1. Quite true Andy . Yes , putting some , few , a , two , whatever into
the heart of an assertion of *every* , *all* is mere tautology which I
shyingly / ashamedly believe Martin is committing not just once but
several times .
2. I suppose here you could point out to Martin that he could be taken
to be right only if he thought of a materialistic monism and I wonder
why you didn't . Yes , materialistic Monism opposes strongly the
Cartesian dualistic understanding of matter/mind , body/soul either
belonging to a quite unfamiliar separate world/domain . If we reject the
Cartesian dualism , it's not plea for others to argue we negate our
belief in two distinct but related philosophically categorical domains
of materiality/ideality , a thing versus concept of a thing , etc. Once
I said while we ourselves are creations of the outdide--matter-- .... ,
does that mean my consciousness which is real and exists , is matter ?
or even material in the sense of palpable , corporeal , stuffy ? No for
sure . I added that some philosophers argue Cs is material in the sense
of it being an attribute of matter and even this does not evade the
categorical distinction .
3. This time , pardon , tautology on your side . It's Martin who should
ask you to show him a representational system which is not *material*
because he asserts materiality with *every* ... . But when I gave
you *language* and some other *systems* as some representational systems
being ideal reasoning upon them , it was dear Martin who should have
broken the silence , entered the discussion and come up with likely
refutations . I already had sided with you .
4. Again I wonder why you who so scholarly argue for the quite
legitimate philosophical categorical distinction of the mind/matter ,
are ready to accept language is material ; and how can you separate thus
language domain from the Cs , mind , intellect , ideality , subjectivity
domain ? Then Martin will be quite right to think of all these as being
material . I'm now reading Dubrovsky's *The Nature of the Ideal* . Maybe
it's a borderline category but I'm sure it's philosophical , too . No
time to search now . It's a familiar controversy here . I side with the
external ideals as being representations of the internal ideals rather
than being genuinely material as other world corporeal objects . We have
suffered lots of confusion with this *doubling* of materiality . I
suppose we have to put them in contrast to each other , otherwise there
will remain unsolved problems . Take the best of the bees and the worst
of the architects or the *real* talers of Marx along with Gods as
examples of ideals -- my previous posts .
5. You do know language came into being because of collective labour .
And please have another look at V's last two paragraphs of T&S . And
please think of what a syntax of a thought might be with children . And
please consider yourself reviewing the lecture you're going to deliver
*in* your mind before putting it in its sound/acoustic version . And
historical genesis as well . Now may you , in your turn , tell me what
kind of existence a consciousness has for which you are seeking an
appropriate definition ?
I wonder if sleep will reign !
--- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<email@example.com>/* wrote:
From: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
quality of the man-sign"
Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <email@example.com>
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 11:54 AM
Haydi, I firmly believe that there is no value in flying on to 101
questions if the very first one remains unsolved.
Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this:
Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all
"material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that
*everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that
these representational systems were material was a "motherhood
statement", i.e., a tautology.
So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not*
material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that
everything is material. You then said that you could name a
representational system which was not material, namely, language.
I responded to you that language was always material, and you now
say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put into a
body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the 'ideal'
which is a social category, not an opposite to "material."
Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a language
which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body. Can you
explain to me what kind of existence language has before it is put
I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this will
lead us back to our original problem: consciousness.
Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> First there were other argumentations .
> Second : to your question : Consciousness itself .
> Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem
persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have
two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the
necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that
itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be
buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known ,
indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct .
> I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a
palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational ,
secondary , derived . Haydi
> --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<firstname.lastname@example.org
> From: Andy Blunden <email@example.com
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
> quality of the man-sign"
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org
> Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM
> Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in
> which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of
> course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial.
> a representational system which is *not* "embiodied."
> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> > Dear Andy
> > Language itself aside from the modality in which it is
> formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the
> folowing reasons : 1. We have read on many occasions that it's a
> formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something
> catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite
> why is it you could accept a formant of this something
> distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* .
> just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a
> *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real
> as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real
> money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy ,
> yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are
> representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the
> and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be
> recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/Cs , the whole
> things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange
> value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second
> > condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the
ink , the
> carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not
> *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* ,
> of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content
> of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln
> Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same
> time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this
> day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many
> many parts , that is , many corporals , materials , use values ;
> but all these should be organized in such a way to represent
> something else , time measurement . The palpability or the
> of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something
> material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this .
> When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the
> sentence/text/book becomes ink
> > spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your
> *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite
> ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone
> a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as
> markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining
> stone frame does not have anything to do with the language
> it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the
> organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the
> stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading
> each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a
> telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your
> mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is
> for your vision not for the language you are using . And
> because a word is a sign , something for something else , in
> ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as referring
> objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively
> are defending !
> > Best
> > Haydi
> > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <email@example.com
> > From: Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
> quality of the man-sign"
> > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <email@example.com
> > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM
> > Language is a material representational system, Haydi.
> > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text
> on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in
> or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy
> of language that I know of.
> > Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material?
> > Andy
> > Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system
> is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which
> > _______________________________________________
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> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
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