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Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious Awareness
- To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious Awareness
- From: Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
- Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2010 21:26:52 -0400
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Let me know when you do Louise, I would love to know your take on it.
On Tue, Nov 2, 2010 at 7:24 PM, Louise Hawkins <l.hawkins@cqu.edu.au> wrote:
> Thanks Robert I will read this article, it looks facinating
>
> Regards
>
> Louise Hawkins
>
> Lecturer - School of Management & Information Systems
> Faculty Business & Informatics
> Building 19/Room 3.38
> Rockhampton Campus
> CQUniversity
> Ph: +617 4923 2768
> Fax: +617 4930 9729
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Robert Lake
> Sent: Tuesday, 2 November 2010 11:24 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> Awareness
>
> Louise,
> I am fascinated by this story. Have you seen this article?
>
> http://aut.sagepub.com/search?fulltext=metonymy&sortspec=date&submit=Submit&andorexactfulltext=phrase&src=selected&journal_set=spaut
> RL
>
> On Mon, Nov 1, 2010 at 9:17 PM, Louise Hawkins <l.hawkins@cqu.edu.au>
> wrote:
>
> > Eric,
> >
> > Maybe it is the level of figurative language understanding??????
> >
> > I give an example: I have a son who has mild autism. One of his beautiful
> > ways of seeing the world (can be called difficulties) is that he
> understands
> > things very literally.
> >
> > Example: "That throws some light on the question." Throwing light is a
> > metaphor: there is no actual light, and a question is not the sort of
> thing
> > that can be lit up."
> >
> > - My son would be looking for a light and something visible
> > (question) for the light to hit.
> >
> > This also extends to idioms (figures of speech - figurative meaning)
> >
> > Example: A bookworm. Someone who reads a lot. My son would think you had
> > called him a worm if you told him he was a bookworm.
> >
> > Although not an idiom or a metaphor, this last example is beautiful for
> > showing how literal he can be:
> >
> > - He used to be terrified of dogs. (gap in story to shorten
> > example). We got a puppy, but he was still very scared. Then we told him
> > that if the dog was on her lead he was in control..... what we did not
> > realise that he would understand this to mean that if the puppy is
> running
> > around with her lead on with no one holding it he is still in control :)
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Regards
> >
> > Louise Hawkins
> >
> > Lecturer - School of Management & Information Systems
> > Faculty Business & Informatics
> > Building 19/Room 3.38
> > Rockhampton Campus
> > CQUniversity
> > Ph: +617 4923 2768
> > Fax: +617 4930 9729
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > Sent: Tuesday, 2 November 2010 10:29 AM
> > To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > Awareness
> >
> > eric--
> >
> > I wonder...everybody, no matter how mentally disturbed, has to be capable
> > of some figurative language. I remember once Halliday remarked that "I
> want
> > you to stand up" is really an INTERPERSONAL metaphor, because you've got
> a
> > command pretending to be a statement, and I asked him if it wasn't true
> to
> > say that the whole of language was a phonological metaphor, because we've
> > got words pretending to be statements, commands, questions, gestures, and
> so
> > on.
> >
> > So I sometimes wonder if the distinction we make between figurative and
> > non-figurative language is nothing but a formalism, like the distinction
> > between, say, metaphor and metonymy, or even the distinction between
> > metaphor and simile. Of course, as you say (and as Rod says) these
> > formalisms can matter a lot. But they are nevertheless a lot more
> pervasive
> > than the overt markings that we have bedecked them with, and so it seems
> > they must also be found in the language of the mentally disturbed
> (perhaps
> > as "literal" statements that are obvioiusly untrue).
> >
> > Choose the best (that is, the most developmentally sophisticated)
> > continuation for the following utterance.
> >
> > Romeo: "Soft! What light from yonder window breaks! ...
> >
> > a) It is like the east and Juliet is like the sun."
> > b) It is the east and Juliet is like the sun."
> > c) It is the east and Julie is the sun."
> > d) Juliet's eyes are nothing like the sun."
> >
> > I think Vygotsky would choose d) because a), b), and c) are merely
> > generalizations from one object to another, while d) combines both
> > generalization (from one object to another) and abstraction (the
> isolation
> > of a single feature, namely Juliet's eyes).
> >
> > In Chapter Five of Thinking and Speech, Vygotsky points out that the
> > function of abstraction, which is really a kind of metonymy, is
> > ontogenetically very ancient. Every time the very young child undergoes a
> > routine, the child is bound to feel on some level that "this is like
> that".
> >
> > But any "perizhvanie", any instance of the "feeling of what happens to
> you"
> > is different in an almost infinite number of ways from any other
> > "perizhvanie". So the belief that "today is just like yesterday" always
> > involves privileging some features of an experience and discounting
> others.
> > This is by no means a mechanical process; we are not talking about a
> Galton
> > photograph; on the contrary, it is a most discriminating and subtle
> > judgment.
> >
> > I think that ALL of the "complexes" we see in Chapter Five can actually
> be
> > seen as just such abstractions from childly activities, although of
> course
> > the resulting structure is thought of as a set of concrete experiences
> and
> > not a concept.
> >
> > For example, the "associative complex" is really a meta-object, a set of
> > objects each of which represents a projection of some different feature
> of
> > the nuclear objects (the "brainstorming" "mind-maps" of which elementary
> > school teachers are so proud are really just associative complexes).
> >
> > The "collection complex" is, as Vygotsky says, a tool kit abstracted from
> > practical routines: brushing teeth, getting dressed, having meals, going
> to
> > bed.
> >
> > The "chain complex" seems to me to be abstracted from games such as
> "tag",
> > where the loser of a particular bout becomes the "hero" of the next bout.
> >
> > The "diffuse complex" is, as Vygotsky says, a result of the limitless
> > diffusion of characteristics we see in imaginative tales.
> >
> > It's really only the pseudocomplex that is metaphorical rather than
> > metonymic, because the child's word "stands for" a thinking process that
> is
> > quite different, but given the exactly the same name. Of course, it is a
> > metaphor-in-itself rather than a metaphor-for-others or a
> > metaphor-for-myself (that is to say, nobody except maybe Vygotsky
> actually
> > KNOWS that the child's pseudocomplex is a metaphor for the adult
> concept).
> >
> > In order to become a metaphor-for-myself, I have to abstract away all the
> > features that make the metaphor work and resynthesize them as a concept.
> But
> > of course a metaphor for a concept is not a metaphor: it's the concept
> > itself, for a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.
> >
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> > --- On Mon, 11/1/10, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > Awareness
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Monday, November 1, 2010, 11:45 AM
> >
> >
> > Hello all:
> >
> > This is such an interesting stream that has flowed into the different
> > tributaries of a delta and then joined again as it has emptied into the
> > vast ocean of communal knowledge.
> >
> > I do not have the linguistic knowledge to offer much in research based
> > efforts of understanding the development of metaphorical knowledge. What
> > I can offer is my observational data of working with severely mentally
> ill
> > young adults. Many do not grasp metaphorical speech and can become very
> > agitated if a person continues on with a metaphor that has not been
> > understood. This explains why so many people who suffer mental health
> > issues are unsuccessful in the academic world.
> >
> > my two cents for a million dollar topic
> > eric
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Robert Lake <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
> > To: Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>, "eXtended Mind, Culture,
> > Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: 11/01/2010 01:04 PM
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of
> Conscious
> > Awareness
> > Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
> >
> >
> >
> > Hi Vera,
> > The *Journal of Aesthetic Education* is interested in publishing it and
> *
> > Francine** *Smolucha says she is writing it.
> > RL
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 1, 2010 at 1:42 PM, Vera John-Steiner <vygotsky@unm.edu>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Hi Robert,
> > >
> > > We are looking for reviews and reviewers for Vygotsky and Creativity.
> Do
> > > you think your publication would be interested and could you think of a
> > > reviewer?
> > >
> > > Thanks, Vera
> > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Robert Lake" <
> > > boblake@georgiasouthern.edu>
> > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Sent: Friday, October 29, 2010 6:35 AM
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > > Awareness
> > >
> > >
> > > Thanks for the LSV Citations David as well as this:
> > > *
> > > "But that's the whole point; the emotional substratum of language is
> > always
> > > there and it never goes away; there is no point of entropy where
> > thinking
> > > and feeling are completely merged."
> > > *I will be pondering and savoring this all weekend.
> > >
> > > RL
> > >
> > > On Fri, Oct 29, 2010 at 8:23 AM, Robert Lake
> > <boblake@georgiasouthern.edu
> > > >wrote:
> > >
> > > Thanks for the Citation David!
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> On Thu, Oct 28, 2010 at 11:48 PM, David Kellogg
> > <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
> > >> >wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Rod:
> > >>>
> > >>> Yes, it seems nonaccidental that we say "I feel LIKE my brain is an
> > >>> erogenous zone" (for example) but we have say "I think THAT my brain
> > is
> > >>> an
> > >>> erogenous zone". The obvious comparison is indirect reported speech
> > for
> > >>> feelings (and thus simile) but more direct forms for thoughts and
> > words
> > >>> (we
> > >>> can say "Richard Shweder says, 'my brain is an erogenous zone'").
> > >>>
> > >>> But Vygotsky considers even the language of the Odyssey to be
> > "lyrically
> > >>> colored" and therefore emotional rather than ideational; when Homer
> > says
> > >>> "And they lay down by the shelving sea" or "When rosy fingered dawn
> > >>> touched
> > >>> the sky" we feel like we know what he means even though we cannot
> > really
> > >>> say
> > >>> that what it is.
> > >>>
> > >>> Of course, in order to really understand this lyrical coloration, you
> > >>> need
> > >>> to be able to read hexameters in ancient Greek. But that's the whole
> > >>> point;
> > >>> the emotional substratum of language is always there and it never
> goes
> > >>> away;
> > >>> there is no point of entropy where thinking and feeling are
> completely
> > >>> merged.
> > >>>
> > >>> The photo experiment is described in Volume Four, pp. 193-194, of
> > >>> Vygotsky's Cllected Works, in a chapter called "Development of Speech
> > and
> > >>> Thinking". Here's the key passage.
> > >>>
> > >>> "(I)f one and the same picture (let us say, the prisoner in jail) is
> > >>> shown
> > >>> to a three-year-old, he will say 'a man, another man, a window, a
> mug,
> > a
> > >>> bench', but for a preschool child it would be 'a man is sitting,
> > another
> > >>> is
> > >>> looking out of a window, and a mug is on the bench'. (...) A
> > >>> five-year-old
> > >>> establishes a connection between words in a single sentence, and an
> > >>> eight-year-old uses complex additional sentences. A theoretical
> > >>> assumption
> > >>> arises: can the story about the picture describe the child's
> thinking?
> > >>> (...)
> > >>> We will ask two children not to tell a story, but to perform what the
> > >>> picture shows. It develops that the children's play about the picture
> > >>> sometimes lasts twenty or thirty minutes, and primarily and most of
> > all
> > >>> in
> > >>> the play those relations are captured that are in the picture. (...)
> > The
> > >>> child understands very well that the people are in jail: here the
> > complex
> > >>> narration about how the people were caught, how they were taken, that
> > one
> > >>> looks out
> > >>> the window, and that he wants to be free is added. Here a very
> > complex
> > >>> narration is added about how the nanny was fined for not having a
> > ticket
> > >>> on
> > >>> the trolley. In a word, we get a typical portrayal of what we see in
> > the
> > >>> story of a twelve-year-old. (1997, pp. 193-194)"
> > >>>
> > >>> We did a whole foreign language replication of this experiment with
> > using
> > >>> a video clip (with an added time element) and some second graders and
> > >>> wrote
> > >>> it up for MCA, but it was (violently) rejected so we gave up. I still
> > >>> have a
> > >>> copy of the paper if you are interested though.
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>
> > >>> --- On Wed, 10/27/10, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> > >>> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> > >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > >>> Awareness
> > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> Date: Wednesday, October 27, 2010, 3:55 AM
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Apologies for missing this, David
> > >>>
> > >>> I suspect that the relationships between affective metaphor and
> > cognitive
> > >>> metaphor are as messy and complicated (or rich and intricate) as any
> > >>> other
> > >>> form of (imagined) boundary between thinking and feeling.
> > >>>
> > >>> When we use a simile I think we invite listeners/readers to colour
> one
> > >>> concept with features of another, often (though not always) in a
> > rather
> > >>> generalised way. When we use a metaphor I think there is more of an
> > >>> invitation to the listener/reader to haul up associations from the
> > murk
> > >>> of
> > >>> personal experience (what does a hot liquid feel like, what does it
> > make
> > >>> me
> > >>> feel like). I realise as I write this that I am assuming that there
> is
> > a
> > >>> difference between a person's 'own' 'lived-in' associations with
> > >>> particular
> > >>> words/concepts and that person's sense of a 'common' or widely shared
> > set
> > >>> of
> > >>> associations (what this can be assumed to mean to other people) -
> > >>> actually
> > >>> probably many different sets of 'common' meanings for different
> > subgroups
> > >>> of
> > >>> 'other people' (people of my generation, people in my professional
> > field,
> > >>> 'kids today', people who have adolescent children .....).
> > >>>
> > >>> To a degree, our sense of how much like another person we are will
> > depend
> > >>> on how well that other person is able to find a fit with our own
> > >>> meanings.
> > >>> We can manage an academic conversation with a relative stranger but
> it
> > >>> won't
> > >>> feel the same as a conversation with a relative or with someone who
> > likes
> > >>> us
> > >>> enough to bother to remember how we feel about things. For babies it
> > is
> > >>> quite easy to differentiate between 'people who like me' and 'people
> > who
> > >>> don't know me' because the former engage in a noticeably more
> > >>> contingent/reciprocal way (they 'like' me both in the sense of caring
> > >>> about
> > >>> me and in the sense of adjusting to me) and this is surely a useful
> > >>> distinction to be able to make. For adults it is more complicated
> > because
> > >>> there are so many gradations of liking to keep track of (guided by
> the
> > >>> steer
> > >>> from embarrassment when we get it wrong!) but I still think that most
> > of
> > >>> us
> > >>> are highly skilled in (unconsciously) picking up cues about the
> degree
> > to
> > >>> which someone
> > >>> is adjusting to us (how much they like us). I also think that our
> own
> > >>> awareness of the adjustments we make when we interact with others
> > forms
> > >>> an
> > >>> important part of our knowledge about other people (we can even make
> > >>> these
> > >>> adjustments when they are not present so that we can imagine, for
> > >>> example,
> > >>> how they would feel about something we are considering suggesting to
> > >>> them).
> > >>>
> > >>> I like the word 'graspture' but for me (and for those who like me
> > enough
> > >>> to know what I am like!) simile is less 'violent' than metaphor, a
> > black
> > >>> and
> > >>> white diagram of the full colour collision.
> > >>>
> > >>> I would like to read more about Vygotsky's replication of Stern's
> > >>> photograph experiment - something I know nothing about - where can I
> > find
> > >>> this?
> > >>>
> > >>> All the best,
> > >>>
> > >>> Rod
> > >>>
> > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > >>> On
> > >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > >>> Sent: 15 October 2010 04:55
> > >>> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > >>> Subject: [xmca] Simile, Metaphor and the Graspture of Conscious
> > Awareness
> > >>>
> > >>> Rod:
> > >>>
> > >>> I agree that there is an AFFECTIVE difference between simile and
> > >>> metaphor.
> > >>> Actually, I think that the use of "like" as a preposition is related
> > to
> > >>> the
> > >>> use of "like" as a verb; the prepositional form is an objectified
> > version
> > >>> of
> > >>> the affective affinity we see in the verbal form. I think that the
> > >>> existence
> > >>> of these two quite different forms is a good example of the
> > >>> DIFFERENTIATION
> > >>> and PARTITIONING that language brings about in affect (the word
> > >>> "articulation" springs to mind in this context).
> > >>>
> > >>> So I'm very interested in what you say about the "distancing" effect
> > of
> > >>> simile. Do you think grammatical metaphor has the same effect of
> > >>> distantiation. Does "growth" suggest an objective view when we
> compare
> > it
> > >>> to
> > >>> "grow", because "growth" does not have an identifiable subject or
> > object?
> > >>>
> > >>> Of course, what Lakoff and Johnson are writing about is not affect
> but
> > >>> COGNITIVE metaphor. The idea is that underlying a whole range of
> > >>> linguistic
> > >>> expressions is some kind of non-verbal IMAGE, e.g. "anger is a hot
> > >>> liquid",
> > >>> quite independent of its verbal expression. From that perspective,
> > there
> > >>> is
> > >>> no difference between simile and metaphor, and there is also no
> > >>> difference
> > >>> between metonymy and metaphor (because metonymy is simply a special
> > case
> > >>> of
> > >>> a linguistic realization of a cognitive metaphor). All stem from a
> > >>> completely undifferentiated, unpartitioned, unarticulated mental
> > >>> equivalence
> > >>> (I think it's no accident that almost all of Lakoff's and Johnson's
> > >>> cognitive metaphors can be expressed as mathematical equations,
> > although
> > >>> none of them are really reversible the way that equations are: we
> > cannot
> > >>> say
> > >>> that a hot liquid = anger).
> > >>>
> > >>> Actually, I didn't say that Piaget believed that children are capable
> > of
> > >>> reasoning "What kind of thought would I be expressing if I were
> making
> > >>> the
> > >>> acoustic sounds/articulatory gestures that I am now hearing?" Quite
> > the
> > >>> contrary. This belief is the core of the "analysis by synthesis"
> views
> > of
> > >>> speech perception, whether they originate in New Haven (Liberman) or
> > >>> Cambridge, MA (Halle). Piaget holds that the child's thinking does
> not
> > >>> achieve the Copernican Revolution of decentration until seven or
> > eight,
> > >>> so
> > >>> Liberman or Halle would have to argue for innate mechanisms that
> > "think"
> > >>> in
> > >>> a decentred way quite against the child's grain.
> > >>>
> > >>> Vygotsky has no such problem. The child is a social being from birth,
> > and
> > >>> it is some time before children actually differentiate themselves
> from
> > >>> the
> > >>> "Ur-wir", the proto-we. It seems to me that this is completely
> > consistent
> > >>> with an ontogenetic "analysis by synthesis"; the child understands
> > >>> because
> > >>> the child has not really differentiated speaker from hearer. The
> > >>> occasional
> > >>> failures of this type of understanding, in fact, play a not
> > >>> inconsequential
> > >>> part in the process of the child's differentiation of "I" from "we",
> > >>> which
> > >>> is only expressed, not generated, in the child's use of negation.
> > >>>
> > >>> Vygotsky mentions his replication of the Stern photograph experiment,
> > >>> where a three year old is given a photo and responds with a list of
> > the
> > >>> objects in it ("a man", "another man", "a window", "a mug") and a
> five
> > >>> year
> > >>> old can add processes ("the man is sitting" "the other man is looking
> > out
> > >>> the window") but only the twelve year old can tell the story of how
> > the
> > >>> men
> > >>> came to be sitting in prison. When Vygotsky replicates this, he asks
> > the
> > >>> children to ROLE PLAY the picture. Since this forces the kids to add
> > the
> > >>> element of time, the five year olds come up with a twenty minute role
> > >>> play
> > >>> that is fully as complex as the narrative of the twelve year olds.
> > >>>
> > >>> When Vygotsky does this, he is trying to show that the idea that
> young
> > >>> children see pictures as a whole and do not differentiate the life
> > >>> stories
> > >>> within it is simply wrong. But in interpreting his result, we risk
> > >>> falling
> > >>> into a rather Piagetian analysis, which holds that speech is really
> an
> > >>> afterthought and not the cause of the child's thinking, because the
> > child
> > >>> is
> > >>> capable of expressing in action so much more than what he can
> > articulate
> > >>> in
> > >>> differentiated speech. I think this is part of what is bugging
> Martin.
> > >>>
> > >>> Two ways of debugging this occur to me. The first is that if we
> accept
> > >>> Vygotsky's account that verbal thinking (not all thinking) develops
> > from
> > >>> the
> > >>> "introvolution" of speech, we have to clearly differentiate between
> > the
> > >>> child's UNDERSTANDING of speech in the environment (which is
> semantic,
> > >>> i.e.
> > >>> NOT entirely dependent on a phasal, lexicogrammatical, partitioning
> of
> > >>> speech) and the child's ability to "articulate" (which is).
> > >>>
> > >>> The second point is that Vygotsky's definition of speech changes. For
> > the
> > >>> very young child, speech includes the child's actions and in fact is
> > more
> > >>> about the child's gestures and the child's use of the affordances in
> > the
> > >>> environment than about vocabulary and grammar. Early speech is
> > dominated
> > >>> by
> > >>> indication and nomination; signifying comes later.
> > >>>
> > >>> In the same way, metaphor comes first, because the child has to be
> > able
> > >>> to
> > >>> accept that a gesture can "stand for" an object, and a word can
> "stand
> > >>> for"
> > >>> the idealized relationship between gesture and object. Similes are a
> > kind
> > >>> of
> > >>> violent graspture of the conscious awareness of metaphor. So to
> speak.
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> --- On Wed, 10/13/10, Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> > >>> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> From: Rod Parker-Rees <R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk>
> > >>> Subject: RE: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> Date: Wednesday, October 13, 2010, 1:08 AM
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> So many ideas to respond to and so little time!
> > >>>
> > >>> Isn't it more likely that our associations between 'mmm' and baby
> > related
> > >>> concepts may be more to do with the fact that this is one of the
> first
> > >>> recognisable sounds produced by babies? Mamas, Moms, mothers and
> > mummies
> > >>> all
> > >>> over the world have reason to like the idea that these first sounds
> > refer
> > >>> to
> > >>> them (fathers are left with papa or dada). But how things may have
> > begun
> > >>> is
> > >>> always only a part of the story - layers upon layers of cultural
> > >>> associations and connotations are wrapped around the infant word as
> it
> > is
> > >>> used in particular kinds of situations and contexts.
> > >>>
> > >>> A Carol pointed out, phonemes are category labels rather than names
> of
> > >>> 'things' - a way of splitting the infinite variations of sound into a
> > >>> limited number of chunks. After the age of about 9 months we begin to
> > >>> actively filter our perception of speech sounds to privilege
> > meaningful
> > >>> distinctions in the languages used around us so there are probably
> > many
> > >>> more
> > >>> SPEECH sounds than any one of us thinks there are because we think
> > only
> > >>> of
> > >>> the sounds we are still able to discriminate.
> > >>>
> > >>> Where J.G. differs from David's version of Piaget's view, that 'You
> > have
> > >>> to imagine what you would be thinking if you were making the noises
> > that
> > >>> you
> > >>> are hearing', he seems to me to be closer to Reddy's 'second person
> > >>> perspective' which has been aired here in the past - babies don't
> have
> > to
> > >>> 'imagine' or 'think' - they have only to engage or respond.
> > >>>
> > >>> Also, while there may be some very general, physiological,
> associative
> > >>> principles in the affective force of sounds (large, grande, enorme
> > versus
> > >>> little, teensy weensy, petit, piccolo for example, and associations
> > with
> > >>> 'squeak' and 'roar') there is also space for enormous variation in
> the
> > >>> effect that words have when they are spoken in different ways by
> > people
> > >>> with
> > >>> different kinds of voice and by people in different moods (you really
> > can
> > >>> hear the difference between someone reciting letter of the alphabet
> > while
> > >>> smiling or while frowning).
> > >>>
> > >>> Here's an experiment - download the transcript of Vikram
> > Ramachandran's
> > >>> lecture 'Phantoms in the brain' from
> > >>> http://www.bbc.co.uk/print/radio4/reith2003/lecture1.shtml?print
> > >>>
> > >>> Read the first paragraph or two before you click on the 'listen'
> > button
> > >>> and then compare the experience of your reading and hearing
> > >>> Ramachandran's
> > >>> voice (all of the lectures from this series are still well worth
> > >>> listening
> > >>> to).
> > >>>
> > >>> Sounds and words may 'have' some power of signification, whether
> > because
> > >>> of their/our physiological properties or because of the layers of
> > >>> association they have accumulated (some of which may be forgotten by
> > or
> > >>> unknown to most of us) but this is a thin, diagrammatic sort of
> > meaning.
> > >>> It
> > >>> is when they are performed by a speaker (or singer) that they can
> > serve
> > >>> as
> > >>> an interface, allowing us to hear through them and engage
> with/respond
> > to
> > >>> the life of another person.
> > >>>
> > >>> So - apologies for my thin, diagrammatic contribution.
> > >>>
> > >>> All the best,
> > >>>
> > >>> Rod
> > >>>
> > >>> P.S. I still think there is a significant affective distinction
> > between
> > >>> the effect of a simile and the effect of a metaphor - a simile
> > announces
> > >>> itself while a metaphor can get to you more immediately.
> > >>>
> > >>> -----Original Message-----
> > >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > >>> On
> > >>> Behalf Of David Kellogg
> > >>> Sent: 13 October 2010 06:58
> > >>> To: Culture ActivityeXtended Mind
> > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> > >>>
> > >>> We can see that J.G. really does believe that vowels and consonants
> > are
> > >>> semantic, just as Khlebnikov did. Leonard Bernstein, in his Harvard
> > >>> Lectures
> > >>> on the "Semantics of Music" had a very similar theory about "mmm";
> > >>> associating it with nursing, nipples, and micturation. It's the kind
> > of
> > >>> thing that the "perceptionists" that Vygotsky criticizes in
> > "Psychology
> > >>> of
> > >>> Art" believed.
> > >>>
> > >>> Of course, there is some evidence to support this; we often find that
> > >>> "milk" and "mammary glands" and "mothers" and "mommas" are associated
> > >>> with
> > >>> the first bilabial sounds that babies make: Korean, Chinese, Arabic,
> > >>> Tibetan
> > >>> and many other languages can provide us with examples, and it's easy
> > to
> > >>> imagine a world where babies are responsible for teaching mothers
> > >>> Motherese
> > >>> as an international language. It's our world, more or less.
> > >>>
> > >>> But there are many languages, including English, where the /m/ sound
> > is
> > >>> associated with NEGATIVES: "malady", "malevolent", "malefactor", etc.
> > >>> Worse,
> > >>> there are certain "things" or even "emotions" which by their very
> > nature
> > >>> cannot be directly expressed in a vowel or a consonant.
> > >>>
> > >>> Consider the number "zero" or the grammatical category of negation.
> > It's
> > >>> really NOT possible (IMpossible, to use an "em") to express something
> > >>> that
> > >>> does not exist by something that does exist in a direct, iconic
> > manner.
> > >>> Something that exists, exists. It doesn't not exist. The only way for
> > it
> > >>> to
> > >>> mean something that does not exist is indirectly, that is,
> > symbolically.
> > >>>
> > >>> We had a related problem in class. The kids are playing a game with
> > >>> cards,
> > >>> where they are supposed to ask "Can you swim?" and if the responder
> > >>> answers
> > >>> "Yes, I can" (because there is a sign on the back of the card
> > indicating
> > >>> "yes") the child is allowed to keep the card.
> > >>>
> > >>> But the teacher has to begin by explaining what the cards mean. And
> > the
> > >>> problem is that the card shows an actual child swimming, not a child
> > who
> > >>> "can" swim. So the solution is a process of what Robert Lake would
> > call
> > >>> metaphor, of having something stand for something else (e.g. "one
> > minus
> > >>> one
> > >>> EQUALS zero").
> > >>>
> > >>> T: Look (indicating the card)! She is swimming. She's swimming.
> > So...she
> > >>> can swim. Now...(indicating himself). I am not swimming. I'm
> teaching,
> > >>> right? BUT...I can swim. Can you swim?
> > >>> S: Yes.
> > >>> T: Good. Can she swim? Can he swim? Ask her. Ask him. How many
> > swimmers
> > >>> in
> > >>> this group? How many swimmers in our class?
> > >>>
> > >>> You can see that the way the teacher handles the problem of
> presenting
> > >>> POTENTIAL rather than ACTUAL swimming is to TRANSFER the meaning to
> > >>> another
> > >>> situation; to have the card stand for something else.
> > >>>
> > >>> I guess I would simply call this process semiosis, and that's why I
> > think
> > >>> that it is part of language development at every single point, bar
> > none.
> > >>> Every form of semiosis, without exception, is a form of metaphor,
> > because
> > >>> the creation of a sign is precisely the creation of something that
> > stands
> > >>> for something else that is not itself.
> > >>>
> > >>> BUT...phonemes really do not exist, except as abstractions (in fact,
> I
> > >>> think they do not even exist as abstractions except for people who
> are
> > >>> literate). They are like the spaces that we IMAGINE we hear (but do
> > not
> > >>> actually hear, except in quite special circumstances) between words.
> > >>> Since
> > >>> they don't exist, they can stand for other things that don't exist.
> As
> > >>> Lear
> > >>> says, "Nothing will come from nothing". He forgot to add that this
> > >>> nothing
> > >>> gives us everything!
> > >>>
> > >>> Never mind. Let's notice the form of Mike's question. He doesn't ask
> > >>> whether phonemes exist or not. He simply asks whether one can produce
> > a
> > >>> particular sound (the example he gives is only an example; it's the
> > >>> letter
> > >>> "em") without there being more than one phoneme "there". Where? In
> the
> > >>> mind,
> > >>> of course.
> > >>>
> > >>> The simple, snotty answer is YES, because phonemes ONLY have
> > >>> psychological
> > >>> reality (and even then only in the minds of literate people, not in
> > the
> > >>> minds of illiterates and children).
> > >>>
> > >>> So there are as many sounds as you think there are: no more and no
> > less,
> > >>> and if you go "mmmmmmm" as J.G. suggests and ask how many sounds your
> > >>> hearer
> > >>> hears, he or she will probably say "one". We can easily find people
> > who
> > >>> will
> > >>> say the same thing about the letter "em" in almost any first grade
> > class.
> > >>>
> > >>> But the complex answer is much more interesting. It seems to me that
> > >>> consonants DEPEND on vowels in a way that is not reciprocally true.
> > You
> > >>> CAN
> > >>> pronounce the sound "a" without any vowel, and "a" is in fact a word
> > (and
> > >>> one of the most common words in our language).
> > >>>
> > >>> At the morphological level, we see the same non-reciprocal dependency
> > >>> relation: In the word "reworked", both "re-" and "-ed" depend on
> > "work"
> > >>> for
> > >>> their meaning, but not vice versa. Which can also be seen at the
> level
> > of
> > >>> relative clauses.
> > >>>
> > >>> In an exchange (which is where I think J.G. really needs to look for
> > the
> > >>> emotional fountainhead of his semantic system) we find that we can
> > have
> > >>> an
> > >>> initiate ("Who are you?") without a response, but a response without
> > an
> > >>> initiate is not a response at all.
> > >>>
> > >>> Why? As far as I know, non-human systems of communication (e.g. bird
> > >>> calls, whale songs, computer coding) do not have this kind of
> > >>> non-symmetrical dependency at any level at all. It's one word = one
> > >>> emotion,
> > >>> more or less like the extremely impoverished view of language that
> > J.G.
> > >>> presents in his paper.
> > >>>
> > >>> It seems to me that non-symmetrical dependency is an essential
> > resource
> > >>> for making a very finite group of phenomena potentially stand for a
> > >>> potentially infinite one (as is polysemy, or as Robert Lake says,
> > >>> "metaphor").
> > >>>
> > >>> This super-productivity is what allows human languages to SIGNIFY
> > rather
> > >>> than simply SIGNAL. But of course this superproductivity brings with
> > it
> > >>> developmental crises, too.
> > >>>
> > >>> I have one other comment on the "reception by production" theories
> > that
> > >>> Joseph Gilbert, Liberman, and Chomsky and Halle are putting forward.
> > ALL
> > >>> of
> > >>> these theories assume a kind of RECIPROCITY, an act of EMPATHY, a
> > >>> DECENTRATION that Piaget rules out until the child is at least seven
> > >>> years
> > >>> old. You have to imagine what you would be thinking if you were
> making
> > >>> the
> > >>> noises that you are hearing. So if Piaget is right, children should
> > not
> > >>> be
> > >>> able to learn to speak until they are seven or eight.
> > >>>
> > >>> David Kellogg
> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>>
> > >>> --- On Tue, 10/12/10, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com> wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> From: Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] The "Semantics" of Vowels and Consonants?
> > >>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <
> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> Date: Tuesday, October 12, 2010, 9:55 PM
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> Dear Mike Cole:
> > >>> The sound of the voiced "M" is mmmmmmmmmm, commonly uttered to
> express
> > >>> pleasure, as in the reaction to something good tasting. The name of
> > the
> > >>> letter is a peripheral issue.
> > >>>
> > >>> J.G.
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> On Oct 12, 2010, at 6:44 PM, mike cole wrote:
> > >>>
> > >>> > David and Joseph.
> > >>> >
> > >>> > A question. The alphabetic character, M, may represent a phoneme.
> > But
> > >>> can
> > >>> > one say the letter M without there being two phonemes there?
> > >>> > mike
> > >>> >
> > >>> > On Tue, Oct 12, 2010 at 4:26 PM, David Kellogg <
> > >>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> > >>> >
> > >>> >> I just want to pick up on ONE aspect of this (very long and almost
> > >>> >> completely unsourced) document, and try to source it, because it's
> > a
> > >>> truism
> > >>> >> in our field that none of us can stand alone.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Even if this were not true in an epistemological sense (there is
> > only
> > >>> so
> > >>> >> much brilliance a lone genius is capable of) it would be absolutey
> > >>
> > >>> true
> > >>> in a
> > >>> >> publishing sense (a long document is unpublishable without a long
> > list
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> references, preferably including all of its potential reviewers).
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> It's this:
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> "The vocal sounds express/communicate states of the emotions first
> > and
> > >>> >> foremost, and as an afterthought, so to speak, they are used to
> > refer
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> things. They communicate emotion by moving the auditory apparatus
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> hearer in a manner analogous to the movements of the vocal
> > apparatus
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> speaker, thereby creating in the hearer an emotion analogous to
> the
> > >>> emotion
> > >>> >> present in the speaker. Just as the touch of the hands conveys the
> > >>> intent of
> > >>> >> the toucher, so the vocal motion of the vocalizer creates in the
> >>
> > >>> hearer
> > >>> an
> > >>> >> emotional state analogous to that of the vocalizer."
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> This is the "reception through production" theory of speech
> > perception
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> was popular in the 1980s. It does have BIG advantages over passive
> > >>> theories
> > >>> >> of reception that preceded it(for one thing, it's much more
> > >>> parsimonious;
> > >>> >> the same system can be used for receiving speech and for
> > transmitting
> > >>> it).
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> There are really TWO variations of this theory:
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> a) The "motor" theory, associated with Alvin Liberman and the
> > Haskins
> > >>> >> Laboratories. This theory relies on the idea of "articulatory
> > >>> gestures". By
> > >>> >> recognizing the kinds of "articulatory gestures" required by >>
> > >>> particular
> > >>> >> sounds, the hearer, through an act of empathy with the speaker,
> > asks
> > >>> >> himself/herself "What would I be saying if I were making gestures
> > like
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> in this situation?"
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> b) The "analysis by synthesis" theory, associated with Chomsky and
> > >>> Halle at
> > >>> >> MIT. This theory relies on pure unempbodied ACOUSTIC knowledge
> > rather
> > >>> than
> > >>> >> articulatory gestures. By recognizing the acoustic patterns (see
> > the
> > >>> theory
> > >>> >> of "distinctive features" laid out in Chomsky and Halle, The Sound
> > >>> Patterns
> > >>> >> of English), the hearer through an act of empathy with the
> speaker,
> > >>> asks
> > >>> >> himself/herself "What would I be saying if I were making gestures
> > like
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> in this situation?"
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I think that BOTH of these variants of the theory have in common a
> > >>> >> recognition that in perception we get a lot more than we hear;
> > people
> > >>> do NOT
> > >>> >> rely on the stream of vowels and consonants as their sole source
> of
> > >>> >> information. Perception is a supreme act of what Bruner calls
> > "going
> > >>> beyond
> > >>> >> the information given".
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Contrary to this, all theories of perception which are based on an
> > >>> analogy
> > >>> >> with the ALPHABET assume that the stream of vowels and consonants
> > >>> really
> > >>> >> does carry the information (or, as Joseph Gilbert puts it,
> > emotion).
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> In Vygotsky's time, this theory was advocated by the brilliant >>
> > >>> futurist
> > >>> >> poet Khlebnikov, who wrote quite extensively on the "emotional >>
> > >>> valence"
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> particular phonemes, and constructed whole poems on this
> > association
> > >>> (e.g.
> > >>> >> "Zangezi", which was composed after a long series of experiments
> on
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> "semantics" of individual phonemes). As you can imagine, they
> don't
> > >>> >> translate very well!
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> David Kellogg
> > >>> >> Seoul National University of Education
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> --- On Mon, 10/11/10, Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> > wrote:
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> From: Joseph Gilbert <joeg4us@roadrunner.com>
> > >>> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] The Genetic Belly Button and the Functional
> > Belly
> > >>> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> >> Date: Monday, October 11, 2010, 11:03 PM
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> 1
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language Creates Culture
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language functions, in human society, as the generator of
> > culture.
> > >>> By
> > >>> >> the effects on
> > >>> >> us of the sounds we utter, we inform ourselves of the effects on
> us
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things which
> > >>> >> make up our world. Since the only sense of the meaning of any
> thing
> > is
> > >>> one
> > >>> >> and the same
> > >>> >> as the effect on us of the thing, and since we relate to our world
> > >>> through
> > >>> >> our words, language informs us of the meanings of things. This
> > >>> informing
> > >>> >> takes place when we use vocal sounds as words to refer to things.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We exist in a vacuous condition vis-à-vis any objective
> knowing
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> ultimate meaning of anything. We do not know the ultimate affect
> on
> > us
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> anything. If we operated by instinct, our choices would not depend
> > on
> > >>> >> knowing, as our choices do. In this culls context, we are informed
> > by
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> affects on us of the sounds of our words of the affects on us of
> > the
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> to which our words refer.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> In the vacuum of outer space, a ship can be propelled by the
> > >>> constant,
> > >>> >> subtle force of an ion drive. In the outer space of our
> > cluelessness
> > >>> >> as
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> the meaning of anything, we are informed of that meaning by the
> > affect
> > >>> on us
> > >>> >> of the sounds of our words.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Spoken language is sound made by the body and used to refer
> to,
> > to
> > >>> >> signify, things. We must thoroughly understand the basis of
> > language
> > >>> >> in
> > >>> >> order to understand anything else about language. Why do we use >>
> > >>> certain
> > >>> >> words to signify certain things? Why are there similarities and
> > >>> differences
> > >>> >> among the various languages in how sound is used to refer to
> > things?
> > >>> >> Is
> > >>> >> there a correlation between and among emotional states and vocal
> > >>> sounds?
> > >>> >> These and other questions must be answered if we are to know how
> > >>> language
> > >>> >> works.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We are born into a language-using group and learn the meanings
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things that
> > >>> >> make up our world simply by learning our group's language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We have a distinct and unique reaction to each vocal sound
> just
> > as
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> do to
> > >>> >> each facial expression and postural position. All forms of body
> > >>> language,
> > >>> >> postural, facial
> > >>> >> and vocal, are expressions of states of our internal goings-on,
> are
> > >>> born of
> > >>> >> those feeling/emotional states. and recreate these states by
> > resonant
> > >>> >> entrainment.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The languages we humans speak currently are the results of
> > the
> > >>> >> experiential contributions of our ancestors. However they, (our >>
> > >>> distant
> > >>> >> relatives), felt about whatever they had words for, we now feel
> > again
> > >>> in the
> > >>> >> present moment, when we utter the words they originally uttered.
> > >>> Therefore
> > >>> >> language functions somewhat as a seed: the experience of past
> > peoples
> > >>> was
> > >>> >> represented in the words they spoke and now, when we voice those
> >>
> > >>> words,
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> re-experience what they did.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language is institutionalized perception. How we, as a
> society,
> > >>> >> perceive our world, is
> > >>> >> 2
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> determined by the the affects on us of our vocal sounds, (a form
> of
> > >>> body
> > >>> >> language), we use to refer to the things that make it up.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Our actions are determined by our perceptions. If we want to
> >>
> > >>> change
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> way we act we must change the way we perceive our world. And we
> can
> > >>> change
> > >>> >> how we perceive our world by changing how we refer to the things
> > that
> > >>> >> constitute our world.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The feelings/emotions of actors on stage and of all of us, are
> > >>> >> communicated by our actions. The way someone moves tells us much
> > about
> > >>> how
> > >>> >> they feel. Our face conveys extensive and subtle information about
> > our
> > >>> >> emotional state. The sounds of our voices carry emotional content.
> > >>
> > >>> And,
> > >>> >> although we normally are not aware of it, the articulate vocal
> > sounds,
> > >>> (the
> > >>> >> sounds of our vowels and consonants), are loaded with information
> > >>
> > >>> about
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> emotional goings-on. The information that comes from the
> articulate
> > >>> sounds
> > >>> >> of our words rather than from the emotional overlay we place on
> > them
> > >>> due to
> > >>> >> our transitory emotional states, is the same no matter what moods
> > we
> > >>> may be
> > >>> >> experiencing while we speak. That aspect of information conveyance
> > is
> > >>> >> institutionalized/standardized. The tone of voice, cadence, and
> > volume
> > >>> >> dynamics can be unique to each situation without altering the
> > >>> fundamental
> > >>> >> referential communication.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> One can experience the effect on ourselves of the various
> vocal
> > >>> sounds
> > >>> >> by, while in a sensitive, receptive mode, saying those sounds out
> > loud
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> sensing their effects. I have done that and have, it seems,
> > discovered
> > >>> their
> > >>> >> meanings. You can do that also. Doing so oneself will give one a
> > more
> > >>> >> complete sense of the effects of vocal utterances than one could
> > >>> experience
> > >>> >> by reading what someone else has written about the effects of the
> > >>
> > >>> vocal
> > >>> >> sounds on the emotions.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> This covert function of language must be brought to light in
> > >>
> > >>> order
> > >>> for
> > >>> >> us to be able to understand the importance of recreating culture.
> > We
> > >>> must
> > >>> >> understand that our behavior, as a society, is fundamentally
> linked
> > to
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> culture, which is a result of our language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We do not objectively know the ultimate meaning of anything
> and
> > >>> >> consequently experience our sense of the meanings of things from
> > the
> > >>> effects
> > >>> >> on us of our words.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> These familiar phrases suggest a perception, perhaps a
> mystical
> > >>> >> perception, of the importance of the spoken word.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The final word.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What's the word?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> In the beginning was the word and the word was with God and
> the
> > >>> word
> > >>> >> was God.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The tongue is the rudder of the soul. It is not what passes
> > into
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> lips that defiles us but
> > >>> >> 3
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> every untoward utterance that proceeds out of our mouths.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Words, as sounds, affect us subliminally, supplying us with a
> > >>> feeling
> > >>> >> for whatever we name. It is that feeling that we experience from
> > the
> > >>> sounds
> > >>> >> of our words that supplies us with a subliminal consensus for our
> > >>> >> world-view.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We cannot realistically expect humans to act in a way >>
> > >>> contradictory
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> their culture's bias. Marx's economic/social theory was used as a
> > >>> rallying
> > >>> >> standard to
> > >>> >> enable regime change. After those individuals who had experienced
> > the
> > >>> >> tyranny of the czar had left the scene, the body-politic
> eventually
> > >>> rejected
> > >>> >> collectivism, (the transplanted economic organ). Russian culture
> is
> > >>> >> fundamentally the same as it was when the roots of its present >>
> > >>> language
> > >>> were
> > >>> >> established and Russian society naturally reverted to its cultural
> > >>> default
> > >>> >> mode after the revolution. After a short time, the czar was
> > replaced
> > >>> >> by
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> head commissar. Marx held that the economic relationships within
> > >>> society
> > >>> >> create all other human relations. It seems that culture is the
> > cause
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> nature of human relationships within any society.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The Culture
> > Made
> > >>> Us
> > >>> >> Do It
> > >>> >> "The unrecognized
> > function
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> >> language"
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> As an iceberg exists mostly under the surface of the water
> > which
> > >>> >> supports it, the fundamental consequence of language tends to be
> >>
> > >>> hidden
> > >>> >> under the surface of our awareness. Most crucial human activities
> > go
> > >>> >> on
> > >>> >> without awareness, for example, all of the bodily functions. Many
> > >>> conscious
> > >>> >> activities proceed without much deliberate awareness. Once one
> > knows
> > >>> well
> > >>> >> how to drive a car, much less awareness is needed to operate the
> > >>> vehicle.
> > >>> >> The subconscious mind supports the same kinds of activities as
> does
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> conscious mind, however with less effort. Anything that can be
> > >>> automated,
> > >>> >> is. Automating essential activities frees the conscious mind to
> > focus
> > >>> on
> > >>> >> issues about which we feel we need to learn in order to more
> > >>> effectively
> > >>> >> cope, (those issues that require conscious attention until new
> > >>> behavioral
> > >>> >> patterns are in place). There is no need to be aware of processes
> > that
> > >>> take
> > >>> >> place well enough without attention. It is only when a problem
> > arises
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> humans, in an attempt to solve it, focus our awareness on it. If
> > we
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> coping well enough without awareness, why be aware? We don't fix
> > >>> something
> > >>> >> if it doesn't seem broken. We don't reinvent our wheel as long as
> > it's
> > >>> >> rolling. However, upon examination, our human condition appears to
> > >>
> > >>> have
> > >>> been
> > >>> >> painfully broken for as long as we can recall, and must be
> > repaired.
> > >>> How may
> > >>> >> we fix it?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Could it be that our behavior is governed by something that we
> > >>> cannot
> > >>> >> see, something of which we are not cognizant? Is there anything in
> > our
> > >>> >> nature that would preclude such a possibility, the possibility
> that
> > >>
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> behavior may be directed by influences not within the purview of
> > our
> > >>> >> everyday consciousness? What could such a force be?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The ability to produce simple vocal sounds made it's
> appearance
> > on
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> scene before our
> > >>> >> 4
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> progenitors made words of those sounds. The ability to vocalize
> > >>> >> articulately is a prerequisite to the ability to verbalize. Words
> > >>> appeared
> > >>> >> when our ancient ancestors became cognizant of the relatedness of
> > >>> stimuli to
> > >>> >> their own vocal reactions to them. When they began deliberately
> > using
> > >>> >> vocalizations to bring to mind things, they made the transition >>
> > >>> between
> > >>> >> deriving their sense of the meaning of things by direct experience
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things to deriving a sense of the meaning of things by
> experiencing
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> affects of the sounds of the words for the things. This
> > supersession
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> primal world by the linguistic world was the start of culture.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Being able to talk about things was very advantageous to our
> > >>> distant
> > >>> >> relatives. They could confer and plan. More important, they >>
> > >>> experienced
> > >>> a
> > >>> >> common sense of the meaning of the things in their world by using
> > >>> common
> > >>> >> symbols with which to refer to them.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Culture was advantageous to our ancestors in the ancient,
> > >>> >> pre-industrial environment. Now our technology provides us with
> the
> > >>> power to
> > >>> >> create and reside in an artificial environment, however one made
> > >>> according
> > >>> >> to the values inherent in our primitive culture. Our culture
> > provides
> > >>> us
> > >>> >> with marching orders and our technology enables us to march very
> > >>> forcefully.
> > >>> >> Are we marching toward the edge of a precipice?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> All action is preceded by a decision to act, be that decision
> > >>> >> consciously or subconsciously made. All decisions are based on a
> > >>> >> consideration of the consequences of those decisions. These
> effects
> > on
> > >>> us of
> > >>> >> the consequences of our actions are the same as and identical with
> > the
> > >>> >> meanings of those actions. How do we know the meanings of things?
> > How
> > >>> do we
> > >>> >> know the affects on us of any thing? Do we know the effects on us
> > of
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> directly as a consequence of our direct experience with them or by
> > >>> indirect
> > >>> >> experience with them by using and experiencing the words for those
> > >>> things?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language is the factory and culture is the product. Culture is
> > an
> > >>> >> abstraction and language is the physical mechanism from which it
> > >>> springs.
> > >>> >> Language is emotionally evocative sounds used to represent things,
> > >>> thereby
> > >>> >> conveying to us a sense of the affects-on-us/the-meanings-of those
> > >>> things.
> > >>> >> Our sense of our own role in our culture provides us with our
> > identity
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> therefore with guidance for our behavior. The cultural values,
> > derived
> > >>> from
> > >>> >> our ancestors' experiences long ago, as represented in our
> > language,
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> instilled in us and direct our behavior today. A body continues in
> > its
> > >>> state
> > >>> >> of motion unless it is acted upon by an outside force. Human
> > culture
> > >>> will
> > >>> >> remain fundamentally unchanged unless it is deliberately changed;
> > and
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> will not happen unless we feel the need to do so and know how to
> do
> > >>
> > >>> it.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Culture resides in the subconscious mind. Many others have
> > spoken
> > >>> about
> > >>> >> the need to change the way we, as a society, think: many have
> > tried,
> > >>> >> by
> > >>> >> using means such as meditation, sleep deprivation, psychoactive
> > >>> substances,
> > >>> >> chanting, philosophical inquiry, etc. to accomplish this change
> and
> > >>
> > >>> may
> > >>> have
> > >>> >> been successful to a degree. However, it seems they were not able
> > to
> > >>> >> lastingly infuse into society at large their newfound vision, due
> > to
> > >>> not
> > >>> >> addressing the status quo at the
> > >>> >> 5
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> root/source, which is the culture. Understanding how language >>
> > >>> functions
> > >>> >> makes it possible to change our culture.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> How did language arise?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> How did language arise? Originally, our progenitors'
> vocalizing
> > >>> only
> > >>> >> expressed internal-goings-on/emotion and did not refer to anything
> > >>> external
> > >>> >> to them. It was advantageous to members of the group to be
> informed
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> emotional conditions of other members. Much later, when
> > consciousness
> > >>> >> developed enough for them to see the connectedness of the sounds
> > >>> uttered to
> > >>> >> the things the sounds were uttered in reaction to, they realized
> > that
> > >>> they
> > >>> >> could bring to mind the thought of the things by uttering their
> > >>> associated
> > >>> >> sounds, (names). The beginning of talking about things was the
> > start
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> >> culture,and the talking about things refocused the talkers'
> > conscious
> > >>> >> attention away from the experience of the emotional reactions to
> > the
> > >>> sounds
> > >>> >> of the words, and toward thoughts related to the things to which
> > the
> > >>> words
> > >>> >> referred. While they were busy directing their attention to
> > thoughts
> > >>> related
> > >>> >> to the things to which the words referred, they were being
> > emotionally
> > >>> >> affected by the vocal sounds they were making to form their
> words.
> > >>
> > >>> So,
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> effects of the sounds they were making vocally were experienced
> > >>> >> subliminally, while
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> consciously, they were dealing with the thoughts of the things >>
> > >>> referred
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> by their words. The affects-on-us/meanings-of things cannot be
> > proven.
> > >>> All
> > >>> >> they had and all we have to go on are the effects on us of the
> > things
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> the effects on us of the sounds of the words that represent the >>
> > >>> things.
> > >>> >> While the effects of the things are changeable through time and
> > >>> somewhat
> > >>> >> unique to each individual, the effects on us of the sounds of the
> > >>
> > >>> words
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> relatively consistent and universal. Having nothing else to go on,
> > we
> > >>> accept
> > >>> >> the effects on us of the vocal sounds of words as
> > >>> revealing/representing the
> > >>> >> effects on us of the things referred to by the words. In this way,
> > >>> culture
> > >>> >> is formed and passed to succeeding generations. Our world views
> > >>> typically
> > >>> >> come from the sense of the meaning of things as represented by the
> > >>> sounds of
> > >>> >> our words rather than from the sense of meaning we may gain from
> > the
> > >>> direct
> > >>> >> experience of the things themselves.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Do vocal sounds, themselves, communicate? When someone utters
> a
> > >>> vocal
> > >>> >> sound, such as a sigh, a growl, a whimper, a scream, etc., do we
> > get a
> > >>> sense
> > >>> >> of how they are feeling? If so, they are communicating their >>
> > >>> condition.
> > >>> How
> > >>> >> does that communication take place? Do we receive information
> > >>> communicated
> > >>> >> in such a manner consciously, subconsciously or by both ways? What
> > is
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> means by which an emotion can be conveyed by sound? Can emotion,
> or
> > >>> anything
> > >>> >> else be communicated by the articulate sounds of our vowels and
> > >>> consonants,
> > >>> >> or do only non-articulate vocal sounds convey meaning? If we allow
> > >>
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> vocal sounds, simply as sounds, communicate, then is it possible
> > or
> > >>> likely
> > >>> >> that the vocal sounds we use to make words also communicate as
> well
> > >>> when
> > >>> >> used as words? What would be the effect of using inherently >>
> > >>> emotionally
> > >>> >> meaningful sounds as symbols to represent external things? Would
> > the
> > >>> >> inherent meaning of the sounds affect our perception of the things
> > >>> >> represented by the sounds?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> 6
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> These considerations may shed light on the issue of the root
> >>
> > >>> causes
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> human behavior. Naturally, those who contemplate our condition and
> > >>> would
> > >>> >> improve it if they could, would be attentive to these matters.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> All of life's processes exist as movements. Emotional
> > conditions
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> patterns of motion. Similar structures, in keeping with the
> > mechanics
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> resonation, impart, on each other, their movements. Our vocal
> > >>> apparatuses
> > >>> >> facilitate our ability to move with each other.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The vibrations made by the body convey the condition of the
> > >>> emotional
> > >>> >> body to other similar/human emotional bodies, and to some degree,
> > to
> > >>> other
> > >>> >> animal emotional bodies. The more similar the other body, the more
> > the
> > >>> >> condition is transposed. Humans receive each others' vocal and
> > other
> > >>> >> body-language communications more readily than other species
> > receive
> > >>> human
> > >>> >> communication. Similar structures transmit their
> > resonation/vibration
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> each other more readily than do dissimilar structures.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> My quest for understanding of human behavior began long ago.
> > When
> > >>> >> I
> > >>> was
> > >>> >> around the age of six, I became increasingly aware that the
> > folkways
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> formal institutions of our society were lacking in humanity and
> > common
> > >>> >> sense. I asked myself why this was so. As a child, I attributed
> the
> > >>> problem
> > >>> >> to people's personal psychology and it was not until I was in my
> > late
> > >>> teens
> > >>> >> that I realized that the cause of the problem is our culture. It
> > was
> > >>> shortly
> > >>> >> after that that I understood how verbal/vocal communication works.
> > The
> > >>> cause
> > >>> >> of The Problem seemed and seems to be the culture which is created
> > by
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> relationship between vocal sounds and what they, as words, refer
> > to.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Some of the reasoning that preceded this realization was
> first,
> > >>> that we
> > >>> >> are not created evil, but rather simply with survival instincts.
> > >>> Second,
> > >>> >> that if we were able to act sanely/rationally, we would be doing
> > what
> > >>> >> produces the best results for everyone. Third, it must be
> something
> > we
> > >>> >> learned, some misinformation, that causes us to behave in ways not
> > in
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> own self-interest. Fourth, when I considered the question of from
> > >>
> > >>> where
> > >>> this
> > >>> >> false information came, I identified as the source, the culture.
> >>
> > >>> Later,
> > >>> I
> > >>> >> realized that we do not, for sure, know the meaning of anything,
> > and
> > >>> that,
> > >>> >> as far as we know, the only thing constant and predictable about
> > any
> > >>> thing
> > >>> >> is its name, (the word-sound we produce in order to bring to
> > >>> consciousness
> > >>> >> whatever thing to which we choose to refer). After a time, I
> became
> > >>> aware of
> > >>> >> how the different vocal sounds we produce when we speak words,
> each
> > >>> create
> > >>> >> in us a unique effect and how those effects inform us
> > subconsciously
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> >> the affect on us, (the meaning), of the thing itself to which the
> > >>
> > >>> word
> > >>> >> sounds refer.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> At this time, I also learned that the sequence of sounds of
> the
> > >>> letters
> > >>> >> of our alphabet represents a sequential delineation of
> > >>> >> emotional/experiential events. From A to Z, the succession of the
> > >>> sounds of
> > >>> >> the letters of our alphabet is an example of
> > >>> pattern-projection/recognition,
> > >>> >> the pattern, in this case, being the seminal emotional events that
> > >>> humans
> > >>> >> experience during their lives, in chronological order.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> 7
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Emotions happen to us: They seem to come from the "great
> > mystery",
> > >>> God,
> > >>> >> or whatever image we may use to portray a place from which strong
> > and
> > >>> >> compelling feelings emanate.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Given, all the vocal sounds that people can make, how would
> one
> > >>> arrange
> > >>> >> the sounds sequentially and from what archetype, (model), would
> the
> > >>> pattern
> > >>> >> of that sequence come? Even if the originators of the present
> > alphabet
> > >>> >> deliberately imposed a pattern on their arrangement of the
> > >>> letter-sounds,
> > >>> >> whatever world view that existed in their minds caused them to
> feel
> > >>> most
> > >>> >> comfortable with the sequence of sounds they chose. The sequence
> > they
> > >>> chose
> > >>> >> must have been agreeable with the story that was represented in
> > their
> > >>> minds
> > >>> >> by those sounds in that sequence. If one admits that vocal sounds
> > >>> affect us,
> > >>> >> then how could a story, a sequence of affects, not be told by the
> > >>> sequence
> > >>> >> in which the sounds exist? Whether or not the originators of any
> > >>> particular
> > >>> >> alphabet had a conscious reason for arranging the sounds of that
> > >>> alphabet in
> > >>> >> the sequence in which they appear, subconscious reasons were
> > >>> influencing
> > >>> >> their arrangement none the less. Does this story, told by our
> > >>> >> alphabet make sense? Does it seem to be an accurate
> representation
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> main events in a human's life?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We tend to cling to our culture as if our lives depended on
> it,
> > as
> > >>> a
> > >>> >> drowning person might cling to a life preserver. Culture offers an
> > >>> answer,
> > >>> >> -in this case subconsciously apprehended-, to the question, "What
> > are
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> meanings of things?" Without culture, there tends to be no
> > consensus
> > >>> about
> > >>> >> what things mean. Language informs us of the meanings of named
> > things
> > >>> by the
> > >>> >> affects on us of the sounds of our words. Those who use the same
> > >>> language
> > >>> >> experience the same sense of the meanings of the things that make
> > up
> > >>> their
> > >>> >> worlds. That sense emanates from the deep levels of their
> > subconscious
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> their final assessment of the meanings of things results from
> their
> > >>> >> processing that deep, culturally caused base sense of meaning
> > through
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> lens of their perception of their own relationship to the society
> > in
> > >>> which
> > >>> >> they live.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> For the sake of clarity, let us consider, hypothetically,
> what
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> result/s would be of using meaningful sounds to refer to things.
> > Would
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> meanings of the sounds spill over into the perceived meanings of
> > the
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> or would the meanings of the things influence the perceived
> > meanings
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> sounds? Or would neither influence the other or would they
> > influence
> > >>> each
> > >>> >> other? Which has a stronger meaning-pressure, the sounds we make
> > with
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> voice or the things which, with the sounds, we name?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The vocal sounds express/communicate states of the emotions
> > first
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> foremost, and as an afterthought, so to speak, they are used to
> > refer
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> things. They communicate emotion by moving the auditory apparatus
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> hearer in a manner analogous to the movements of the vocal
> > apparatus
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> speaker, thereby creating in the hearer an emotion analogous to
> the
> > >>> emotion
> > >>> >> present in the speaker. Just as the touch of the hands conveys the
> > >>> intent of
> > >>> >> the toucher, so the vocal motion of the vocalizer creates in the
> >>
> > >>> hearer
> > >>> an
> > >>> >> emotional state analogous to that of the vocalizer.
> > >>> >> Just as our becoming-human progenitors were gaining
> > consciousness,
> > >>> (the
> > >>> >> ability to
> > >>> >> 8
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> contemplate the consequences of their actions), they were, for the
> > >>> first
> > >>> >> time, using vocal expressions as words to refer to specific
> things,
> > >>
> > >>> not
> > >>> only
> > >>> >> to express immediate emotional goings-on. Since they vocalized
> > >>> primarily
> > >>> >> under duress, their words were expressions born of fear rather
> than
> > of
> > >>> >> conscious understanding. The mind concentrates on problems, on
> > issues
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> could potentially be destructive to the perceiver. When this >>
> > >>> fear-based
> > >>> >> thinking bias becomes institutionalized in language, the language
> > >>> itself is
> > >>> >> a source of anxiety. The more we verbalize about any given
> problem,
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> more
> > >>> >> stressed-out we become. This reminds me of an Eskimo method of
> > killing
> > >>> a
> > >>> >> wolf. They would smear congealed blood on a very sharp knife and
> > set
> > >>> >> it
> > >>> out,
> > >>> >> with the blade pointing upward, where wolves frequented. When a
> > wolf
> > >>> licked
> > >>> >> the blood, it would bleed and lick its own blood not knowing it
> was
> > >>> bleeding
> > >>> >> to death. We are wolfish for knowledge and we pursue it by using
> > our
> > >>> >> main thinking tool, our language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The Unrecognized Role of Language
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Culture is the hidden law-of-the-land. We are creatures of >>
> > >>> culture,
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> its subjects. Our culture originally enhanced our survivability
> > and,
> > >>> in a
> > >>> >> technologically advanced world, may become the instrument of our
> > >>> >> destruction. Our culturally motivated ways of relating to one
> > another
> > >>> may
> > >>> >> have once been viable, although perhaps immoral, and now, with our
> > >>> powerful
> > >>> >> ability to cause environmental change, are untenable.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> "The release of atom power has changed everything except our
> > way
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> thinking...the solution to this problem lies in the heart of
> > mankind.
> > >>> If
> > >>> >> only I had known, I should have become a watchmaker." --- Albert
> > >>> Einstein
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I wish to change what is in that "heart".
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The referential function of human language is merely the "tip
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> iceberg" of the role of language. Its larger and more profound >>
> > >>> function
> > >>> is
> > >>> >> unacknowledged: It is spoken language's informing us of the
> > meanings
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> all
> > >>> >> to which we verbally refer. We are moved in a primal way by the
> > sounds
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> produce with our voice and, in the absence of any "objective", >>
> > >>> absolute
> > >>> >> information regarding (the affects on us)/(the meanings of) the
> > things
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> our world, we accept the affects on us of the vocal sounds of our
> > >>
> > >>> words
> > >>> as
> > >>> >> representing the affects on us of the things to which our words
> > refer.
> > >>> In
> > >>> >> this way, we are informed subliminally, simply by learning our
> > >>> language, of
> > >>> >> the meaning of our world. How else could we, as very young
> > children,
> > >>> have
> > >>> >> achieved a sense of how we were affected by the numerous things
> > that
> > >>> made up
> > >>> >> our world?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> This matter is of paramount importance because we act in >>
> > >>> accordance
> > >>> >> with how we perceive our world, (with what our world means to us),
> > and
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> sense of that meaning is derived from the affects upon us of our
> > >>> words.
> > >>> >> Much of human behavior that is commonly attributed to "human
> > nature"
> > >>> >> is
> > >>> >> actually motivated by cultural nature, which is created by
> > language.
> > >>> >> 9
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> How and what would our society be if we had a culture which
> > >>> instilled
> > >>> >> in us the values that we would consciously choose to hold?
> > Presently,
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> simply assimilate the culture in which we are born. Once we
> > understand
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> mechanism of cultural transmission, we will be able to change our
> > >>
> > >>> group
> > >>> >> program.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> However, it seems that many of us may be too timid to venture
> > >>
> > >>> forth
> > >>> >> from the false security of our unquestioned and familiar values.
> > Some
> > >>> have
> > >>> >> expressed to me that language is a product of nature and that to
> >>
> > >>> change
> > >>> it
> > >>> >> deliberately would produce an unnatural result, a Frankenstein >>
> > >>> culture,
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> consequences of which would probably be destructive. To those I >>
> > >>> suggest
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> we are inherently unable to venture out of the natural realm, as
> we
> > >>
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> inextricably woven into the web of nature. Furthermore it is
> > entirely
> > >>> >> correct and wholesome for us, with the goal of improving our
> > >>> survivability,
> > >>> >> to choose to correct our culture at its source. Once we see how we
> > may
> > >>> help
> > >>> >> ourselves, we would be within our progressive evolutionary
> > tradition
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> use
> > >>> >> all our knowledge to do so.
> > >>> >> .
> > >>> >> Vocal sounds either communicate as vocal sounds or they do
> not.
> > If
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> assume that vocal sounds do not communicate, then language only >>
> > >>> blindly
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> unintelligently refers to things. If we assume that vocal sounds
> do
> > >>> >> communicate something, as vocal sounds, then language does more
> > than
> > >>> merely
> > >>> >> refer to things: it also informs us about the things named. Which
> > is
> > >>> true?
> > >>> >> Do any of us believe that our vocal sounds do not
> > express/communicate
> > >>> >> anything? If we believe that vocal sounds communicate/express
> > >>> something,
> > >>> >> then what is it that they communicate/express? If vocal sounds do
> > >>> >> communicate as sounds, do they loose that communicative function
> > when
> > >>> >> incorporated into words or do they continue to be expressive when
> > used
> > >>> in
> > >>> >> words?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> If vocal sounds that constitute words communicate something as
> > >>> sounds,
> > >>> >> then what effect does the sound of a word exert on our perception
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> thing to which that word refers?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Many seem to have difficulty accepting the idea that the
> > primary
> > >>> >> meanings of vocal sounds, including the sounds of words, are the
> > >>> effects
> > >>> >> they cause within each of us and not the things to which they
> refer
> > >>> when
> > >>> >> uttered as words. Another point that aided me in understanding the
> > >>> function
> > >>> >> of language is that we really do not know the meaning of anything
> > but
> > >>> rather
> > >>> >> behave as though our taken-for-granted assumptions are valid only
> > >>> because
> > >>> >> they have not been held to the light of inquiry. It is only that
> > which
> > >>> >> resides in our subconscious and of which we are not conscious and
> > >>> >> consequently do not question, that we act as if we "know" for
> sure.
> > >>> Remember
> > >>> >> the caterpillar in Alice in Wonderland? When asked how he managed
> > to
> > >>> >> coordinate the movements of all those legs, he became aware of the
> > >>> >> previously unconscious process of walking and then could not walk.
> > The
> > >>> only
> > >>> >> sense of the meanings of things that we dependably share with the
> > >>> others of
> > >>> >> our society is
> > >>> >> instilled in each of us by the relationship between the sounds of
> > our
> > >>> >> words and the things to which those words refer. Words are the
> link
> > >>> between
> > >>> >> our autonomic, cultural sense of meaning and the things that make
> > up
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> world. We give things a familiarity by attaching to them sounds >>
> > >>> created
> > >>> by
> > >>> >> our body. Our words are related to things because the vocal sounds
> > of
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> words are related to our reactions to those things. We may not
> > >>> ordinarily
> > >>> >> experience an emotional reaction to the things that
> > >>> >> 10
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> make up our world. It is during our seminal moments that we
> > experience
> > >>> >> emotional reactions to things.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What meaning, if any, do things have if we are not affected by
> > >>> those
> > >>> >> things? All meaning is relative. If we were totally unaffected by
> > >>> something,
> > >>> >> would it be meaningful? How would whatever meaning it may have be
> > >>> perceived?
> > >>> >> Clearly, what we want to know about something, (anything), is how
> > it
> > >>> affects
> > >>> >> us, (what it is?).
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> After many attempts to share these findings with those in
> > >>> academia,
> > >>> >> their lack of understanding, even more their lack of interest in
> > >>> >> understanding the ideas I was putting forth , dampened my impulse
> > to
> > >>> reach
> > >>> >> out to those whom I previously had thought were most likely to
> > >>> understand
> > >>> >> these findings.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I figured that what I was saying was challenging on a deep
> > level
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> >> most, who would otherwise gain a glimpse of it. My discovery,
> seems
> > to
> > >>> >> threaten the sense of security of those who consciously or
> > otherwise
> > >>> treat
> > >>> >> their culture as an idol. Some of us, especially those of highly
> > >>> exercised
> > >>> >> intellectual abilities, feel that security is to be had by being
> > able
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> "explain" the meaning of things. By uttering words, (sounds),
> about
> > >>> things,
> > >>> >> what meaning is revealed? Doing so may create the illusion of
> > >>> understanding
> > >>> >> by seeming to make the named things familiar. But does it, only
> > inform
> > >>> us
> > >>> >> with the effect/meaning of the sounds of words, or with the
> meaning
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things as well? What are the meanings of the things?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> It appears that culture is the root of all normal human
> > behavior.
> > >>> We
> > >>> >> all behave according to our values and assumptions and those
> derive
> > >>> from our
> > >>> >> culture. Do our academicians know what culture is, how it relates
> > to
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> people who are instilled with it and how it may be changed?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We are informed subliminally of the meaning of our world by
> the
> > >>> >> language that we speak.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Why is it so difficult for people to understand how language
> > >>> generates
> > >>> >> culture? What is/are the missing piece/s of information that they
> > need
> > >>> in
> > >>> >> order to grasp that concept?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> A better way is possible. We need only the vision of this
> > better
> > >>> world,
> > >>> >> as an everyday experience, in order for us to act in accord with
> > it.
> > >>> The
> > >>> >> consciousness of how to act in order to create the world we wish
> > must
> > >>> be the
> > >>> >> status quo, not the rarity that it now is. This changing of the
> > status
> > >>> quo
> > >>> >> can be accomplished by changing the culture and changing culture
> is
> > >>> >> accomplished by changing language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Are we conscious that we are affected by the sounds we make
> > with
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> voice? We are commonly aware that the quality of singers voices >>
> > >>> affects
> > >>> us.
> > >>> >> We know that great orators and actors affect us with their
> delivery
> > >>
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> vocal character. Everyone's voice affects us. We are aware of the
> > >>> affect of
> > >>> >> tone of voice but not of the affect of articulated phonemes per
> se.
> > >>> >> 11
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We have no way of knowing the final meaning of anything. We
> > might
> > >>> think
> > >>> >> we know what a thing will do to us in the immediate future but
> what
> > >>> about
> > >>> >> how it will affect us much later? When we become aware of
> > something,
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> question its meaning and once something is questioned, we never
> > gain a
> > >>> sense
> > >>> >> of its absolute meaning Only that which remains in the
> subconscious
> > we
> > >>> do
> > >>> >> not question. The feelings that well up from our subconscious, in
> > >>> reaction
> > >>> >> to various things, seems to be true absolutely. Our feelings
> > strongly
> > >>> affect
> > >>> >> our train of thought.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The certainty of the uninformed is typically replaced by the
> > >>> wonderment
> > >>> >> of the "enlightened".
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Our culture/language supplies us with a sense of knowing the
> > >>> meaning of
> > >>> >> all things for which we have a name. This sense of the meaning of
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> helps us to feel secure in the face of an uncertain, threatening
> >>
> > >>> world.
> > >>> We
> > >>> >> gain that sense of knowing the meaning of things simply be having
> > >>
> > >>> words
> > >>> for
> > >>> >> things. Our subconscious accepts the affects of the sound of the
> > words
> > >>> as
> > >>> >> being the affects of the things to which the words refer. The
> > words
> > >>> stand
> > >>> >> for the things we name with them and replace, subliminally, our
> > >>> perception
> > >>> >> of the things referred to with our perception of the words >>
> > >>> themselves.
> > >>> The
> > >>> >> words are all we have to go on for the sensing of the
> > meaning/effect
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Having words inform us of the meanings/effects of things seems
> > to
> > >>> have
> > >>> >> some advantages compared to being informed of the meanings/effects
> > of
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> by direct perception of the things themselves. All those who use
> a
> > >>> >> particular language have the same basic subliminal sense of the
> > >>> meanings of
> > >>> >> named things and consequently, are able to participate in the
> group
> > >>> dynamic
> > >>> >> of their society. The words for things stay constant through time
> > >>
> > >>> while
> > >>> how
> > >>> >> we are affected directly by things changes. We can share
> > experience,
> > >>> >> knowledge and wisdom with words. Without words, our own personal
> > >>> experience
> > >>> >> would be all we would have and we would not be able to share it.
> > Words
> > >>> >> enable abstract thought and planning.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We think, influenced by the feelings of the sounds of words
> for
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> and feel as though we were thinking with the perception of the
> > things
> > >>> >> themselves.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Are we conscious that we are affected by the sounds we make
> > with
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> voice? We are commonly aware that the quality of singers voices >>
> > >>> affects
> > >>> us.
> > >>> >> We know that great orators and actors affect us with their
> delivery
> > >>
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> vocal character. Everyone's voice affects us. We are aware of the
> > >>> affect of
> > >>> >> tone of voice but not of the affect of articulated phonemes per
> se.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> When we utter vocal sounds that are simply sounds and not
> > words,
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> may, more easily, experience consciously, the effects of the
> > sounds,
> > >>> than
> > >>> >> when we speak words. When we speak words, we typically experience
> > >>> >> consciously the referential function of the words and not the
> > affects
> > >>> on us
> > >>> >> of the sounds of the words, while we experience the effects of the
> > >>> vocal
> > >>> >> sounds of words subliminally. Because we experience the one thing,
> > >>
> > >>> (the
> > >>> >> referential meanings of the words), consciously, and the other
> > thing,
> > >>> (the
> > >>> >> affects on us of the sounds), subconsciously, we
> > >>> >> 12
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> subconsciously interpret the subliminal effects of the vocal
> sounds
> > as
> > >>> >> being the effects of the things to which the words refer. The
> > >>> subconscious
> > >>> >> mind supplies us with the bottom line of the meaning of whatever
> it
> > is
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> are considering because we cannot reason with the subconscious
> mind
> > >>
> > >>> and
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> can with the conscious mind. Whatever we are conscious of, we can
> > >>> question
> > >>> >> and whatever we question becomes uncertain. However we have a
> > >>> language-based
> > >>> >> subconscious reaction to that which the
> (meaning-of)/(effect-on-us)
> > is
> > >>> >> consciously unknown as long as we have a word for it, and that
> > >>> subconscious
> > >>> >> reaction creates an experience of and hence a sense of knowing the
> > >>> meaning
> > >>> >> of that which, prior to being named, did not seem to be known. The
> > >>> word,
> > >>> >> made of sounds of our body, stands in for the unknown thing, the
> > thing
> > >>> >> separate from our body. In the absence of any objective sense of
> > the
> > >>> >> meanings of things, we rely on our words to provide us with a
> sense
> > of
> > >>> >> knowing,
> > >>> >> because knowing relieves us of the stress of anxiety. We are
> > driven
> > >>> into
> > >>> >> the perceived safety of our familiar culture, as represented in
> our
> > >>> >> language, by the stress of the fear generated by not knowing. One
> > must
> > >>> be
> > >>> >> willing to accept the mystery of existence in order to experience,
> > >>
> > >>> free
> > >>> from
> > >>> >> the bias of existing culture.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Considering words to be things in and of themselves, (sounds),
> > and
> > >>> not
> > >>> >> only a means to refer to things, will enable us to examine them
> for
> > >>> their
> > >>> >> inherent meaning. The primary meaning of a word is not the thing
> > which
> > >>> it
> > >>> >> represents. It is, rather, the affects on us of it's sounds. We
> > >>> consciously
> > >>> >> consider the meaning of the word to be the thing to which the word
> > >>> refers
> > >>> >> and we subconsciously experience the meaning of the word as the >>
> > >>> effects
> > >>> on
> > >>> >> us of its sounds. Because we experience, profoundly and
> > consistently,
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> effects on us of our human vocal sounds while we experience less
> > >>> intimately
> > >>> >> and less consistently the effects on us of the things to which we
> > >>
> > >>> refer
> > >>> with
> > >>> >> words, the emotional effects of the words as sounds overrides the
> > >>> emotional
> > >>> >> effects of the things named, and informs us of the nature of named
> > >>> things.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> In a similar way that explorers laid claim to land in the name
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> monarch, we tend to lay claim to that which we name in order to
> > render
> > >>> it
> > >>> >> seemingly familiar and known.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Everything that we perceive subconsciously creates an
> emotional
> > >>> >> reaction that may be experienced consciously and everything that
> we
> > >>> perceive
> > >>> >> consciously affects us subconsciously as well. We consciously
> > perceive
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> sounds of spoken language and we are also affected subconsciously
> > by
> > >>> those
> > >>> >> same sounds. In the course of verbal communication, we think of
> the
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> to which our words refer while subconsciously we are emotionally
> > >>> affected by
> > >>> >> the sounds of our words. This simultaneous occurrence of the
> > thought
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> a
> > >>> >> thing and the subconscious experience of the emotion generated by
> > the
> > >>> sound
> > >>> >> of the word we use to refer to that thing, subliminally informs us
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> affect-on-us ,(the-meaning-of), the thing. In this way, we acquire
> > a
> > >>> sense
> > >>> >> of the affects-on-us, (the-meanings-of), everything for which we
> > have
> > >>> >> a
> > >>> >> word. This is important because our actions in relation to the
> > things
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> make up our world are motivated by our perceptions of the meanings
> > of
> > >>> >> those things. Therefore, if we would change, for the better, our
> > >>> >> societies' behavior, we ought to change our languages.
> > >>> >> Since spoken language is crucial in determining the course of
> > >>
> > >>> human
> > >>> >> events, it would be
> > >>> >> 13
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> better if we consciously agreed with the subliminal sense of the
> > >>> meanings
> > >>> >> of things which is instilled in us by our language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We humans are not doing so well with our relationships with
> one
> > >>> another
> > >>> >> that we should be complacent regarding the improvement of our
> > culture.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> People have been attempting to address social and economic
> > >>> challenges
> > >>> >> ever since there were people. All the religions were attempts to
> > >>> provide a
> > >>> >> basis for our behavior. Marxism was/is an attempt to remedy social
> > and
> > >>> >> economic inequality and exploitation. "Hippie" communes were
> > typically
> > >>> >> instituted to provide healthy social environments. Organized
> > politics
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> codified legal systems were/are created, supposedly, to improve
> our
> > >>> >> condition. Why is it unclear whether any of these deliberate
> social
> > >>> >> structures actually made/make our situation better or worse? Could
> > it
> > >>> be
> > >>> >> that the cause of our malaise is something that is not being >>
> > >>> recognized
> > >>> by
> > >>> >> those who strive to improve our lot? For how many years, for how
> > many
> > >>> >> centuries and millennium will we try to fix our broken world by
> > >>> creating
> > >>> >> laws, religions, political and economic institutions before we
> > decide
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> doing so does not deal with the source of the problem? Marx's
> > mistake
> > >>> was
> > >>> >> believing that
> > >>> >> economics is the foundation upon which all of society's other
> > >>> institutions
> > >>> >> are based. It seemed reasonable to him that since life is based
> > upon
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> biological economics of survival, that economics must be the
> > >>> determining
> > >>> >> force in society. He did not see that our culture provides us with
> > a
> > >>> sense
> > >>> >> of the meaning of all recognized things thereby assuaging the
> > >>> fear/terror
> > >>> >> that naturally arises as a result of our consciousness of our
> > physical
> > >>> >> vulnerability and that we tend to protect and defend that culture
> > >>> because of
> > >>> >> the perceived security which it provides. Once culture is
> > established,
> > >>> it
> > >>> >> causes the economic and social relationships to be what they are,
> > and
> > >>> they
> > >>> >> cannot be lastingly changed without changing the culture.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> The culture, created by language forms our values which then
> > >>> strongly
> > >>> >> influence the decisions we make consciously and subconsciously.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What
> > is
> > >>> >> culture?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I define culture as the common fundamental values held by the
> > >>> members
> > >>> >> of a society. These values derive from our perception of the
> > meanings
> > >>> of,
> > >>> >> (the affects on us of), the things that make up our world.
> "Things"
> > >>
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> whatever we identify as being distinguishable from other things,
> > which
> > >>> >> include feelings, thoughts, values, people and ideals. The
> meanings
> > of
> > >>> >> things are one with and the same as the affects on us of those
> > things.
> > >>> How
> > >>> >> do we acquire our sense of, (the affects on us of)/(the meanings
> > of),
> > >>> >> things? Is it from our own individual experiences with things? Is
> > it
> > >>> from
> > >>> >> what we say to ourselves and to each other about things? If it
> were
> > >>> based on
> > >>> >> individual experience, how would we achieve consensus and if we
> > could,
> > >>> why
> > >>> >> would all cultures not be pretty much the same?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Most would hold that even within a given society our
> individual
> > >>> values
> > >>> >> are not the same and
> > >>> >> 14
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> surely the popular view of what our values are, indicated by a
> > cursory
> > >>> >> survey of our behavior, seems to support that conclusion. When
> > >>> attempting to
> > >>> >> assess the values that underlie behavior we should consider the
> > >>> influence of
> > >>> >> the role that each individual sees themselves as playing within
> > their
> > >>> >> culture. Given the same subliminal, fundamental values,
> individuals
> > >>> within
> > >>> >> any society tend to behave not only relative to those basic values
> > but
> > >>> also
> > >>> >> relative to how they perceive themselves, (who they perceive >>
> > >>> themselves
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> be), within their society.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> It seems that the cause of the problem of why we do so many
> > >>> seemingly
> > >>> >> destructive and self-defeating things must be so basic, so
> > fundamental
> > >>> as to
> > >>> >> escape our awareness. It must be housed in the subconscious mind
> > since
> > >>> all
> > >>> >> our attempts to address it have been futile. It is that which we
> > don't
> > >>> >> consciously know that we subconsciously know that sometimes makes
> > us
> > >>> wonder
> > >>> >> why we do what we do. Our emotional reactions are influenced by
> > that
> > >>> which
> > >>> >> resides in the subconscious just as they are by that of which we
> > are
> > >>> >> conscious, and often, we create rationales to explain our
> behavior,
> > >>> while
> > >>> >> the actual reasons for the feelings that motivate us may be other
> > than
> > >>> what
> > >>> >> we choose to think.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What does every cultural group share within itself that
> affects
> > >>
> > >>> its
> > >>> >> members profoundly and without their conscious knowledge? Where
> are
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> hidden rules, by which we live, to be found? Our culture is an
> > >>> artifact,
> > >>> >> inherited from distant ancestors, formed in an environment vastly
> > >>> different
> > >>> >> than today. Ways of interacting with one another that may have
> > seemed
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> work then now appear to be dysfunctional. The primary example is
> > war,
> > >>> which
> > >>> >> before weapons of mutual destruction, was rationalizable by the
> > >>> victors. But
> > >>> >> now, with nuclear weapons, would there be any victors? We still
> > think
> > >>> as we
> > >>> >> did then but we cannot afford to act today as we may have believed
> > we
> > >>> could
> > >>> >> then. Our technology has evolved tremendously but our culture has
> > not.
> > >>> We
> > >>> >> are ill-equipped to cope with the situation our technology has
> > enabled
> > >>> us to
> > >>> >> create. Furthermore, even if war seemed winnable, wouldn't we
> > prefer
> > >>> peace?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> If we admit that vocal sounds inherently affect us, as do
> > facial
> > >>> >> expressions and general body posture, then we may ask how our
> sense
> > of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> meaning of the things which make up our world is affected by using
> > >>> >> inherently meaningful symbols to refer to them. What is the
> > relative
> > >>> >> strength of the emotional effects upon us of our symbols compared
> > to
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> emotional effects of the things to which they refer? Considering
> > that
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> emotional effects of the things themselves vary with context and
> is
> > >>> peculiar
> > >>> >> of each of us, and that the emotional effects of the vocal symbols
> > is
> > >>> >> relatively consistent and universal, can we assume that the
> > meanings
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> symbols create the perceived meanings of the things? Is this
> > >>> relationship
> > >>> >> the same or different within the conscious and subconscious minds?
> > >>
> > >>> Does
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> conscious or subconscious mind more strongly influence our
> > behavior?
> > >>> Are our
> > >>> >> behaviors affected by our subconscious minds even when we are
> > trying
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> do
> > >>> >> what we
> > >>> >> consciously think we should do?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We either are or are not affected by our vocal utterances. I
> > see
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> we are. If we were not affected by our vocal utterances, we would
> > not
> > >>> >> vocalize. The whole purpose of vocalizing is
> > >>> >> 15
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> communication! And in order to communicate, we must be affected by
> > >>
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> which we use to communicate.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What, we may ask, is communicated by vocalizing? What is
> > >>> communicated
> > >>> >> when other animals vocalize? It is clear that animals communicate
> > >>
> > >>> their
> > >>> >> instantaneous emotional states by their vocalizations. How is this
> > >>> >> communication accomplished? The vibrating of the body of the >>
> > >>> vocalizer,
> > >>> >> (sender), causes the body of the receiver to vibrate in sympathy.
> > The
> > >>> >> receiver experiences the motions and consequently the emotions of
> > the
> > >>> >> sender. This simple process is the foundation of our vocal
> > activity,
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> verbal activity, (our language), and our culture. Many of us seem
> > to
> > >>> balk at
> > >>> >> accepting the idea that our lofty retorical proclamations are
> > founded
> > >>> upon
> > >>> >> such primal processes. If you are one of these, consider that our
> > >>> genetic
> > >>> >> blueprint is shared, in the majority, by all other vertebrates and
> > >>> largely
> > >>> >> by all other animals. To those who disparage animals, please be
> > >>> reminded
> > >>> >> that the Grand Creator authored ALL of everything, not only us and
> > >>> those of
> > >>> >> whom we
> > >>> >> approve.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What are the ingredients that make up the mix of influences
> > that
> > >>> >> determine human behavior? Given that we are intelligent enough to
> > >>> appreciate
> > >>> >> and cherish the truths that are our guiding principles, and given
> > that
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> are not born self destructive, then for what reason/s did we act
> as
> > we
> > >>> have?
> > >>> >> From where does the false information come that motivates much of
> > our
> > >>> >> behavior? "Human nature" does not account for our inhuman actions.
> > The
> > >>> cause
> > >>> >> of our destructiveness must exist among the things which we learn.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> From what ultimate source do we acquire our information
> > regarding
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> meaning of our world? Our culture is that source.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What have we got to go on in order to achieve a sense of the
> > >>> meaning of
> > >>> >> our world other than the words we speak?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Do we have a benchmark for establishing the meaning of things?
> > If
> > >>> >> everything is relative, what is it relative to? We need not look
> > >>> further
> > >>> >> than ourselves to find that. How could it be otherwise? We look
> out
> > >>> from our
> > >>> >> eyes and hear with our ears and think that we can objectively >>
> > >>> determine
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> nature of each and every thing that we examine. However, with our
> > >>> survival
> > >>> >> in the balance, as it inescapably is, how whatever it is that we
> > >>> examine
> > >>> >> relates to our survival determines what it must mean to us. How we
> > are
> > >>> >> affected by the things that constitute our world establishes their
> > >>> meaning.
> > >>> >> The vocal sounds we make express and convey the different
> emotional
> > >>> effects
> > >>> >> we experience. Our words are made up of these body-sounds.
> > Therefore,
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> words convey emotional meaning and inform us of the affects on us
> > of
> > >>> things
> > >>> >> for which we have names.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language exists in both the conscious and the subconscious. We
> > are
> > >>> >> conscious of the words we speak and of the things to which they
> > refer,
> > >>> while
> > >>> >> they inform us subconsciously of the effects on us, (the meanings
> > of),
> > >>> those
> > >>> >> things to which they refer.
> > >>> >> Does it matter what things mean? Does it matter what we think
> > they
> > >>> >> mean? Do our actions
> > >>> >> 16
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> relative to them depend on what they mean to us? Do we act in >>
> > >>> relation
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> things according to what they mean to us? How do we know the
> > ultimate
> > >>> effect
> > >>> >> on us of any thing? Is the effect on us of any thing its meaning?
> > How
> > >>> can
> > >>> >> any thing mean to us anything other than what its effect on us is?
> > How
> > >>> do we
> > >>> >> obtain a sense of the meanings of things? Do we get that sense of
> > the
> > >>> >> affects-on-us/ the-meanings-of things directly from our own
> > experience
> > >>> with
> > >>> >> things or as mediated by language?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Of all forms of body language, (vocalization, facial
> expression
> > >>
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> overall body posture), only one of them,vocalization, is commonly
> > used
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> represent things other than conditions of the emotional body. Our
> > >>> general
> > >>> >> posture is very communicative of our physical-emotional state
> > without
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> deliberate intent and is sometimes used deliberately to convey the
> > >>> same.
> > >>> >> Facial expression can be more finely communicative of our state of
> > >>> >> being/feeling than is general body posture. Vocalization, while
> > being
> > >>> >> profoundly expressive/communicative, is, by civilized people,
> > >>> ordinarily
> > >>> >> exclusively reserved for uttering words. While we are not aware of
> > the
> > >>> >> affect upon ourselves of the phones we utter, we are aware of the
> > >>> effect
> > >>> >> upon ourselves of the emotional embellishments we add to them.
> > Often,
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> consciously add emotional content to our words in order to
> > embellish
> > >>> their
> > >>> >> referential meaning. Since we are busy, often consciously,
> > processing
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> referential meaning of
> > >>> >> our words, we are unaware of the emotional impact of the sounds
> > that
> > >>> make
> > >>> >> them up. Each distinct articulate vocal sound affects us in its
> own
> > >>> unique
> > >>> >> way. Understanding this is crucial to understanding the workings
> of
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> culture-creating function of language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We not only refer to things with our words. More profoundly,
> we
> > >>> inform
> > >>> >> ourselves of the very meaning of those things simply by using a
> > word,
> > >>> (a
> > >>> >> vocal sound), to refer to them. This information as to the
> affects
> > >>> upon us,
> > >>> >> (the meanings of), the things which make up our world, constitutes
> > our
> > >>> >> culture. Culture is information, (in-formation). Since we are not
> > >>
> > >>> aware
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> the nature of this information, it exists in our subconscious
> > minds.
> > >>> >> We
> > >>> act
> > >>> >> according to a subconscious program put in place by our language.
> > If
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> understand how we receive information regarding the meaning or our
> > >>> world, we
> > >>> >> can change that information so that it agrees with what we believe
> > to
> > >>> be the
> > >>> >> nature of our world. Our culture was passed down, from long ago;
> > from
> > >>> before
> > >>> >> electronics, before motorized transport and the printing press. If
> > we
> > >>> were
> > >>> >> to deliberately create our language today, would we create the one
> > we
> > >>> >> currently use? If so or if not, why? Would we know how to create a
> > >>> >> language that conveys the meanings of things that are their
> actual
> > >>> >> meanings? If we would know, how would we know? If not, why not?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> That which affects us profoundly and constantly must be in
> > close
> > >>> >> proximity. Things right in front of us are often overlooked when
> we
> > >>> search
> > >>> >> for that which affects us powerfully. We tend to assume that if
> the
> > >>> causes
> > >>> >> of major difficulties were so close to us, it would be obvious and
> > we
> > >>> would
> > >>> >> have discovered them by now. Let us reexamine our major influences
> > to
> > >>> look
> > >>> >> for what causes us to behave as we do.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Our species, is plenty smart enough to understand why our
> > saints
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> prophets are correct when they exhort us to be "good". We create
> > >>> secular
> > >>> >> laws that mirror our religious tenants and are
> > >>> >> 17
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> sensitive to any critique of our behavior. Our feelings of guilt
> > seem
> > >>> to be
> > >>> >> well developed. Why then do we act as we do; making war against
> one
> > >>> another
> > >>> >> and engaging in all kinds of destructive activity?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I have heard many claim that it is simply "human nature" to
> act
> > in
> > >>> >> destructive ways. Those who believe that, feel that there is
> > nothing
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> be
> > >>> >> done to correct our human malaise other than punishment. Evil ones
> > >>
> > >>> must
> > >>> be
> > >>> >> trimmed back, like a noxious and thorny vine. I do not subscribe
> to
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> depressing idea and know that the truth of the matter is that we
> >>
> > >>> humans
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> inherently survival oriented and will learn whatever seems as
> > though
> > >>> >> it
> > >>> will
> > >>> >> further our survival. It is because of our native intelligence
> > coupled
> > >>> with
> > >>> >> our survival desire that we voluntarily stretch our consciousness
> > in
> > >>> order
> > >>> >> to glimpse a better way for ourselves to carry on.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> What are the forces that influence our behavior? What we
> > believe
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> be
> > >>> >> good and correct does not, it seems, by itself, determine our
> > actions.
> > >>> Do we
> > >>> >> not fully believe that what seems to be right to us is truly
> right?
> > Or
> > >>> is
> > >>> >> there some other influence that informs us of what the world and
> > all
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things and concepts and people in it mean to us, something else
> > that
> > >>> >> influences our perception of how we must behave in order to
> > survive?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Our behavior is related to how we are affected by the things
> > that
> > >>> make
> > >>> >> up our world. We behave in relation to the various things that
> fill
> > >>
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> awareness, according to how they affect our survivability, (how we
> > >>> PERCEIVE
> > >>> >> that they affect our survivability). We perceive the world
> directly
> > >>> through
> > >>> >> personal contact with it and indirectly through contact with that
> > >>
> > >>> which
> > >>> >> represents the world to us, (our language). Language represents
> the
> > >>> world by
> > >>> >> labeling everything about which we speak, with sounds made by our
> > >>> bodies.
> > >>> >> Those vocal sounds are part and parcel of states of our emotions.
> > Our
> > >>> >> preverbal progenitors and our children when young, make vocal
> > sounds
> > >>> >> in
> > >>> >> reaction to various environmental stimuli. Those emotive sounds
> are
> > >>> >> intuitively made sense of by all who hear them. We sense the
> > >>> vocalizations
> > >>> >> and they make sense to us. The vocal sounds are made by a body in
> > an
> > >>> >> emotional state and cause that state to be reproduced in the
> > emotional
> > >>> body
> > >>> >> of the hearer
> > >>> >> of those sounds. The sending body vibrates and the receiving body
> > >>> vibrates
> > >>> >> similarly. An emotionally linked vibrational pattern is spread
> from
> > >>
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> originator of the vocal sound-vibration to whoever's auditory >>
> > >>> apparatus
> > >>> is
> > >>> >> moved by it. The transmittance of the vibrational pattern is the
> > >>> >> transmission of the emotion. We are emotionally affected by the
> > >>> emotions of
> > >>> >> others.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Language is an institution, a standardized way we move our
> > bodies,
> > >>> >> specifically our vocal apparatuses, our ears, central nervous
> > system
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> emotions, in relation to the various things that make up our
> world.
> > In
> > >>> >> relation to a book, we who speak English, utter the sound, "book".
> > In
> > >>> >> relation to a book, a Spanish-speaking person utters the sound, "
> > >>> libro".
> > >>> >> These two different sounds move us in different ways, giving us a
> > >>> different
> > >>> >> experience of that which refers to and represents that object and
> > >>> >> consequently, of the thing referred to. The primal meaning of a
> > word
> > >>> >> is
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> effect the sound of it creates within us. The secondary, more
> > distant
> > >>> >> meaning of a word is that to which it refers. The secondary
> meaning
> > is
> > >>> what
> > >>> >> we commonly accept as being the one and only meaning. We are
> > >>> >> 18
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> generally not aware of the primary meaning, because we are
> affected
> > by
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> vocal sounds of our words subliminally and by the secondary,
> > >>> referential,
> > >>> >> meaning of words consciously. Awareness of the primary meanings
> of
> > >>> vocal
> > >>> >> sounds was superseded by the awareness of the >> secondary,
> > >>> -referential-,
> > >>> >> meaning of vocal sounds used as words.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> To understand the functionality, the "nuts and bolts", of >>
> > >>> language,
> > >>> is
> > >>> >> to free ourselves of domination by culture, to be the masters of
> > >>> culture
> > >>> >> rather than its subjects. We have been inextricably attached to
> > >>> culture, for
> > >>> >> better or for worse, ever since our use of language began. Now we
> > can
> > >>> >> intentionally create a language/culture that informs us as we
> would
> > >>> like to
> > >>> >> be informed, of the effects on us, (the meanings of), all the
> > things
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> name.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Certainly we agree that we are affected by the sounds we
> utter.
> > >>> What
> > >>> >> then is the
> > >>> >> consequence of referring to all the things to which we refer, (all
> > the
> > >>> >> things that make up our conscious world), with inherently
> > meaningful
> > >>> sounds?
> > >>> >> If we were able to refer to things with "meaningless" symbols,
> then
> > >>
> > >>> all
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> would be conveying is the thought of the thing. When we refer to
> >>
> > >>> things
> > >>> with
> > >>> >> inherently meaningful symbols, we are also informing ourselves of
> > the
> > >>> >> meanings of the things to which we are referring. Is there such a
> > >>
> > >>> thing
> > >>> as a
> > >>> >> meaningless symbol? Is anything meaningless? In order to perceive
> > >>> anything,
> > >>> >> including a symbol, that symbol must register upon our senses and
> > in
> > >>> order
> > >>> >> to register upon our senses, the sensed thing must affect us. No
> >>
> > >>> effect
> > >>> on
> > >>> >> us, equals no perception by us. Whatever the affect on us is, is
> > the
> > >>> >> fundamental meaning of the sensed thing. When we refer to things,
> > we
> > >>> are
> > >>> >> primarily being affected by the symbol which we use to do the >>
> > >>> referring
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> secondarily by the memory, if there is a memory, of the thing to
> > which
> > >>> we
> > >>> >> are referring. When we refer to something with which we have no
> >>
> > >>> direct
> > >>> >> experience, we have only the symbol, (word), to affect us and thus
> > to
> > >>> inform
> > >>> >> us.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> If there is a discrete connection between a vocal sound and a
> > >>> thing,
> > >>> >> and a connection likewise between a particular vocal sound and a
> > >>> specific
> > >>> >> effect on the emotions, then there is a connection between the
> > effect
> > >>> on us
> > >>> >> of the sound and the thing to which that sound, (word), refers.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We are aware that sound has an effect and that the word is
> > sound
> > >>> and
> > >>> >> that the word has an effect and that the word refers to a thing.
> > Are
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> aware that, for all intents and purposes, the effect seems to be
> > the
> > >>> thing.
> > >>> >> How we are affected by a thing, our perception of a thing, is
> > accepted
> > >>> >> subliminally as being the meaning of the thing. Our actions
> > relative
> > >>> >> to
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> things in our world, are related to the perceived meanings of
> those
> > >>> things.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> We feel the feelings generated by the sounds of our words at
> > the
> > >>> same
> > >>> >> time as we are deliberately focusing on the things to which the
> > words
> > >>> refer.
> > >>> >> As a consequence, we associate particular vocal-sound-generated
> > >>> feelings
> > >>> >> with particular things. The thing does not define the feeling.
> > Rather,
> > >>> the
> > >>> >> feeling defines the thing. The feeling of the word determines what
> > is
> > >>> >> accepted subliminally as the meaning of the thing. The word
> enables
> > us
> > >>> to
> > >>> >> experience feelings of the meanings of things not present, and
> > unknown
> > >>> by
> > >>> >> direct experience. It establishes a sense of
> > >>> >> 19
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> consensus which wells up from the subconscious minds among the >>
> > >>> speakers
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> a given language.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> All throughout human history, language has been playing this
> > role
> > >>> of
> > >>> >> consensus creator based on the information we derive from the
> > sounds
> > >>> >> of
> > >>> our
> > >>> >> words regarding the-affects-on-us/the-meanings-of, the things that
> > >>
> > >>> make
> > >>> up
> > >>> >> our worlds. If we would rather live in a culture of our own
> > creation
> > >>> than in
> > >>> >> just any one in which we happened to be born, we might consider
> > >>> >> experimenting with cultural change through language renewal.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I have been asked what I hope to achieve with this
> information.
> > My
> > >>> >> desire is that we become aware of the forces that affect us so
> that
> > we
> > >>> may
> > >>> >> be able to change the circumstances that exist to circumstances
> > that
> > >>> >> we
> > >>> >> would prefer.
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> Because of the inherent shortcomings inherent in existing
> > >>> languages,
> > >>> >> although words can be used in a kindly manner to help get us back
> > on
> > >>> track
> > >>> >> when we lose our way, they cannot, in and of themselves, guide
> > anyone
> > >>> who is
> > >>> >> determined to see things in a certain way. Only the willing can be
> > >>> helped.
> > >>> >> How can we help people to be willing?
> > >>> >>
> > >>> >> I observe that culture is the prosthetic subconscious of
> > society,
> > >>> that
> > >>> >> which we who live in a particular society share with one another
> > and
> > >>> have in
> > >>> >> common. It has to do with our world-view. Our world view is formed
> > by
> > >>> what
> > >>> >> things mean to us. How do we obtain our sense of the meaning of
> our
> > >>> world?
> > >>> >> Do we share t
> > >>>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > > --
> > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.
> > > *Assistant Professor
> > > Social Foundations of Education
> > > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > > Georgia Southern University
> > > P. O. Box 8144
> > > Phone: (912) 478-5125
> > > Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > > Statesboro, GA 30460
> > >
> > > *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> > > midwife.*
> > > *-*John Dewey.
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > > __________________________________________
> > > _____
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > --
> > *Robert Lake Ed.D.
> > *Assistant Professor
> > Social Foundations of Education
> > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> > Georgia Southern University
> > P. O. Box 8144
> > Phone: (912) 478-5125
> > Fax: (912) 478-5382
> > Statesboro, GA 30460
> >
> > *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> > midwife.*
> > *-*John Dewey.
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Inline Attachment Follows-----
> >
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
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> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
> > xmca mailing list
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> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> *Robert Lake Ed.D.
> *Assistant Professor
> Social Foundations of Education
> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
> Georgia Southern University
> P. O. Box 8144
> Phone: (912) 478-5125
> Fax: (912) 478-5382
> Statesboro, GA 30460
>
> *Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
> midwife.*
> *-*John Dewey.
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
--
*Robert Lake Ed.D.
*Assistant Professor
Social Foundations of Education
Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading
Georgia Southern University
P. O. Box 8144
Phone: (912) 478-5125
Fax: (912) 478-5382
Statesboro, GA 30460
*Democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its
midwife.*
*-*John Dewey.
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