In the meantime Martin ..."Monism" has to be qualified. If dualism means sorting everything into two categories of thing, then monism is a watse of time, because sorting everything into one category is not sorting them at all. Let's say we have monism (All is One) and then we make a distinction ... ?
And "material" and "ideal" are not contraries to be distinguished from one another in this discourse. If anything, I guess the opposite of "ideal" is "natural", i.e., not the product of a labour process.
Andy Martin Packer wrote:
Andy, the aim, as I understand it, is to articulate a monist account of ontogenesis in a social form of life. If this leads to absurdity it would, I suppose, demonstrate that monism fails just as miserably as dualism. But I don't yet think this is the case. Yes, an organism adapts by changing both its environment and itself. But such a broad statement says both too much and too little. It's as true of a snail as of a human. If we don't attribute minds (of the Kantian kind) to snails there's no logical necessity to attribute them to humans either, at least if we can find a more convincing alternative. In a separate message I will try to unpack Ilyenkov's acount of how humans change themselves. We can get our teeth into that. Martin On 2/20/09 12:57 AM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:Your comments about the limitations of the commonsense idea of my navigational ability amounting to an image of the world inside my body are valid enough, but I think that if you push this position to its extreme you end up in just as much nonsense as someone who still believes in the homunculus. An organism adapts to its environment, by changing that environment, yes, but also by changing themselves. Andy PS, Yes cultural-historical philosophy (if I could call it that) begins with the critique of Kant, but I understand from Ilyenkov, that Kant was responding to Hume ... Martin Packer wrote:Andy, I would say that Ilyenkov is clear that he is responding not to Hume or Descrates, but to Kant. It was Kant who simply equated ideality with individual consciousness. Ilyenkov writes that "Here “ideality” is clearly understood as a synonym for the “pure” and the a priori nature of consciousness as such, with no external connections." The ability to summon Melbourn landmarks in ones imagination is an impressive feat, but not one we should straighforwardly equate with being able to navigate the city on foot. Like "inner" speech, it's almost irresistable to ask *where* such visual and auditory images are located, and then reply, in the mind! And then to assume that *all* cognitive activity goes on in the same 'place.' Nonsense! Most of our cognition is in the world, in practice, in the wild, an embodied intelligence. But this is *my* objection to internal images. I'm more interested at the moment in figuring out Ilyenkov's position. Martin On 2/19/09 12:44 AM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:Martin, I don't know if this will help or make things worse. ... I understand your antipathy to the whole idea of "internal images". If, as some French philosophers seemed to think, nothing happened between Desartes and Saussure, we would have to share your antipathy. But the German tradition was responding to Hume not Descartes and "internal images" in the sense of Locke or Descartes have been off the table since 1790-something. I think it's like "The Unconscious". We all know that the Unconscious exists, it's part of our everyday experience. My unconscious does half my work, at least. But from CHAT we know that the Unconscious is a product of development which only arises fairly late in ontogenetic development, probably just in time to know what the words "The Unconscious" mean. But if like Freud we make The Unconscious a basic premise of the structure of the Mind, then that is entirely something else, and may lead to mysticism. I think it is the same with "internal images". I could tell you with my eyes closed every landmark between here and the centre of Melbourne several miles away, without the aid of a map or anything. So having such an "internal image" is a matter of commonplace experience. But psychological experimentation shows that my capacity to reconstruct these images in any form is an immensely complex process, at which I can arrive only after some development. Does that help, or not maybe? Andy Andy Blunden wrote:In "Learning by Expanding", Engstrom quotes V P Zinchenko as claiming that "word meaning" is very close to being a special case of "tool mediated action". I think this is correct and one could add "joint" as it is invariably other people that one shares meaning with, not things, and meaning which is not shared is nothing. A word is no more nor less ideal than a key or a dollar or a wine bottle or a white shirt or an automobile or an open hand, but how can we counterpose words or any artefact to activity? Activity uses artefacts and is impossible without them; things are only artefacts insofar as they are incorporated in Activity. Andy Martin Packer wrote:But Andy, if we're following Ilyenkov's lead, don't words have an ideal character that activity lacks? Martin On 2/17/09 9:11 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:(2) Apart from artefacts, is also activity. Doubtbless activity is implicit in meaning in some way, but it is unclear to me. I think it is a mistake to make the foundation of consciousness just words, rather than practice. Andy Mike Cole wrote:Without the time (or skill to switch to cyrrilic!) I have been thinking about Kolya's questions, ,David. For those who forget in the stream of xcma chatting, Nikolai asks: where Vygotsky posits word meaning as unit of analysis of human consciousness? In which text and on what page? From what Vygotsky's work it is taken? Could I ask you to make a quotation from Vygotsky? Thank you in advance Nikolai I was thinking how nice it would be to know how to search the vygotsky corpus online in Russian, which I do not know how to do. And remembering fragments of why I thought David's comments resonated strongly with my own intuitions, formed in part, by LSV. such as (no quotations or page numbers, just failing memory here): meaning is the most stable form of sense-- every totally stable? really? word meaning changes in development the closing of *Speech and Thought *that David points to, the drop of water, perhaps, being in my eye. The citation of the fragment from Doestoevsky where a bunch of guys are standing around saying, it seems, the word "product of defecation" (oh poo!) and every one is using the same word and every one is both saying the same thing and saying something different. Don't all of these and many other examples (Paula, are the Sakharov -LSV blocks of any help here?) point to the general conclusion that David was asserting? Might our Russian friends join Nikolai and help us to understand the core of the issue David raised? Is he incorrect? Can you search the corpus and help us to understand if we are misleading each other? mike On Tue, Feb 17, 2009 at 5:26 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:Dear Professor Veresov: Let me begin by saying how much we enjoy your work here in Korea. Our group has been discussing your 2005 "Outlines" article "Marxist and non-Marxist aspects of the cultural historical psychology of L.S. Vygotsky" since we read it last year, and I found your 2006 article "Leading activity in developmental psychology" very useful in figuring out why I don't accept the whole construct of "leading activity". I think that BOTH works are really quite central to the periodization problem under discussion, but I also think that BOTH works refer mainly and centrally (and thus for me somewhat misleadingly) to a period of Vygotsky's oeuvre that is quite different from the one I have in mind. The 2005 article places a good deal of stress on early Vygotsky, a Vygotsky who is almost non-Vygotskyan, or at least non-psychological, Vygotsky in his early twenties, a student of the humanities with a very strong sense that nothing human is alien to them. The 2006 article in contrast seems to me to place a great deal of stress on the post-Vygotsky period, and I was very surprised and pleased to read that the work on "leading activity" is really not as far as I had thought from the fragments LSV left behind in his unfinished "Child Development". Elkonin, at any rate, seems to have been fully aware that the "leading activity" is in no way typical or characteristic of a particular period (though Leontiev and lately Karpov have said exactly the opposite). The problem remains that I do not see any place for the crisis in this work, and there is no question but that MY Vygotsky, LATE Vygotsky, the Vygotsky of Thinking and Speech gives the crisis an absolutely central (one might even say a critical) role. Of course, when I said that word meaning is a unit of analysis for human consciousness I am not simply repeating what others have said (e.g. Werstch 1985). On the contrary, I mean what for me is the most mature and therefore in some ways least characteristic moment of Vygotsky's own work; I might even call it the "leading activity" of his thinking. I meant, especially, the very last three paragraphs of Thinking and Speech. I have always found this to be a little like the last page of "Origin of Species", rather more than a conclusion, but a whole revolutionary program, complete with a clarion call in the very last six words: Осмысленное слово есть микрокосм человеческого сознания. David Kellogg Seoul National University of Education. _______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca_______________________________________________ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
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