First of all, an error. I wrote:
"Thinking is a PSYCHOLOGICAL process, and compared to thinking it is a
relatively closed system."
What I meant to write was that compared to SPEAKING it (thinking) is a
relatively closed system; it is not clear how new information gets in
without speech, and therefore it is not clear how one could ever learn
to speak by thinking or even learn to think by thinking, while it IS
clear (to me) how we can learn to speak by speaking and even learn to
think by speaking.
Secondly, I think that Andy is suggesting that the alternative to this
view is really to admit that tool bearing (or artefactual) acts on the
environment are the way in which we learn to think AND the way we learn
to speak. This seems to me to be very close to the Kharkov
interpretation, which is now, like the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics, something like the canonical understanding of Vygotsky.
Of course, such things do happen. They are, in fact, the very basis of
discovery learning, and project learning and (in my own field)
content-based teaching and immersion. We learn language by learning
through language and not by learning about language.
But that is not the only way that learning happens, and it is not even
the main way it happens in the upper grades of elementary school.
Here it seems to me that it is the Kharkov, Activity Theoretic,
interpretation which is too narrow. We also learn language by learning
about language, and in fact in foreign language learning this is more
often than not the starting point.
Of course I recognize Andy's frustration with my apparently
logocentrism; it is the same expressed by Leontiev when he writes that
language is not the demiurge of thinking. Thinking, Leontiev believes,
doesn't have a demiurge; both it and speaking are simply forms of
activity, emerging in parallel.
I don't agree. At one stage of the child's learning, action does indeed
lead thinking (we see this not just in physical education but also
in chants, songs, and hip hop music where the action of speaking is more
important than the meaning element). At another, it is clearly the other
way around (what David Kirshner calls the "logical" content of algebra,
as opposed to its empirical, problem solving concent).
The one thing that thinking and speech do NOT do is emerge in
parallel, turning like the wheels of a cart, or rather like the wheels
of a desk, revolving in synch ONLY because they are responding to a same
environment.
Yet here I will agree with Andy (and of course with Marx). Words by
themselves are nothing to speak of. Language as language is neither a
demiurge nor a semi-hemi-demiurge; it is not even an urge, for nobody
speaks without some kind of underlying motive. So language qua language
has no explanatory power whatsoever with respect to human consciousness.
As Vygotsky said, linguists fetishize words in much the same way that
political economists have fetishized commodities. In order to really
understand how a word meaning can structure and restructure
consciousness, we have to uncover the sensuous human relationships that
word meanings really represent, in much the same way that Marx uncovered
the human relationships congealed into commodities.
David Kellogg
Seoul National University of Education
--- On *Thu, 9/2/10, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote:
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: Re: [xmca] The Absolute and all that
To: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Thursday, September 2, 2010, 6:24 PM
David, I can understand why people (eg LSV) like Spinoza, but the
reservations I always had about old Spinoza were explained to me by
Herder, in his "God. Some Conversations," which begins and continues
for some way, as a eulogy to Spinoza, but then finally he shows that
there is still too much of Descartes in Spinoza. He "corrects"
Spinoza in the direction of Activity Theory. I don't know that any
of the founders of CHAT had read "God. Some Conversation" because I
never hear Herder getting credit for this. But you know, who wants
to be part of a God-Nature which is but a giant machine?
And the alternative to the God language, is not thought David. Marx said
"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to
descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is
the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given
thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make
language into an independent realm."
http://marx.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch03p.htm#447
Isn't that why we use this awkward word "artefact"? All you
linguists have to do is expand your mind a little to include roads,
machines, paintings, guns, human bodies, landscapes, etc., etc.,
etc., in addition to language.
eh voila! we have it.
Andy
David Kellogg wrote:
> Near the end of section six of Chapter Two (Piaget) in Thinking
and Speech, Vygotsky has two paragraphs where he is criticizing
Piaget for purging the child's imagination of all of the child's
WANTS and NEEDS (which Vygotsky defines as anything that is, in the
child's view, a motive for action).
> He does this at the beginning of Chapter Seven in Mind in
Society too, where he talks about how "some theorists" deny that
play fulfills a need, and set up the child as a little philosopher
whose cognitive level changes with the solution of abstract logical
problems. Some theorists in Geneva who share the name of a
well-known watchmaker, that is.
> Vygotsky is defending play as a PRACTICAL activity. But the next
move in his Thinking and Speech argument seems strange, almost
theological, to us. He brings in the following extremely opaque
quotation from the recently published "Philosophical Notebooks" of
Lenin.
>
> *__*
> "Primitive idealism: the universal (concept, idea) is a
/particular being/. This appears wild, monstrously (more accurately,
childishly) stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the
idea of God, of the same nature (/absolutely /of the same nature)?"
>
>
> I have been reading this for years without any understanding of
what Vygotsky is doing here. He is not apple polishing ("See! I read
Lenin! Even when Lenin's unreadable!") or axe grinding ("Piaget
contradicts LENIN, so of course Piaget's wrong. Right?"). He really
is putting his finger on the soft, idealist underbelly of Piaget's
notion which we may sum up as, "I think, and therefore I speak!"
>
>
> The idea that the concept is a BEING really is an
anthropomorphism. The child thinks of the sun, the moon and even the
table and the chair as a kind of Teletubby.
>
>
> That's why Lenin calls it "childishly" and not just monstrously
stupid, and that is why he says that the idea of God is ABSOLUTELY
of the same nature. Lenin continues:
>
>
> "Tables, chairs and the /ideas/ of table and chair; the world and
the idea of the world (God);
>
> thing and “noumen,” the unknowable “Thing-in-itself”; the
connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law,
λόγος (Logos),^ God."
>
>
> The reason I could read this for years (even before I read
Vygotsky) without a clue about what it meant is that I just wasn't
paying attention to the semi-colons. Lenin has FOUR examples of the
great, childish idea that a concept is a kind of being.
>
>
> a) the (wooden) table (in my kitchen) and the (mental) idea of
table (in my mind). Eric and I have discussed this in the context of
groceries on the one hand and fiddles on the other. The former is a
thing, and the latter is an idea; the latter can very easily, to a
suggestible mind (and we are speaking of children) give rise to the
God of Tables.
>
>
> b) the world (nature) on the one hand and the idea of the world
(God) on the other. This is, I think, what Spinoza really means when
he says "Natura, sive Deus". I am much more sympathetic to this view
than Andy is, but of course he is right and Lenin is right when he
says that it is another instance of monstrous, childish
anthropomorphizing.
>
>
> c) the physical object on the one hand (in my hand), and the
"thing in itself" on the other. The baby's rattle in the baby's
hand, and then Kant's "noumon", an unknowable, mysterious God of
(Baby) Things.
>
>
> d) The actual relationship of the sun and the earth and the
reified, hypostatized "being" of "natural law" (once conceived of
geocentrically, now conceived of heliocentrically), "Logos", God.
>
>
> Lenin continues:
>
>
> "The doubling up of human knowledge and the /possibility/ of
idealism (= religion) are /given/ already in the first, elementary
abstraction. (…)."
>
>
> Why would any right-thinking child want to dabble in this
mind-boggling redundancy? Piaget cannot really tell us. But Lenin
can. It's to do with PLAY, and AFFECT, and the desire to ESCAPE:
>
>
> "The approach of the (human) mind to a particular thing, the
taking of a copy (= a concept) of it /is not/ a simple, immediate
act, a dead mirroring, but one which is complex, split into two,
zig-zag- like, which /includes in it/ the possibility of the flight
of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the
/transformation/ (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which
man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a /fantasy /(in
letzter Instanz = God)."
>
>
> The child's creation of concepts is not a pure, truth seeking act
at all. The child IS a little scientist, but he's like a REAL
scientist, who does his best work while shaving or day-dreaming or
fleeing from his lecture notes and procrastinating the pile of
homework he's supposed to be correcting.
>
>
> That's why Piaget (and Freud) are so very very wrong to write off
the "autistic" side of life as nondevelopmental and even
antidevelopmental. It's the playful side of life, the "life-fleeing"
side, which creats our abstractions, zigging and zagging between the
exigencies of real life and the desire to run away from it, if only
for an instant.
>
>
> God is a kind of game, a reified, hypostatized, anthropomorphized
being who presides over all life-fleeing play. That is why, perhaps,
there are no atheists on the tennis courts and shooting galleries,
although there may be quite a few in foxholes.
>
>
> Lenin concludes with what we can only read as a rousing defense
of the child's day dream:
>
>
> "For even in the simplest generalisation, in the most elementary
general idea (“table” in general), /there is/ a certain bit of fantasy."
>
>
> We are never too young and never too old for this certain bit of
fantasy. Even Piaget's underlying idea of "I think, therefore I
speak" has this smattering of idealism in it.
>
>
> Last week we had a rather extended discussion of a very much
extended article in the New York Times which, if I may gently
paraphrase, said that of course Whorf was totally wrong but maybe,
you know, language really does "shape" the way we think, so maybe
Whorf was a little bit totally right too.
>
>
> I can't help wonder: what the devil is the alternative? We think,
and that shapes the way we speak? Yes, I can see the (very
Piagetian) appeal of this.
>
>
> I suppose it's not a bad place to start with your average NYT
reader, who feels with his morning coffee, cognitive agency coursing
through his veins and transforming themselves into verbal thoughts
and rousing speeches, more or less in that order.
>
> Out of the night that covers me
>
> Black as the pit from pole to pole
>
> I thank whatever gods may be
>
> For my immortal soul
>
>
> No matter then how strait the gate
>
> How charged with punishments the scroll
>
> I am the master of my fate
>
> I am the captain of my soul!
>
>
> (This was reportedly the last written message to the world of
Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, before his execution. He
not only did not speak them, he didn't even think them: they are
from a rather dreary poem by William Ernest Henley)
>
>
> But wait, thinks the very young child (who, as we know, already
knows how to think). How do I learn to speak?
>
>
> Thinking is a PSYCHOLOGICAL process, and compared to thinking it
is a relatively closed system. Speaking is a SOCIAL process, and it
is by its very nature open. So it makes sense to say that we learn
to think by speaking and even that we learn to speak by speaking.
>
>
> Of course, as an adult, I too feel that I think and then I speak.
But when I think about it developmentally, and certainly when I
examine the actual data (just where are these empirical studies
which "disprove" Whorf?), it seems that things are very much the
other way around. Children speak and then adolescents start to think.
>
>
> David Kellogg
>
> Seoul National University of Education
>
>
>
> --- On *Thu, 9/2/10, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>/*
wrote:
>
>
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>
> Subject: [xmca] The Absolute and all that
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> Date: Thursday, September 2, 2010, 4:56 PM
>
> was "Valsiner and pseudoconcepts"
>
> Well, I wrote that advice about God many years ago, Eric, and
I know
> better now, but really it is about the nature of our times
(cf 200
> years ago) and upbringing (I was raised as an atheist). I
have since
> learnt much better to understand what Hegel is on about when
he is
> talking of God. It is still not part of my language, but
still it is
> easily misunderstood in the age of Christopher Hitchins and
Richard
> Dawkins and other narrowminded silliness.
>
> For some people "Nature" is the absolute, but generally the
> conception of Nature in modern society does not even rise to the
> level of Pantheism, surviving more at the level of folk religion.
> For many science people Experience is absolute, and its minor
Gods
> are repeatable Experiment and Double blind trials.
>
> Every research methodology is an Absolute and has its God -
that is
> the simple sense in which Hegel talks about God. Of course, your
> good, practical-minded natural scientist would deny it, but
> exhortations that they only believe in Nature, or what can be
> proved, or science or any such formulation, is usually
nothing more
> than their own ill-informed theology.
>
> Does that make sense to you Eric? I am trying to get a
one-day event
> going in Melbourne around a critique of the New Atheism. I
will have
> something written in good time.
>
> Andy
>
> ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> wrote:
> > Andy:
> >
> > I have finally found the time to get through a months worth of
> XMCA postings and found this one could not pass without a brief
> mention. In reading what you have written about Hegel I have
great
> respect for your work and find your insights on CHAT to be
> wonderful. But I am struck with a circular argument about
concepts
> ala Hegel that on the one hand you embrace and on the other
hand you
> poo-poo. That being that a concept holds the absolute (or as
> Ilyenkov calls it the ideal) and the absolute speaks of GOD
but then
> you yourself have written that when one comes across Hegel
writing
> of GOD to just skip over that part and not lay any credence
to it. Hegel was a philospher and not a practitioner, his ideas
build upon
> previous ideas. Marx the same. Now when you move to Vygotsky or
> Valsiner they were practitioners of research methodologies and
> philosphical constructs need to be deconstructed into measurable
> units. If this is childish so be it but one cannot have a
research
> methodology that does not deconstruct. Holding an ideal for the
> sake of holding the ideal never gets the horse out of the barn.
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > Date: 08/11/2010 03:45 AM
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> >
> >
> > Denise,
> >
> > I have at last found the time to look at Valsiner's article.
> > I have only got 2 or 3 pages into the article but the
> > problem is immediately obvious and I have better things to
> > do than read the whole article.
> >
> > *From what I have read*, Valsiner is some kind of
> > cognitivist and consequently his idea of what a concept is
> > is simply quite different from the tradition of Goethe,
> > Hegel and Marx which Vygotsky was continuing. He holds to
> > the childish and shallow view that a concept is just a
> > collection of "features" which are deemed to be necessary
> > and sufficient for a thing to fall under the definition of a
> > concept, as in Set Theory and Formal Logic. The same as for
> > people like Rudolf Carnap and the Logical Positivists.
> >
> > Once you adopt what Hegel calls the "abstract general"
> > conception of concepts, then what Vygotsky calls a
> > pseduoconcept is the only genuine concept. Vygotsky's idea
> > of "concept" will simply make no sense. Talking about
> > concepts from a Vygotskyan point of view to someone that
> > holds this view is just talking at cross purposes. Waste of
> > time.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Denise Newnham wrote:
> > > Dear Michael,
> > >
> > > >
> > > I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it
clearly
> stipulated in
> > > the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his
> words and text
> > >
> > > >
> > > Denise
> > >
> > > Dear Denise,
> > >
> > > >
> > > Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively
optimistic about
> Peirce cand
> > > abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that
optimism).
> > >
> > > But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic
form of
> what later
> > > (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book
CULTURE
> IN MINDS AND
> > > SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS
cannot
> be the highest
> > > level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further
> creativity of
> > > meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
> > >
> > > Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my
terminology into
> field-type
> > > sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
> > >
> > > >
> > > Jaan
> > >
> > > >
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
> On
> > > Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> > > Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > > >
> > > Hi Denise,
> > >
> > > >
> > > I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to
how and why
> > > pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of
abduction. I am currently
> > > under the impresson that abduction is primarily about
> hypothesis generation
> > > - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to
unique
> problems. So
> > > I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by
> Vygotsky's
> > > definition, might play in all this.
> > >
> > > >
> > > Michael
> > >
> > > >
> > > _____ >
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> on behalf of Denise Newnham
> > > Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> > > To: ablunden@mira.net
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>;
> 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > > Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts
is in
> his book 'The
> > > guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the
> concept of
> > > development: Historical and epistemological
perspectives. In
> W. Damon, & R.
> > > Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1.
> Theoretical models
> > > of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
> > >
> > > I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria
would be
> the closest
> > > example) attributed and overly idealized role to the
role of
> concepts in
> > > human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the
> hierarchy of
> > > mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating
> lower ones), yet
> > > by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of
> semiogenesis is
> > > actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
> pseudo-concepts
> > > (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex
> qualities) are
> > > the core (and highest form) of human psychological
> functioning. The claim
> > > would fit with the unity of representational fields (of
Karl
> Buhler,
> > > described and extended earlier) and with the central
focus of
> abduction
> > > (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of
making
> sense (along
> > > the lines of Pierce).
> > >
> > > I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and
> heard that there
> > > was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that
time
> have not heard
> > > or read this debate.
> > >
> > > Denise
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
> On
> > > Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > > Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > > Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
> > >
> > > Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> > > 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> > > incredible that someone could know as much about
Vygotsky as
> > > Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> > > development hierarchy.
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Denise Newnham wrote:
> > >> Dear Larry and others,
> > >>
> > >> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of
> turn so if so
> > > let
> > >> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract
below made
> me think of
> > >> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts
where he
> states that
> > >> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at
the top
> to the
> > >> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as
> 'open to
> > > changes
> > >> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner,
1997d]'
> (2001, p.
> > >> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the
> spontaneous of
> > >> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that
> Cole's fifth
> > >> dimension attests to this argument. There is an
interesting
> paper by
> > >> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
> > >>
> > >> Denise
> > >>
> > >> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives
lead
> to the
> > >> developmental question of how socially situated
microgenetic
> experiences
> > >> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization
that
> organize
> > >> experience across situations [and organize the relation of
> the "lower" and
> > >> "higher"
> > >> functions]?'
> > >>
> > >> -----Original Message-----
> > >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu>]
> On
> > >> Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > >> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers:
Special
> Issue on
> > >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > >>
> > >> Hi Leif and Katerina
> > >>
> > >> Leif,
> > >> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The
Present
> Moment" and I
> > >> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the
topic of
> "engagement"
> > >> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of
> engaging with
> > >> others. I will look up his earlier work discussing
Vygotsky
> and Glick.
> > > It
> > >> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's
> articles on
> > >> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that
Werner was
> also focused
> > > on
> > >> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
> > >>
> > >> Katerina,
> > >> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept
metaphor" but
> generally I
> > >> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human
> science" as
> > >> interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's
> interpretation of
> > >> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also
> REFLECTING on Mike
> > > &
> > >> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of
> development, and
> > >> also my attempt to link these perspectives with
neo-Meadian
> notions of
> > >> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social
positions]. These
> > >> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead
to the
> developmental
> > >> question of how socially situated microgenetic
experiences get
> > >> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization
that organize
> > > experience
> > >> across situations [and organize the relation of the
"lower"
> and "higher"
> > >> functions]?
> > >>
> > >> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary
> Developmental
> > >> Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental
> processes got
> > >> organized "at one of three different levels: the
> sensorimotor, the
> > >> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes
> experience at
> > > the
> > >> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have
metaphoric
> models of
> > > "mind"
> > >> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance,
> orchestra, etc.]
> > >> However, this still leaves us with questioning the
> RELATIONAL process of
> > >> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of
> organization at the
> > >> sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> > >> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and
> Natalia, and
> > >> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the
> capacity for
> > >> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that
> may be more
> > >> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a
linear
> teleological
> > >> dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the
> sensorimotor and
> > >> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience
> once social
> > >> situations of development are symbolic [and
metaphorical]? As Glick
> > > points
> > >> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions
> "undergo a
> > >> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots."
> (p.562) However
> > >> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to
organize
> > > experience.
> > >> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT
linear
> process where
> > > a
> > >> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of
> development. An
> > >> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of
these "leading
> > >> activities" as continuing to remain central for
development. For
> > >> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only
dominant
> in one
> > >> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the
> background, but
> > >> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience
[depending
> on the
> > > societal
> > >> microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the
previous
> "leading
> > >> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not
on the
> stage of
> > >> development [age determined] but rather on the particular
> social situation
> > >> of development. Mike's point that particular school
contexts
> correlate
> > > with
> > >> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
> development.
> > >> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered
development
> that is
> > >> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity
> which recedes
> > > into
> > >> the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we
> structured schools
> > > and
> > >> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was
> VALUED,
> > > identity
> > >> and concept development would be altered.
> > >> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the
idea of the
> > > possibility
> > >> of creating institutional structures which promote the
> "interchangeability
> > >> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate
> social spaces
> > >> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of
this is
> the creation
> > > of
> > >> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where
interchangeability of
> > > positions
> > >> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of
"agentic
> capacity"
> > >> where ALL participants experience being recognized and
> experiencing
> > > OTHERS
> > >> RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative
activity
> is formative
> > > of
> > >> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and
> also "concept
> > >> development" formed within microgenetic moments of
> development. The reason
> > > I
> > >> appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> > >> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL
INTERCHANGEABILITY
> of social
> > >> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate
> sensorimotor,
> > >> perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe
this
> "ideal" of
> > >> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and
> dialogical as
> > > the
> > >> participants openly share perspectives. This also
creates social
> > >> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective
capacity]
> is nurtured
> > > and
> > >> "grown" [cultured]
> > >>
> > >> Larry
> > >>
> > >> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> > > <kplakits@gmail.com
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@gmail.com>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@gmail.com>>wrote:
> > >>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept
> "metaphor",
> > > which
> > >>> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> > >>> Katerina Plakitsi
> > >>> Assistant Professor of Science Education
> > >>> Department of Early Childhood Education
> > >>> School of Education
> > >>> University of Ioannina
> > >>> 45110
> > >>> Greece
> > >>> tel.: +302651005771 office
> > >>> fax: +302651005842
> > >>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> > >>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@cc.uoi.gr>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=kplakits@cc.uoi.gr>
> > >>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> > >>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> > >>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
<http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> > >>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> > >>>
> > >>> --------------------------------------------------
> > >>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
> > >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers:
> Special Issue on
> > >>>
> > >>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > >>>
> > >>> Hi Martin
> > >>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading"
models
> of young
> > >>>> infants
> > >>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other
"minds"
> [persons] is a
> > >>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed
previously in CHAT
> > >>>> conversations
> > >>>> on this listserve.
> > >>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd
> person societal
> > >>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I
> have sympathy
> > > for
> > >>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like
to read
> more widely
> > > on
> > >>>> this particular topic.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any
recommendations
> for further
> > >>>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the
> various models in a
> > >>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special
issue
> of the Review
> > >>>> of
> > >>>> Philosophy and Psychology?
> > >>>>
> > >>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants
> capacity for
> > >>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis,
ontogenesis, and
> microgenesis.
> > >>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various
models of
> "infants
> > >>>> engaging
> > >>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> > >>>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of
> "higher" mental
> > >>>> functions.]
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Larry
> > >>>>
> > >>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer
> <packer@duq.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=packer@duq.edu>>
wrote:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Begin forwarded message:
> > >>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>>
> > >>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> > >>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=cogdevsoc@virginia.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=cogdevsoc@virginia.edu>
> > >>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> Mindreading,
> > >>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> > >>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and
Psychology
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Guest Editors:
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San
Diego
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit
remarkable
> capacities
> > >>>>>> for
> > >>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A
prevalent
> account of
> > >> such
> > >>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or
> "mindreading": the
> > >>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of
> specific kinds
> > >>>>> (i.e.,
> > >>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the
> contents of such
> > >>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and
psychologists
> question the
> > >>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist
> framework for
> > >>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and
> methods of
> > >>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that
> infants may be
> > >>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and
possibly
> > >>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that
do not
> equate to any
> > >>>>> sort
> > >>>>> of mindreading.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must
adequately
> accommodate
> > >>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments
> involving a
> > > variety
> > >>>>> of
> > >>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation"
> paradigm and
> > >>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks
> involving more
> > >>>>> active
> > >>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand
> others' goals,
> > >>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs.
> Perhaps most
> > >>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13
> months of age
> > >> are
> > >>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others,
> well before they
> > >>>>> are
> > >>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief
tasks
> around 4 years
> > >>>>> of
> > >>>>> age.
> > >>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and
> Psychology aims to
> > >>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and
non-mindreading
> > > approaches
> > >>>>> to
> > >>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to
clarify
> their
> > >>>>> theoretical
> > >>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with
> rivals; and how
> > >> they
> > >>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data,
> particularly that from
> > >>>>> human
> > >>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be
> addressed include
> > >>>>> but
> > >>>>> are not limited to:
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a
> systematic
> > >>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it
follow that
> they must be
> > >>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any
> concepts at all?
> > >>>>>> - Normally developing children become able to
> attribute false
> > >>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it
> follow that they
> > >>>>> must
> > >>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
> > >>>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally
involve?
> What exactly
> > >>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading
approaches
> to early
> > >> social
> > >>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one
> over the other?
> > >>>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations
> thought to play in
> > >>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental
> representations might be
> > >>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn
between
> > >>>>> representational
> > >>>>> and non-representational approaches?
> > >>>>>> - How precisely should we understand the
> explicit/implicit
> > >>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Invited contributors
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Important dates
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> How to submit
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
> > >>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login
> and select
> > >>>>> "Social
> > >>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article
> type to submit a
> > >>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than
8,000 words.
> > >> Submissions
> > >>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the
> journal's website:
> > >>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions?
Please email
> the guest
> > >>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk>,
> mherschb@ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=mherschb@ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=mherschb@ucsd.edu>,
> > > v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> About the journal
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN:
1878-5158;
> eISSN:
> > >>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published
quarterly
> by Springer
> > >> and
> > >>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in
> cognitive science.
> > >>>>> The
> > >>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for
discussion on
> topics of
> > >>>>> mutual
> > >>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to
foster
> > >>>>> interdisciplinary
> > >>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the
sciences
> of the mind,
> > >>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> > >>>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in
> empirical
> > >> research
> > >>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of
philosophical
> relevance. It
> > >>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited
contributions
> from leading
> > >>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for
paper.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Editorial board
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive
> Editors: Roberto
> > >>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> > >>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina
> Bicchieri, Penn;
> > >> Ned
> > >>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley;
> Richard Breheny,
> > >>>>> UCL;
> > >>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin
Davies,
> ANU; Vittorio
> > >>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto,
> Hertfordshire; Ray
> > >>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie,
> Rutgers; Diego
> > >>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë,
> Berkeley; Christopher
> > >>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel
Povinelli,
> > >>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn,
> Rutgers; Brian
> > >>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado
> Sinigaglia, Milan;
> > > Barry
> > >>>>> C.
> > >>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille
Varzi,
> Columbia;
> > >>>>> Timothy
> > >>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> > >>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> > >>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> > >>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
> > >>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
> > >>>>>> Malet Street
> > >>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>>>
> > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > >>>>> xmca mailing list
> > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > >>>> xmca mailing list
> > >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>>
> > >>>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> xmca mailing list
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>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>
> > >> _______________________________________________
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>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>
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>
<http://us.mc1103.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>
> > >>
> > >
> > > --
> > >
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > *Andy Blunden*
> > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> > >
> > >
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> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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>
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> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> > >
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> > >
>
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>
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> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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> > --
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > *Andy Blunden*
> > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> > Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> > Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
> >
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> >
>
> --
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
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> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
>
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>
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*Andy Blunden*
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Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
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