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Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Larry, thanks for the immediate response. I am on vacations and I have no permanent internet. I will be back later. 

Katerina Plakitsi
Assistant Professor of Science Education
Department of Early Childhood Education
School of Education
University of Ioannina
45110
Greece
tel.: +302651005771 office
fax: +302651005842
tel.: +6972898463 mobile
e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr
http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 04, 2010 8:04 PM
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 


Hi Leif and Katerina

Leif,
I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and I
agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement"
that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick. It 
is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused on 
"microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.

Katerina,
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation of
Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on Mike & 
Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and
also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental
question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
"generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize experience 
across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher"
functions]?

Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience at the 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of "mind" 
[for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL process of
linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the
sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear teleological
dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glick points 
out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However
these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize experience. The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process where a 
specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the societal 
microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous "leading
activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
development [age determined] but rather on the particular social situation
of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate with 
particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes into the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools and affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED, identity 
and concept development would be altered.
My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the possibility 
of creating institutional structures which promote the "interchangeability
of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the creation of the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of positions 
is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing OTHERS RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is formative of 
particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The reason I 
appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal" of
actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as the 
participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured and 
"grown" [cultured]

Larry
On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor", which 
is been considered as a constructivist argument?
Katerina Plakitsi
Assistant Professor of Science Education
Department of Early Childhood Education
School of Education
University of Ioannina
45110
Greece
tel.: +302651005771 office
fax: +302651005842
tel.: +6972898463 mobile
e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr
http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on

Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Hi Martin


This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
infants
CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is a
fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
conversations
on this listserve.
I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy for this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely on 
this particular topic.

Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further
articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models in a
spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the Review
of
Philosophy and Psychology?

I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and microgenesis.
However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
engaging
with others" become transformed in the transition to
TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
functions.]

Larry

On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

Begin forwarded message:


> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>
> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
>
>
>
> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
>
>
>
> Guest Editors:
>
> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
>
> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
>
> Victoria Southgate, University of London
>
>
>
>
>
>           CALL FOR PAPERS
>
>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
>
>
>
>
>
> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
> for
attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of such 
abilities is that they involve “theory of mind” or “mindreading”: the
ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
(i.e.,
to have concepts of “belief,” “desire,” etc.) and the contents of such
mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to any
sort
of mindreading.
>
>
>
> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a variety 
of
nonverbal tasks — e.g., the “violation of expectation” paradigm and
anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
active
responses —suggest that young infants can understand others’ goals,
intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age are 
selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before they
are
able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 years
of
age.
>
> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading approaches 
to
basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
theoretical
commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how they 
propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
human
developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include
but
are not limited to:
>
>
>
> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
>
> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that they
must
be operating with a “theory of mind” or the equivalent?
>
> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early social 
cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
>
> - What exact roles are mental representations thought to play > in 
mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
representational
and non-representational approaches?
>
> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
>
>
>
> Invited contributors
>
> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
>
> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
>
> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
>
>
>
> Important dates
>
> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
>
> -       Target publication date: July 2011
>
>
>
>
>
> How to submit
>
> Prospective authors should register at:
https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
“Social
Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives” as an article type to submit a
manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. Submissions 
should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's website:
http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk 
>
>
>
> About the journal
>
> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and 
focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive science.
The
aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
mutual
interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
interdisciplinary
research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
>
> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical > research 
as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
>
>
>
> Editorial board
>
> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: > Roberto 
Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; > Ned 
Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard Breheny,
UCL;
Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; Vittorio
Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; Ray
Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; Christopher
Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian
Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; Barry 
C.
Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
Timothy
Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
>
>
>
> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> Henry Wellcome Building
> Birkbeck, University of London
> Malet Street
> London, WC1E 7HX.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

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