[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ; From 2-?
- To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <email@example.com>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Intensions in context and speech complexity ; From 2-?
- From: Mike Cole <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2009 09:11:00 -0700
- Delivered-to: email@example.com
- Dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:reply-to:in-reply-to :references:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=Ic+4hSt99v2wzXnyEBIZzUHyT2k//O/EIGpK/Wb4up4=; b=T+kgRPXm3itl/WRPh0E1ioh4TGNzK3GRm677Jh1XTzdfZSiIiKFcqX76oEXwW4ljoT NhyuMsTYlBpepGfI+AsDeWnXrf/3RWIbe19HLIDlFNB0CYwl8fHv7oYuOFHPiSrzlSyU ALiqIh8aJb4PvR14tm/TZ0L/eLfzItJLoTIEQ=
- Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:reply-to:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id :subject:from:to:content-type; b=X6ePuSWXF2BCXnmglv0nykz4biwvfsFD/2AKF9F6XpseSLrRBWvnD1xojlECVoBIAs mQ0otzXxiTDrszSiW3g+5yWyn8YimPwAl+ALPAtaEtLd4wzXNqEPvSkbGTzhSayYdaHC mj52eM2vAav65iFIkG/jv6ebbtH6v1HLWNKzo=
- In-reply-to: <4BA1A14C-FFE5-42A9-A4C7-FA9A4BBD9BC1@eastsideinstitute.org>
- List-archive: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca>
- List-help: <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org?subject=help>
- List-id: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca.weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-post: <mailto:email@example.com>
- List-subscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org?subject=subscribe>
- List-unsubscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:email@example.com?subject=unsubscribe>
- References: <firstname.lastname@example.org> <4A640110.email@example.com> <firstname.lastname@example.org> <4BA1A14C-FFE5-42A9-A4C7-FA9A4BBD9BC1@eastsideinstitute.org>
- Reply-to: email@example.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
- Sender: email@example.com
On Mon, Jul 20, 2009 at 9:05 AM, Lois Holzman <
> This formulation of the question is clarifying, Mike, and helps me realize
> that I can't answer it—
> because it is asking something in terms that frame the thing that's going
> on in a particular way that, to me, is too assumptive.
> I don't see it in terms of external constraints, intentions and goals - I
> don't have a mentalistic understanding of the social relational activity of
> speaking, creating conversation, playing with language.
> I can't see what is gained by invoking compliance, imposition, limitations,
> intentions and goals, and I feel that doing so obscures the "form of
> life"-ness. I'm with Wittgenstein on this - speaking is part of an activity,
> or of a form of life."
> An experimenter asking a child to "say what I say" is a particular language
> game, and the same child talking/babbling in another situation is another.
> If I understand, you're trying to find a reason that what the child says is
> different in the two. I guess I wonder why you think they wouldn't be. And
> why the direction to look is "internal."
> Lois Holzman, Director
> East Side Institute for Group and Short Term Psychotherapy
> 920 Broadway, 14th floor
> New York NY 10010
> tel. 212.941.8906 ext. 324
> fax 212.941.0511
> On Jul 20, 2009, at 10:56 AM, Mike Cole wrote:
> Andy/David/ Lois:
>> Why are the simplifications when children imitate sentences that carry out
>> the intentions of others and limit their agency to
>> complying with external constraints imposed by others absent when they
>> out their own intentions in speech acts that are instrumental to carrying
>> out those goals and may be more complicated, grammatically, than what
>> experimenters ask of them? I get the dropping out the subject part in
>> speech, I think.
>> On Sun, Jul 19, 2009 at 10:30 PM, Andy Blunden <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
>> Mike, my reading of Vygotsky's explanation of the process of speech being
>>> abbreviated as it transforms into silent speech, as I recall, is that the
>>> child for example leaves off the subject of a sentence for example,
>>> they already know the subject, and such like. I.e., as I read it, they
>>> dense elements of context internally so that the verbal instruction to
>>> themselves carries that context implicitly. Just like if I say "Pass me
>>> that" the hearer won't understand without the help of a shared visual
>>> So intention is part of the context, but it is the context, and it's
>>> various mental representations and cues which is relevant, isn't it?
>>> So for example, the continued presence of all the elements of a snippet
>>> dialogue act as cues which would allow something to be repeated, because
>>> entire act in response to cues in the context can be repeated.
>>> But also, relevant to a topic we have been discussing, Mike, the project
>>> which the speech act is a part has to be understood and shared by the
>>> if they are to make sense of it, and of course psychological testing is
>>> generally such a project.
>>> I don't really know if that's relevant to the distinction you're after
>>> Mike Cole wrote:
>>> David's note of a few days ago on 3-7 year old changes in egocentric
>>>> me of an old article by Slobin and Welch (reprinted in Ferguson and
>>>> *Studies of Child Development, 1963)
>>>> *that it took a while to track down. The study is often cited in studies
>>>> elicited imitation where an adult says some
>>>> sentence and asks a little kid to repeat it. Kids simplify the sentence
>>>> normal circumstances ("Where is the kitty"
>>>> becomes "where kitty") and other such stuff. There is a pretty large
>>>> literature on this.
>>>> But when I went to find the phenomenon in the article that had most
>>>> me, I could not find it in the recent lit
>>>> on elicited imitation. The phenomenon seems relevant to the monologic,
>>>> dialogic etc speech discussion.
>>>> The phenomenon is this: When a 2yr/5month old child is recorded saying
>>>> you finish your eggs all up, Daddy, you
>>>> can have your coffee." they can repeat this sentence pretty much as it
>>>> right afterward. But 10 minutes later it has
>>>> become simplified a la the usual observation.
>>>> Citing William James (the child has an "intention to say so and so")
>>>> and Welch remark:
>>>> If that linguistic form is presented for imitation while the intention
>>>> still operative, it can be faily successfully imitated. Once the
>>>> is gone, however, the utterance must be processed in linguistic terms
>>>> -- without its original intentional and
>>>> contextual support." In the absence of such support, the task can
>>>> the child's abilities and reveal a more limited competence than may
>>>> be present in spontaneous speech (p. 489-90).
>>>> This kind of observation seems relevant in various ways both to language
>>>> acquisition in school settings and to my reccurrent
>>>> questions about the social situation of development. Is it relevant to
>>>> discussion of egocentric and social speech, David?
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> Andy Blunden (Erythrós Press and Media) http://www.erythrospress.com/
>>> Orders: http://www.erythrospress.com/store/main.html#books
>>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca mailing list
> xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list