Re: [xmca] Ethnomethodology

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

This topic seems important to me. Might you write it up into an editorial
for mca, Ed? (I would suggest that you involve Martin, but, ugh, he has this
other topic he was going to write on).

Another article that some of us at LCHC have been discussing is harvey
sach's piece on "doing being ordinary" which, as it turns out also is not
incidently related, we believe, to Durkheim.

mike

On Tue, Mar 10, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Michael,
>
> I think it can fairly be said, as you do, that EM differs from all
> approaches to doing social research within FA. But there is other work that
> explores the What More? The point can be made concisely that FA treats the
> everyway work of producing order as a resource, but never as a topic. CA
> takes it as a topic of inquiry.
>
> Heidegger made the same point about Kant. He argued that Kant, in his
> analysis of human knowledge, had ignored the fundamental involvement of
> humans in the world, involvement that is practical, emotional, and
> concerned. Intentionality ­ the way perception is always a relationship to
> something in the world ­ is fundamental to being human. Kant cheated: he
> ³has to make use² of this basic relationality in his analysis of perception
> and knowledge ³without expressly recognizing it as such² (1975/1982, p.
> 67).
>
> Merleau-Ponty too, in the Phenomenology of Perception, makes this point
> about Kant, as prime representative of a model of human functioning that
> gives priority to formal knowledge, and ignores or dismisses practical
> know-how:
>
> "the numerical specifications of science retrace the outline of a
> constitution of the world which is already realized before shape and size
> come into being. Kant takes the results of this pre-scientific experience
> for granted, and is enabled to ignore them only because he makes use of
> them² (1945/1962, p. 301-2)
>
> I imagine Hegel said the same about Kant - can anyone provide an example?
>
> And Foucault too focuses on What More?, describing for example his approach
> in the Archaeology of Knowledge in this way: it...
>
> "consists of not ­ of no longer ­ treating discourses as groups of signs
> (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as
> practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of
> course, discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is *more* than
> use these signs to designate things. It is this *more* that renders them
> irreducible to language (langue) and to speech. It is this *Œmore¹* that we
> must reveal and describe² (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 49, emphasis added)
>
> Here too the important move is to recommend that formal knowledge,
> representation, is secondary to and based on something more fundamental
> that
> FA (whether it be Kant or Grounded Theory) ignores. Practical know-how is
> more fundamental than formal know-that. (English lacks the distinction made
> in Spanish between 'conocer' and 'saber,' or in French between 'savoir' and
> 'connaitre,' which are the terms Foucault used.)
>
> Martin
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 3/10/09 12:41 PM, "Wolff-Michael Roth" <mroth@uvic.ca> wrote:
>
> > I show how
> > the EM what more differs from ALL other approaches to doing social
> > research.
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca