[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 78

To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 78
From: Indy Guide <indyguide@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 00:37:23 -0500
Delivered-to: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Dkim-signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=domainkey-signature:mime-version:received:in-reply-to:references :date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=h5JeS9pUi1bZ3KAb2HGKUUP3mMJ6xb8dK8drunIgHdM=; b=N08+Y6B/Je1iHMSad41BX658Hwea0sK0cgvtaMVMKjwM6IgqZoubkHm2UHP4wSVdAO 4IAA+bIYafCgHrK3RGwQO3dNrU7cl5YBIYBKKj2ljJagBNBkJPeBLjkNx+pcsXBw21ZT BPy+mr4fLjk7vimL4r8Saoq5J9tyPYFeqIRck=
Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :content-type; b=GSbIgeTmmgNR4wecX03wP+z/O2NlGVcUckvQZ07LacIOyH41nfZFAAScGWhR47DPcj 1NuzXyejvVISeRvXMUZ5iE4qYlGz+Ev2YZyll02rmXBzg2h/u1//EPB43YrXcTVNB+sU j1Q6HrFNJNXEiEdVvvlB/qzinvSq2Io+138dA=
In-reply-to: <20090224012623.2D8ED1B98D1@weber.ucsd.edu>
List-archive: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca>
List-help: <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=help>
List-id: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca.weber.ucsd.edu>
List-post: <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
List-subscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=subscribe>
List-unsubscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=unsubscribe>
References: <20090224012623.2D8ED1B98D1@weber.ucsd.edu>
Reply-to: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sender: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
David K.

 don't you think it's reasonable to say that LSV transcended (or
attempted to transcend) the internal-external dichotomy?

jay
http://fatbikez.com

On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 8:26 PM, <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu> wrote:

> Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>        xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>        http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>        xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>        xmca-owner@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re: On Marxist and non-Marxist aspects of the
>      cultural-historical psychology of LSV (E. Knutsson)
>   2. RE: Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
>      (Achilles Delari Junior)
>   3. Re: Ilyenkov on the material and spiritual (Andy Blunden)
>   4. Re: Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
>      (Andy Blunden)
>   5. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 47: Ilyenkov on ideality
>      and social relations (Derek Melser)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 23:03:41 +0100 (CET)
> From: "E. Knutsson" <eikn6681@student.su.se>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] On Marxist and non-Marxist aspects of the
>        cultural-historical psychology of LSV
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <14754472.89741235426621531.JavaMail.eikn6681@student.su.se>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
>
> David K.
>
> You mentioned LSV's use of terms like 'internal' and 'external' to point to
> the
> inside and the outside of a single semiotic process. If, according to LSV,
> all
> higher mental functions "originate as actual relationships between
> individuals": don't you think it's reasonable to say that LSV transcended
> (or
> attempted to transcend) the internal-external dichotomy?
>
> E.K.
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 22:26:43 +0000
> From: Achilles Delari Junior <achilles_delari@hotmail.com>
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <COL109-W65DE5FA906542034034C1392AE0@phx.gbl>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
>
> Greetings for all...
>
> One more question, please:
>
> What do you think about the ontological/methodological role that "unit of
> analysis"
> and/or "microcosm" can play in the actual relation between the "object of
> study"
> and its "explanatory principle(s)"?
>
> Thank you.
> Achilles.
>
>
>
>
>
> > From: vygotsky@unm.edu
> > To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
> > Date: Mon, 23 Feb 2009 10:29:13 -0700
> > CC:
> >
> > David,
> > Your last message provided a very clear analysis of the microcosm/unit
> > analysis.
> > Thanks, Vera
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "David Kellogg" <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
> > To: <mcole@weber.ucsd.edu>; "xmca" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Sent: Monday, February 23, 2009 5:29 AM
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
> >
> >
> > On the subject of dress. Until I was forty years old, I didn't really
> know
> > how to tie a necktie. When I got a job at a university, it became every
> > important for me to learn, and I asked my father, who, being rather old
> > fashioned, wore a necktie every single day of this teaching life.
> >
> > My father was enough of a teacher to realize that this was a skill that
> had
> > to be imparted through ACTION and not through WORD MEANING. So he tried
> to
> > SHOW me. But he was also enough of a teacher to realize that tying a
> necktie
> > requires a mirror-image reversal of perspective, and so he made the
> mistake
> > of trying to show me how to tie a necktie on MY neck rather than just
> > showing me how to tie a necktie on HIS neck.
> >
> > He couldn't do it. This is a man who has tied quite literally thousands
> of
> > neckties. But the skill of tying a necktie on your OWN neck does not seem
> to
> > generalize to tying neckties on other people's necks. This is, of course,
> > what Thorndike found when he looked at perceptually based skills like
> > estimating line segments. He found that these skills (and also motor
> skills
> > like tying knots) did not generalize.
> >
> > But notice that SOME of my father's skills DID generalize. For instance,
> he
> > knew that in order to teach somebody a motor skill you need to SHOW them
> and
> > not TELL them. He also knew that it's better to take THEIR perspective in
> > showing them than to take your OWN. These skills are NOT perceptually
> based.
> > They are not motor based. They are higher level "skills" (I'm rather
> unsure
> > whether we should continue to call them skills; it seems to me that
> > "knowledge" might be more appropriate here.)
> >
> > Of course, that's what Vygotsky told Thorndike. He said that the reason
> why
> > the various skills on his tests wouldn't generalize was that they were
> all
> > lower level psychological functions, which are embedded in separate motor
> > routines. But that's NOT true of higher level psychological functions,
> all
> > of which are mediated by word meanings. My father's teaching skills are
> now
> > almost completely unconscious (because they have been automatized) but
> they
> > were painstakingly built up through decades of three hour lectures and
> > workshops and laboratory sessions.
> >
> > Now, it seems to me that I understand what Nikolai was saying very well
> (and
> > I understand Andy not at all!). Nikolai argued that a microcosm is
> different
> > from a unit because a macrocosm is not reducible, without remainder, to
> many
> > many "cosms" which are in turn reducible (again without remainder) to
> > "microcosms". But a "unit of analysis" has to be reducible in this way.
> >
> > This is essentially what Leontiev believes about "activity", which is
> > reducible without remainder to "actions", in turn reducible without
> > remainder to operational conditions. But of course it is absolutely NOT
> true
> > of Vygotsky's real model, which is not Leontiev's "mediated action" but
> > instead Marx's commodity. We cannot say that capitalist economic
> relations
> > are reducible without remainder to commodities.
> >
> > Some commodities are mostly exchange value and other commodities are
> mostly
> > use value and they are not even reducible to each other. In the same way,
> > some mediating artefacts are mostly symbols and others are mostly tools,
> and
> > these are qualitatively different; by interacting, they produce a whole
> > macrocosm which is not reducible to the some of its microcosmic parts.
> >
> > Symbols are not reducible to tools, because they have an additional
> > function, that of acting on the user's mind, which is not found in the
> tool.
> > For that reason, we cannot say that a mind is reducible to nothing but
> > tools, or for that matter to nothing but symbols. A mind is a macrocosm
> > which cannot be reduced to the microcosms of word meanings.
> >
> > Nikolai is quite right that the philosophical tradition of Goethe, the
> > Gestalt and the "macrocosm" is one philosophical tradition, and the
> > philosophical tradition of Democratus, the atom, and the analytical unit
> is
> > another. But I do NOT think this means that Vygotsky was following one
> > philosophical tradition in Chapter One of Thinking and Speech where he
> > argues that the meaningful word is a unit of thinking and of speech (and
> of
> > social interaction and communication) and a completely different one in
> > Chapter Seven where he says that the meaningful word is a microcosm of
> > consciousness.
> >
> > I think it means that in Chapter One he is laying out what his analysis
> will
> > accomplish, and in Chapter Seven he is summing up what it has
> accomplished.
> > That is why he uses "unit" in the first chapter and "microcosm" in the
> last.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Cansado de espaço para só 50 fotos? Conheça o Spaces, o site de
> relacionamentos com até 6,000 fotos!
> http://www.amigosdomessenger.com.br
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 10:30:06 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Ilyenkov on the material and spiritual
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <49A3317E.8080900@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Yeah, I think I made a pretty weak argument here. At some
> later time we must return to the question of what is
> actually meant by "material" in the clearly ontological
> sense, and what it could mean to say that consciousness is
> material, but let's leave that till we have cleared up a
> couple of other terms.
>
> Andy
>
> Martin Packer wrote:
> > 'Spiritual life' is a term from Plato, hence in quotes. Here Ilyenkov is
> > granting that in his doctrine of the 'Platonic' forms that have their own
> > objective existence, Plato recognized something true about individual
> > consciousness - that it depends on ideal (yet material) forms whose
> > existence is social, and so completely independent of the individual.
> > There's no suggestion here that consciousness is not itself material, if
> > this is what you want to imply.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On 2/23/09 3:38 AM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> >> If everything is material for Ilyenkov, Martin, what does he
> >> mean by this:
> >>
> >> "Here [in Plato], in a semi-mystical, semi-mythological form
> >> was clearly established a perfectly real fact, the fact of
> >> the dependence of the mental (and not only mental) activity
> >> of the individual on the system of culture established
> >> before him and completely independently of him, a system in
> >> which the ³spiritual life² of every individual begins and
> >> runs its course."
> >>
> >> Using Google, I find that Ilyenkov often uses "spiritual" in
> >> contrast to "material", sometimes in inverted commas but
> >> often not all.
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>> Andy,
> >>>
> >>> Once again you're pointing out what is material for Ilyenkov. I didn't
> >>> bother to emphasize what things are material, because Ilyenkov is a
> >>> materialist. Everything in his ontology is material. He is a monist!
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
> Skype andy.blunden
> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 10:52:50 +1100
> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID: <49A336D2.60900@mira.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Well, at last our lack of understanding is mutual David, so
> we start from a good old "level playing field"!
>
> You conclude that 'in Chapter One he [LSV] is laying out
> what his analysis will accomplish, and in Chapter Seven he
> is  summing up what it has accomplished. That is why he uses
> "unit" in the first chapter and "microcosm" in the last.'
>
> Does that mean that you are re-asserting that "word meaning"
> is a unit of analysis for consciousness? Or did I lose you
> somewhere along the line?
>
> Andy
>
> David Kellogg wrote:
> > On the subject of dress. Until I was forty years old, I didn't really
> know how to tie a necktie. When I got a job at a university, it became every
> important for me to learn, and I asked my father, who, being rather old
> fashioned, wore a necktie every single day of this teaching life.
> >
> > My father was enough of a teacher to realize that this was a skill that
> had to be imparted through ACTION and not through WORD MEANING. So he tried
> to SHOW me. But he was also enough of a teacher to realize that tying a
> necktie requires a mirror-image reversal of perspective, and so he made the
> mistake of trying to show me how to tie a necktie on MY neck rather than
> just showing me how to tie a necktie on HIS neck.
> >
> > He couldn't do it. This is a man who has tied quite literally thousands
> of neckties. But the skill of tying a necktie on your OWN neck does not seem
> to generalize to tying neckties on other people's necks. This is, of course,
> what Thorndike found when he looked at perceptually based skills like
> estimating line segments. He found that these skills (and also motor skills
> like tying knots) did not generalize.
> >
> > But notice that SOME of my father's skills DID generalize. For instance,
> he knew that in order to teach somebody a motor skill you need to SHOW them
> and not TELL them. He also knew that it's better to take THEIR perspective
> in showing them than to take your OWN. These skills are NOT perceptually
> based. They are not motor based. They are higher level "skills" (I'm rather
> unsure whether we should continue to call them skills; it seems to me that
> "knowledge" might be more appropriate here.)
> >
> > Of course, that's what Vygotsky told Thorndike. He said that the reason
> why the various skills on his tests wouldn't generalize was that they were
> all lower level psychological functions, which are embedded in separate
> motor routines. But that's NOT true of higher level psychological functions,
> all of which are mediated by word meanings. My father's teaching skills are
> now almost completely unconscious (because they have been automatized) but
> they were painstakingly built up through decades of three hour lectures and
> workshops and laboratory sessions.
> >
> > Now, it seems to me that I understand what Nikolai was saying very well
> (and I understand Andy not at all!). Nikolai argued that a microcosm is
> different from a unit because a macrocosm is not reducible, without
> remainder, to many many "cosms" which are in turn reducible (again without
> remainder) to "microcosms". But a "unit of analysis" has to be reducible in
> this way.
> >
> > This is essentially what Leontiev believes about "activity", which is
> reducible without remainder to "actions", in turn reducible without
> remainder to operational conditions. But of course it is absolutely NOT true
> of Vygotsky's real model, which is not Leontiev's "mediated action" but
> instead Marx's commodity. We cannot say that capitalist economic relations
> are reducible without remainder to commodities.
> >
> > Some commodities are mostly exchange value and other commodities are
> mostly use value and they are not even reducible to each other. In the same
> way, some mediating artefacts are mostly symbols and others are mostly
> tools, and these are qualitatively different; by interacting, they produce a
> whole macrocosm which is not reducible to the some of its microcosmic parts.
> >
> > Symbols are not reducible to tools, because they have an additional
> function, that of acting on the user's mind, which is not found in the tool.
> For that reason, we cannot say that a mind is reducible to nothing but
> tools, or for that matter to nothing but symbols. A mind is a macrocosm
> which cannot be reduced to the microcosms of word meanings.
> >
> > Nikolai is quite right that the philosophical tradition of Goethe, the
> Gestalt and the "macrocosm" is one philosophical tradition, and the
> philosophical tradition of Democratus, the atom, and the analytical unit is
> another. But I do NOT think this means that Vygotsky was following one
> philosophical tradition in Chapter One of Thinking and Speech where he
> argues that the meaningful word is a unit of thinking and of speech (and of
> social interaction and communication) and a completely different one in
> Chapter Seven where he says that the meaningful word is a microcosm of
> consciousness.
> >
> > I think it means that in Chapter One he is laying out what his analysis
> will accomplish, and in Chapter Seven he is  summing up what it has
> accomplished. That is why he uses "unit" in the first chapter and
> "microcosm" in the last.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
> Skype andy.blunden
> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2009 14:25:18 +1300
> From: Derek Melser <derek.melser@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 47: Ilyenkov on
>        ideality        and social relations
> To: ablunden@mira.net,  "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>        <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Message-ID:
>        <739d15940902231725t1ad1cf44r12acd242aeccf0c5@mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252
>
> Dear Andy, Martin, Steve, David and other contributors to this thread,
> Let me butt in here, possibly a bit rudely...
> I presume everyone agrees with LSV and me that consciousness (including
> perceiving and thinking) and speech are actions of the person. [Even if
> consciousness covers, or qualifies, a whole range of actions ('conscious
> action'), it is still fundamentally actional – still something we *do *(and
> have to learn how to do).]
>
> And I presume everyone agrees with LSV and me that solo action is
> derivative
> of and reducible to shared (concerted) activity, rather than the other way
> round.
>
> And I presume everyone agrees that LSV sometimes describes speech as if it
> were the using of purpose-made artifacts (words qua 'tools') and at other
> times describes speech as if it were not an artifact-using kind of action
> at
> all, but rather a pure action (like sighing ostentatiously, signalling 'no'
> or plucking a grape). [I agree with the 'pure action' view. A written word
> is a graphic representation of an act of speaking. But that act of speaking
> is not literally a matter of 'using a word'. Even Skinner saw that.]
>
> Whichever side we come down on on the 'words as artifacts' issue, we still
> have to face the fact that there are such things as purpose-made artifacts
> and they are somehow to be distinguished from natural phenomena. And there
> are such things as people's actions too. These also have to be
> distinguished, somehow, from natural phenomena.
>
> So we are left with two very important questions. I personally would much
> rather know what the answers to them are than know what any past scholar,
> of
> whatever nationality or political persuasion, thought about it (though that
> could be interesting).
>
> 1. Are purpose-made artifacts (a USB key, say, or a road sign) objectively
> observable physical phenomena?
>
> 2. Are people's actions objectively observable physical phenomena?
>
> Derek
>
> http://www.derekmelser.org
>
>
> 2009/2/23 Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>
> > I think I need to start saying things like 'ideal aspect' or
> > referring to 'ideality'. (Almost) everything made by human
> > labour has 'significance' or 'meaning' and this does not
> > exclude the fact that many properties of a thing may be
> > natural rather than ideal. The provenance of a coin
> > incorporates it within a country's money system, but none of
> > the physical properties of it establish that provenance,
> > because coutnerfeiters are clever. But the tarnishing of
> > silver coins is not an artefact, that is a natural of all
> > silver coins. I think 'ideality' is a property of certain
> > things which is quite distinct from any physical property.
> > How do you describe what sort of property is ideality?
> >
> > Thinking about why Marx's analysis of money is so central
> > (for Ilyenkov for example) to a solution of the problem of
> > the ideal, and not just the nature of capitalism. I think
> > money is a kind of 'microcosm' (to link this to the
> > discussion with Nicolai).
> >
> > People can say words are just made up, conventional symbols,
> > but words are just like money, and people think that money
> > is just a conventional symbol, too. The way money emerged
> > from thousands of years of human practice demonstrated how
> > the ideal emerges out of the practice of bringing things
> > into elation with one another in labour processes. I want to
> > think about this some more, MArtin, and thank you for your
> > continual challenges!
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Martin Packer wrote:
> > > Andy,
> > >
> > > Once again you're pointing out what is material for Ilyenkov. I didn't
> > > bother to emphasize what things are material, because Ilyenkov is a
> > > materialist. Everything in his ontology is material. He is a monist!
> > >
> > > But he still wants to draw distinctions. I should probably have been
> > clearer
> > > that when Ilyenkov writes that it is the task of philosophy to clarify
> > > "the distinction between the 'ideal' and the 'real' ('material')," what
> > he
> > > must mean is the distinction between what is ideal (and also material)
> > and
> > > what is material (but not also ideal). I presume that this distinction
> > must
> > > be drawn by humans (even philosophers are human!), using social
> > practices.
> > > If everything within social practice becomes ideal (if, as you put it,
> > > "every artifact is... ideal"), how could this task ever be completed? I
> > can
> > > only infer that for Ilyenkov there are things within social practice
> that
> > > are material (of course) but not ideal. And then it follows that only
> > > certain material things within social practice are (also) ideal.
> > >
> > > What are these ideal (yet material) things? Images, monuments, money,
> > > drawings, models, and "such symbolic objects" as banners, coats of
> > arms....
> > >
> > > Martin
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On 2/22/09 12:36 AM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> > >
> > >> Martin Packer wrote:
> > >>> Clearly he [Ilyenkov]
> > >>> understands that it is a complete mistake to draw the line between
> the
> > ideal
> > >>> and the material so that the mind is on one side and the world on the
> > other.
> > >>> But he evidently still wants to draw the line. My interpretation is
> > that he
> > >>> wants to draw it between those social artifacts that become ideal and
> > those
> > >>> that do not.
> > >> I don't think this is right Martin, though Ilyenkov focusses
> > >> so much on Marx's treatment of money, one wonders ... If
> > >> there is to be a line, then it would be between artificial
> > >> and natural, (i.e., part of a labour process or not part of
> > >> a labour process) or between the mental and the material
> > >> (see the commentary on Kant's idea about the real talers in
> > >> his pocket). But even then there could be no actual thing
> > >> which was wholly ideal or natural. Both the ideal and the
> > >> natural can be material and can be reflected in
> > >> consciousness. Ideal things are ideal from the beginning to
> > >> the end of their perception by an individual, that's the
> > >> point I think.
> > >>
> > >> Looking at any given artefact, there are things about it
> > >> which are incidental with respect to any labour process and
> > >> other things which can be understood only in relation to
> > >> their meaning in some labour process. Every artefact is (as
> > >> I read it) both natural and ideal.
> > >>
> > >> I take the materiality of a thing to be its existence
> > >> outside of consciousness and its connection with every other
> > >> material thing in hte universe. Materiality is therefore a
> > >> property of an ideal such as a coin as much as it is a
> > >> property of the other side of the moon. Hegel of course
> > >> "mistakenly" thought that ideality existed in Nature.
> > >>
> > >> In his book about Lenin, Ilyenkov says:
> > >>
> > >> 'Consciousness'  let us take this term as Lenin did  is
> > >> the most general concept which can only be defined by
> > >> clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of
> > >> 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived.
> > >>
> > >> You've raised some interesting issues in this email Martin.
> > >> I need to think some more about it ...
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> Andy
> > >>
> > >>
> > >>> I think, in fact, that the interpretation you are offering is
> > attributed by
> > >>> Ilyenkov to Hegel. For Hegel, he says (along with other idealists
> such
> > as
> > >>> Popper and Plato):
> > >>>
> > >>> "what begins to figure under the designation of the ³real world² is
> an
> > >>> already ³idealised² world, a world already assimilated by people, a
> > world
> > >>> already shaped by their activity, the world as people know it, as it
> is
> > >>> presented in the existing forms of their culture."
> > >>>
> > >>> This is your position too, isn't it - that the social world is made
> up
> > of
> > >>> ideal objects?
> > >>>
> > >>> Ilyenkov argues that Marx used the term 'ideal' in the same way as
> > Hegel,
> > >>> but applied it to a completely different "range of phenomena":
> > >>>
> > >>> "In Capital Marx quite consciously uses the term ³ideal² in this
> formal
> > >>> meaning that it was given by Hegel... although the
> > philosophical-theoretical
> > >>> interpretation of the range of phenomena which in both cases is
> > similarly
> > >>> designated ³ideal² is diametrically opposed to its Hegelian
> > interpretation."
> > >>>
> > >>> Martin
> > >>>
> > >>>
> > >>> _______________________________________________
> > >>> xmca mailing list
> > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >>>
> > >
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > >
> >
> > --
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/><
> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
> > Skype andy.blunden
> > Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> > http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
> End of xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 78
> ************************************
>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Prev by Date: Re: [xmca] On Marxist and non-Marxist aspects of the cultural-historical psychology of LSV
Next by Date: Re: [xmca] Re: microcosm/unit of analysis and xmca discourse
Previous by thread: Re: [xmca] On Marxist and non-Marxist aspects of the cultural-historical psychology of LSV
Next by thread: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 47: Ilyenkov on ideality and social relations
Index(es):
- Date
- Thread