
> >>> >> come from the sense of the meaning of things as represented by 
the
> >>> sounds of
> >>> >> our words rather than from the sense of meaning we may gain from
> the
> >>> direct
> >>> >> experience of the things themselves.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Do vocal sounds, themselves, communicate? When someone utters 
a
> >>> vocal
> >>> >> sound, such as a sigh, a growl, a whimper, a scream, etc., do we
> get a
> >>> sense
> >>> >> of how they are feeling? If so, they are communicating their >>
> >>> condition.
> >>> How
> >>> >> does that communication take place? Do we receive information
> >>> communicated
> >>> >> in such a manner consciously, subconsciously or by both ways? 
What
> is
> >>> the
> >>> >> means by which an emotion can be conveyed by sound? Can emotion, 
or
> >>> anything
> >>> >> else be communicated by the articulate sounds of our vowels and
> >>> consonants,
> >>> >> or do only non-articulate vocal sounds convey meaning? If we 
allow
> >>
> >>> that
> >>> >> vocal sounds, simply as sounds, communicate,  then is it possible
> or
> >>> likely
> >>> >> that the vocal sounds we use to make words also communicate as 
well
> >>> when
> >>> >> used as words? What would be the effect of using inherently >>
> >>> emotionally
> >>> >> meaningful sounds as symbols to represent external things? Would
> the
> >>> >> inherent meaning of the sounds affect our perception of the 
things
> >>> >>  represented by the sounds?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                                                     6
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     These considerations may shed light on the issue of the root 
>>
> >>> causes
> >>> of
> >>> >> human behavior. Naturally, those who contemplate our condition 
and
> >>> would
> >>> >> improve it if they could, would be attentive to these matters.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     All of life's processes exist as movements. Emotional
> conditions
> >>> are
> >>> >> patterns of motion. Similar structures, in keeping with the
> mechanics
> >>> of
> >>> >> resonation, impart, on each other, their movements. Our vocal
> >>> apparatuses
> >>> >> facilitate our ability to move with each other.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The vibrations made by the body convey the condition of the
> >>> emotional
> >>> >> body to other similar/human emotional bodies, and to some degree,
> to
> >>> other
> >>> >> animal emotional bodies. The more similar the other body, the 
more
> the
> >>> >> condition is transposed. Humans receive each others' vocal and
> other
> >>> >> body-language communications more readily than other species
> receive
> >>> human
> >>> >> communication. Similar structures transmit their
> resonation/vibration
> >>> to
> >>> >> each other more readily than do dissimilar structures.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     My quest for understanding of human behavior began long ago.
> When
> >>> >> I
> >>> was
> >>> >> around the age of six, I became increasingly aware that the
> folkways
> >>> and
> >>> >> formal institutions of our society were lacking in humanity and
> common
> >>> >> sense. I asked myself why this was so. As a child, I attributed 
the
> >>> problem
> >>> >> to people's personal psychology and it was not until I was in my
> late
> >>> teens
> >>> >> that I realized that the cause of the problem is our culture. It
> was
> >>> shortly
> >>> >> after that that I understood how verbal/vocal communication 
works.
> The
> >>> cause
> >>> >> of The Problem seemed and seems to be the culture which is 
created
> by
> >>> the
> >>> >> relationship between vocal sounds and what they, as words, refer
> to.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Some of the reasoning that preceded this realization was 
first,
> >>> that we
> >>> >> are not created evil, but rather simply with survival instincts.
> >>> Second,
> >>> >> that if we were able to act sanely/rationally, we would be doing
> what
> >>> >> produces the best results for everyone. Third, it must be 
something
> we
> >>> >> learned, some misinformation, that causes us to behave in ways 
not
> in
> >>> our
> >>> >> own self-interest. Fourth, when I considered the question of from
> >>
> >>> where
> >>> this
> >>> >> false information came, I identified as the source, the culture. 
>>
> >>> Later,
> >>> I
> >>> >> realized that we do not, for sure, know the meaning of anything,
> and
> >>> that,
> >>> >> as far as we know, the only thing constant and predictable about
> any
> >>> thing
> >>> >> is its name, (the word-sound we produce in order to bring to
> >>> consciousness
> >>> >> whatever thing to which we choose to refer). After a time, I 
became
> >>> aware of
> >>> >> how the different vocal sounds we produce when we speak words, 
each
> >>> create
> >>> >> in us a unique effect and how those effects inform us
> subconsciously
> >>> >> of
> >>> >>  the affect on us, (the meaning), of the thing itself to which 
the
> >>
> >>> word
> >>> >> sounds refer.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     At this time, I also learned that the sequence of sounds of 
the
> >>> letters
> >>> >> of our alphabet represents a sequential delineation of
> >>> >> emotional/experiential events. From A to Z, the succession of the
> >>> sounds of
> >>> >> the letters of our alphabet is an example of
> >>> pattern-projection/recognition,
> >>> >> the pattern, in this case, being the seminal emotional events 
that
> >>> humans
> >>> >> experience during their lives, in chronological order.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                                                     7
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Emotions happen to us: They seem to come from the "great
> mystery",
> >>> God,
> >>> >> or whatever image we may use to portray a place from which strong
> and
> >>> >> compelling feelings emanate.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Given, all the vocal sounds that people can make, how would 
one
> >>> arrange
> >>> >> the sounds sequentially and from what archetype, (model), would 
the
> >>> pattern
> >>> >> of that sequence come? Even if the originators of the present
> alphabet
> >>> >> deliberately imposed a pattern on their arrangement of the
> >>> letter-sounds,
> >>> >> whatever world view that existed in their minds caused them to 
feel
> >>> most
> >>> >> comfortable with the sequence of sounds they chose. The sequence
> they
> >>> chose
> >>> >> must have been agreeable with the story that was represented in
> their
> >>> minds
> >>> >> by those sounds in that sequence. If one admits that vocal sounds
> >>> affect us,
> >>> >> then how could a story, a sequence of affects,  not be told by 
the
> >>> sequence
> >>> >> in which the sounds exist? Whether or not the originators of any
> >>> particular
> >>> >> alphabet had a conscious reason for arranging the sounds of that
> >>> alphabet in
> >>> >> the sequence in which they appear, subconscious reasons were
> >>> influencing
> >>> >> their arrangement none the less. Does this story, told by our
> >>> >>  alphabet make sense? Does it seem to be an accurate 
representation
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> main events in a human's life?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We tend to cling to our culture as if our lives depended on 
it,
> as
> >>> a
> >>> >> drowning person might cling to a life preserver. Culture offers 
an
> >>> answer,
> >>> >> -in this case subconsciously apprehended-, to the question, "What
> are
> >>> the
> >>> >> meanings of things?" Without culture, there tends to be no
> consensus
> >>> about
> >>> >> what things mean. Language informs us of the meanings of named
> things
> >>> by the
> >>> >> affects on us of the sounds of our words. Those who use the same
> >>> language
> >>> >> experience the same sense of the meanings of the things that make
> up
> >>> their
> >>> >> worlds. That sense emanates from the deep levels of their
> subconscious
> >>> and
> >>> >> their final assessment of the meanings of things results from 
their
> >>> >> processing that deep, culturally caused base sense of meaning
> through
> >>> the
> >>> >> lens of their perception of their own relationship to the society
> in
> >>> which
> >>> >> they live.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     For the sake of clarity, let us consider, hypothetically, 
what
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> result/s would be of using meaningful sounds to refer to things.
> Would
> >>> the
> >>> >> meanings of the sounds spill over into the perceived meanings of
> the
> >>> things
> >>> >> or would the meanings of the things influence the perceived
> meanings
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> sounds? Or would neither influence the other or would they
> influence
> >>> each
> >>> >> other? Which has a stronger meaning-pressure, the sounds we make
> with
> >>> our
> >>> >> voice or the things which, with the sounds, we name?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The vocal sounds express/communicate states of the emotions
> first
> >>> and
> >>> >> foremost, and as an afterthought, so to speak, they are used to
> refer
> >>> to
> >>> >> things. They communicate emotion by moving the auditory apparatus
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> hearer in a manner analogous to the movements of the vocal
> apparatus
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> speaker, thereby creating in the hearer an emotion analogous to 
the
> >>> emotion
> >>> >> present in the speaker. Just as the touch of the hands conveys 
the
> >>> intent of
> >>> >> the toucher, so the vocal motion of the vocalizer creates in the 
>>
> >>> hearer
> >>> an
> >>> >> emotional state analogous to that of the vocalizer.
> >>> >>     Just as our becoming-human progenitors were gaining
> consciousness,
> >>> (the
> >>> >> ability to
> >>> >>                                                     8
> >>> >>
> >>> >> contemplate the consequences of their actions), they were, for 
the
> >>> first
> >>> >> time, using vocal expressions as words to refer to specific 
things,
> >>
> >>> not
> >>> only
> >>> >> to express immediate emotional goings-on. Since they vocalized
> >>> primarily
> >>> >> under duress, their words were expressions born of fear rather 
than
> of
> >>> >> conscious understanding. The mind concentrates on problems, on
> issues
> >>> that
> >>> >> could potentially be destructive to the perceiver. When this >>
> >>> fear-based
> >>> >> thinking bias becomes institutionalized in language, the language
> >>> itself is
> >>> >> a source of anxiety. The more we verbalize about any given 
problem,
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> more
> >>> >> stressed-out we become. This reminds me of an Eskimo method of
> killing
> >>> a
> >>> >> wolf. They would smear congealed blood on a very sharp knife and
> set
> >>> >> it
> >>> out,
> >>> >> with the blade pointing upward, where wolves frequented. When a
> wolf
> >>> licked
> >>> >> the blood, it would bleed and lick its own blood not knowing it 
was
> >>> bleeding
> >>> >> to death. We are wolfish for knowledge and we pursue it by using
> our
> >>> >>  main thinking tool, our language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                        The Unrecognized Role of Language
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Culture is the hidden law-of-the-land. We are creatures of >>
> >>> culture,
> >>> and
> >>> >> its subjects. Our culture originally  enhanced our survivability
> and,
> >>> in a
> >>> >> technologically advanced world, may become the instrument of our
> >>> >> destruction. Our culturally motivated ways of relating to one
> another
> >>> may
> >>> >> have once been viable, although perhaps immoral, and now, with 
our
> >>> powerful
> >>> >> ability to cause environmental change, are untenable.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>      "The release of atom power has changed everything except our
> way
> >>> of
> >>> >> thinking...the solution to this problem lies in the heart of
> mankind.
> >>> If
> >>> >> only I had known, I should have become a watchmaker." --- Albert
> >>> Einstein
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I wish to change what is in that "heart".
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The referential function of human language is merely the "tip
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> iceberg" of the role of language. Its larger and more profound >>
> >>> function
> >>> is
> >>> >> unacknowledged: It is spoken language's informing us of the
> meanings
> >>> >> of
> >>> all
> >>> >> to which we verbally refer. We are moved in a primal way by the
> sounds
> >>> we
> >>> >> produce with our voice and, in the absence of any "objective", >>
> >>> absolute
> >>> >> information regarding (the affects on us)/(the meanings of) the
> things
> >>> of
> >>> >> our world, we accept the affects on us of the vocal sounds of our
> >>
> >>> words
> >>> as
> >>> >> representing the affects on us of the things to which our words
> refer.
> >>> In
> >>> >> this way, we are informed subliminally, simply by learning our
> >>> language, of
> >>> >> the meaning of our world. How else could we, as very young
> children,
> >>> have
> >>> >> achieved a sense of how we were affected by the numerous things
> that
> >>> made up
> >>> >> our world?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     This matter is of paramount importance because we act in >>
> >>> accordance
> >>> >> with how we perceive our world, (with what our world means to 
us),
> and
> >>> our
> >>> >> sense of that meaning is derived from  the affects upon us of our
> >>> words.
> >>> >> Much of human behavior that is commonly attributed to "human
> nature"
> >>> >> is
> >>> >> actually motivated by cultural nature, which is created by
> language.
> >>> >>                                                     9
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     How and what would our society be if we had a culture which
> >>> instilled
> >>> >> in us the values that we would consciously choose to hold?
> Presently,
> >>> we
> >>> >> simply assimilate the culture in which we are born. Once we
> understand
> >>> the
> >>> >> mechanism of cultural transmission, we will be able to change our
> >>
> >>> group
> >>> >> program.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     However, it seems that many of us may be too timid to venture
> >>
> >>> forth
> >>> >> from the false security of our unquestioned and familiar values.
> Some
> >>> have
> >>> >> expressed to me that language is a product of nature and that to 
>>
> >>> change
> >>> it
> >>> >> deliberately would produce an unnatural result, a Frankenstein >>
> >>> culture,
> >>> the
> >>> >> consequences of which would probably be destructive. To those I 
>>
> >>> suggest
> >>> that
> >>> >> we are inherently unable to venture out of the natural realm, as 
we
> >>
> >>> are
> >>> >> inextricably woven into the web of nature. Furthermore it is
> entirely
> >>> >> correct and wholesome for us, with the goal of improving our
> >>> survivability,
> >>> >> to choose to correct our culture at its source. Once we see how 
we
> may
> >>> help
> >>> >> ourselves, we would be within our progressive evolutionary
> tradition
> >>> >> to
> >>> use
> >>> >> all our knowledge to do so.
> >>> >> .
> >>> >>     Vocal sounds either communicate as vocal sounds or they do 
not.
> If
> >>> we
> >>> >> assume that vocal sounds do not communicate, then language only 
>>
> >>> blindly
> >>> and
> >>> >> unintelligently refers to things. If we assume that vocal sounds 
do
> >>> >> communicate something, as vocal sounds, then language does more
> than
> >>> merely
> >>> >> refer to things: it also informs us about the things named. Which
> is
> >>> true?
> >>> >> Do any of us believe that our vocal sounds do not
> express/communicate
> >>> >> anything? If we believe that vocal sounds communicate/express
> >>> something,
> >>> >> then what is it that they communicate/express? If vocal sounds do
> >>> >> communicate as sounds, do they loose that communicative function
> when
> >>> >> incorporated into words or do they continue to be expressive when
> used
> >>> in
> >>> >> words?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     If vocal sounds that constitute words communicate something 
as
> >>> sounds,
> >>> >> then what effect does the sound of a word exert on our perception
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> thing to which that word refers?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Many seem to have difficulty accepting the idea that the
> primary
> >>> >> meanings of vocal sounds, including the sounds of words, are the
> >>> effects
> >>> >> they cause within each of us and not the things to which they 
refer
> >>> when
> >>> >> uttered as words. Another point that aided me in understanding 
the
> >>> function
> >>> >> of language is that we really do not know the meaning of anything
> but
> >>> rather
> >>> >> behave as though our taken-for-granted assumptions are valid only
> >>> because
> >>> >> they have not been held to the light of inquiry. It is only that
> which
> >>> >> resides in our subconscious and of which we are not conscious and
> >>> >> consequently do not question, that we act as if we "know" for 
sure.
> >>> Remember
> >>> >> the caterpillar in Alice in Wonderland? When asked how he managed
> to
> >>> >> coordinate the movements of all those legs, he became aware of 
the
> >>> >> previously unconscious process of walking and then could not 
walk.
> The
> >>> only
> >>> >> sense of the meanings of things that we dependably share with the
> >>> others of
> >>> >> our society is
> >>> >>  instilled in each of us by the relationship between the sounds 
of
> our
> >>> >> words and the things to which those words refer. Words are the 
link
> >>> between
> >>> >> our autonomic, cultural sense of meaning and the things that make
> up
> >>> our
> >>> >> world. We give things a familiarity by attaching to them sounds 
>>
> >>> created
> >>> by
> >>> >> our body. Our words are related to things because the vocal 
sounds
> of
> >>> our
> >>> >> words are related to our reactions to those things. We may not
> >>> ordinarily
> >>> >> experience an emotional reaction to the things that
> >>> >>                                                     10
> >>> >>
> >>> >> make up our world. It is during our seminal moments that we
> experience
> >>> >> emotional reactions to things.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What meaning, if any, do things have if we are not affected 
by
> >>> those
> >>> >> things? All meaning is relative. If we were totally unaffected by
> >>> something,
> >>> >> would it be meaningful? How would whatever meaning it may have be
> >>> perceived?
> >>> >> Clearly, what we want to know about something, (anything), is how
> it
> >>> affects
> >>> >> us, (what it is?).
> >>> >>
> >>> >>      After many attempts to share these findings with those in
> >>> academia,
> >>> >> their lack of understanding, even more their lack of interest in
> >>> >> understanding the ideas I was putting forth , dampened my impulse
> to
> >>> reach
> >>> >> out to those whom I previously had thought were most likely to
> >>> understand
> >>> >> these findings.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I figured that what I was saying was challenging on a deep
> level
> >>> >> to
> >>> >> most, who would otherwise gain a glimpse of it. My discovery, 
seems
> to
> >>> >> threaten the sense of security of those who consciously or
> otherwise
> >>> treat
> >>> >> their culture as an idol. Some of us, especially those of highly
> >>> exercised
> >>> >> intellectual abilities, feel that security is to be had by being
> able
> >>> to
> >>> >> "explain" the meaning of things. By uttering words, (sounds), 
about
> >>> things,
> >>> >> what meaning is revealed? Doing so may create the illusion of
> >>> understanding
> >>> >> by seeming to make the named things familiar. But does it, only
> inform
> >>> us
> >>> >> with the effect/meaning of the sounds of words, or with the 
meaning
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> things as well? What are the meanings of the things?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     It appears that culture is the root of all normal human
> behavior.
> >>> We
> >>> >> all behave according to our values and assumptions and those 
derive
> >>> from our
> >>> >> culture. Do our academicians know what culture is, how it relates
> to
> >>> the
> >>> >> people who are instilled with it and how it may be changed?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We are informed subliminally of the meaning of our world by 
the
> >>> >> language that we speak.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Why is it so difficult for people to understand how language
> >>> generates
> >>> >> culture? What is/are the missing piece/s of information that they
> need
> >>> in
> >>> >> order to grasp that concept?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     A better way is possible. We need only the vision of this
> better
> >>> world,
> >>> >> as an everyday experience, in order for us to act in accord with
> it.
> >>> The
> >>> >> consciousness of how to act in order to create the world we wish
> must
> >>> be the
> >>> >> status quo, not the rarity that it now is. This changing of the
> status
> >>> quo
> >>> >> can be accomplished by changing the culture and changing culture 
is
> >>> >> accomplished by changing language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Are we conscious that we are affected by the sounds we make
> with
> >>> our
> >>> >> voice? We are commonly aware that the quality of singers voices 
>>
> >>> affects
> >>> us.
> >>> >> We know that great orators and actors affect us with their 
delivery
> >>
> >>> and
> >>> >> vocal character. Everyone's voice affects us. We are aware of the
> >>> affect of
> >>> >> tone of voice but not of the affect of articulated phonemes per 
se.
> >>> >>                                                     11
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We have no way of knowing the final meaning of anything. We
> might
> >>> think
> >>> >> we know what a thing will do to us in the immediate future but 
what
> >>> about
> >>> >> how it will affect us much later? When we become aware of
> something,
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> question its meaning and once something is questioned, we never
> gain a
> >>> sense
> >>> >> of its absolute meaning Only that which remains in the 
subconscious
> we
> >>> do
> >>> >> not question. The feelings that well up from our subconscious, in
> >>> reaction
> >>> >> to various things, seems to be true absolutely. Our feelings
> strongly
> >>> affect
> >>> >> our train of thought.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The certainty of the uninformed is typically replaced by the
> >>> wonderment
> >>> >> of the "enlightened".
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Our culture/language supplies us with a sense of knowing the
> >>> meaning of
> >>> >> all things for which we have a name. This sense of the meaning of
> >>> things
> >>> >> helps us to feel secure in the face of an uncertain, threatening 
>>
> >>> world.
> >>> We
> >>> >> gain that sense of knowing the meaning of things simply be having
> >>
> >>> words
> >>> for
> >>> >> things. Our subconscious accepts the affects of the sound of the
> words
> >>> as
> >>> >> being the affects of the things to which the words refer.  The
> words
> >>> stand
> >>> >> for the things we name with them and replace, subliminally, our
> >>> perception
> >>> >> of the things referred to with our perception  of the words >>
> >>> themselves.
> >>> The
> >>> >> words are all we have to go on for the sensing of the
> meaning/effect
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> things.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Having words inform us of the meanings/effects of things 
seems
> to
> >>> have
> >>> >> some advantages compared to being informed of the 
meanings/effects
> of
> >>> things
> >>> >> by direct perception of the things themselves.  All those who use 
a
> >>> >> particular language have the same basic subliminal sense of the
> >>> meanings of
> >>> >> named things and consequently, are able to participate in the 
group
> >>> dynamic
> >>> >> of their society. The words for things stay constant through time
> >>
> >>> while
> >>> how
> >>> >> we are affected directly by things changes. We can share
> experience,
> >>> >> knowledge and wisdom with words. Without words, our own personal
> >>> experience
> >>> >> would be all we would have and we would not be able to share it.
> Words
> >>> >> enable abstract thought and planning.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We think, influenced by the feelings of the sounds of words 
for
> >>> things
> >>> >> and feel as though we were thinking with the perception of the
> things
> >>> >> themselves.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Are we conscious that we are affected by the sounds we make
> with
> >>> our
> >>> >> voice? We are commonly aware that the quality of singers voices 
>>
> >>> affects
> >>> us.
> >>> >> We know that great orators and actors affect us with their 
delivery
> >>
> >>> and
> >>> >> vocal character. Everyone's voice affects us. We are aware of the
> >>> affect of
> >>> >> tone of voice but not of the affect of articulated phonemes per 
se.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     When we utter vocal sounds that are simply sounds and not
> words,
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> may, more easily,  experience consciously, the effects of the
> sounds,
> >>> than
> >>> >> when we speak words. When we speak words, we typically experience
> >>> >> consciously the referential function of the words and not the
> affects
> >>> on us
> >>> >> of the sounds of the words, while we experience the effects of 
the
> >>> vocal
> >>> >> sounds of words subliminally. Because we experience the one 
thing,
> >>
> >>> (the
> >>> >> referential meanings of the words), consciously, and the other
> thing,
> >>> (the
> >>> >> affects on us of the sounds), subconsciously, we
> >>> >>                                                     12
> >>> >>
> >>> >> subconsciously interpret the subliminal effects of the vocal 
sounds
> as
> >>> >> being the effects of the things to which the words refer. The
> >>> subconscious
> >>> >> mind supplies us with the bottom line of the meaning of whatever 
it
> is
> >>> we
> >>> >> are considering because we cannot reason with the subconscious 
mind
> >>
> >>> and
> >>> we
> >>> >> can with the conscious mind. Whatever we are conscious of, we can
> >>> question
> >>> >> and whatever we question becomes uncertain. However we have a
> >>> language-based
> >>> >> subconscious reaction to that which the 
(meaning-of)/(effect-on-us)
> is
> >>> >> consciously unknown as long as we have a word for it, and that
> >>> subconscious
> >>> >> reaction creates an experience of and hence a sense of knowing 
the
> >>> meaning
> >>> >> of that which, prior to being named, did not seem to be known. 
The
> >>> word,
> >>> >> made of sounds of our body, stands in for the unknown thing, the
> thing
> >>> >> separate from our body. In the absence of any objective sense of
> the
> >>> >> meanings of things, we rely on our words to provide us with a 
sense
> of
> >>> >> knowing,
> >>> >>  because knowing relieves us of the stress of anxiety. We are
> driven
> >>> into
> >>> >> the perceived safety of our familiar culture, as represented in 
our
> >>> >> language, by the stress of the fear generated by not knowing. One
> must
> >>> be
> >>> >> willing to accept the mystery of existence in order to 
experience,
> >>
> >>> free
> >>> from
> >>> >> the bias of existing culture.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Considering words to be things in and of themselves, 
(sounds),
> and
> >>> not
> >>> >> only a means to refer to things, will enable us to examine them 
for
> >>> their
> >>> >> inherent meaning. The primary meaning of a word is not the thing
> which
> >>> it
> >>> >> represents. It is, rather, the affects on us of it's sounds. We
> >>> consciously
> >>> >> consider the meaning of the word to be the thing to which the 
word
> >>> refers
> >>> >> and we subconsciously experience the meaning of the word as the 
>>
> >>> effects
> >>> on
> >>> >> us of its sounds. Because we experience, profoundly and
> consistently,
> >>> the
> >>> >> effects on us of our human vocal sounds while we experience less
> >>> intimately
> >>> >> and less consistently the effects on us of the things to which we
> >>
> >>> refer
> >>> with
> >>> >> words, the emotional effects of the words as sounds overrides the
> >>> emotional
> >>> >> effects of the things named, and informs us of the nature of 
named
> >>> things.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     In a similar way that explorers laid claim to land in the 
name
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> monarch, we tend to lay claim to that which we name in order to
> render
> >>> it
> >>> >> seemingly familiar and known.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Everything that we perceive subconsciously creates an 
emotional
> >>> >> reaction that may be experienced consciously and everything that 
we
> >>> perceive
> >>> >> consciously affects us subconsciously as well. We consciously
> perceive
> >>> the
> >>> >> sounds of spoken language and we are also affected subconsciously
> by
> >>> those
> >>> >> same sounds. In the course of verbal communication, we think of 
the
> >>> things
> >>> >> to which our words refer while subconsciously we are emotionally
> >>> affected by
> >>> >> the sounds of our words. This simultaneous occurrence of the
> thought
> >>> >> of
> >>> a
> >>> >> thing and the subconscious experience of the emotion generated by
> the
> >>> sound
> >>> >> of the word we use to refer to that thing, subliminally informs 
us
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> affect-on-us ,(the-meaning-of), the thing. In this way, we 
acquire
> a
> >>> sense
> >>> >> of the affects-on-us, (the-meanings-of), everything for which we
> have
> >>> >> a
> >>> >> word. This is important because our actions in relation to the
> things
> >>> that
> >>> >> make up our world are motivated by our perceptions of the 
meanings
> of
> >>> >>  those things. Therefore, if we would change, for the better, our
> >>> >> societies' behavior, we ought to change our languages.
> >>> >>     Since spoken language is crucial in determining the course of
> >>
> >>> human
> >>> >> events, it would be
> >>> >>                                                     13
> >>> >>
> >>> >> better if we consciously agreed with the subliminal sense of the
> >>> meanings
> >>> >> of things which is instilled in us by our language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We humans are not doing so well with our relationships with 
one
> >>> another
> >>> >> that we should be complacent regarding the improvement of our
> culture.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     People have been attempting to address social and economic
> >>> challenges
> >>> >> ever since there were people. All the religions were attempts to
> >>> provide a
> >>> >> basis for our behavior. Marxism was/is an attempt to remedy 
social
> and
> >>> >> economic inequality and exploitation. "Hippie" communes were
> typically
> >>> >> instituted to provide healthy social environments. Organized
> politics
> >>> and
> >>> >> codified legal systems were/are created, supposedly, to improve 
our
> >>> >> condition. Why is it unclear whether any of these deliberate 
social
> >>> >> structures actually made/make our situation better or worse? 
Could
> it
> >>> be
> >>> >> that the cause of our malaise is something that is not being >>
> >>> recognized
> >>> by
> >>> >> those who strive to improve our lot? For how many years, for how
> many
> >>> >> centuries and millennium will we try to fix our broken world by
> >>> creating
> >>> >> laws, religions, political and economic institutions before we
> decide
> >>> that
> >>> >> doing so does not deal with the source of the problem? Marx's
> mistake
> >>> was
> >>> >> believing that
> >>> >>  economics is the foundation upon which all of society's other
> >>> institutions
> >>> >> are based. It seemed reasonable to him that since life is based
> upon
> >>> the
> >>> >> biological economics of survival, that economics must be the
> >>> determining
> >>> >> force in society. He did not see that our culture provides us 
with
> a
> >>> sense
> >>> >> of the meaning of all recognized things thereby assuaging the
> >>> fear/terror
> >>> >> that naturally arises as a result of our consciousness of our
> physical
> >>> >> vulnerability and that we tend to protect and defend that culture
> >>> because of
> >>> >> the perceived security which it provides. Once culture is
> established,
> >>> it
> >>> >> causes the economic and social relationships to be what they are,
> and
> >>> they
> >>> >> cannot be lastingly changed without changing the culture.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     The culture, created by language forms our values which then
> >>> strongly
> >>> >> influence the decisions we make consciously and  subconsciously.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>                                                              What
> is
> >>> >> culture?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I define culture as the common fundamental values held by the
> >>> members
> >>> >> of a society. These values derive from our perception of the
> meanings
> >>> of,
> >>> >> (the affects on us of), the things that make up our world. 
"Things"
> >>
> >>> are
> >>> >> whatever we identify as being distinguishable from other things,
> which
> >>> >> include feelings, thoughts, values, people and ideals. The 
meanings
> of
> >>> >> things are one with and the same as the affects on us of those
> things.
> >>> How
> >>> >> do we acquire our sense of, (the affects on us of)/(the meanings
> of),
> >>> >> things? Is it from our own individual experiences with things? Is
> it
> >>> from
> >>> >> what we say to ourselves and to each other about things? If it 
were
> >>> based on
> >>> >> individual experience, how would we achieve consensus and if we
> could,
> >>> why
> >>> >> would all cultures not be pretty much the same?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Most would hold that even within a given society our 
individual
> >>> values
> >>> >> are not the same and
> >>> >>                                                     14
> >>> >>
> >>> >> surely the popular view of what our values are, indicated by a
> cursory
> >>> >> survey of our behavior, seems to support that conclusion. When
> >>> attempting to
> >>> >> assess the values that underlie behavior we should consider the
> >>> influence of
> >>> >> the role that each individual sees themselves as playing within
> their
> >>> >> culture. Given the same subliminal, fundamental values, 
individuals
> >>> within
> >>> >> any society tend to behave not only relative to those basic 
values
> but
> >>> also
> >>> >> relative to how they perceive themselves, (who they perceive >>
> >>> themselves
> >>> to
> >>> >> be), within their society.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     It seems that the cause of the problem of why we do so many
> >>> seemingly
> >>> >> destructive and self-defeating things must be so basic, so
> fundamental
> >>> as to
> >>> >> escape our awareness. It must be housed in the subconscious mind
> since
> >>> all
> >>> >> our attempts to address it have been futile. It is that which we
> don't
> >>> >> consciously know that we subconsciously know that sometimes makes
> us
> >>> wonder
> >>> >> why we do what we do. Our emotional reactions are influenced by
> that
> >>> which
> >>> >> resides in the subconscious just as they are by that of which we
> are
> >>> >> conscious, and often, we create rationales to explain our 
behavior,
> >>> while
> >>> >> the actual reasons for the feelings that motivate us may be other
> than
> >>> what
> >>> >> we choose to think.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What does every cultural group share within itself that 
affects
> >>
> >>> its
> >>> >> members profoundly and without their conscious knowledge? Where 
are
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> hidden rules, by which we live, to be found? Our culture is an
> >>> artifact,
> >>> >> inherited from distant ancestors, formed in an environment vastly
> >>> different
> >>> >> than today. Ways of interacting with one another that may have
> seemed
> >>> to
> >>> >> work then now appear to be dysfunctional. The primary example is
> war,
> >>> which
> >>> >> before weapons of mutual destruction, was rationalizable by the
> >>> victors. But
> >>> >> now, with nuclear weapons, would there be any victors? We still
> think
> >>> as we
> >>> >> did then but we cannot afford to act today as we may have 
believed
> we
> >>> could
> >>> >> then. Our technology has evolved tremendously but our culture has
> not.
> >>> We
> >>> >> are ill-equipped to cope with the situation our technology has
> enabled
> >>> us to
> >>> >> create. Furthermore, even if war seemed winnable, wouldn't we
> prefer
> >>> peace?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     If we admit that vocal sounds inherently affect us, as do
> facial
> >>> >> expressions and general body posture, then we may ask how our 
sense
> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> meaning of the things which make up our world is affected by 
using
> >>> >> inherently meaningful symbols to refer to them. What is the
> relative
> >>> >> strength of the emotional effects upon us of our symbols compared
> to
> >>> the
> >>> >> emotional effects of the things to which they refer? Considering
> that
> >>> the
> >>> >> emotional effects of the things themselves vary with context and 
is
> >>> peculiar
> >>> >> of each of us, and that the emotional effects of the vocal 
symbols
> is
> >>> >> relatively consistent and universal, can we assume that the
> meanings
> >>> >> of
> >>> the
> >>> >> symbols create the perceived meanings of the things? Is this
> >>> relationship
> >>> >> the same or different within the conscious and subconscious 
minds?
> >>
> >>> Does
> >>> our
> >>> >> conscious or subconscious mind more strongly influence our
> behavior?
> >>> Are our
> >>> >> behaviors affected by our subconscious minds even when we are
> trying
> >>> >> to
> >>> do
> >>> >> what we
> >>> >>  consciously think we should do?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We either are or are not affected by our vocal utterances. I
> see
> >>> that
> >>> >> we are. If we were not affected by our vocal utterances, we would
> not
> >>> >> vocalize. The whole purpose of vocalizing is
> >>> >>                                                     15
> >>> >>
> >>> >> communication! And in order to communicate, we must be affected 
by
> >>
> >>> that
> >>> >> which we use to communicate.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What, we may ask, is communicated by vocalizing? What is
> >>> communicated
> >>> >> when other animals vocalize? It is clear that animals communicate
> >>
> >>> their
> >>> >> instantaneous emotional states by their vocalizations. How is 
this
> >>> >> communication accomplished? The vibrating of the body of the >>
> >>> vocalizer,
> >>> >> (sender),  causes the body of the receiver to vibrate in 
sympathy.
> The
> >>> >> receiver experiences the motions and consequently the emotions of
> the
> >>> >> sender. This simple process is the foundation of our vocal
> activity,
> >>> our
> >>> >> verbal activity, (our language), and our culture. Many of us seem
> to
> >>> balk at
> >>> >> accepting the idea that our lofty retorical proclamations are
> founded
> >>> upon
> >>> >> such primal processes. If you are one of these, consider that our
> >>> genetic
> >>> >> blueprint is shared, in the majority, by all other vertebrates 
and
> >>> largely
> >>> >> by all other animals. To those who disparage animals, please be
> >>> reminded
> >>> >> that the Grand Creator authored ALL of everything, not only us 
and
> >>> those of
> >>> >> whom we
> >>> >>  approve.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What are the ingredients that make up the mix of influences
> that
> >>> >> determine human behavior? Given that we are intelligent enough to
> >>> appreciate
> >>> >> and cherish the truths that are our guiding principles, and given
> that
> >>> we
> >>> >> are not born self destructive, then for what reason/s did we act 
as
> we
> >>> have?
> >>> >> From where does the false information come that motivates much of
> our
> >>> >> behavior? "Human nature" does not account for our inhuman 
actions.
> The
> >>> cause
> >>> >> of our destructiveness must exist among the things which we 
learn.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>      From what ultimate source do we acquire our information
> regarding
> >>> the
> >>> >> meaning of our world? Our culture is that source.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What have we got to go on in order to achieve a sense of the
> >>> meaning of
> >>> >> our world other than the words we speak?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Do we have a benchmark for establishing the meaning of 
things?
> If
> >>> >> everything is relative, what is it relative to? We need not look
> >>> further
> >>> >> than ourselves to find that. How could it be otherwise? We look 
out
> >>> from our
> >>> >> eyes and hear with our ears and think that we can objectively >>
> >>> determine
> >>> the
> >>> >> nature of each and every thing that we examine. However, with our
> >>> survival
> >>> >> in the balance, as it inescapably is, how whatever it is that we
> >>> examine
> >>> >> relates to our survival determines what it must mean to us. How 
we
> are
> >>> >> affected by the things that constitute our world establishes 
their
> >>> meaning.
> >>> >> The vocal sounds we make express and convey the different 
emotional
> >>> effects
> >>> >> we experience. Our words are made up of these body-sounds.
> Therefore,
> >>> our
> >>> >> words convey emotional meaning and inform us of the affects on us
> of
> >>> things
> >>> >> for which we have names.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Language exists in both the conscious and the subconscious. 
We
> are
> >>> >> conscious of the words we speak and of the things to which they
> refer,
> >>> while
> >>> >> they inform us subconsciously of the effects on us, (the meanings
> of),
> >>> those
> >>> >> things to which they refer.
> >>> >>     Does it matter what things mean? Does it matter what we think
> they
> >>> >> mean? Do our actions
> >>> >>                                                     16
> >>> >>
> >>> >> relative to them depend on what they mean to us?  Do we act in >>
> >>> relation
> >>> to
> >>> >> things according to what they mean to us? How do we know the
> ultimate
> >>> effect
> >>> >> on us of any thing? Is the effect on us of any thing its meaning?
> How
> >>> can
> >>> >> any thing mean to us anything other than what its effect on us 
is?
> How
> >>> do we
> >>> >> obtain a sense of the meanings of things? Do we get that sense of
> the
> >>> >> affects-on-us/ the-meanings-of things directly from our own
> experience
> >>> with
> >>> >> things or as mediated by language?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Of all forms of body language, (vocalization, facial 
expression
> >>
> >>> and
> >>> >> overall body posture), only one of them,vocalization, is commonly
> used
> >>> to
> >>> >> represent things other than conditions of the emotional body. Our
> >>> general
> >>> >> posture is very communicative of our physical-emotional state
> without
> >>> our
> >>> >> deliberate intent and is sometimes used deliberately to convey 
the
> >>> same.
> >>> >> Facial expression can be more finely communicative of our state 
of
> >>> >> being/feeling than is general body posture. Vocalization, while
> being
> >>> >> profoundly expressive/communicative, is, by civilized people,
> >>> ordinarily
> >>> >> exclusively reserved for uttering words. While we are not aware 
of
> the
> >>> >> affect upon ourselves of the phones we utter, we are aware of the
> >>> effect
> >>> >> upon ourselves of the emotional embellishments we add to them.
> Often,
> >>> we
> >>> >> consciously add emotional content to our words in order to
> embellish
> >>> their
> >>> >> referential meaning. Since we are busy, often consciously,
> processing
> >>> the
> >>> >> referential meaning of
> >>> >>  our words, we are unaware of the emotional impact of the sounds
> that
> >>> make
> >>> >> them up. Each distinct articulate vocal sound affects us in its 
own
> >>> unique
> >>> >> way. Understanding this is crucial to understanding the workings 
of
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> culture-creating function of language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We not only refer to things with our words. More profoundly, 
we
> >>> inform
> >>> >> ourselves of the very meaning of those things simply by using a
> word,
> >>> (a
> >>> >> vocal sound), to refer to them.  This information as to the 
affects
> >>> upon us,
> >>> >> (the meanings of), the things which make up our world, 
constitutes
> our
> >>> >> culture. Culture is information, (in-formation). Since we are not
> >>
> >>> aware
> >>> of
> >>> >> the nature of this information, it exists in our subconscious
> minds.
> >>> >> We
> >>> act
> >>> >> according to a subconscious program put in place by our language.
> If
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> understand how we receive information regarding the meaning or 
our
> >>> world, we
> >>> >> can change that information so that it agrees with what we 
believe
> to
> >>> be the
> >>> >> nature of our world. Our culture was passed down, from long ago;
> from
> >>> before
> >>> >> electronics, before motorized transport and the printing press. 
If
> we
> >>> were
> >>> >> to deliberately create our language today, would we create the 
one
> we
> >>> >> currently use? If so or if not, why? Would we know how to create 
a
> >>> >>  language that conveys the meanings of things that are their 
actual
> >>> >> meanings? If we would know, how would we know? If not, why not?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     That which affects us profoundly and constantly must be in
> close
> >>> >> proximity. Things right in front of us are often overlooked when 
we
> >>> search
> >>> >> for that which affects us powerfully. We tend to assume that if 
the
> >>> causes
> >>> >> of major difficulties were so close to us, it would be obvious 
and
> we
> >>> would
> >>> >> have discovered them by now. Let us reexamine our major 
influences
> to
> >>> look
> >>> >> for what causes us to behave as we do.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Our species, is plenty smart enough to understand why our
> saints
> >>> and
> >>> >> prophets are correct when they exhort us to be "good".  We create
> >>> secular
> >>> >> laws that mirror our religious tenants and are
> >>> >>                                                     17
> >>> >>
> >>> >> sensitive to any critique of our behavior. Our feelings of guilt
> seem
> >>> to be
> >>> >> well developed. Why then do we act as we do; making war against 
one
> >>> another
> >>> >> and engaging in all kinds of destructive activity?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I have heard many claim that it is simply "human nature" to 
act
> in
> >>> >> destructive ways. Those who believe that, feel that there is
> nothing
> >>> >> to
> >>> be
> >>> >> done to correct our human malaise other than punishment. Evil 
ones
> >>
> >>> must
> >>> be
> >>> >> trimmed back, like a noxious and thorny vine. I do not subscribe 
to
> >>> that
> >>> >> depressing idea and know that the truth of the matter is that we 
>>
> >>> humans
> >>> are
> >>> >> inherently survival oriented and will learn whatever seems as
> though
> >>> >> it
> >>> will
> >>> >> further our survival. It is because of our native intelligence
> coupled
> >>> with
> >>> >> our survival desire that we voluntarily stretch our consciousness
> in
> >>> order
> >>> >> to glimpse a better way for ourselves to carry on.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     What are the forces that influence our behavior? What we
> believe
> >>> >> to
> >>> be
> >>> >> good and correct does not, it seems, by itself, determine our
> actions.
> >>> Do we
> >>> >> not fully believe that what seems to be right to us is truly 
right?
> Or
> >>> is
> >>> >> there some other influence that informs us of what the world and
> all
> >>> the
> >>> >> things and concepts and people in it mean to us, something else
> that
> >>> >> influences our perception of how we must behave in order to
> survive?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Our behavior is related to how we are affected by the things
> that
> >>> make
> >>> >> up our world. We behave in relation to the various things that 
fill
> >>
> >>> our
> >>> >> awareness, according to how they affect our survivability, (how 
we
> >>> PERCEIVE
> >>> >> that they affect our survivability). We perceive the world 
directly
> >>> through
> >>> >> personal contact with it and indirectly through contact with that
> >>
> >>> which
> >>> >> represents the world to us, (our language). Language represents 
the
> >>> world by
> >>> >> labeling everything about which we speak, with sounds made by our
> >>> bodies.
> >>> >> Those vocal sounds are part and parcel of states of our emotions.
> Our
> >>> >> preverbal progenitors and our children when young, make vocal
> sounds
> >>> >> in
> >>> >> reaction to various environmental stimuli. Those emotive sounds 
are
> >>> >> intuitively made sense of by all who hear them. We sense the
> >>> vocalizations
> >>> >> and they make sense to us. The vocal sounds are made by a body in
> an
> >>> >> emotional state and cause that state to be reproduced in the
> emotional
> >>> body
> >>> >> of the hearer
> >>> >>  of those sounds. The sending body vibrates and the receiving 
body
> >>> vibrates
> >>> >> similarly. An emotionally linked vibrational pattern is spread 
from
> >>
> >>> the
> >>> >> originator of the vocal sound-vibration to whoever's auditory >>
> >>> apparatus
> >>> is
> >>> >> moved by it. The transmittance of the vibrational pattern is the
> >>> >> transmission of the emotion. We are emotionally affected by the
> >>> emotions of
> >>> >> others.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Language is an institution, a standardized way we move our
> bodies,
> >>> >> specifically our vocal apparatuses, our ears, central nervous
> system
> >>> and
> >>> >> emotions, in relation to the various things that make up our 
world.
> In
> >>> >> relation to a book, we who speak English, utter the sound, 
"book".
> In
> >>> >> relation to a book, a Spanish-speaking person utters the sound, "
> >>> libro".
> >>> >> These two different sounds move us in different ways, giving us a
> >>> different
> >>> >> experience of that which refers to and represents that object and
> >>> >> consequently, of the thing referred to. The primal meaning of a
> word
> >>> >> is
> >>> the
> >>> >> effect the sound of it creates within us. The secondary, more
> distant
> >>> >> meaning of a word is that to which it refers. The secondary 
meaning
> is
> >>> what
> >>> >> we commonly accept as being the one and only meaning. We are
> >>> >>                                                     18
> >>> >>
> >>> >> generally not aware of the primary meaning, because we are 
affected
> by
> >>> the
> >>> >> vocal sounds of our words subliminally and by the secondary,
> >>> referential,
> >>> >> meaning of words consciously.  Awareness of the primary meanings 
of
> >>> vocal
> >>> >> sounds was superseded by the awareness of the >> secondary,
> >>> -referential-,
> >>> >> meaning of vocal sounds used as words.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     To understand the functionality, the "nuts and bolts", of >>
> >>> language,
> >>> is
> >>> >> to free ourselves of domination by culture, to be the masters of
> >>> culture
> >>> >> rather than its subjects. We have been inextricably attached to
> >>> culture, for
> >>> >> better or for worse, ever since our use of language began. Now we
> can
> >>> >> intentionally create a language/culture that informs us as we 
would
> >>> like to
> >>> >> be informed, of the effects on us, (the meanings of), all the
> things
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> name.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Certainly we agree that we are affected by the sounds we 
utter.
> >>> What
> >>> >> then is the
> >>> >> consequence of referring to all the things to which we refer, 
(all
> the
> >>> >> things that make up our conscious world), with inherently
> meaningful
> >>> sounds?
> >>> >> If we were able to refer to things with "meaningless" symbols, 
then
> >>
> >>> all
> >>> we
> >>> >> would be conveying is the thought of the thing. When we refer to 
>>
> >>> things
> >>> with
> >>> >> inherently meaningful symbols, we are also informing ourselves of
> the
> >>> >> meanings of the things to which we are referring. Is there such a
> >>
> >>> thing
> >>> as a
> >>> >> meaningless symbol? Is anything meaningless? In order to perceive
> >>> anything,
> >>> >> including a symbol, that symbol must register upon our senses and
> in
> >>> order
> >>> >> to register upon our senses, the sensed thing must affect us. No 
>>
> >>> effect
> >>> on
> >>> >> us, equals no perception by us. Whatever the affect on us is, is
> the
> >>> >> fundamental meaning of the sensed thing. When we refer to things,
> we
> >>> are
> >>> >> primarily being affected by the symbol which we use to do the >>
> >>> referring
> >>> and
> >>> >> secondarily by the memory, if there is a memory, of the thing to
> which
> >>> we
> >>> >>  are referring. When we refer to something with which we have no 
>>
> >>> direct
> >>> >> experience, we have only the symbol, (word), to affect us and 
thus
> to
> >>> inform
> >>> >> us.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     If there is a discrete connection between a vocal sound and a
> >>> thing,
> >>> >> and a connection likewise between a particular vocal sound and a
> >>> specific
> >>> >> effect on the emotions, then there is a connection between the
> effect
> >>> on us
> >>> >> of the sound and the thing to which that sound, (word), refers.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We are aware that sound has an effect and that the word is
> sound
> >>> and
> >>> >> that the word has an effect and that the word refers to a thing.
> Are
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> aware that, for all intents and purposes, the effect seems to be
> the
> >>> thing.
> >>> >> How we are affected by a thing, our perception of a thing, is
> accepted
> >>> >> subliminally as being the meaning of the thing. Our actions
> relative
> >>> >> to
> >>> the
> >>> >> things in our world, are related to the perceived meanings of 
those
> >>> things.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     We feel the feelings generated by the sounds of our words at
> the
> >>> same
> >>> >> time as we are deliberately focusing on the things to which the
> words
> >>> refer.
> >>> >> As a consequence, we associate particular vocal-sound-generated
> >>> feelings
> >>> >> with particular things. The thing does not define the feeling.
> Rather,
> >>> the
> >>> >> feeling defines the thing. The feeling of the word determines 
what
> is
> >>> >> accepted subliminally as the meaning of the thing. The word 
enables
> us
> >>> to
> >>> >> experience feelings of the meanings of things not present, and
> unknown
> >>> by
> >>> >> direct experience. It establishes a sense of
> >>> >>                                                     19
> >>> >>
> >>> >> consensus which wells up from the subconscious minds among the >>
> >>> speakers
> >>> of
> >>> >> a given language.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     All throughout human history, language has been playing this
> role
> >>> of
> >>> >> consensus creator based on the information we derive from the
> sounds
> >>> >> of
> >>> our
> >>> >> words regarding the-affects-on-us/the-meanings-of, the things 
that
> >>
> >>> make
> >>> up
> >>> >> our worlds. If we would rather live in a culture of our own
> creation
> >>> than in
> >>> >> just any one in which we happened to be born, we might consider
> >>> >> experimenting with cultural change through language renewal.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I have been asked what I hope to achieve with this 
information.
> My
> >>> >> desire is that we become aware of the forces that affect us so 
that
> we
> >>> may
> >>> >> be able to change the circumstances that exist to circumstances
> that
> >>> >> we
> >>> >> would prefer.
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     Because of the inherent shortcomings inherent in existing
> >>> languages,
> >>> >> although words can be used in a kindly manner to help get us back
> on
> >>> track
> >>> >> when we lose our way, they cannot, in and of themselves, guide
> anyone
> >>> who is
> >>> >> determined to see things in a certain way. Only the willing can 
be
> >>> helped.
> >>> >> How can we help people to be willing?
> >>> >>
> >>> >>     I observe that culture is the prosthetic subconscious of
> society,
> >>> that
> >>> >> which we who live in a particular society share with one another
> and
> >>> have in
> >>> >> common. It has to do with our world-view. Our world view is 
formed
> by
> >>> what
> >>> >> things mean to us. How do we obtain our sense of the meaning of 
our
> >>> world?
> >>> >> Do we share t
> >>>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >
> > --
> > *Robert Lake  Ed.D.
> > *Assistant Professor
> > Social Foundations of Education
> > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > Georgia Southern University
> > P. O. Box 8144
> > Phone: (912) 478-5125
> > Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > Statesboro, GA  30460
> >
> > *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> > midwife.*
> > *-*John Dewey.
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
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> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> *Robert Lake  Ed.D.
> *Assistant Professor
> Social Foundations of Education
> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> Georgia Southern University
> P. O. Box 8144
> Phone: (912) 478-5125
> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> Statesboro, GA  30460
>
> *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> midwife.*
> *-*John Dewey.
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
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>


--
*Robert Lake  Ed.D.
*Assistant Professor
Social Foundations of Education
Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
Georgia Southern University
P. O. Box 8144
Phone: (912) 478-5125
Fax: (912) 478-5382
Statesboro, GA  30460

 *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
midwife.*
*-*John Dewey.
__________________________________________
_____
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