Re: [xmca] Classical German Philosophy

[Larry Purss <lpurss@shaw.ca>]

Hi Andy
I'm on my week break from school and  on a small Island off of Vancouver where my only access to internet is to park outside the local library. Beautiful setting but limited time to respond.
Andy I want to thank you for your thoughtful response. Your mention of the key difference between CHAT and the dialogical perspective as being how  central mediation is is helpful as a framework.
Markova, in her book, articulates Moscovici's theory of social representations (as a communicative framework for understanding "representations") as a way to go beyond the interactional (face to face) self/other tension. Her theory is not a theory of intersubjectivity where "representations" are theorized as being located "inside" the subjective mind. Representations for Markova and Moscovici are socially constructed and institutional facts but are dialogical and not predetermined.
I'm not sure Andy if you consider these social representations as MEDIATING forms or products? and therefore articulating notions similar to chat. I do recognize that material artifacts as psychological tools are not emphasized in Moscovici's theory. (However I remember Mike's question asking  how significant Moscovici's ideas are to a CHAT perspective)

Martin, thank you for the chapters of your book to read. When I get back home I will download and read the articles.  The little I know about continental philosophy is that this tension between self and other and what is ontological has been an ongoing debate in those circles.  
Martin, what are your thoughts on the current "dialogical" perspectives being generated that are taking a stand on  one side of the self/other debates?

Andy and Martin, from your comments, the self/other debate and its historical construction does have a place as one current in our reflections on this listserv.

Thanks for the CHAT
 
Larry

----- Original Message -----
From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Date: Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:47 am
Subject: Re: [xmca] Classical German Philosophy
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> I will *try* to respond Larry, but I suspect very
> inadequately. ...
> 
> Larry Purss wrote:
> > Hi Andy and others
> > Your comment on "appropriating"  ideas from other 
> traditions and being 
> > aware of the background contexts that frame those ideas is 
> much 
> > appreciated.
> > I have been interested in the "self/other tension and how to 
> appropriate 
> > its notions. Ivana Markova in her book "Dialogicality and 
> Social 
> > Representations: The Dynamics of Mind" suggests Wittgenstein, 
> Bahktin, 
> > and G.H.Mead have all taken a position that the Ego-Alter or 
> Self-Other 
> > tension is ONTOLOGICAL to the FORMATION (or should I say 
> production?) of 
> > mind.
> 
> I always have trouble with "ontological", Larry. Up until
> the early 20th century, the science of Being meant exactly
> that. But so far as I can see the rise of Phenomenology,
> whose subject matter is inner, subjective thought forms,
> phantoms in other words, accessed by introspection, brought
> about a change in the meaning of "Being" and consequently of
> "ontological" which, so far as I can see, has become
> something to do with personal identity and inner forms of
> mental activity. Thus reducing Marx's dictum about being and
> consciosuness to utter rubbish, of course! The least I can
> say is: be aware of the fact that for everyone from
> Aristotle to Hegel to Marx to Vygotsky, "Being" and
> "ontological" meant one thing (or at least one related set
> of concepts) and from Husserl to Heidegger to Sartre and so
> on, it meant the exact opposite. Both sets of concepts are
> fine, but they have very different referents.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> 
> 
> >  From this "tradition" or "framework" self/other are 
> viewed as 
> > "figure/ground" and indivisible. We can for analytical 
> purposes discuss 
> > either side of the tension to attempt clarity but in actual 
> practises or 
> > situations it is impossible for one to exist without the other.
> 
> A lot of "intersubjective" or "dialogic" currents of thought
> take it for granted the aforesaid processes hinge on
> immediate interaction between psyches or consciousnesses, or
> at least, that the fact that such consciousnesses or psyches
> can only interact as mediated by cultural artefacts
> (including the body, words, sense organs, and so on) is
> overlooked or regarded as trivial, or backgrounded. In CHAT
> this is not the case, since the mediating elements and
> context (both ideal and material) are deemed to be crucial
> factors in the interaction. I could mention A. Honneth, J.
> Habermas and R R Williams as examples of writers who exclude
> mediation.
> 
> 
> > Now for NORMATIVE development. Is our current notions of 
> "perspective 
> > taking" (reflection on reflection) as one function of 
> development an 
> > historical and institutional recognition that selves and 
> institutions in 
> > "modernity" require "self-reflective" forms of cognition and 
> identity in 
> > order for modern persons to "develop" viable ways to 
> participate in 
> > modern forms of "praxis"?
> 
> The ? at the end tells me there is a question in there. I
> think the answer is "yes." :)
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> > Another way of asking this question is the current 
> articulation of 
> > dialogicality as ontological for the formation of mind a more 
> > "universal" notion of development as "reflection" and 
> "abstraction" OR 
> > is this notion of development a normative construct?  
> Either way, we are 
> > living through modernity, so the insights from Bahktin, 
> Wittgenstein, 
> > and Mead are valid.
> 
> I really don't know how to answer that question (?) Larry,
> but yes of course these three writers are of great interest
> in CHAT.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> > Finally, the tension of "certainty/uncertainty and the purpose 
> of 
> > schooling seems relevant.  If "scientific" notions of 
> truth are 
> > monological and speak to structure and formation and causality 
> as 
> 
> It is hard enough, for me, to know exactly what "scientific"
> means, Larry, let alone when it has inverted commas around
> it to start with. I can only say that since I strive to be
> scientific and "monological" sounds like something I
> wouldn't want to be, though you are talking about how many
> voices truth has, I don't know, but I suspect I disagree.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> 
> > explanations, then teachers should have the authority to 
> TRANSMIT this 
> > knowledge as various Discourses with their appropriate 
> frameworks.  
> > (Knowledge through seeing)  However, if schools are to 
> impart 
> > dialogical theories of knowledge, then UNCERTAINTY, 
> negotiation and the 
> 
> I don't know, but I question whether what schools are for is
> something I can answer (not being the designer of society)
> but I wouldn't really want to define it as transmitting or
> imparting knowledge. But it is a tricky question.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> 
> > recognition that all knowledge is provisional should be 
> promoted in 
> > schools. (knowledge through the "mouth"-see Markova)
> > Andy, I'm not sure where the "ego-Alter" opposition as a 
> theory of 
> > knowledge fits into CHAT frameworks but it is definitely 
> central to 
> > socio-cultural notions of psychology.
> 
> I think the main thing between intersubjective theories and
> CHAT is the question of mediation. The genealogy of both
> currents from Hegel is interesting. I think the I/Me
> theories, as brilliant and useful as they often are, arose
> by means of a 20th century misreading of Hegel. In Hegel's
> psychology the I/Me relation is doubly mediated by the
> resources of the subjects themselves. It is only
> *apparently* unmediated. But that doesn't make these
> theories wrong *of course*. But according to Hegel "There is
> nothing on Earth, in Heaven, or anywhere else which is not
> both immediate and mediated." I think he is right there.
> Missing one or the other moment is always a mistake.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> 
> > If the Ego-Alter tension or the "Culture-cognition-social 
> interaction" 
> > notion of sociality is a central unit of  analysis, then 
> I will keep 
> 
> If "Culture-cognition-social interaction" is a unit of
> analysis, then we are going to go from confusion to deeper
> confusion. What do you mean?
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> 
> > reflecting on the place of socioAFFECTIVE notions of 
> communication in 
> > our ongoing debates. If self/other(s) tensions are mutually 
> constituted 
> > and both constrain and afford situated practices and 
> production 
> > (concepts, institutions, and SIGNIFICANT symbols frame this 
> tension) 
> > then I believe e-motions need a central place in the 
> negotiation of the 
> > ego-alter antinomy.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> I'm a bit lost at this point, Larry.
> 
> > Finally, Andy I agree that every relational antinomy must be 
> > articulated specifically, but I'm trying to get clarity in how 
> central 
> > this tension is to CHAT perspectives?
> 
> Well, I think any time you make a distinction you need to
> mean something by it, Larry. And that is as important to
> CHAT as anywhere else.
> 
> Andy
> 
> >  
> > Just curious?
> > Larry 
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > Date: Monday, March 8, 2010 6:01 pm
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Classical German Philosophy
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > 
> >  > Sure. And I have many dear friends who urge Heidegger upon
> >  > me with like advice. The reasons for my negative reactions
> >  > to Heidegger are complex, but I do need to get round to
> >  > evaluating his work by reading it. In the past, every 
> time I
> >  > have taken the trouble read a great writer who for some
> >  > other reason I had maintained an hostility, I found myself
> >  > forced to modify my view and appreciate the work.
> >  >
> >  > My real issue, you know, is not whether Heidegger is 
> good or
> >  > bad, or whether his ideas can contribute to CHAT or 
> not, but
> >  > purely and simply that, if we are going to *appropriate*
> >  > (i.e. make our own) ideas from other traditions of thinking
> >  > and practice, then the work has to be done to investigate
> >  > the intellectual context and to follow the "semantic
> >  > network" of the relevant words, the ramifications of the
> >  > concepts and their role in the given theory/practice, and
> >  > make whatever changes are necessary, in the newly introduced
> >  > idea and in its new context, so that it makes sense. ...
> >  >
> >  > And when the classic works of our own tradition are 
> out of
> >  > print and becoming unavailable secondhand, even more so.
> >  >
> >  > Andy
> >  >
> >  > Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >  > > Andy,
> >  > > Nobody here agrees with the atrocities committed by 
> the Nazis,
> >  > or the Turks (Armenians), or the Ihuitus on the 
> Tootsie, or the
> >  > Serbian genocides . . .
> >  > >
> >  > >  But, being the dialectician you are, you 
> should read
> >  > Derrida's treatment of the issue, Heidegger I mean, 
> discussing>  > the position of the French-Jewish 
> philosopher Jankélévitch, the
> >  > Jew-sh-French-Germman poet Paul Celan's visit to Todtnauberg
> >  > (where Heidegger had a cabin). Derrida (2005) writes, "to
> >  > forgive the forgivable, the venial, the excusable, 
> that which
> >  > one can always forgive, this is not forgiving" (p. 
> 32).The title
> >  > of the little book, in which he articulates Hegel, 
> too, is
> >  > Forgiving: The Unforgivable and Imprescribable. The 
> issue is
> >  > more complex than to condemn a person who, silently by and
> >  > large, perhaps also somewhere in talk or writing, has
> >  > fraternized with the Nazi. Did he know? Did you know 
> that he
> >  > knew or not knew?
> >  > >
> >  > > When you do not forgive the unforgivable, you are 
> not doing
> >  > anything special; when you forgive the forgivable, you 
> are not
> >  > doing anything special. There is nothing ethical 
> because you can
> >  > do both in a mechanical manner. The true decision, the 
> one that
> >  > demands commitment, is the one that Derrida proposes: 
> Forgiving:>  > the unforgivable
> >  > >
> >  > > Derrida, J. (2005). Pardonner: l'impardonable et
> >  > l'limprescriptible. Paris: L'Herne.
> >  > >
> >  > > Michael
> >  > >
> >  > >
> >  > >
> >  > >
> >  > > On 2010-03-08, at 4:10 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >  > >
> >  > > Well "Identity and Difference" is on its way from 
> Amazon, so I
> >  > can catch up with Heidegger to some extent. And I 
> agree with
> >  > Emily. H-G Gadamer I found very useful.
> >  > >
> >  > > Just a note: most people who have defended Heidegger 
> to me ask
> >  > me to *overlook* the connection of his views with 
> practice, and
> >  > take his ideas on their own merits separately from his 
> practice.>  > So this is a first.
> >  > >
> >  > > andy
> >  > >
> >  > > Wolff-Michael Roth wrote:
> >  > >> Mike,
> >  > >> Heidegger does so in Being and Time, in the section 
> on the
> >  > tool, and in the section on the way signs function. In these
> >  > pages, Heidegger also points out that for the person 
> using tools
> >  > and producing something, the ultimate product and its 
> use are
> >  > important mediating moments in the 
> awareness/consciousness of
> >  > the producer. This is precisely what we later find in 
> Leont'ev,>  > and in the right-hand part of Yrjö's 
> triangle, where you go from
> >  > obect --> outcome, and the latter is going to be taken 
> up again
> >  > in this or another activity system. So perhaps 
> Heidegger goes
> >  > even further in not limiting himself to the 
> orientation toward
> >  > the outcome but goes right to the way in which future users
> >  > incorporate this material thing (which could also be a 
> written>  > text) in their activity.
> >  > >> What matters to Heidegger is not how a tool, 
> object. . .
> >  > whatever looks to the detached theoretician, including a
> >  > Hegelian, but to someone caught up in praxis, coping 
> (this is H.
> >  > Dreyfus' word in his reading of Being and Time, at 
> least, he
> >  > read the first half). For many on this list who find 
> Heidegger>  > hard to read, H. Dreyfus' reading /Being-in-
> the-World: A
> >  > Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time/ is probably 
> a very
> >  > good introduction. Phil Agre in his early work at 
> least bases a
> >  > lot on his reading of Heidegger (via Dreyfus, I 
> believe) (Agre,
> >  > /Computation and Human Experience/) And I think David 
> Chapman,>  > too, was doing "Heideggerian AI"
> >  > >> Cheers,
> >  > >> Michael
> >  > >> On 2010-03-07, at 5:48 PM, mike cole wrote:
> >  > >> Michael-
> >  > >> Right, mutual constitution. But the problem of saying
> >  > everything about everything remains. Its kind of like 
> Kenneth>  > Burke who has a pentad as a basic unit of 
> analysis for human
> >  > activity (approximately), but carries out his analyses 
> in terms
> >  > of various
> >  > >> "ratios".
> >  > >> Can you give us references to the parts of 
> Heidegger and
> >  > Holtzkamp in English so that us non-German readers can get
> >  > connected with what have written? The Leontiev 
> reference was
> >  > very helpful. There is so much to read!!
> >  > >> mike
> >  > >> On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 9:57 AM, Wolff-Michael Roth
> >  > <mroth@uvic.ca <mailto:mroth@uvic.ca>> wrote:
> >  > >>    Hi Mike,
> >  > >>    the issue I want to highlight is 
> the mutual
> >  > constitution. It makes
> >  > >>    no sense to talk about tools as 
> if they
> >  > could be isolated and talked
> >  > >>    about independent of the concrete 
> practical>  > object/motive oriented
> >  > >>    activity. You cannot talk about
> >  > subjectivity/identity independent of
> >  > >>    activity, and yet people do it 
> all of the
> >  > time. Take, for example,
> >  > >>    all those scholars who use 
> interviews to
> >  > get at "identity," and do
> >  > >>    not make thematic the fact that the
> >  > interview is the activity, and
> >  > >>    its object/motive is the 
> production of the
> >  > interview/text. Whether
> >  > >>    the text has anything to do with the
> >  > activity of a teacher at
> >  > >>    school, or a student at school, never
> >  > (hardly every) is asked.
> >  > >>    The same, we observe scholars who are
> >  > looking for and writing about
> >  > >>    the tools, as if the nature of 
> the tool
> >  > could be identified
> >  > >>    independent of the activity---
> >  > >>    This is precisely the point Heidegger
> >  > makes, and – sorry Andy, you
> >  > >>    are NOT right on this point in your
> >  > commentary – Heidegger says
> >  > >>    precisely in many instances what 
> Leont'ev>  > also says, and Heidegger
> >  > >>    did it a few years before Leont'ev.
> >  > >>    ((And again, sorry Andy, 
> Heidegger works
> >  > out precisely the issue of
> >  > >>    consciousness in activity, and 
> the relation
> >  > of the subject to the
> >  > >>    tool, which is at the heart of 
> Leont'ev))>  > >>    Mike, what we are 
> getting to, then, is
> >  > cognition separate from life,
> >  > >>    cognition that makes no sense 
> because it is
> >  > not connected to the
> >  > >>    senses in sensual practical activity.
> >  > >>    Precisely when we substantialize 
> the things
> >  > that are part of the
> >  > >>    activity --- for Leont'ev, only those
> >  > things are relevant that are
> >  > >>    relevant to the subject, and this 
> point is
> >  > brought out by Klaus
> >  > >>    Holzkamp ---- not the kind of 
> stuff outside
> >  > researchers bring to the
> >  > >>    situation when they take the 
> triangle as
> >  > the grid through which they
> >  > >>    look at situations, at 
> activities. For the
> >  > subject it is totally
> >  > >>    irrelevant what the researcher 
> sees and
> >  > thinks, and this is another
> >  > >>    form of breaking things out of an
> >  > integrated and dynamic whole.
> >  > >>    Cheers,
> >  > >>    Michael
> >  > >>    On 2010-03-07, at 8:28 AM, mike 
> cole wrote:
> >  > >>    Thanks Andy, and Michael for the 
> section>  > ref to Leontiev.
> >  > >>    Could I repeat a second part of 
> my question
> >  > which appears to have gotten
> >  > >>    lost in the multiple threads?
> >  > >>    Michael wrote: "you have been 
> breaking out
> >  > individual (constitutive)
> >  > >>    moments
> >  > >>    of activity and treated them as 
> elements,>  > much like others take the YE
> >  > >>    triangle and then break out the 
> object, the
> >  > subject, the division of
> >  > >>    labor,
> >  > >>    the tools..."
> >  > >>    I asked about how one talks about 
> how one
> >  > breaks out "moments of
> >  > >>    activity"
> >  > >>    (that is how I phrase the matter 
> when I am
> >  > thoughtful enough to do
> >  > >>    so), and,
> >  > >>    having highlighted them, given the
> >  > impression that they are
> >  > >>    elements in a static sense. What 
> sort of
> >  > language does one use to be
> >  > >>    able,
> >  > >>    for example, to talk about a particular
> >  > division of labor, without
> >  > >>    at least
> >  > >>    deep backgrounding, say, the 
> tools being
> >  > used or the web of social rules
> >  > >>    that are recruited in this instance?
> >  > >>    Even to say that "everything is 
> connected>  > to everything else"
> >  > >>    implies some
> >  > >>    notion of "things/processes" that are
> >  > connected. How to avoid
> >  > >>    misunderstanding and distinguish 
> it from
> >  > disagreement?>>    mike
> >  > >>    On Sun, Mar 7, 2010 at 2:50 AM, Andy
> >  > Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
> >  > >>    <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
> >  > >>     > If anyone is interested in
> >  > exploring the German Idealists, and
> >  > >>    the roots of
> >  > >>     > Activity Theory and Cultural
> >  > Psychology in their writings, I have put
> >  > >>     > together a page :
> >  > >>     >
> >  > 
> http://www.marxists.org/subject/philosophy/german.htm>>     > where 
> > you can browse as you wish ...
> >  > >>     >
> >  > >>     >
> >  > >>    
> _______________________________________________>  > 
> >>    xmca mailing list
> >  > >>    xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >  > <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>>   
> >  > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
> >  >
> >  > --
> >  > -------------------------------------------------------
> ----------
> >  > -------
> >  > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> >  > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> >  > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> >  >
> >  > _______________________________________________
> >  > xmca mailing list
> >  > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >  > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >  >
> 
> -- 
> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> -------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> Ilyenkov $20 ea
> 
> 
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