Dear Larry and Michael, I find this conversation so very interesting and
exciting (to the neglect of some of my other work(: I agree with Michael
that there should be a dialectical focus on the three logics with prime on
imagination as the other logics are rule bound and damper creativity as
Valsiner stated. DO either of you know the works of Engestrom and expansive
learning? I recommend the article of " studies of expansive learning:
foundations, findings and future challenges. (Engestrom and Sannino, 2009).
'In expansive learning, learners learn something that in not yet there'.
I have found a bit by Bateson (1979) and quote: We are so accustomed to the
universe in which we live and to our puny methods of thinking about it that
we can hardly see that it is for example, surprising that abduction is
possible, that it is possible to describe some event or thing and then to
look around the world for other cases to fit the same rules that we devised
for our description. ... this lateral extension of abstract components of
description is called abduction, and I hope the reader may see it with a
fresh eye. THie very possibility of abduction is a little uncanny, and the
phenomenon is enormously more widespread than he or she might, at first
thought, have supposed. Metaphor, dream, parable, allegory, the world of
art, the whole of science, the whole of religion, the whole of poetry,
totemism the organization of facts in comparative anatomy- all of these are
instances of aggregates of instances of abduction, within the human mental
sphere. But obviously the possibility of abduction extends to the very roots
also fo physical science, Newton's analysis of the solar system and the
periodic table of the elements being historic examples. Conversely, all
thought would be totally impossible in a universe in which abduction not
expectable. Here I am concerned only with that aspect of the universal fact
of abduction which is relevant to the order of change...Any change in our
epistemology will involve a shifting our whole system of abductions. we must
pass through that threat of that chaos where thought becomes impossible.
Every abduction may be seen as a double or multiple description of some
object or event or sequence.
Abduction is that moment (long or short) of no mans land or liminality
before the new and solid and in this I see the link to pseudo-concepts. It
is not the last but the highest:)
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: 10 August 2010 19:55
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Abduction, Creativity and Imagination
Denise
Your wonderful articles from Valsiner, and now Paavola, along with
Vygotsky's chapter on Imagination [and Dewey's chapter 1 in "Art &
Experience"] is a wealth of new connections and a topic which I believe is
CENTRAL to understanding human sciences. You mention your work is mostly
with adults. I work with 12 year olds who I believe are getting a cultural
message that "play" as central to development [and recognition
of "imagination" as central] must no longer be central at their age and it
is time for learning "received" knowledge in order to aquire the tools to
become "productive members of society. I want to emphasize that I agree
that acquiring received knowledge IS CENTRAL [within schools], BUT I
question the loss of vitality that I "perceive" [or project???] as childhood
is left behind and life gets "serious". I question why imagination has to
become so "interiorized" and "private" at this developmental time period.
Is it an INVARIANT STAGE of development or a cultural artifact that locates
"imagination" as private.
In my work as a counsellor, when I'm successful in creating "shared spaces"
where 12 year olds can OPENLY delight in each others fanciful imaginal
thoughts, INTERCHANGEABILITY of social positions [listener and speaker]
becomes fluid and dynamic with a blurring of private and public imaginal
sharing of perspectives. This procedural process CREATES novel spaces where
imagination [ones most private reveries] have an opening to become shared
and co-constituted. The vulnerability and risk involved in sharing ones
most interiorized fanciful reveries with other 12 year old peers is an
experience that most 12 year old students in school settings [where the
focus and institutional structure supports passing on received knowledge]
have left behind on the playground.
It is my perception of institutions, such as schools, which value received
scientific knowledge as central to development which needs to be
critiqued. The institutional de-valuing of "shared" imagination [creativity
and coordination of perspectives] within our particular HISTORICAL school
structures may be constraining the recognition of imagination as continuing
to be foundational beyond childhood. The topic of ABDUCTION within the
pragmatic tradition and the expansion of this line of inquiry by authors
such as Paavola seems to hold a lot of potential [which may become
actualized] for re-visioning the place of the imagination in the learning
sciences. Playworlds, such as the 5th dimension, are a specific example of
this potential.
Denise, your contribution to this conversation and the articles you have
posted are a gold mine of new perspectives which need coordinating in shared
[imaginal & actual] space.
Michael you mentioned that you have been doing a lot of reflection on this
topic. I also am fascinated with the dialectical process of how abduction
coordinates with deduction and induction and the pragmatist IDEAL of this
process proceeding within a community of inquiry. I'm planning on reading
the Valsiner, Vygotsky, and Paavola articles to become more conversant with
these topics. This topic preoccupied Peirce for a reason. I don't believe
abduction is any more or less central as a form of inference than deduction
or induction. However, I do intuitively sense, in school settings that
abduction is sometimes viewed as less central to reflection and therefore
may need to be foregrounded in developmental accounts to re-establish a more
equal balance.
Larry
On Mon, Aug 9, 2010 at 6:19 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote:
Dear Michael, Andy, Larry and Mike
I have sent you the chapter 6 from Valsiner culture in minds and societies
which you should have received by now.
There was one thing that came to my mind during the weekend is that
Vygotsky is referring to children's concept formation from the embryo
forward. I think that there is a big gap between what we know of children
and the thinking process of adults. My work is at the moment largely with
adults.
I do enjoy Peirce's abduction as that moment of creativity (agree with
Michael) and his way of expressing it . This then would be the locus of
change. As the next step would be experimentation (stabilization) and
adaptation/modification.
Denise
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Michael Glassman
Sent: 09 August 2010 14:04
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [xmca] Abduction, Creativity and Imagination
Hi Larry and All,
I wonder if it might be worthwhile making a differentiation between
creativity and imagination. Creativity it seems to be is more active and
can be observed, is process oriented, and is, or can be directly related
to
problem solving. Imagination is maybe more inside the head and less
directly related to problem solving. I sort of think of John Lennon's
song
Imagine and the old song "Just my Imagination." Well anyway, maybe
abduction is more related to creativity than imagination.
Michael
_____
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss
Sent: Sun 8/8/2010 9:45 AM
To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Hi Mike and Denise and Michael [and others engaged in this expanding
conversation]
Mike, this topic's multi-voicedness has definitely gone ballistic and I've
been sent into orbit. However, without coordinates I'm confused about
which
constellation I'm circling. Hard to get my bearings when moving at warp
speed.
I struggle with reading and understanding Peirce, but I do recognize the
depth and profound intuitive insights which he generates from a lifetime
of
reflecting.
Valsiner's "translation" of Peirce's concept "abduction" as ABSOLUTELY
FOUNDATIONAL to the other generative functions of "inferencing" [deduction
and induction] articulates the ABSOLUTE CENTRALITY OF IMAGINATION as
implicated in the formation of mind, "self" "culture" "history".
Your mentioning the influence of prior discussions about LSV and
imagination
[and playworlds] led me back to a CHAT discussion in 2006 on these topics.
In that thread you were discussing John Dewey's Chapter 1 of "Art &
Experience"
Within that thread on Dewey the topic of "learning by expanding" was being
discussed and you posted the following quote from Dewey.
"... if life continues and in continuing it expands there is an overcoming
of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a transformation of them
into different aspects of a higher powered and more SIGNIFICANT life. The
marvel of organic, of vital, adaptation through expansion (instead of by
contraction and passive accomodation) actually takes place. Here in germ
are
balance and harmony attained through rhythm. Equilibrium comes about not
mechanically and inertly but out of and because of tension." (p.13)
Mike, I decided to repost this quote you previously posted to express the
centrality of this theme of abduction and imagination for Peirce, Dewey,
and
Mead.
Michael mentioned the central value of instrumental pragmatism was in the
empirical putting into practice abductive processes. However as I read
Valsiner's translation of Peirce I want to suggest that instrumental
pragmatism is GROUNDED IN IMAGINATION [abduction] and without imagination
there is no LEARNING BY EXPANDING.
I believe Mead's contribution to pragmatism was his focus on expanding
SELF
formation and developing the "agentic capacity" to ACTUALIZE imaginal
expansions within a community of dialogical inquiry. What Mead brings to
the conversation is a focus on "intersubjectivity" and SHARED imagination
as the ground of emerging subjectivity. The terms "perspective-taking"
and
"social acts" and "SIGNIFICANT [shared] SYMBOLS" are key concepts in his
emphasis on learning by EXPANDING. Coordinating multiple perspectives is
the procedural process of abduction [as I understand abduction from
Valsiner's translation]
Denise,
I want to once more thank you for Valsiner's article which I hope EXPANDS
our learning in our playworld. When I asked for other readings
contrasting
"mind reading" and "non-mind reading" theories I had no idea of the orbit
I
would be sent into.
Larry
This
On Sat, Aug 7, 2010 at 10:21 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
Thanks Denis
This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in
every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion.
multi-voicedness goes ballistic!!
Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the
abduction/
imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not
connect
the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV
and
imagination).
Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting.
mike
On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch>
wrote:
Dear Michael,
I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly
stipulated
in
the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and
text
Denise
Dear Denise,
Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce
cand
abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what
later
(2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS
AND
SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the
highest
level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity
of
meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into
field-type
sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
Jaan
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Michael Glassman
Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Hi Denise,
I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am
currently
under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis
generation
- the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique
problems.
So
I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
definition, might play in all this.
Michael
_____
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book
'The
guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon,
&
R.
Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
models
of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the
closest
example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts
in
human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones),
yet
by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis
is
actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that
pseudo-concepts
(i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities)
are
the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The
claim
would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of
abduction
(rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense
(along
the lines of Pierce).
I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that
there
was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not
heard
or read this debate.
Denise
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
development hierarchy.
Andy
Denise Newnham wrote:
Dear Larry and others,
I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so
if
so
let
me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me
think
of
Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states
that
pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
changes
or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001,
p.
85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous
of
intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's
fifth
dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
Denise
'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic
experiences
get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
experience across situations [and organize the relation of the
"lower"
and
"higher"
functions]?'
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On
Behalf Of Larry Purss
Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue
on
Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Hi Leif and Katerina
Leif,
I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment"
and
I
agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of
"engagement"
that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and
Glick.
It
is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles
on
Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also
focused
on
"microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
Katerina,
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but
generally
I
accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation
of
Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on
Mike
&
Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development,
and
also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions
of
social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These
reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
developmental
question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get
"generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
experience
across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and
"higher"
functions]?
Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes
got
organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience
at
the
3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models
of
"mind"
[for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL
process
of
linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at
the
sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia,
and
others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity
for
organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be
more
reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear
teleological
dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once
social
situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As
Glick
points
out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo
a
differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562)
However
these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
experience.
The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
where
a
specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An
alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background,
but
ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
societal
microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous
"leading
activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage
of
development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
situation
of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts
correlate
with
particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of
development.
Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which
recedes
into
the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured
schools
and
affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
identity
and concept development would be altered.
My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
possibility
of creating institutional structures which promote the
"interchangeability
of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social
spaces
which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the
creation
of
the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
positions
is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic
capacity"
where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
OTHERS
RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is
formative
of
particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also
"concept
development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
reason
I
appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are
there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of
social
positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal"
of
actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and
dialogical
as
the
participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social
spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is
nurtured
and
"grown" [cultured]
Larry
On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
<kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept
"metaphor",
which
is been considered as a constructivist argument?
Katerina Plakitsi
Assistant Professor of Science Education
Department of Early Childhood Education
School of Education
University of Ioannina
45110
Greece
tel.: +302651005771 office
fax: +302651005842
tel.: +6972898463 mobile
e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
<http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
--------------------------------------------------
From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue
on
Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Hi Martin
This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of
young
infants
CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds"
[persons]
is
a
fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
conversations
on this listserve.
I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person
societal
interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have
sympathy
for
this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more
widely
on
this particular topic.
Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for
further
articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various
models
in
a
spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
Review
of
Philosophy and Psychology?
I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity
for
engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
microgenesis.
However, I'm also interested in how the various models of
"infants
engaging
with others" become transformed in the transition to
TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher"
mental
functions.]
Larry
On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
wrote:
Begin forwarded message:
From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
Mindreading,
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest Editors:
Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
Victoria Southgate, University of London
CALL FOR PAPERS
Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable
capacities
for
attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account
of
such
abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading":
the
ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific
kinds
(i.e.,
to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of
such
mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists
question
the
standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may
be
exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate
to
any
sort
of mindreading.
Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately
accommodate
recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
variety
of
nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm
and
anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving
more
active
responses -suggest that young infants can understand others'
goals,
intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps
most
prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of
age
are
selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well
before
they
are
able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
years
of
age.
This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
aims
to
create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
approaches
to
basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
theoretical
commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and
how
they
propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that
from
human
developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed
include
but
are not limited to:
- Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they
must
be
operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at
all?
- Normally developing children become able to attribute
false
beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow
that
they
must
be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
- What does mental attribution minimally involve? What
exactly
distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to
early
social
cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the
other?
- What exact roles are mental representations thought to
play
in
mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might
be
involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
representational
and non-representational approaches?
- How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
Invited contributors
- José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
- Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
- Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
Important dates
- Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
- Target publication date: July 2011
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at:
https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and
select
"Social
Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to
submit
a
manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
Submissions
should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
website:
http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the
guest
editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
About the journal
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by
Springer
and
focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
science.
The
aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics
of
mutual
interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
interdisciplinary
research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the
mind,
including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
research
as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical
relevance.
It
includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from
leading
authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
Editorial board
Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
Roberto
Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri,
Penn;
Ned
Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
Breheny,
UCL;
Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
Vittorio
Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto,
Hertfordshire;
Ray
Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers;
Diego
Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
Christopher
Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers;
Brian
Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia,
Milan;
Barry
C.
Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi,
Columbia;
Timothy
Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
Dr. Victoria Southgate
Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
Henry Wellcome Building
Birkbeck, University of London
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HX.
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Andy Blunden*
Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/<http://home.mira.net/~andy/>
<http://home.mira.net/~andy/%3Chttp:/home.mira.net/~andy/> >
Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
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