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Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Thank you for such an enthusiastic discussion pertaining to
percepts/concepts/artefacts/etc. I have thoroughly enjoyed the
conversation, a very healthy back and forth pertaining to an extremely
important fulcrum in understanding human development.
I would like to return to the original question and that is; what
differentiates everyday concepts from scientific concepts? I really liked
Michael Glassman's original example about the glassblower and that the
glassblower would be interested in developing a practical skill in her
apprentice rather then one versed in the 'scientific rigor' of
glassblowing. So this would describe everyday concepts as being practical
in nature and scientific concepts as being theoretical in nature. Are
people in agreement about this?
When thinking about the idea of a precept I do have a hard time just
discarding it and stating that they are floating about in the ether until
we snatch one into our brain. There is a complexity to them but a
complexity that falls short of a cultural artefact. I must say I
currently have a banana inspired brain but I can't at the moment move
passed the thought that percepts provide the jumping off point for the
appropriation of cultural artifacts.
what do others think?
From: Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
Date: 07/12/2010 10:31 AM
Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
Sent by: firstname.lastname@example.org
On Jul 11, 2010, at 2:26 AM, David H Kirshner wrote:
> So if we take it that, say, a baby is
> having the experience within a culture that has reified "pain" (as
> something that can be attributed to babies under certain circumstances),
> then the baby's first person experience is not pain, because she or he
> has not yet appropriated it as such.
It is pain-for-others, but not yet pain-for-self. So it both is and isn't
> Michael's point, that
> Martin grudgingly acceded to, is that SOME experiences (for example,
> perhaps, pain), are not subject to revision--perhaps because they are
> too closely related to biological imperatives
Did I accede to this, David? I don't think so. I tried to suggest that
experiences such as love and pain are mediated, organized, colonized by
practices and technologies of romance, sexuality, eroticism, treatment,
> how can we gain insight into originary processes when all we have
> are data about conditions afterwards.
Can you spell out a bit more the problem you see, for my
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