Dear Michael, I quote the section prior to that quoted previously (Valsiner 1998, p.279) 'The process of differentiation and hierarchical integration in the movement from complexes to concepts was viewed by Vygotsky as entailing an important transitional form- that of pseudo-concept. This is a form of reasoning that at the outside looks like concept (i.e. seems organized by an abstract, unitary relation between objects) but in reality remains a complex (i.e entails a multitude of relations between objects - Vygtoskly, 1931,p. 256). For example, in an experimental setting a person select form all available materials all triangles. This operation could be accomplished on different bases- on that of a generalized "idea of triangle" (concept) or on the basis of a myriad of associative ties between the similar looking objects of triangular shape, without any use of generalization (i.e. reasoning on the basis of a complex). In the case of concept use, the deductive process is applied; in the case of a complex, the inductive generalization'. He discussed extensively his argument to Peirce in this book ' The guided mind' pp. 241-249. I quote a section: ' Deduction proves that something must be, induction shows that something actually is operative, and abduction just suggests that something may be (Deledalle, 1990)'... later quoting Peirce: " The crucial characteristic of abductive inference (inference a posteriori) is its enablement of further possibilities that are not entailed by either inductive or deductive (a priori) inference. Enablement of further possibilities is always uncertain, bringing into the reasoning process both openness and indeterminacy..' He then goes on to quote Shweder, 1990 where abduction is seen as a process a where in the mind it is a space for personal arrangement and interpretation. " in other words, the abductive faculty is the faculty of imagination, which comes to the rescue of sensation and logic by providing them with the intellectual means to see through experience and leap beyond empty syllogisms and tautologies to some creative representation of an underlying reality that might be grasped and reacted to, even if that imagined reality cannot be found, proved, or disproved by inductive or deductive rule following'. More on this line of thinking although not so explicit is the works of Daniels (2005, pp.11-16). The basic dilemma with Vygotsky's reasoning is that scientific reasoning is seen as a finite. Pseudo concepts are alive and transforming and bouncing of and reconstructing and more individual. Therefore there appear to be more steps within the formation of concepts and perhaps due to his early death were not investigated. I see these concepts as being a dialogue between the everyday, pseudoconcepts and scientific concepts. At times one will dominate and at times another due to the context within which mind is interacting. The level of dialogue and type of dialogue will differ within individuals due to environment, context, biological differences, activities engaged with etc. Denise p.s Mike Cole asked me to copy and pdf the sections. I shall do this ASAPJ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Glassman Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hi Denise, I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am currently under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis generation - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems. So I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's definition, might play in all this. Michael _____ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, & R. Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical models of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley. I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler, described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along the lines of Pierce). I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not heard or read this debate. Denise -----Original Message----- From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner, 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the development hierarchy. Andy Denise Newnham wrote: > Dear Larry and others, > > I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so let > me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of > Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that > pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the > developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to changes > or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p. > 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of > intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth > dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by > Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web. > > Denise > > 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the > developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences > get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize > experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and > "higher" > functions]?' > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on > Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology > > Hi Leif and Katerina > > Leif, > I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and I > agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement" > that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with > others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick. It > is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on > Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused on > "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts. > > Katerina, > I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I > accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as > interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation of > Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on Mike & > Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and > also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of > social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These > reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental > question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get > "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize experience > across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher" > functions]? > > Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental > Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes got > organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the > perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience at the > 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of "mind" > [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.] > However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL process of > linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the > sensorimotor and perceptual levels. > Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and > others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for > organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more > reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear teleological > dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and > perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social > situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glick points > out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a > differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However > these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize experience. > The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process where a > specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An > alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading > activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For > example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one > specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but > ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the societal > microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous "leading > activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of > development [age determined] but rather on the particular social situation > of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate with > particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development. > Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is > socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes into > the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools and > affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED, identity > and concept development would be altered. > My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the possibility > of creating institutional structures which promote the "interchangeability > of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces > which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the creation of > the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of positions > is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity" > where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing OTHERS > RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is formative of > particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept > development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The reason I > appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are > there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social > positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor, > perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" of > actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as the > participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social > spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured and > "grown" [cultured] > > Larry > > On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote: > >> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor", which >> is been considered as a constructivist argument? >> Katerina Plakitsi >> Assistant Professor of Science Education >> Department of Early Childhood Education >> School of Education >> University of Ioannina >> 45110 >> Greece >> tel.: +302651005771 office >> fax: +302651005842 >> tel.: +6972898463 mobile >> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> >> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html >> >> -------------------------------------------------- >> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com> >> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on >> >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology >> >> Hi Martin >>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young >>> infants >>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is a >>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT >>> conversations >>> on this listserve. >>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal >>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy for >>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely on >>> this particular topic. >>> >>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further >>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models in a >>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the Review >>> of >>> Philosophy and Psychology? >>> >>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for >>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis. >>> However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants >>> engaging >>> with others" become transformed in the transition to >>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher" mental >>> functions.] >>> >>> Larry >>> >>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: >>> >>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk> >>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00 >>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu >>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, >>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Guest Editors: >>>>> >>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire >>>>> >>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego >>>>> >>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS >>>>> >>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities >>>>> for >>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of > such >>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the >>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds >>>> (i.e., >>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of such >>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the >>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for >>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of >>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be >>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly >>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any >>>> sort >>>> of mindreading. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate >>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a variety >>>> of >>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and >>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more >>>> active >>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals, >>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most >>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age > are >>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they >>>> are >>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years >>>> of >>>> age. >>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to >>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading approaches >>>> to >>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their >>>> theoretical >>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how > they >>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from >>>> human >>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include >>>> but >>>> are not limited to: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic >>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be >>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all? >>>>> - Normally developing children become able to attribute false >>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they >>>> must >>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent? >>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly >>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early > social >>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other? >>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations thought to play in >>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be >>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between >>>> representational >>>> and non-representational approaches? >>>>> - How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit >>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Invited contributors >>>>> >>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University >>>>> >>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod >>>>> >>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Important dates >>>>> >>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010 >>>>> >>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> How to submit >>>>> >>>>> Prospective authors should register at: >>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select >>>> "Social >>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to submit a >>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. > Submissions >>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website: >>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the guest >>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> About the journal >>>>> >>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN: >>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer > and >>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science. >>>> The >>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of >>>> mutual >>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster >>>> interdisciplinary >>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, >>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. >>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical > research >>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It >>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading >>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Editorial board >>>>> >>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: Roberto >>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU. >>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; > Ned >>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny, >>>> UCL; >>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio >>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray >>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego >>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher >>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli, >>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian >>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; Barry >>>> C. >>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia; >>>> Timothy >>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate >>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow >>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development >>>>> Henry Wellcome Building >>>>> Birkbeck, University of London >>>>> Malet Street >>>>> London, WC1E 7HX. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> xmca mailing list >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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