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Re: [xmca] Vygotsky vs. Bakhtin (or, "Incommensurable Paradigms Redux")
Ana, Larry, Mike:
I think that the two quotations I offered are both about the same problem: that is, they are both about the link between esthetics and ethics. It is something I am still trying to write an article on, and when I get stuck I ask xmca for help. (Thanks again for all the help--again!)
The first quotation is from Bakhtin's "Art and Answerability", where, as Ana says, "answerability" acquires an axiological sense; it's about values, both esthetic and ethical. But the second is NOT from Vygotsky's later work on concept formation. It's from his early work, "Psychology of Art".
Both are arguing against the same basic idea, which is that art consists of the "social expression of emotion". This was Bukharin's formulation, and I think Bakhtin and Vygotsky are equally appalled by its vulgar, sensationalist conclusions. Both use Tolstoy as a kind of foil, since Tolstoy shared the underlying Bukharinist idea that art is basically immoral because it involves affective contagion and ambiguous moral judgments.
"Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics" represents a fundamental break from this view, because here he completely rejects all forms of "finishedness" in the novel, and all forms of homogeneity in the aesthetic response. It is precisely the unfinishedness and heterogeneity of the aesthetic response that makes it compatible with free choice in dialogic "answerability", and thus with free choice in ethical "answerability" as well.
"Psychology of Art" does this too. Vygotsky begins by rejecting all of the tendentious explanations for Hamlet, and showing how they are actually consistent with Tolstoy's conclusion that Hamlet is a bad play. The explainers agree that it is unambiguous both morally and esthetically, and so their difference of opinion with Tolstoy is simply a matter of taste. What Vygotsky gets from Tolstoy's essay is precisely Tolstoy's conclusion that Shakespeare cannot make up his mind, and he turns it on its head; like Bakhtin he concludes that it is this element of unfinishedness, this element of free play and volitional choice, that gives the work its esthetic and its ethical dimension.
But I think there is a real difference between the two which we cannot explain away by saying that they have different emphases or even that they have incommensurable paradigms. They have different emphases because they have different approaches and different methods. We can see the difference because they are working the same seam of the same mine.
Bakhtin considers the social to be an empty abstraction, akin, as Ana says, to Saussurean "synchrony". The "social" is to the interpersonal is rather as "dialectics" is to a dialogue, and the interpersonal alone is the true basis of ethical answerability. Vygotsky sees that the interpersonal is an empty basis for the esthetic response; the esthetic response must necessarily connect us to a larger social tradition lasting many generations--in BOTH directions.
Vygotsky takes the Tolstoyan/Bukharin view that art is the social "expression" of emotion and tries to transform it too into wine; he argues that it is a "tool" for the social "transformation" of an emotion.The ethical dimension of art does not come from empathy or sympathy in this life but from the possibility, present in every work of art from remotest antiquity down to the present, of a good life yet to come.
Paradoxically, this view, with its strong evangelical flavor, comes from the unbelieving Jew, and not from the devout Christian. "We know," Brecht says, "that disbelief works miracles."
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On Sun, 9/5/10, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana@zmajcenter.org> wrote:
From: Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana@zmajcenter.org>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky vs. Bakhtin (or, The Interpersonal Is Not the Sociocultural Redux)
To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Sunday, September 5, 2010, 8:42 PM
Mike,
It is very interesting that you map the two approaches as vertical and horizontal -- vertical, I assume, being oriented to the ways of knowing as organized by socio-cultural (structural) means -- abstracted, generalized and decontextualized (epistemological); while horizontal approach is dealing with human actual relations, events of their lives and paths of their individual development (ontological).
I am not sure if they are horizontal or vertical or is it just the way we study them -- but to understand development of any person and furthermore to understand the implications and meaning of particular educational relations, events and decisions -- I think we need to study and understand the "intersection" of the two aspects -- because in real life they are inseparable.
I think that the epistemological orientation alone is not sufficient since it is looking at more structural patterns of organization of thought and more global patterns of organization of the relations (institutional, agentive, division of labor, social conventions and rules) and provides a view of the patterns only in a hindsight, i.e. when the patterns of social development are finished developing, and not from the actual experiences, relations and the life moments of the participants - as patterns of development are themselves patterns-in-development.
In that sense, Bakhtin's notion of a chronotope -- that includes the unity of the topological (local), axiological (value, judgment and affect), and diachronic (in real time), real life line of events and the pattern of actual relation building -- is not merely a different orientation, but also implies the necessity of including the significances of the seemingly "particular" into our explanatory models.
There is a very good quote by Voloshinov (a close colleague of Bakhtin), in the "Marxism and the Philosophy of Language" within his discussion of Saussure's distinction of la Langue and la Parole:
"Indeed, if we were to disregard the subjective, individual consciousness vis-a-vis the language system, the system of norms incontestable for that consciousness, if we were to look at language in a truly objective way - from the side, so to speak, or more accurately, from above it, we would discover no inert system of self-identical norms. Instead, we would find ourselves witnessing the ceaseless generation of language norms.
>From a truly objective viewpoint, one that attempts to see the language in a way completely apart from how it appears to any given individual at any given moment in time, language presents the picture of a ceaseless flow of becoming.... Thus, a synchronic system, from the objective point of view, does not correspond to any real moment in the historical process of becoming".
Although Vygotsky criticized Gestalt Psychology for the lack of the dynamic, developmental approach to the relationship between language and thought, he himself looked at the change of the relationship between language and thought as a change in structural and functional aspects of language and thought -- as decontextualized - synchronic categories. In addition, although Vygotsky insisted on the unity of the affective and intellectual aspects of language-thought and on the "union of generalization and communication", his analysis of communication stayed focussed on transformations of conceptual categories (generalization) and did not concern relational aspects of communication. Was the relational aspect of communication somehow there, but just backgrounded? I think it is the matter of priorities -- not just research priorities, but the priorities in the whole model and the analysis of development.
Ana
__________________________
Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane
Assistant Professor of Education
Chestnut Hill College
e-mails: Marjanovic-ShaneA@chc.edu
ana@zmajcenter.org
anamshane@gmail.com
Phone: 267-334-2905 (cell)
On Sep 5, 2010, at 3:38 PM, mike cole wrote:
> The way you phrase the contrast, Anna, it is almost as if you were
> identifying vertical (LSV) and horizontal (MB) dimensions of development. Is
> that like socio-cultural "vs" cultural-historical?
>
> When you write that for LSV real life moments "and relations with
> othersrepresent simultaneously the substance of the developing
> individual and the
> shaping and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental process," the
> inter-relations highlighted in Bakhtin, seem there, but "backgrounded."
> Reciprocally, Bakhtin, in other ways, (chronotopes come mind) acknowledges
> the cultural historical.
>
> Do you see these views as complementary or conflicting?
> mike
> On Sun, Sep 5, 2010 at 11:52 AM, Ana Marjanovic-Shane <ana@zmajcenter.org>wrote:
>
>> Dear David,
>>
>> The two quotes and stand points that you write about, the perspectives of
>> Bakhtin and Vygotsky do not have the same focus. Bakhtin and Vygotsky, I
>> would say, have two different frames of mind -- their concerns are
>> different. It is not that they are not looking at the seemingly the same
>> phenomenon, but they are looking at it with different concerns and for
>> different reasons.
>>
>> It is ironical, that Vygotsky, who brought to our attention the social in
>> the individual, was actually concerned with the birth, growth and the
>> development of one's understanding and experiencing (perezhivanie) the world
>> through personal transformation of concepts, attitudes and sensibilities
>> ("transformation of water into wine") -- so he ultimately was concerned
>> about the epistemological issues. What was remarkable is that he realized
>> that the real life moment (social-cultural-historical - structural qualities
>> of the environment) and the relationships with others -- represent
>> simultaneously the substance of the developing individual and the shaping
>> and formatting tools (mediation) of the developmental process. But still
>> Vygotsky's main concern was the individual development (and through it the
>> raise toward the absolute (god?)) toward more powerful forms of
>> comprehension (not only cognitive, but in all its aspects).
>>
>> On the other hand, I see Bakhtin as being concerned with human
>> relationships, their quality and their impact on the people who relate --
>> their ontological substance in terms of life and death, power and
>> subordination, love and hate, honoring and despising, leading and
>> following... He was concerned about conditions for a person to grow in the
>> relationships in which s/he is fair and just and is being treated fairly and
>> justly. And he was concerned with various implications of these
>> relationships, expectations, fears and hopes on how one perceives the world
>> and her/himself. So I would say that for Bakhtin - the epistemological was
>> in the service of the prevailing concern with human existence (ontological)
>> and that the measure of development was not in the complexity of one's
>> concepts, but in the complexity and morality of one's relationships and
>> deeds (postupak) toward others.
>>
>> So if for Vygotsky it was important to study all that is part of the
>> process by which one finds the Truth, for Bakhtin, truth is a means of
>> creating your voice, which can only be achieved by penetrating and being
>> penetrated by the voices of the others -- i.e. entering into passionate and
>> compassionate relationships and as he says finding yourself in them
>> (returning to yourself).
>>
>> And in that light -- you can see that the concern with the ultimate
>> enlightenment and the raise toward knowledge, and by implication toward the
>> Truth -- can be "objectivized" (i.e. universal, decontextualized, and
>> scientific) and stripped off of "value statements", i.e. made "godless".
>> And, also one can see that the concern with with the deeply relational
>> understanding of the other and the empathy in human interaction, can be
>> motivated by a very religious drive to find human virtue (as a spiritual
>> category) -- where knowledge and the clarity of concepts are measured not by
>> their structural and systemic properties, but by their ethical value
>> (Bakhtin's "postupok") in creating and shaping relationships.
>>
>> What do you think?
>>
>> Ana
>>
>>
>>
>> __________________________
>> Dr. Ana Marjanovic-Shane
>> Assistant Professor of Education
>> Chestnut Hill College
>> e-mails: Marjanovic-ShaneA@chc.edu
>> ana@zmajcenter.org
>> anamshane@gmail.com
>> Phone: 267-334-2905 (cell)
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sep 4, 2010, at 3:07 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>
>>> I've often puzzled over the paradox that the ostensible believer Bakhtin
>> appears to deny the very possibility of the abstract absolute, while the
>> ostensibly unbelieving Vygotsky clearly affirms it in his "measure of
>> generality" and his work on concept formation, and above all in his
>> "Psychology of Art" and on creativity.
>>>
>>> Bakhtin appears to think that existence is an endless but ultimately
>> godless carnival, with the low and high constantly changing places. If God
>> exists, it is largely thanks to the devil, to whom he must be very closely
>> related, if not on intimate terms. On the other hand, the genuinely godless
>> Jew Vygotsky thinks that Jacob's ladder was a great spiral staircase, and
>> man is always headed for the Crown of Glory (that is, the concept) no matter
>> how often he seems to turn in circles.
>>>
>>> It's almost as if Bakhtin believes that the mere impossiblity of God does
>> nothing to lessen his reality in the Son of Man, while Vygotsky believes
>> that the mere possibility of God in the mind of man suggests that he must be
>> overthrown, abolished, and supplanted by the sons of men.
>>>
>>> See if you can figure out who this is:
>>>
>>> "The life situation of a suffering human being that is really experienced
>> from within may prompt me to perform an ethical action, such as providing
>> assistance, consolation or cognitive reflection. But in any event my
>> projection of myself into him must be followed by a return into myself, a
>> return to my own place outside the suffering person, for only form this
>> place can the material derived from my projecting myself into the other be
>> rendered meaningful ethically, cognitively, or esthetically. If this return
>> into myself did not actually take place, the pathological phenomenon of
>> experiencing another's suffering as one's own would result--an infection
>> with another's suffering, and nothing more."
>>>
>>> And this?
>>>
>>> “Art would have a dull and ungrateful task if its only purpose were to
>> infect one or many persons with feelings. If this were so, its significance
>> would be very small, because there would be only a quantitative expansion
>> and no qualitative expansion beyond an individual’s feeling The miracle of
>> art would then by like the break miracle of the Gospel, when five barley
>> loaves and two small fishes fed thousands of people, all of whom ate and
>> were satisfied, and a dozen baskets were filled with the remaining food.
>> This miracle is only quantitative: thousands were fed and were satisfied,
>> but each of them ate only fish and bread. But was this not their daily diet
>> at home, without any miracles? (…) The miracle of art reminds us much more
>> of another miracle in the Gospel, the transformation of water into wine.
>> Indeed, art’s true nature is that of transubstantiation, something that
>> transcends ordinary feelings; for the fear, pain, or excitement caused by
>>> art includes something above and beyond its normal, conventional
>> content.”
>>>
>>> Both are attacking the Tolstoyan idea that art is a kind of disease,
>> spreading emotion like a one of the plagues that Moses and Aaron visited
>> upon the Pharoah. Both believe, as Brecht did, that art requires an
>> objectifying move; that the tennis ball in play can never understand the
>> laws of motion, and man in the grip of passion cannot really make sense of
>> emotion either. (This, for me, was Spinoza's really great contribution,
>> Andy!)
>>>
>>> But for one the going out and the coming back is quite enough; God goes
>> out to man in the form of Christ and returns to himself in order to bestow
>> perfect forgiveness. For the other, on the other hand, the whole thing must
>> be turned on its head: instead of the sociocultural emerging from the sum
>> total of the interpersonal, the interpersonal may only truly be made sense
>> of as a microcosm of the sociocultural.
>>>
>>> David Kellogg
>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>
>>>
>>>
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