Re: [xmca] about emotions

[Larry Purss <lpurss@shaw.ca>]

Jay
I am not a Freudian scholar and have as much resistance to Freudian and neo-Freudian constructions as everybody on CHAT. It is the newer relational and intersubjective psychoanalytic theories that focus on interpretive meaning that I find interesting.  They are looking at Peirce and the other Pragmatists, Gadamer, and are embracing the discursive and interpretive turn in the human studies.  The point you have just conceded has implications which they are deeply invoved in exploring.  Infant studies is one of the central focuses for their understanding.
At the cultural-historical level they are engaging with the same themes as CHAT and I see many parallels.  They are passionately trying to move beyond a Cartesian subject/object split and are looking at the linquistic turn, and also at the dramaturgical framework of enactments and scenarios. I personally find it generative of new and novel perspectives to engage with discourses which on the surface seem so oppossed.
Jay, 
I don't have an academic background and except for CHAT most of my thoughts are personal reveries on the development of "the self"

Larry

----- Original Message -----
From: Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>
Date: Monday, November 30, 2009 8:49 pm
Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>

> 
> Yes, Larry, I can agree that the originary moments of connection 
> for  
> an individual persist in some form as core constituents even of 
> the  
> later, more elaborated or "higher" cultural formations of 
> feeling. So,  
> were they to be undermined in an individual's psyche, by 
> some  
> conflicts of denials that blocked their participation in the 
> higher  
> forms, then those forms would lose their meaning and/or 
> their  
> emotional support. I find this an interesting way to look 
> at  
> psychoanalytic views of the emotion-culture relationship, at 
> least for  
> individuals. Would we get something similar also at the societal-
> 
> historical level of analysis? (I confess I never really 
> understood  
> Eros and Thanatos.)
> 
> JAY.
> 
> Jay Lemke
> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> Educational Studies
> University of Michigan
> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> 
> Visiting Scholar
> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> University of California -- San Diego
> La Jolla, CA
> USA 92093
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Nov 29, 2009, at 11:17 AM, Larry Purss wrote:
> 
> > Jay
> > I agree that acts become symbolic because of there 
> ASSOCIATIONS and  
> > patterns with other acts which are experienced as meaningful.
> > The question I struggle with is the focus on "higher" symbolic 
> and  
> > "higher" cognitive relational patterns superceding and 
> transforming  
> > these initial "moments of connection"  I agree that 
> complexity is  
> > emergent and is formative of cultural historical patterns 
> of  
> > activity and all the theories that try to understand this 
> matrix is  
> > foundational to understanding human science.
> > However, this is where the "relational psychoanalytic" 
> discourse  
> > points to a recognition that these "moments of connection" 
> continue  
> > to be central (at the level of affect attunement) to all the 
> further  
> > elaboration of culture.
> > If these "moments of connection" become disconnected (as a 
> regular  
> > pattern) the whole cultural ediface collapses for that person 
> who is  
> > disconnected.
> > Larry
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Jay Lemke <jaylemke@umich.edu>
> > Date: Sunday, November 29, 2009 10:53 am
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >
> >> Larry,
> >>
> >> I certainly agree about the importance of understanding how
> >> "moments
> >> of connection" occur, even across species, and to do so as
> >> a
> >> meaningful-and-feelingful process.
> >>
> >> In Goodall's case, I wonder how long a prior period of
> >> interaction
> >> there may have been with this particular chimp? and whether some
> >> sort
> >> of bond was building up, with this special moment as an
> >> emergent
> >> threshhold for a qualitatively new relationship.
> >>
> >> In the case of chimps, however, I don't think we can exclude
> >> that the
> >> processes involved may have been "symbolic" in some sense,
> >> as
> >> something like a symbolic capacity is well developed in their
> >> species.
> >> The gesture of touching hands, it seems to me, has a lot of
> >> symbolic
> >> potential in it: trust (cf. the human handshake or open-hand,
> >> no
> >> weapon gesture), and intimacy, and whatever relationships
> >> between
> >> chimps may involve light peripheral body contact, etc. How does
> >> an act
> >> become symbolic? at least in part because of its
> >> associations,
> >> sometimes even accidental ones, with other actions or
> >> activities. For
> >> instance, would we say that grooming behavior between chimps is
> >> not
> >> simply functional (to eliminate parasites), but also symbolic
> >> of
> >> nurturance relationships? or at least proto-symbolic?
> >>
> >> Here is a hypothesis: no meaning without feeling, and no
> >> feeling
> >> without meaning.
> >>
> >> JAY.
> >>
> >> Jay Lemke
> >> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> >> Educational Studies
> >> University of Michigan
> >> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> >> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> >>
> >> Visiting Scholar
> >> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> >> University of California -- San Diego
> >> La Jolla, CA
> >> USA 92093
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Nov 28, 2009, at 11:15 PM, Larry Purss wrote:
> >>
> >>> Emotions is a central topic to reflect on in our ways of being
> >> human.> I was watching Moyers on PBS yesterday and he was
> >> interviewing Jane
> >>> Goodal.  She described an incident when a chimp reached
> >> out and took
> >>> her hand and their eyes met. She described this as a profound
> >> moment
> >>> of recognition for both of them and changed their way of being
> >> with
> >>> each other. In our theories of emotions we must include
> >> an
> >>> explanation of what changed in their relationship because of
> >> that
> >>> moment of connection that was not symbolic and was pre-
> >> linguistic,
> >>> but was communication.
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>> ----- Original Message -----
> >>> From: Beth Ferholt <bferholt@gmail.com>
> >>> Date: Saturday, November 28, 2009 9:33 pm
> >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
> >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>
> >>>> Jay,
> >>>> I am thinking about a three year old I knew very well explaining
> >>>> that the
> >>>> girl next door was his best friend because she made him cry 
> --
> >>>> apparently a
> >>>> good thing, at least until he learned otherwise from the older
> >>>> people in his
> >>>> life!
> >>>> But we adults relearn all the time from the children around us
> >>>> that sadness
> >>>> (maybe not fear and its opposite, but certainly sadness), is
> >> not as
> >>>> different from happiness as we tend to assume.
> >>>> Beth
> >>>>
> >>>> On Sat, Nov 28, 2009 at 11:59 PM, Jay Lemke
> >>>> <jaylemke@umich.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> I have had Scheff on my reading list for a while, but was away
> >>>> from the
> >>>>> right kinds of libraries most of last year.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm afraid I just don't see why it's important to list
> >>>> something as a
> >>>>> "basic" emotion? That usually just means that someone 
> wants it
> >>>> to count as
> >>>>> having academic or intellectual importance, or that they want
> >>>> to link it to
> >>>>> our baser animal nature, or that it's a candidate for some
> >>>> sort of
> >>>>> biological universal, pre-determined by evolution. All of
> >>>> which agendas give
> >>>>> me the creeps!
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But I've heard good things about Scheff, so I will get round
> >>>> to him soon.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> How about this: there are several hundred "basic" emotions?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> In any case, I was thinking of anthropological arguments about
> >>>> "guilt> cultures" vs. "shame cultures" and the kind of analysis
> >>>> Achilles was citing
> >>>>> from LSV about how feelings, whatever their biological
> >>>> functions or
> >>>>> antecdents, get infused and transformed by culture into
> >>>> something a great
> >>>>> deal more.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thanks for the reminder about Scheff!
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> JAY.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Jay Lemke
> >>>>> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> >>>>> Educational Studies
> >>>>> University of Michigan
> >>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> >>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Visiting Scholar
> >>>>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> >>>>> University of California -- San Diego
> >>>>> La Jolla, CA
> >>>>> USA 92093
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On Nov 28, 2009, at 8:47 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Thomas Scheff
> >>>>>> http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/
> >>>>>> makes a good case that guilt is among the basic emotions, Jay.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Jay Lemke wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Achilles, and friends --
> >>>>>>> I am not sure of the best interpretation of LSV's position
> >>>> on these
> >>>>>>> matters, but it seems to me to be in the spirit of his work
> >>>> and the later
> >>>>>>> CHAT tradition that we imagine a culturally informed
> >>>> "development" (probably
> >>>>>>> with phylogenetic antecedents) in which the "higher"
> >>>> functions develop out
> >>>>>>> of the earlier ones by a progessive layering or refinement,
> >>>> specialization,>>> and differentiation -- both for higher
> >>>> feelings as well as higher
> >>>>>>> cognitions.
> >>>>>>> Indeed I don't think we want to separate affect and
> >>>> cognition, or feeling
> >>>>>>> and meaning, emotion and reason, too much. A little
> >>>> distinction is useful to
> >>>>>>> give us purchase on understanding their integration. I would
> >>>> assume that in
> >>>>>>> the developmental and evolutionary sequence, these two
> >>>> aspects of our
> >>>>>>> adaptive operating-with-the-world, are initially less
> >>>> separable and less
> >>>>>>> distinguishable, aspects of a single functional process. And
> >>>> that later in
> >>>>>>> the sequence we LEARN to MAKE a distinction, and perhaps
> >>>> even to FEEL a
> >>>>>>> difference between them.
> >>>>>>> But it is their functional integration which is of the 
> greatest>>>>>>> importance, not their difference (in my 
> opinion). So to the
> >>>> higher mental
> >>>>>>> functions viewed cognitively (and it is not at all clear
> >>>> that LSV did view
> >>>>>>> them ONLY cognitively in our modern sense) there must
> >>>> correspond also
> >>>>>>> "higher feelings", what we might call culturally refined or
> >>>> culturally>>> differentiated and functionally specialized
> >>>> feelings, which function as part
> >>>>>>> of the whole engagement in activity that enables us to
> >>>> sometimes get a bit
> >>>>>>> ahead of our semi-predictable environments. Insight.
> >>>> Intuition. A feeling
> >>>>>>> for the organism. Good hunches. Good judgment. A nose for
> >>>> useful lines of
> >>>>>>> research. And so on.
> >>>>>>> Of course once we are immersed in a complex world of highly
> >>>> culturally>>> differentiated feelings, we realize that their
> >>>> functions are not simply
> >>>>>>> practical, not simply dictated by evolutionary fitness. Or
> >>>> at least not in
> >>>>>>> very obvious ways. And so I have taken to making a heuristic
> >>>> distinction of
> >>>>>>> my own in terminology among emotions (the more classical
> >>>> ones, triggered by
> >>>>>>> environmental events, with obvious adaptive significance,
> >>>> like those listed
> >>>>>>> by Darwin and borrowed by James, such as fear, anger,
> >>>> disgust, desire,
> >>>>>>> etc.), affects (which I use to mean the "higher" feelings,
> >>>> the more
> >>>>>>> culturally specific and "refined" ones, like feeling noble
> >>>> or feeling
> >>>>>>> guilty), and feelings as such (the general category, of
> >>>> which emotions and
> >>>>>>> affects are subclasses, and which also includes the more
> >>>> auto-perceptual
> >>>>>>> feelings like feeling tired or feeling dizzy).
> >>>>>>> Again it is not so much the distinctions here that I value
> >>>> theoretically,>>> but getting a sense of the scope of the whole
> >>>> domain of feelings, and how to
> >>>>>>> make sense of any particular feeling-type within it.
> >>>> (Distinguishing again
> >>>>>>> between the uniqueness of a particular feeling on a
> >>>> particular occasion and
> >>>>>>> the more generic feeling-types recognized or recognizable
> >>>> culturally across
> >>>>>>> instances.)
> >>>>>>> Whew!  A lot to chew on ...
> >>>>>>> JAY.
> >>>>>>> Jay Lemke
> >>>>>>> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> >>>>>>> Educational Studies
> >>>>>>> University of Michigan
> >>>>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> >>>>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> >>>>>>> Visiting Scholar
> >>>>>>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> >>>>>>> University of California -- San Diego
> >>>>>>> La Jolla, CA
> >>>>>>> USA 92093
> >>>>>>> On Nov 27, 2009, at 10:45 PM, Achilles Delari Junior wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Jay,
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Thank you very much.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Something near to this distinction between feelings and
> >> emotions>>>>>> was posed by William James too, according
> >> Vygotsky, but James
> >>>>>>>> saw this distinction in terms that these social dimension
> >>>> of affective
> >>>>>>>> world, the higher feelings, have almost nothing related to
> >>>> biological,>>>> physiological, material, body, conditions. And
> >>>> Vygotsky criticizes
> >>>>>>>> this like a way of dualistic thinking - this dualism 
> can be
> >>>> understood>>>> as based in ideological motivations too: "the
> >>>> human is not an animal,
> >>>>>>>> nor a material been, but a divine been, in his higher, 
> superior>>>>>>>> feelings..."
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> A distinction between feelings and emotions is present in
> >>>> Damasio too
> >>>>>>>> in neurofunctional terms... But Vygotsky proposed the
> >>>> question of
> >>>>>>>> a systemic inter-relationship in that the lower can turns
> >>>> higher, and
> >>>>>>>> vice versa... I don't know what we can thing about this...
> >>>> In this
> >>>>>>>> case, distinction between feelings and emotions are useful,
> >>>> but if
> >>>>>>>> we want to understand the entire human been, his/her whole
> >>>> personality,>>>> the integration and inter-functional relations
> >>>> between feelings and
> >>>>>>>> emotions turns relevant too, In my point of view.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Best wishes.
> >>>>>>>> Achilles.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> From: jaylemke@umich.edu
> >>>>>>>>> To: lchcmike@gmail.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] about emotions
> >>>>>>>>> Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2009 19:28:26 -0800
> >>>>>>>>> CC:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I am certainly one of those people interested in emotion,
> >>>> or feeling,
> >>>>>>>>> or affect, or whatever we choose to make of the phenomenon.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> The topic seems to have historically accumulated a lot of
> >>>> ideological>>>>> baggage. And while its expression may be more
> >>>> sophisticated today than
> >>>>>>>>> in times past, there doesn't seem to be that much less of
> >>>> it (as for
> >>>>>>>>> example in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy review
> >>>> noted by
> >>>>>>>>> someone earlier).
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Emotion tends to be seen as bad in our philosophical
> >>>> tradition. As the
> >>>>>>>>> enemy of reason, the motor of self-deception, etc. It
> >>>> links us to the
> >>>>>>>>> animals, to our "baser" nature, etc. A bit of this in
> >> the pagan
> >>>>>>>>> tradition, a lot of it in christian asceticism, and tons
> >>>> of it in
> >>>>>>>>> Enlightenment rationalism and its successors.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Emotions are also associated with the unreliable feminine
> >>>> vs. the cool
> >>>>>>>>> and collected masculine, with the passions of the mob
> >> vs. the
> >>>>>>>>> thoughtful elite, with peasants, workers, and children,
> >>>> and pretty
> >>>>>>>>> much every social category whose oppression needs some
> >>>> legitimation.>>>>> Indeed one of the near universal
> >>>> legitimations of elite power is "we
> >>>>>>>>> know what's good for you", not just because of what we
> >>>> know, but
> >>>>>>>>> because you can't be trusted to see your own best
> >>>> interests through
> >>>>>>>>> the haze of your emotions.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Useful as this is to elite interests, it combines further
> >>>> with the
> >>>>>>>>> cult of individualism to make emotions a purely
> >>>> individual, mental,
> >>>>>>>>> subjective matter. Non-material, non-social, non-
> >> cultural, and
> >>>>>>>>> universal (the easier to apply the stigma of emotionality
> >>>> to non-
> >>>>>>>>> European cultures). It is rather hard to crawl out of this
> >>>> pit of mud.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> As I've been trying to do for the last year or two. There
> >>>> would be too
> >>>>>>>>> much to say for a short post on this list, but here 
> are a
> >>>> few basic
> >>>>>>>>> suggestions:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Feeling is a broad enough category to get back to the
> >>>> phenomenology of
> >>>>>>>>> affect/emotion, whereas "emotion" is too narrowly defined
> >>>> within the
> >>>>>>>>> tradition of animal-like and universal.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> There are a LOT of different feelings, and that is more
> >>>> important than
> >>>>>>>>> efforts to identify some small number of basic emotions.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Many feelings are associated with evaluative judgments and
> >>>> this may be
> >>>>>>>>> a key link to re-unify affective and cognitive.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Feelings do differ significantly across cultures, and are
> >>>> part of a
> >>>>>>>>> larger system of meanings-and-feelings specific to a
> >> community.>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> You can't make meanings across any longer term process of
> >>>> reasoning>>>>> without feelings and evaluative judgments.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> It is likely that feelings have histories, both in
> >>>> cultures and in
> >>>>>>>>> individuals.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Feelings are often reliable guides to survival, to
> >>>> adaptive action,
> >>>>>>>>> and to finding ways to meet our needs.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Feelings are just as situated and distributed as are
> >>>> cognitions. And
> >>>>>>>>> just as active and actively made and produced.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> In short -- pretty much everything in our dominant
> >>>> tradition about
> >>>>>>>>> emotions and feelings is exactly wrong -- and for the
> >>>> worst possible
> >>>>>>>>> ideological-political reasons, I believe.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> JAY.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Jay Lemke
> >>>>>>>>> Professor (Adjunct, 2009-2010)
> >>>>>>>>> Educational Studies
> >>>>>>>>> University of Michigan
> >>>>>>>>> Ann Arbor, MI 48109
> >>>>>>>>> www.umich.edu/~jaylemke
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> Visiting Scholar
> >>>>>>>>> Laboratory for Comparative Human Communication
> >>>>>>>>> University of California -- San Diego
> >>>>>>>>> La Jolla, CA
> >>>>>>>>> USA 92093
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 26, 2009, at 8:08 AM, mike cole wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> With so much interest in achieving an integrated
> >>>> understanding of
> >>>>>>>>>> emotion,
> >>>>>>>>>> cognition, and development, Achilles, your focus on this
> >>>> topic is a
> >>>>>>>>>> helpful
> >>>>>>>>>> reminder of its continued importance.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Seems like one of those many areas in psychological
> >>>> research where
> >>>>>>>>>> we cannot
> >>>>>>>>>> keep from murdering to dissect.
> >>>>>>>>>> mike
> >>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> >> _________________________________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> Novo site do Windows Live: Novidades, dicas dos produtos
> >> e
> >>>> muito mais.
> >>>>>>>> Conheça!
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>
> >> 
> http://www.windowslive.com.br/?ocid=WindowsLive09_MSN_Hotmail_Tagline_out09_______________________________________________>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> --
> >>>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------
> --
> >> --
> >>>> ----------
> >>>>>> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> >>>>>> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> >>>> Ilyenkov $20
> >>>>>> ea
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
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