Re: [xmca] Vygotsky vs. Bakhtin (or, The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural Redux)

[David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>]

Bakhtin said that there is no ETHICAL point in two people suffering together, empathy by itself produces neither consolation nor redress. "Misery loves company", but company does not love misery. Two miserable people are no more likely "to perform an ethical action such as providing assistance, consolation, or cognitive reflection" than one person is. In order to get an action and not just a feeling out of an esthetic response, we have to return to our own point of view. But in order for it to be ethical, we have to have gone out to the viewpoint of the other.
 
Vygotsky took this even further. He said that there is no ESTHETIC point in two people suffering instead of one either. The miracle of art is NOT that it spreads individual, personal, biological emotion from one person to another. That is merely the miracle of melodrama, horror films, thrillers, pornography and advertising. 
 
The miracle of art is that the emotion shared out is a higher emotion to begin with. It is SOCIAL, CULTURAL, and COMMUNAL in nature, so the aesthetic response is not the response of the viewer to the emotion of the creator but rather a shared response to some larger ideological whole in which they both take part.
 
How could we test this? Well, we tried...in one of many studies submitted to MCA back in 2008 (you can actually see some of our raw data at the end of the video of our presentations on the MCA website). Our approach was to take four versions of a traditional story about "Pulgasari", the metal eating monster, and then code the response of two children (one three and a half and one four years old) as reflecting either:
 
a) "I am Pulgasari" (empathy, character point of view)
b) "I see Pulgasari" (sympathy, observer point of view)
c) "I talk about Pulgasari" (going out to the character point of view and then returning to the reader/viewer point of view)
 
To code the data, we used Hallidayan grammatical distinctions in mood. 
  
Suppose the child says:
 
TY: Pulgasari likes metal.
 
The child "knows" this by taking the point of view of the Pulgasari. So the sentence "Pulgasari likes metal" suggests the sentence "I am Pulgasari", and that suggests EMPATHY.
 

Suppose the child says:
 
TY: Does Pulgasari like metal? 
 
The child is asking somebody outside the story because the child does not know. So the sentence "Does Pulgasari like metal?" suggets the sentence "I (you, we) see Pulgasari" and that places the child OUTSIDE the story and suggests SYMPATHY.
 
We also used transitivity relations (again, Halliday's concept). Suppose the child says:
 
YH: I like Pulgasari.
A: Why?
YH: Because he's good (cool/cute/crazy...)
 
The child is using either an ethical or an aesthetic notion to judge the Pulgsari. So the sentence "I like Pulgasari" invites the question "Why?" and this leads us to some kind of judgement, either ethical or esthetic. 
 
Like English, the notion of "good/bad" has both an ethical and an esthetic dimension in Korean. "JJakhada/nappeuda" means something like "just/evil" but "choda/nappeuda" means something like "nice/nasty". So we calculated the ratio of instances of "nice/nasty" and of "just/evil" to total turns in each condition (character-empathy, observer-sympathy, reader-judgment). 
 
NICE NASTY:
Character-empathy: 32%.
Observer-sympathy: 5%
Reader-judgment: 16%
 
JUST/EVIL:
Character: 3%
Observer: 5%
Reader-judgment: 27%
 
Interesting, no? The actual transcripts are even more interesting. Too bad the study's unpublishable! But that is another story....
 
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
 
 
--- On Wed, 9/15/10, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:


From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky vs. Bakhtin (or, The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural Redux)
To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wednesday, September 15, 2010, 7:38 AM


Larry-- A long delayed response to your note. I intersperse responses in
red.
mike

On Mon, Sep 6, 2010 at 8:04 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Ana and Mike
>
> I agree there is lots to think about in this thread.
>
> One possible suggestion for recognizing and acknowledging the simultaneous
> dimensions or perspectives is to EXPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGE the particular BIAS
> from which one is writing, [what one is foregrounding] and acknowledging
> that all perspectives are privileged. When we consciously draw attention to
> the particular bias of our position we draw attention to the need for
> further reflection [and distanciation] in order to understand the
> INTERSECTION or LINKING of the simultaneous dimensions.
>

In principle this suggestion makes perfect sense. In practice, its not clear
to me that we can be that self conscious about what we are not focusing on.
We are so often dealing with multi-dimensional processes that some sort of
bracketing out is essential, so the issue becomes how to make as explicit as
we can our particular foci and then work like
hell (maybe in discussion parts of presentation?) pointers to what we have
backgrounded?
(Assuming we can gain access to what we cannot see using the lenses we have
used!)

>
>
> It is clear that my bias is to foreground actual human relations, and
> working in school settings I notice this dimension is often backgrounded. I
> wonder if there is a bias to focus on learning as "design-science" because
> it is viewed as more "rigorous" and "objective" and in contrast to see
> notions of "we" as "tender-hearted" and "dependent" and "vulnerable". In
> schools, it is often assumed children must develop beyond the "we" and take
> their place as  I-selves in the school SYSTEM. The school system has its
> biases and I notice how difficult it is to form "we" relationships in
> settings that emphasize "I" and "The school community" [they-self]
> Three thoughts here among many:
>

1. In so far as actual human reactions are cultural mediated (and its pretty
far) it seems that we do violence to the phenomena we are trying to
understand when we ignore the mediational means/institutional settings
through which those actual relations are constituted.  And vice versa.
Conclusion: we do a lot of violence to the phenomena we are trying to
understand!

2. I am uncertain about what is meant by "a bias to focus on learning as
'design science' . Here are some of my concerns that i think are related.
First, I think a "bias to focus on learning" is a mistake and one that I
have been insuffciently sensitive to. Jean Lave is certainly correct that
learning is pervasive and occurs without deliberate teaching -- no learning
theorist in the American tradition would ever disagree. What Americans (me,
for example) insufficiently attended to was the teaching/learning process
seen as a systemically organized form of joint mediated activity, a double
sided process.

3. I agree that the appropriation of the term "design experimentation" and
the more recent variations on that kind of way to conceptualize the study of
learning and development in multi-party, more or less complex systems of
activity like classrooms and workplaces, along with the invention of terms
such as "learning sciences" often function as a way to gain "scientific
legitimacy." I am not so sure that they result in an "I-we" bifurcation or
an anti-relationship-oriented approach. There are plenty of examples of
"design research" in which designing to afford new kinds of interpersonal
relations is central.

My .05 dollars worth.
mike

>  I noticed that when I wrote about the notion of "we-self" [Binswanger's
> term] I was hesitant.  WHY??  Is it because the term is  "sentimental" and
> "ideal" or because "we" implies the loss of "I"??  Ana's articulation of
> Bahktin's perspective foregrounding the dimension of human relations gave me
> the opportunity to bring the notion of Binswanger's we-self into the
> conversation as one example of a tradition exploring actual human relations
> within Binswanger's existential-INTERPERSONAL framework. This tradition
> continues and acknowledges Hegel's fundamental notion of recognition as
> central to this framework.
>
> I recognize  I am biased to intersubjective accounts and therefore I am
> attempting to get some distance from my own biases by deepening my
> understanding of structural accounts and also the centrality of modes of
> production and artifacts for understanding human interaction and activity
> SYSTEMS.
>
> As Mike said, lots to think about.
>
> Ana
> I hope this thread opens up an extended dialogue.
>
> Larry
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 5, 2010 at 9:04 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Lots to think about in your note and Larry's which just preceded it in my
>> mail queue, Ana.
>> A further analogical mapping which leads to your conclusion: I think we
>> need
>> to study and understand the "intersection" of the two aspects -- because
>> in
>> real life they are inseparable.
>>
>> I also relate this two dimension system to modes and relations of
>> production
>> of which the same can be said. One without the other is meaningless.
>>
>> That said, it is difficult to look at four sides of a problem at the same
>> (or from four simultaneously
>> in-play perspectives). So different people tend to forground/background
>> different parts of the overall
>> system depending upon their point of view which in turn depends upon a
>> myriad of cirumstantial factors.
>>
>> mike
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 5, 2010 at 8:42 PM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana@zmajcenter.org
>> >wrote:
>>
>> > Mike,
>> >
>> > It is very interesting that you map the two approaches as vertical and
>> > horizontal -- vertical, I assume, being oriented to the ways of knowing
>> as
>> > organized by socio-cultural (structural) means -- abstracted,
>> generalized
>> > and decontextualized (epistemological); while horizontal approach is
>> dealing
>> > with human actual relations, events of their lives and paths of their
>> > individual development (ontological).
>> >
>> > I am not sure if they are horizontal or vertical or is it just the way
>> we
>> > study them -- but to understand development of any person and
>> furthermore to
>> > understand the implications and meaning of particular educational
>> relations,
>> > events and decisions -- I think we need to study and understand the
>> > "intersection" of the two aspects -- because in real life they are
>> > inseparable.
>> >
>> > I think that the epistemological orientation alone is not sufficient
>> since
>> > it is looking at more structural patterns of organization of thought and
>> > more global patterns of organization of the relations (institutional,
>> > agentive, division of labor, social conventions and rules) and provides
>> a
>> > view of the patterns only in a hindsight, i.e. when the patterns of
>> social
>> > development are finished developing, and not from the actual
>> experiences,
>> > relations and the life moments of the participants - as patterns of
>> > development are themselves patterns-in-development.
>> >
>> > In that sense, Bakhtin's notion of a chronotope -- that includes the
>> unity
>> > of the topological (local), axiological (value, judgment and affect),
>> and
>> > diachronic (in real time), real life line of events and the pattern of
>> > actual relation building  -- is not merely a different orientation, but
>> also
>> > implies the necessity of including the significances of the seemingly
>> > "particular" into our explanatory models.
>> >
>> > There is a very good quote by Voloshinov (a close colleague of Bakhtin),
>> in
>> > the "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language"  within his discussion of
>> > Saussure's distinction of la Langue and la Parole:
>> >
>> > "Indeed, if we were to disregard the subjective, individual
>> consciousness
>> > vis-a-vis the language system, the system of norms incontestable for
>> that
>> > consciousness, if we were to look at language in a truly objective way -
>> > from the side, so to speak, or more accurately, from above it, we would
>> > discover no inert system of self-identical norms. Instead, we would find
>> > ourselves witnessing the ceaseless generation of language norms.
>> > From a truly objective viewpoint, one that attempts to see the language
>> in
>> > a way completely apart from how it appears to any given individual at
>> any
>> > given moment in time, language presents the picture of a ceaseless flow
>> of
>> > becoming.... Thus, a synchronic system, from the objective point of
>> view,
>> > does not correspond to any real moment in the historical process of
>> > becoming".
>> >
>> > Although Vygotsky criticized Gestalt Psychology for the lack of the
>> > dynamic, developmental approach to the relationship between language and
>> > thought, he himself looked at the change of the relationship between
>> > language and thought as a change in structural and functional aspects of
>> > language and thought  -- as decontextualized - synchronic categories. In
>> > addition, although Vygotsky insisted on the unity of the affective and
>> > intellectual aspects of language-thought and on the "union of
>> generalization
>> > and communication", his analysis of communication stayed focussed on
>> > transformations of conceptual categories (generalization) and did not
>> > concern relational aspects of communication. Was the relational aspect
>> of
>> > communication somehow there, but just backgrounded? I think it is the
>> matter
>> > of priorities -- not just research priorities, but the priorities in the
>> > whole model and the analysis of development.
>> >
>> > Ana
>> >
>> > __________________________
>> > Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane
>> > Assistant Professor of Education
>> > Chestnut Hill College
>> > e-mails:  Marjanovic-ShaneA@chc.edu
>> >                 ana@zmajcenter.org
>> >                 anamshane@gmail.com
>> > Phone:    267-334-2905 (cell)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Sep 5, 2010, at 3:38 PM, mike cole wrote:
>> >
>> > > The way you phrase the contrast, Anna, it is almost as if you were
>> > > identifying vertical (LSV) and horizontal (MB) dimensions of
>> development.
>> > Is
>> > > that like socio-cultural "vs" cultural-historical?
>> > >
>> > > When you write that for LSV  real life moments "and relations with
>> > > othersrepresent simultaneously the substance of the developing
>> > > individual and the
>> > > shaping and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental
>> process,"
>> > the
>> > > inter-relations highlighted in Bakhtin, seem there, but
>> "backgrounded."
>> > > Reciprocally, Bakhtin, in other ways, (chronotopes come mind)
>> > acknowledges
>> > > the cultural historical.
>> > >
>> > > Do you see these views as complementary or conflicting?
>> > > mike
>> > > On Sun, Sep 5, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <
>> > ana@zmajcenter.org>wrote:
>> > >
>> > >> Dear David,
>> > >>
>> > >> The two quotes and stand points that you write about, the
>> perspectives
>> > of
>> > >> Bakhtin  and Vygotsky do not have the same focus.  Bakhtin and
>> Vygotsky,
>> > I
>> > >> would say, have two different frames of mind -- their concerns are
>> > >> different. It is not that they are not looking at the seemingly the
>> same
>> > >> phenomenon, but they are looking at it with different concerns and
>> for
>> > >> different reasons.
>> > >>
>> > >> It is ironical, that Vygotsky, who brought to our attention the
>> social
>> > in
>> > >> the individual, was actually concerned with the birth, growth and the
>> > >> development of one's understanding and experiencing (perezhivanie)
>> the
>> > world
>> > >> through personal transformation of concepts, attitudes and
>> sensibilities
>> > >> ("transformation of water into wine") -- so he ultimately was
>> concerned
>> > >> about the epistemological issues. What was remarkable is that he
>> > realized
>> > >> that the real life moment (social-cultural-historical - structural
>> > qualities
>> > >> of the environment) and the relationships with others -- represent
>> > >> simultaneously the substance of the developing individual and the
>> > shaping
>> > >> and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental process. But
>> still
>> > >> Vygotsky's main concern was the individual development (and through
>> it
>> > the
>> > >> raise toward the absolute (god?)) toward more powerful forms of
>> > >> comprehension (not only cognitive, but in all its aspects).
>> > >>
>> > >> On the other hand, I see Bakhtin as being concerned with human
>> > >> relationships, their quality and their impact on the people who
>> relate
>> > --
>> > >> their ontological substance in terms of life and death, power and
>> > >> subordination, love and hate, honoring and despising, leading and
>> > >> following... He was concerned about conditions for a person to grow
>> in
>> > the
>> > >> relationships in which s/he is fair and just and is being treated
>> fairly
>> > and
>> > >> justly. And he was concerned with various implications of these
>> > >> relationships, expectations, fears and hopes on how one perceives the
>> > world
>> > >> and her/himself. So I would say that for Bakhtin - the
>> epistemological
>> > was
>> > >> in the service of the prevailing concern with human existence
>> > (ontological)
>> > >> and that the measure of development was not in the complexity of
>> one's
>> > >> concepts, but in the complexity and morality of one's relationships
>> and
>> > >> deeds (postupak) toward others.
>> > >>
>> > >> So if for Vygotsky it was important to study all that is part of the
>> > >> process by which one finds the Truth, for Bakhtin, truth is a means
>> of
>> > >> creating your voice, which  can only be achieved by penetrating and
>> > being
>> > >> penetrated by the voices of the others -- i.e. entering into
>> passionate
>> > and
>> > >> compassionate relationships and as he says finding yourself in them
>> > >> (returning to yourself).
>> > >>
>> > >> And in that light -- you can see that the concern with the ultimate
>> > >> enlightenment and the raise toward knowledge, and by implication
>> toward
>> > the
>> > >> Truth -- can be "objectivized" (i.e. universal, decontextualized, and
>> > >> scientific) and stripped off of "value statements", i.e. made
>> "godless".
>> > >> And, also one can see that the concern with with the deeply
>> relational
>> > >> understanding of the other and the empathy in human interaction, can
>> be
>> > >> motivated by a very religious drive to find human virtue (as a
>> spiritual
>> > >> category) -- where knowledge and the clarity of concepts are measured
>> > not by
>> > >> their structural and systemic properties, but by their ethical value
>> > >> (Bakhtin's "postupok") in creating and shaping relationships.
>> > >>
>> > >> What do you think?
>> > >>
>> > >> Ana
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> __________________________
>> > >> Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane
>> > >> Assistant Professor of Education
>> > >> Chestnut Hill College
>> > >> e-mails:  Marjanovic-ShaneA@chc.edu
>> > >>                ana@zmajcenter.org
>> > >>                anamshane@gmail.com
>> > >> Phone:    267-334-2905 (cell)
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >>
>> > >> On Sep 4, 2010, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>> > >>
>> > >>> I've often puzzled over the paradox that the ostensible believer
>> > Bakhtin
>> > >> appears to deny the very possibility of the abstract absolute, while
>> the
>> > >> ostensibly unbelieving Vygotsky clearly affirms it in his "measure of
>> > >> generality" and his work on concept formation, and above all in his
>> > >> "Psychology of Art" and on creativity.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Bakhtin appears to think that existence is an endless but ultimately
>> > >> godless carnival, with the low and high constantly changing places.
>> If
>> > God
>> > >> exists, it is largely thanks to the devil, to whom he must be very
>> > closely
>> > >> related, if not on intimate terms. On the other hand, the genuinely
>> > godless
>> > >> Jew Vygotsky thinks that Jacob's ladder was a great spiral staircase,
>> > and
>> > >> man is always headed for the Crown of Glory (that is, the concept) no
>> > matter
>> > >> how often he seems to turn in circles.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> It's almost as if Bakhtin believes that the mere impossiblity of God
>> > does
>> > >> nothing to lessen his reality in the Son of Man, while Vygotsky
>> believes
>> > >> that the mere possibility of God in the mind of man suggests that he
>> > must be
>> > >> overthrown, abolished, and supplanted by the sons of men.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> See if you can figure out who this is:
>> > >>>
>> > >>> "The life situation of a suffering human being that is really
>> > experienced
>> > >> from within may prompt me to perform an ethical action, such as
>> > providing
>> > >> assistance, consolation or cognitive reflection. But in any event my
>> > >> projection of myself into him must be followed by a return into
>> myself,
>> > a
>> > >> return to my own place outside the suffering person, for only form
>> this
>> > >> place can the material derived from my projecting myself into the
>> other
>> > be
>> > >> rendered meaningful ethically, cognitively, or esthetically. If this
>> > return
>> > >> into myself did not actually take place, the pathological phenomenon
>> of
>> > >> experiencing another's suffering as one's own would result--an
>> infection
>> > >> with another's suffering, and nothing more."
>> > >>>
>> > >>> And this?
>> > >>>
>> > >>> “Art would have a dull and ungrateful task if its only purpose were
>> to
>> > >> infect one or many persons with feelings. If this were so, its
>> > significance
>> > >> would be very small, because there would be only a quantitative
>> > expansion
>> > >> and no qualitative expansion beyond an individual’s feeling The
>> miracle
>> > of
>> > >> art would then by like the break miracle of the Gospel, when five
>> barley
>> > >> loaves and two small fishes fed thousands of people, all of whom ate
>> and
>> > >> were satisfied, and a dozen baskets were filled with the remaining
>> food.
>> > >> This miracle is only quantitative: thousands were fed and were
>> > satisfied,
>> > >> but each of them ate only fish and bread. But was this not their
>> daily
>> > diet
>> > >> at home, without any miracles? (…) The miracle of art reminds us much
>> > more
>> > >> of another miracle in the Gospel, the transformation of water into
>> wine.
>> > >> Indeed, art’s true nature is that of transubstantiation, something
>> that
>> > >> transcends ordinary feelings; for the fear, pain, or excitement
>> caused
>> > by
>> > >>> art includes something above and beyond its normal, conventional
>> > >> content.”
>> > >>>
>> > >>> Both are attacking the Tolstoyan idea that art is a kind of disease,
>> > >> spreading emotion like a one of the plagues that Moses and Aaron
>> visited
>> > >> upon the Pharoah. Both believe, as Brecht did, that art requires an
>> > >> objectifying move; that the tennis ball in play can never understand
>> the
>> > >> laws of motion, and man in the grip of passion cannot really make
>> sense
>> > of
>> > >> emotion either. (This, for me, was Spinoza's really great
>> contribution,
>> > >> Andy!)
>> > >>>
>> > >>> But for one the going out and the coming back is quite enough; God
>> goes
>> > >> out to man in the form of Christ and returns to himself in order to
>> > bestow
>> > >> perfect forgiveness. For the other, on the other hand, the whole
>> thing
>> > must
>> > >> be turned on its head: instead of the sociocultural emerging from the
>> > sum
>> > >> total of the interpersonal, the interpersonal may only truly be made
>> > sense
>> > >> of as a microcosm of the sociocultural.
>> > >>>
>> > >>> David Kellogg
>> > >>> Seoul National University of Education
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>>
>> > >>> _______________________________________________
>> > >>> xmca mailing list
>> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>>
>> > >>
>> > >> _______________________________________________
>> > >> xmca mailing list
>> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >>
>> > > _______________________________________________
>> > > xmca mailing list
>> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> > >
>> >
>> >
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca




_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca