Nice to know that we are in agreement Martin.I think your suspicion that people don't know that LSV's concept is based on Hegel's is right, but worse than that almost no CHAT person knows any Hegel beyond the Phenomenology, so they don't know Hegel's concept anyway. Plus, Sakharov didn't know Hegel either, and he /seems/ to give authoritative evidence that Vygotsky was a logical positivist. Chapter 5 of T&S is much better, but again, if you don't know Hegel, you could read that as a logical positivist I imagine. Chapter 6 of T&S is the best thing of all, but I suspect that it is usually not understood.
When we had the discussion about concepts last year, I recorded my contribution to the discussions, re Davydov: http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/concept-really-concept.htm and re scientific vs everyday concepts:
http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/scientific-concepts.htmor you can get Hegel's Logic with my Vygotskyite Foreword at http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#hegel
I think rehabilitation of Hegel's Science of the Concept in a form which is intelligible (it isn't in the original) is important. Otherwise the same old debates go on and on and on.
Andy Martin Packer wrote:
Andy, Well I knew that I would not have to convince *you* that when LSV wrote of 'concept' he was drawing on Hegel! How many other readers of LSV reach that same conclusion I don't know. To reach it one has to cast aside the idea that he viewed the 'concept' as most of cognitive psychology does, as mental representation, or viewed knowledge as Piaget did, as individual cognitive structures and operations, or viewed 'science' as many people do, as hypothesis-testing experimentation. If you and I are in agreement on this that is fine. I'm not sure how many others we now have to convince! Martin On Mar 18, 2010, at 8:01 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:I'm not sure what you mean by "concept" Martin. Although it is my opinion that LSV never actually read Hegel, he worked with a lot of other people who did. Reading Chapter 6 of T&S, for example, the hypothesis that he understood "concept" in a Hegelian fashion stands up, so I take that to be the case. Nothing in Rosch's interesting article comes close to Hegel's idea of the concept. The polemic against cognitivism and logical positivism is really irrelevant to a discussion of concepts informed by Hegel, Marx or Vygotsky. I presume she not familiar with these writers. Andy Martin Packer wrote:Andy, a quick reply and then I have to go. I keep trying to argue, in various ways and places, that LSV did not buy into the representational theory of mind that dogs much of cognitive science and is characteristic of Piaget, a result of his Kantianism. One challenge that LSV's emphasis on concepts introduces is that it becomes difficult to block the interpretation that LSV was proposing just a social kind of Piaget - co-onstruction of conceptual knowledge, internalization of mental representations. There are to my mind numerous indications that LV was in fact doing something quite different. But to make the case convincingly one has to find in his writing a different approach to concepts than the dominant one. What I like about Rosch's article is that (1) she makes a pretty strong case for the inability of cognitive science, or at least the representational theory of mind form of cognitive science, to provide either a cogent theory of concepts or explanations of the emp
irical data, and (2) she offers a different way of thinking about concepts that begins with a non-dualistic approach to mind-world. To quote just one paragraph:
"Corollary A: Concepts Are Not Representational. Since the subjective and objective aspects of concepts and categories arise together as different poles of the same act of cognition and are part of the same informational field, they are already joined at their inception. They do not need to be further joined by a representational theory of mind, such as that of working cognitivism, and they cannot be separated by the solipsistic representational theory of mind of strict cognitivism. Concepts and categories do not represent the world in the mind; they are a participating part of the mind-world whole of which the sense of mind (of having a mind that is seeing or thinking) is one pole, and the objects of mind (such as visible objects, sounds, thoughts, emotions, and so on) are the other pole. Concepts -- red, chair, afraid, yummy, armadillo, and all the rest -- inextricably bind, in many different functioning ways, that sense of being or having a mind to the sense of the ob
je
cts of mind."This is just what one needs to develop a position in which people think using concepts, but concepts are not mental representations. But what does this have to do with LSV? I've just been re-reading chapter 5, and there are any many things that LSV writes that are compatible with this way of viewing concepts. No time for details at the moment, but he writes of the adolescent who thinks using concepts as actively picking out attributes and synthesizing them, always dealing with a practical problem. (Cf also Barsalou's articles, which Rosch cites, proposing that concepts are always formed "on the fly," in real time.) Martin On Mar 17, 2010, at 8:34 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:Ineresting paper, Martin. I liked the suggestion of "concept" being an approach to the study of "situation," rather than the other way around. I agree. Also appreciate the "prototype" approach. Am I right, I think this idea comes to us from the Schleiermeier/Bahktin route rather than the Hegel/Vygotsky route? A powerful approach, which I think needs to be integrated with approaches with an Hegelian heritage. Pity about Vygotsky being lumped with Piaget and thrown in the Cognitivist basket. And pity that the guy who wrote the Science of the Concept in 1813 is skipped over as if he never existed. :) Andy Martin Packer wrote: .. this wonderful paper by Eleanor Rosch. She is famous for her work in the 1970s on prototypes; in this paper she takes head on the problems that cognitive science has in actually specifying what a concept is, and she recommends that we need to rethink our views of both mind and world:<http://psychology.berkeley.edu/faculty/profiles/erosch1999.pdf> Martin _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/ Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
-- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca