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Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign"

1. Quite true Andy . Yes , putting some , few , a , two , whatever into the heart of an assertion of *every* , *all* is mere tautology which I shyingly / ashamedly believe Martin is committing not just once but several times . 
2. I suppose here you could point out to Martin that he could be taken to be right only if he thought of a materialistic monism and I wonder why you didn't . Yes , materialistic Monism opposes strongly the Cartesian dualistic understanding of matter/mind , body/soul either belonging to a quite unfamiliar separate world/domain . If we reject the Cartesian dualism , it's not plea for others to argue we negate our belief in two distinct but related philosophically categorical domains of materiality/ideality , a thing versus concept of a thing , etc. Once I said while we ourselves are creations of the outdide--matter-- .... , does that mean my consciousness which is real and exists , is matter ? or even material in the sense of palpable , corporeal , stuffy ? No for sure . I added that some philosophers argue Cs is material in the sense of it being an attribute of matter and even this does not evade the categorical distinction . 
3. This time , pardon , tautology on your side . It's Martin who should ask you to show him a representational system which is not *material* because he asserts materiality with *every* ... . But when I gave you *language* and some other *systems* as some representational systems being ideal reasoning upon them , it was dear Martin who should have broken  the silence , entered the discussion and come up with likely refutations . I already had sided with you . 
4. Again I wonder why you who so scholarly argue for the quite legitimate philosophical categorical distinction of the mind/matter , are ready to accept language is material ; and how can you separate thus language domain from the Cs , mind , intellect , ideality , subjectivity domain ? Then Martin will be quite right to think of all these as being material . I'm now reading Dubrovsky's *The Nature of the Ideal* . Maybe it's a borderline category but I'm sure it's philosophical , too . No time to search now . It's a familiar controversy here . I side with the external ideals as being representations of the internal ideals rather than being genuinely material as other world corporeal objects . We have suffered lots of confusion with this *doubling* of materiality . I suppose we have to put them in contrast to each other , otherwise there will remain unsolved problems . Take the best of the bees and the worst of the architects or the *real* talers
 of Marx along with Gods as examples of ideals -- my previous posts . 
5. You do know language came into being because of collective labour . And please have another look at V's last two paragraphs of T&S . And please think of what a syntax of a thought might be with children . And please consider yourself reviewing the lecture you're going to deliver *in* your mind before putting it in its sound/acoustic version . And historical genesis as well . Now may you , in your turn , tell me what kind of existence a consciousness has for which you are seeking an appropriate definition ? 
I wonder if sleep will reign !
Friendly Yours

--- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material quality of the man-sign"
Cc: "Culture ActivityeXtended Mind" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 11:54 AM

Haydi, I firmly believe that there is no value in flying on to 101 questions if the very first one remains unsolved.

Going to your third: the problem under discussion was this:

Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so the statement that these representational systems were material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology.

So I responded "show me a representational system which is *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he says that everything is material. You then said that you could name a representational system which was not material, namely, language.

I responded to you that language was always material, and you now say "no, language is an non-material entity which is "put into a body." I suspect that you are relying on the concept of the 'ideal' which is a social category, not an opposite to "material."

Let's just deal with this. I don't accept that there is a language which is non-material which can then be "put into" a body. Can you explain to me what kind of existence language has before it is put into material.

I won't try to anticipate your answer, but I wonder if this will lead us back to our original problem: consciousness.


Haydi Zulfei wrote:
> Andy
>  First there were other argumentations .
>  Second : to your question : Consciousness itself .
>  Third : This was just a telegraphic note but the problem persists . Embodiment is to put something in a body . Then we have two things . The cover and the covered . In principle , the necessity of putting that something -- ideal -- in a body is that itself is not of the same genus . That's for you to expect ideals be buried there in the mysterious hidden box yet not quite well known , indefinable ! at times , stopped , deceased , so life is also defunct .
>  I can also give *subjectivity , subjectness* ; can you show me a palpable thing called *subjectivity* and it's representational , secondary , derived .   Haydi
> --- On *Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden /<ablunden@mira.net>/* wrote:
>     From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>     Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
>     quality of the man-sign"
>     To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>     Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 9:57 AM
>     Haydi, you can't talk of "Language *aside from* the modality in
>     which it is embodied" and then say "language is not material." Of
>     course, anything "aside from" its materiality is immaterial. Show me
>     a representational system which is *not* "embiodied."
>     Andy
>     Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>      > Dear Andy
>      >  Language itself aside from the modality in which it is
>     formed/embodied and as it is consisted of signs is ideal for the
>     folowing reasons :  1. We have read on many occasions that it's a
>     formant of the Cs . When you are dealing with the Cs as something
>     catogirically distinct from the material which is quite quite true ,
>     why is it you could accept a formant of this something categorically
>     distinct from *material* could be all the way *material* . This is
>     just where Martin finds the opportunity to argue for a doubling of
>     *materiality* . A statue as such is ideal the same way real talers
>     as well as Gods are ideal for Marx (previous post) . Real talers or
>     money paper are things palpable , corporeal , stuffy , substantial ;
>     yet they are for Marx ideal ; the yardstick is that they are
>     representations for something *esle* . The talerness of the talers
>     and the statueness of a statue need a social thinking body to be
>     recognized as such . Aside from the social thought/Cs , the whole
>     things become just use values , valueless , lacking any exchange
>     value as for Marx . And we shouldn't forget the second
>      >  condition Lenin mentions either . As of language , the ink , the
>     carbon or the acoustics with which it is embodied does not make it
>     *material* the same way *stone* , *bronze* , *cement* , *plastics*
>     of a staue do not make the *form* -- not contrasting content here --
>     of the statueness *material* ; the form now indicates Lincoln , now
>     Lenin , now so and so . But the stone , etc. remain the same all the
>     time . This latter part you name categorically *material* to this
>     day distinct from the *ideal* as Cs is . A clock consists of many
>     many parts , that is  , many corporals , materials , use values ;
>     but all these should be organized in such a way to represent
>     something else , time measurement . The palpability or the visuality
>     of the clock should not take us where we could say it's something
>     material . See what of the three divisions of Peirce fits this .
>     When you take the ideality of the language away from it , the whole
>     sentence/text/book becomes ink
>      >  spilt/scattered over the paper out of neglect . Your example of
>     *carved in stone* incidentally helps us to get the gist quite easily
>     ; you , in fact , take some materiality away from the stone so that
>     a language becomes eligible for the readers . What remains as some
>     markings or signs no longer have any materiality ; the remaining
>     stone frame does not have anything to do with the language carved in
>     it . This is also true with the braille texture . It's the
>     organization/ordinance of the texture which is a language not the
>     stuff therefrom . When you and Mike are on the screen lipreading
>     each other in non-acoustics silence , you , in fact , have a
>     telepathy version of language ; you're this way exchanging your
>     mentalities with no materiality at hand . The computer is modality
>     for your vision not for the language you are using .  And lastly ,
>     because a word is a sign , something for something else , in itself
>     ! just a yelling or a marking denoting nothing as referring to the
>     objects of the world which you so philosophically / inexaustively
>     are defending !
>      >  Best
>      >  Haydi
>      > --- On Sat, 9/26/09, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>     <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>      >
>      >
>      > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>     <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=ablunden@mira.net>>
>      > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness "only a part of the material
>     quality of the man-sign"
>      > To: "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com
>     <http://us.mc464.mail.yahoo.com/mc/compose?to=haydizulfei@yahoo.com>>
>      > Date: Saturday, September 26, 2009, 12:26 AM
>      >
>      >
>      > Language is a material representational system, Haydi.
>      >
>      > Language may be in speech (vibrations in the air), text (markings
>     on a surface or optical projections on a screen or carved in stone)
>     or texture (as in Braille), but there is no mental telepathy version
>     of language that I know of.
>      >
>      > Why do you think the written and spoken word is not material?
>      >
>      > Andy
>      > Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>      >> Now you ask Martin to tell you a representational system which
>     is not *material* . I tell you *language* is a system which is not
>     material.
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >
>      >       _______________________________________________
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>      > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>      >
>     --
>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>     Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
>     Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
>     Ilyenkov $20 ea
>     _______________________________________________
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Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov $20 ea

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