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Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
- To: firstname.lastname@example.org, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
- From: Wolff-Michael Roth <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2010 17:59:43 -0700
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I don't understand. Without intersubjectivity, no culture would be possible. The problem arises when you try to think culture from individualism rather than from Life. We couldn't even try to find out whether we are understanding in the same/similar way if we did not already share in intersubjectivity.
This is why philosophers like Jean-Luc Nancy or Emmanuel Levinas begin with the pre-being WITH, that unfolds into Self-Other. Prior to the self-other distinction prior to self seeing another self is the WITH that allows us to see the other as other and ourselves as self.
On 2010-07-09, at 5:36 PM, mike cole wrote:
Yes, this is the way to go.
But intersubjectivity is not impossible, but the circumstances are rare.
ask me when you see me.
On Fri, Jul 9, 2010 at 5:04 PM, Martin Packer <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
> This is the famous and familiar 'chicken-sexing' phenomenon. Experts are
> able to tell the sex of day-old chickens, and can't explain why. The best
> chicken sexers come from Japan, where the Zen-Nippon Chick Sexing School
> has 2-year long courses.
> But I don't follow your argument. You seem to be saying, since they can't
> explain what they do in words, they have no concepts. But they must have
> something, so they have percepts.
> You are apparently equating a concept with a 'cultural label' that is
> 'stuck' on an object, as though we could only recognize a barrel if it were
> labelled 'barrel,' if not literally then metaphorically. That seems a
> rather simplistic view of what concepts do. And actually the chicken sexers
> do employ cultural labels - as do your fish sorters, I presume. The chicken
> sexers say to themselves, 'male chick,' 'female chick.' They simply can't
> introspect the characteristics they have identified which have enabled them
> to attach the label. Your fish sorters are saying, 'good fish, 'bad fish,'
> or something similar. Obviously these are cultural-historical distinctions,
> On Jul 9, 2010, at 6:14 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>> See, even without the notion of "barrel", you perceive a shape and do not
> run into it. This shape, prior to all cultural labels you might stick to it
> or recognize it as part of cultural-historical activity, is some shape that
> exists for you in your practices. In two papers, one in Journal of
> Pragmatics and the other in Social Studies of Science, I describe phenomena
> for which there are no words or concepts and yet people act toward it. For
> example, fish culturists sort fish. They can't tell you the difference
> between the ones that go to the right, down into the bucket, or into the
> left channel. They ask you to "just look." So they can see it, but not tell
> it. Similarly, in ecological field work, the participants could see
> differences but not tell them, that is see that something is not a rock pile
> even though the definition of a rock pile said it was one.
>> How do you describe or name what they see as difference but for which
> there is no concept, no "notion" to name and tell the difference? In such
> cases, "percept" may well do the trick. There are two percepts, they are
> different, yet there are no cultural-historical concepts to name, theorize,
> conceptualize . . .
>> As you see from the title of one paper, I used the term "perceptual
> gestalts" . . . . Don't know whether that resolves your problem, but was
> useful and the best solution for me.
>> Roth, W.-M. (2005). Making classifications (at) work: Ordering practices
> in science. Social Studies of Science, 35, 581-621.
>> Roth, W.-M. (2004). Perceptual gestalts in workplace communication.
> Journal of Pragmatics, 36(6), 1037-1069.
>> On 2010-07-09, at 3:43 PM, Martin Packer wrote:
>> "Describe" in what respect, Michael?
>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 4:01 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
>>> Martin, the percept might describe the forms that appear in perception?
> What do you think? Michael
>>> On 2010-07-09, at 9:46 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
>>> For me, the question that needs to be answered is why we need to
> introduce a new term, "percept." We can all talk about 'perception,' as an
> active process of interaction with the world, right? What is gained when we
> start to talk about 'percepts,' as though there are some little entities
> floating around somewhere? Haven't we turned a process into an entity?
>>> The university has a good selection of DVDs, and I recently checked out
> the first season of the cable TV channel Showtime's series The Tudors, which
> recounts how Henry VIII's need for a male heir led to the rupture between
> England and the Catholic Church. It's not exactly aiming for historical
> accuracy, but I was then motivated to check out Elton's history of the
> period and it turns out the series does a pretty good job of touching on
> most of the important events.
>>> Everyone in the show is a fashion statement, including Cardinal Wolsey
> who, as played by Sam Neil, is both cunning and likable. He shows up each
> time in a different outfit, wearing a variety of official headgear, each in
> that rich cardinal red.
>>> One morning I was fixing breakfast and reached out for the salt shaker.
> It's made of transparent plastic with a lid, something we picked up at the
> supermarket. But the lid is bright red, and (and here's the point; thanks
> for your patience!) as I picked it up, for a second or two what I saw was a
> little cardinal.
>>> That seems to me a nice example of what Mike has been exploring, the
> active and ongoing character of perception, in which conceiving and
> perceiving are intimately linked. I see the object *through* and *in terms*
> of a concept (though we're still none to sure what that is!), in this case
> the concept of cardinal that had been enriched by watching the TV show. The
> process is not entirely within me as an individual, because the salt shaker
> did its part.
>>> To me, saying that I "have" a "percept" doesn't help me understand this
> process. The percept would be - what, a little red cardinal? or is the
> percept the salt shaker, and I impose a concept of cardinal on it? but isn't
> 'salt shaker' a concept too?? Putting all of this stuff inside the
> individual leads to an infinite regress, not a satisfactory explanation (or
> even description) of what is going on.
>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 10:43 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>>>> Percept would be preference? I don't know exactly but people do not
>>>> operate upon appropriated concepts 100% of the time. Do they?
>>>> children do not. Currently I am not exactly sure what the question is
>>>> that needs to be answered.
>>>> Perhaps the percept in the 'not-wanting-to-listen-to-dylan" for me
>>>> be I would prefer listening to the radio seeing as he never gets any
>>>> time or perhaps it would be that I am stuck inside of mobile with the
>>>> memphis blues again?
>>>> That certainly is a great question. Others with
>>>> From: Martin Packer <email@example.com>
>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
>>>> Date: 07/09/2010 09:14 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] perception/conception etc
>>>> Sent by: email@example.com
>>>> OK, Eric let's suppose you woke up this morning not wanting to listen
>>>> Dylan. What is the percept in that situation? Dylan? His music? Your
>>>> temporary dislike? The fact that yesterday you felt differently?
>>>> On Jul 9, 2010, at 8:04 AM, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>>>>> I understand your misgivings about placing construction within but
>>>>> this makes sense: concepts are appropriated from the social/cultural
>>>>> arena but percepts are individually based. My percepts about music
>>>>> run counter to yours and there are even days I don't want to listen to
>>>>> Dylan. However, I have an appropriated concept of music that is
>>>>> extremely similar to yours. Does this make sense? I know this
>>>>> internal/exteranl debate has raged for years and won't end anytime
>>>>> but some things do indeed happen within. I still have to think though
>>>>> that cracking this code between everyday and scietific could assist in
>>>>> understanding human development.
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