Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Ah, yes, Nikolai. There is the problem of being busy and unable to promise
to contribute to discussions on XMCA. It is widely felt and acknowledged.

There is a lot of interest in getting the chronology of ideas among Russian
psychologists, not only Vygotsky Et al but others, more or less straight,
including the relationship between what they write and their social context
at that time. It is not an easy matter, even for historians of Russian
social sciences, let alone those for whom that topic is peripheral but
signficant.

There are also ongoing examinations and re-examinations of concepts and
their meanings, not only as they might appear in translation dictionaries
and specialized dictionaries such as Meshcheryakov and Zinchenko, but in
different time periods applied to different specific topics. Naglyadno which
appeared in the discussion yesterday is a case in point.

To me these issues are always worth re-examination, partly because more
information becomes available (it was a matter of some danger to interact
with an American in Moscow at the time when relevant scholars were alive
in the 60's+, a matter of further danger to take books out of Moscow, etc.),
the relationship between theoretical frameworks and conceptual distinctions
was poorly understood, and new, relevant data have subsequently appeared.
So this "historical" strain in MCA discussion, with several native Russian
speakers with good command of English, Finnish and other intermediaries,
etc. has a signficance that goes beyond the minutea.

At the same time, current attempts to comprehend, extend, improve upon
theories that are about 100 years old when the telephone switchboard
metaphor was the height of scientific chic when talking about the brain and
short lengths of silent film were all that many had at their disposal, are
important. Hence the tradition of discussion of ongoing, current research.

I hope you and everyone has voted on the articles currently on offer. All
are
interesting and relatively inexpensively available directly from the
publisher. But one is free even to those who could not otherwise get access,
thereby broadening the possibilities for international understanding.

See you when your busy schedule permits.
mike

On Tue, Feb 10, 2009 at 3:27 AM, Nikolai Veresov
<nikolai.veressov@oulu.fi>wrote:

> Thank you, Mike, for your kind invitation. Of course I had "discussants" in
> my mind. There are some topics here I am interested in, I so I will follow
> the discussions. As for possible comments, I cannot promise.
> All the best
> Nikolai
>
> ----- Original Message ----- From: <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>
> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Monday, February 09, 2009 7:13 PM
> Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24
>
>
>  Send xmca mailing list submissions to
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>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>  1. Re: Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13 (Mike Cole)
>>
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 09:13:02 -0800
>> From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>> Message-ID:
>> <30364f990902090913l5ad0c719h9cbb0c2081cb7590@mail.gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=KOI8-R
>>
>> Nice to have your chronological clarifications, Nikolai.
>> I believe the initial word you were looking for in your greeting was
>> discussant, althought at times
>> it may seem difficult to tell the difference!
>>
>> I hope you will join us in voting for an article to discussion from MCA
>> and
>> joint the discussion.
>> mike
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 9, 2009 at 7:53 AM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Nikolai:
>>>
>>> Very concise and thoughtful summary.  I count myself as among the
>>> ignorant
>>> who have always equated reflexology and behaviorism.  Now that you have
>>> set
>>> this record straight I am interested in your view of the difference.  I
>>> look forward to your reply.
>>>
>>> eric
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                     "Nikolai
>>>                     Veresov"                 To:      <
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>                     <nikolai.veresso         cc:
>>>                     v@oulu.fi>               Subject: [xmca] Re: xmca
>>> Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>>>                     Sent by:
>>>                     xmca-bounces@web
>>>                     er.ucsd.edu
>>>
>>>
>>>                     02/09/2009 01:14
>>>                     AM
>>>                     Please respond
>>>                     to "eXtended
>>>                     Mind, Culture,
>>>                     Activity"
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Good day to all highly respected disputants
>>>
>>> As you know I am not actively involved in this discussion list, but I
>>> read
>>> it carefully. I made my mind to interrupt highly respected participants
>>> because of two reasons. First, it seems to me that before doing
>>> conclusions
>>>
>>> the researcher should investigate the topic as deep as possible. Second,
>>> my
>>>
>>> name was mentioned in Andy's message, which gives me right to reply, not
>>> in
>>>
>>> defence, but in respect to make things clear.
>>>
>>> As A. Pushkin wrote: Mislead me please, since I am glad to be misled.
>>>
>>> Andy wrote:
>>>
>>> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for >
>>> behaviourism"
>>> I
>>> > found the style of presentation a bit confusing at times, and then I >
>>> read
>>> > the translator's (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the >
>>> speech
>>> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet another
>>> document.
>>> > So I think to myself "I have been wrong all along!" So I tracked down >
>>> the
>>> > speech and transcribed it.
>>> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the "Consciousness is
>>> > a
>>> > problem ..." one.
>>> >
>>> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the two documents
>>> is
>>> > an academic nicety (from where I'm coming from.)
>>>
>>> The papers of Vygotsky (1) "The methods of..." based on his presentation
>>> made at 1924 Congress in Petrograd and (2) "Consciousness as a problem"
>>> reflect different periods of his scientific evolution. I mean the
>>> transition
>>> from reflexological model to behaviouristic one. What can mislead the
>>> reader
>>> of this paper is only the radical lack of academic knowledge of what is
>>> the
>>>
>>> difference between reflexology and behaviourism. It is true, that the
>>> papers
>>> are connected. But what is also true, that there is a deep difference in
>>> approaches in these two papers. I made the comparison of them in my book,
>>> no
>>> need to repeat it here, but let us just take two places from each. In the
>>> first paper, criticising the dualism of psychology, he argued the
>>> necessity
>>>
>>> to combine "subjective psychology" and reflexology on the basis of "an
>>> objective" method of study of the human consciousness. In the second one
>>> he
>>>
>>> rejected the idea of any reflexological explanation of consciousness: "we
>>> should beware of any direct transportation of reflexological laws into
>>> psychology" (Vygotsky 1982, p. 83). There is a number other places in the
>>> both papers, which show the differences between them - what is needed to
>>> see
>>> them, is just to open your eyes.
>>>
>>> There is one more point here, which cannot be missed. These two papers
>>> belong to two periods and it means that they must be analysed together
>>> with
>>>
>>> the other papers made during the same period. I mean, particularly, that
>>> the
>>> "Methods of..." is the result of Vygotsky's work in Gomel (definitely
>>> before
>>> 1924). It means, that Vygotsky was working in the psychology not in 1924
>>> but
>>> long ago (he himself wrote that he started his studies in psychology in
>>> 1917). "Pedagogical psychology" was written also in Gomel, and this book
>>> is
>>>
>>> reflexological, at least it is NOT behaviouristic (social
>>> behaviouristic).
>>> Even more, it could be a surprise to Andy, that at Petrograd Vygotsky
>>> made
>>> not one presentation, but three (the Program of the Congress is available
>>> in
>>> the Internet and in the book of Gita Vygodskaya). If we take all these
>>> papers together we will see very clear, that there is absolutely nothing
>>> about social behaviourism in them, including "The methods...". On the
>>> contrary,  Vygotsky called himself than a bigger reflexologist than
>>> Pavlov
>>> (Vygotsky, 1982c, p. 58; Vygotsky, 1994, p. 40). Of course, his
>>> reflexology
>>>
>>> was not Pavlovian, it was in search for the objective method of study of
>>> subjective phenomena. This important period of Vygotsky's work is missed
>>> in
>>>
>>> Jussi's paper, which is very sad since it completely destroys his overall
>>> construction.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, "Consciousness as a problem..." also was not a lonely
>>> paper made from nothing. It reflects the period when LSV was working in
>>> Moscow in a field of defectology (1924-19245), particularly with deaf and
>>> dumb children. In his experimental studies he went to the conclusion that
>>> the concept of reflex is not valid to explain the point and it is needed
>>> to
>>>
>>> search for another concept. Here again to understand the point we have
>>> not
>>> to separate the "Consciousness as a problem..." from the other works of
>>> that
>>> period. I doubt whether Andy knows LSV papers made during that period
>>> (1924-1925), whereas they ALL reflect the movement of Vygotsky from
>>> reflexology to behaviourism. Behaviouristic model was not satisfactory
>>> and
>>> LSV had to reject it very soon, but this is another story I have no time
>>> to
>>>
>>> discuss. I just want to say, that before comparing papers and made
>>> conclusions that the "only difference is their academic nicety" one have
>>> to
>>>
>>> investigate all the matters, which are behind and which are clear for
>>> those
>>>
>>> who have academic background. Otherwise the analysis will remain
>>> superficial. A golden ring and a wooden wheel also look similar, and so
>>> what?
>>>
>>> Nikolai
>>>
>>>
>>> From: <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2009 6:32 AM
>>> Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>>>
>>>
>>> > Send xmca mailing list submissions to
>>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> >
>>> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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>>> > You can reach the person managing the list at
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>>> >
>>> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>>> > than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Today's Topics:
>>> >
>>> >   1. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Andy Blunden)
>>> >   2. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Mike Cole)
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 1
>>> > Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2009 15:29:57 +1100
>>> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Behaviourism
>>> > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> > Message-ID: <498A6B45.2050109@mira.net>
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
>>> >
>>> > Apologies all. :( In typical fashion, after declaring
>>> > ignorance of this topic, I try to "correct" others, then
>>> > have to "correct myself", then withdraw my correction, and
>>> > now want to correct myself again. :( "Shoot first, answer
>>> > questions later!"
>>> >
>>> > I have always based my understanding of Vygotsky's entrance
>>> > into the world of psycholgy on Mike's Introduction to "The
>>> > Making of Mind" referring to the speech at the 2nd Congress
>>> > of blah blah blah in January 1924. That was why I objected
>>> > to the claim that Vygotsky started out as a "social
>>> > behaviourist" or *any kind* of behaviourist.
>>> >
>>> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for
>>> > behaviourism" I found the style of presentation a bit
>>> > confusing at times, and then I read the translator's
>>> > (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the speech
>>> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet
>>> > another document. So I think to myself "I have been wrong
>>> > all along!" So I tracked down the speech and transcribed it:
>>> >
>>> > http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm
>>> >
>>> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the
>>> > "Consciousness is a problem ..." one.
>>> >
>>> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the
>>> > two documents is an academic nicety (from where I'm coming
>>> > from.)
>>> >
>>> > So I just want to ask teh advocates of Vygotsky I, II and
>>> > III a couple of questions to help me understand:
>>> >
>>> > (1) By "social behaviourist" do you mean a follower of GH
>>> > Mead? Or do you mean someone thinking along the lines to
>>> > which GH Mead would come? Can you define the central idea?
>>> >
>>> > (2) The idea of construction of self (I) via Other (me) is
>>> > not sufficient basis for calling someone "social
>>> > behaviourist" is it? Whether you track this idea to Hegel
>>> > (1807), Mead (1932), Kojeve (1937), or elsewhere?.
>>> >
>>> > (3) Do you agree that Vygotsky's January 1924 speech is a
>>> > full-on attack on Behaviourism, which was at that time the
>>> > dominant creed at the Congress? He also attack the otehr
>>> > speakers at the Congress.
>>> >
>>> > (4) Do you think it makes sense to call someone engaged in a
>>> > critique of all existing views, who knows they do not yet
>>> > have an adequate theory and are just at the beginning of
>>> > their critique, any "ism" ?
>>> >
>>> > Serious questions. I'm trying to understand where you guys
>>> > are coming from.
>>> >
>>> > Andy
>>> >
>>> > Andy Blunden wrote:
>>> >> Mmmm. After re-reading this material myself, I have to now put myself
>>> >> into a "Don't Know" basket. Interesting material, but I withdraw my
>>> >> attempts to make any claims about it.
>>> >> Andy
>>> >> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>> >>> On the question of Vygotsky as a "social Behaviourist before 1929", I
>>> >>> have scanned two pages From the Introduction to Б─°Mind in >>>
>>> Society,Б─²
>>> >>> by
>>> >>> Mike Cole and Sylvia Scribner, pp 4-6
>>> >>>
>>> >>> POSTREVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY IN RUSSIA
>>> >>>
>>> >>> In the early decades of the twentieth century psychology in Russia,
>>> >>> as
>>> >>> in Europe, was torn between contending schools, each of which offered
>>> >>> partial explanations of a limited range of phenomena. In 1923 at the
>>> >>> first all-Russian psychoneurological congress K. N. Kornilov >>>
>>> initiated
>>> >>> the first major organizational and intellectual shift in psychology
>>> >>> following the revolution. At that time the prestigious Institute of
>>> >>> Psychology in Moscow was headed by G. I. Chelpanov, an adherent of
>>> >>> Wundt's introspective psychology and a foe of behaviorism. (He had
>>> >>> published the sixth edition of his book, The Mind of Man, a critique
>>> >>> of materialist theories of the mind, in 1917, just before the
>>> >>> revolution.) Chelpanov assigned a restricted role to Marxism in
>>> >>> psychology, asserting it could help explain the social organization
>>> >>> of
>>> >>> consciousness but not the properties of individual consciousness. In
>>> >>> a
>>> >>> talk entitled "Contemporary Psychology and Marxism" Kornilov
>>> >>> criticized Chelpanov both for the idealistic basis of his
>>> >>> psychological theory and for the restricted role he assigned to
>>> >>> Marxism in psychology. Kornilov, who called his own approach
>>> >>> reactology, sought to subsume all branches of psychology within a
>>> >>> Marxist framework that used behavioral reactions as the basic data.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Kornilov's critique of Chelpanov in 1923 won the day. Chelpanov was
>>> >>> removed as director of the Institute of Psychology and was replaced
>>> >>> by
>>> >>> Kornilov, who immediately brought together a corps of young >>>
>>> scientists
>>> >>> dedicated to formulating and promoting a *behavioral, Marxist theory
>>> >>> of psychology*.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Vygotsky must have produced quite a sensation one year later at the
>>> >>> second psychoneurological meeting when he gave a talk entitled
>>> >>> "Consciousness as an Object of the Psychology of Behavior." Whatever
>>> >>> else one extracted from Kornilov's reactological approach, it quite
>>> >>> clearly did not feature the role of consciousness in human activity,
>>> >>> nor did it accord the concept of consciousness a role in >>>
>>> psychological
>>> >>> science.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Vygotsky was *dissenting* from newly established authority. He was
>>> >>> not, however, promoting a return to the position advocated by
>>> >>> Chelpanov. In his initial speech and a series of subsequent
>>> >>> publications, he made it clear that in his view none of the existing
>>> >>> schools of psychology provided a firm foundation for establishing a
>>> >>> unified theory of human psychological processes. Borrowing a phrase
>>> >>> from his German contemporaries, he often referred to the "crisis in
>>> >>> psychology" and set himself the task of achieving a synthesis of
>>> >>> contending views on a completely new theoretical basis.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> For Vygotsky's Gestalt contemporaries, a crisis existed because
>>> >>> established theories (primarily Wundt's and Watsonian behaviorism)
>>> >>> could not, in their view, explain complex perceptual and
>>> >>> problemsolving behaviors. For Vygotsky, the crisis went much deeper.
>>> >>> He shared the Gestalt psychologists' dissatisfaction with
>>> >>> psychological analysis that began by reducing all phenomena to a set
>>> >>> of psychological "atoms." But he felt that the Gestalt psychologists
>>> >>> failed to move beyond the description of complex phenomena to the
>>> >>> explanation of them. Even if one were to accept the Gestalt >>>
>>> criticisms
>>> >>> of previous approaches, a crisis would still exist because psychology
>>> >>> would remain split into two irreconcilable halves: a "natural >>>
>>> science"
>>> >>> branch that could explain elementary sensory and reflex processes,
>>> >>> and
>>> >>> a "mental science" half that could describe emergent properties of
>>> >>> higher psychological processes. What Vygotsky sought was a
>>> >>> comprehensive approach that would make possible description and
>>> >>> explanation of higher psychological functions in terms acceptable to
>>> >>> natural science. To Vygotsky, explanation meant a great deal. It
>>> >>> included identification of the brain mechanisms underlying a
>>> >>> particular function; it included a detailed explication of their
>>> >>> developmental history to establish the relation between simple and
>>> >>> complex forms of what appeared to be the same behavior; and,
>>> >>> importantly, it included specification of the societal context in
>>> >>> which the behavior developed. Vygotsky's goals were extremely
>>> >>> ambitious, perhaps unreasonably so. He did not achieve these goals
>>> >>> (as
>>> >>> he was well aware). But he did succeed in providing us with an astute
>>> >>> and prescient analysis of modern psychology.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> A major reason for the continued relevance of Vygotsky's work is that
>>> >>> in 1924 and the following decade he constructed a penetrating >>>
>>> critique
>>> >>> of the notion that an understanding of the higher psychological
>>> >>> functions in humans can be found by a multiplication and complication
>>> >>> of principles derived from animal psychology, in particular those
>>> >>> principles that represent the mechanical combination of
>>> >>> stimulus-response laws. At the same time he provided a devastating
>>> >>> critique of theories which claim that the properties of adult
>>> >>> intellectual functions arise from maturation alone, or are in any way
>>> >>> preformed in the child and simply waiting for an opportunity to
>>> >>> manifest themselves.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> In stressing the social origins of language and thinking, Vygotsky
>>> >>> was
>>> >>> following the lead of influential French sociologists, but to our
>>> >>> knowledge he was the first modern psychologist to suggest the
>>> >>> mechanisms by which culture becomes a part of each person's nature.
>>> >>> Insisting that psychological functions are a product of the brain's
>>> >>> activity, he became an early advocate of combining experimental
>>> >>> cognitive psychology with neurology and physiology. Finally, by
>>> >>> claiming that all of these should be understood in terms of a Marxist
>>> >>> theory of the history of human society, he laid the foundation for a
>>> >>> unified behavioral science.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> --------------------------
>>> >>>
>>> >>> The text referred to above and  described on this list as I >>>
>>> understand
>>> >>> it, as evidence of Vygotsky's adherence to a variety of behaviourism,
>>> >>> is at:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Nicolai Veresov's commentary on it claims errors in Mike Cole's
>>> >>> narrative; but whether Vygotsky's article belongs to 1924, 1925 or
>>> >>> 1926, it is all within what has been spoken of as his "social
>>> >>> behaviourist" phase:
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>>
>>> http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>> For my part, I read this material as documenting that behaviourism
>>> >>> was
>>> >>> declared to be the Marxist Psychology in 1923 (coincident with the
>>> >>> death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin to leadership of the USSR) and
>>> >>> in the eyes of the vast majority of "Marxists", within and outside
>>> >>> the
>>> >>> USSR, remains so to this day.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> As I see it, the counter claim begins from Vygotsky's speech in 1924
>>> >>> (or 1925 or 1926).
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Andy
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Jussi Silvonen wrote:
>>> >>>> Hi everybody!
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> First, I'd like to thank Jonna for introducing my paper and starting
>>> >>>> the discussion.  I'm sorry about the delay of my comments - >>>>
>>> sometimes
>>> >>>> there is life also outside the academy (luckily not too often, as
>>> >>>> you
>>> >>>> know), which keeps us out of the office for few days.
>>> >>>> There are already too many issues in this ongoing and extremely
>>> >>>> interesting discussion to comment in one e-mail. So I will simply
>>> >>>> start by listing some of the issues mentioned so far. After that I
>>> >>>> try to a little bit clarify my motivations and point of view, to
>>> >>>> focus the discussion.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Before that, anyhow,  I have to make confession. I don't know >>>>
>>> Russian
>>> >>>> and read Vygotsky only in English and in German. I compiled a
>>> >>>> bibliography of English translations of LSV's works I know so far
>>> >>>> (=102), which shows the textual base of my paper. You can find it on
>>> >>>> my site:
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> http://joyx.joensuu.fi/~jsilvone/papers/Vygo_bibliography.pdf<http://joyx.joensuu.fi/%7Ejsilvone/papers/Vygo_bibliography.pdf>
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> (I added original dates of LSV's papers in the references and
>>> >>>> cross-referenced overlapping versions of  translations, hope this
>>> >>>> could help those not having the Collected Works in their library).
>>> >>>> Comments on the bibliography are welcomed, too. Those reading LSV in
>>> >>>> Russia can probably tell, if something (or what) essential sources,
>>> >>>> related to my arguments, are missing.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> 1.
>>> >>>> Reading very fast the comments so far, at least following topics or
>>> >>>> arguments were represented:
>>> >>>> - The question of periods in Vygotsky's work. According to David
>>> >>>> there would be almost a consensus about three Vygotskies ( LSV I,
>>> >>>> II,
>>> >>>> III), but this point was questioned. My special contribution to this
>>> >>>> debate, however, is not the statement of three periods as such, but
>>> >>>> the opinion that Vygotsky was committed to behaviorism in one moment
>>> >>>> of his thinking. This point obviously requires more discussion, as
>>> >>>> Steve and others remarked.
>>> >>>> - The question of the tools by which we should conceptualize the
>>> >>>> (possible) periods in LSV. My suggestion was that we could integrate
>>> >>>> some ideas / concepts from Althusser and Foucault to our attempt to
>>> >>>> understand critically and self-reflective way the development (or
>>> >>>> non-development) of our tradition. Some agreed to some degree, but
>>> >>>> the idea was strongly criticized, too (at least Andy).
>>> >>>> - The problem of semiotics or semiotic mediation in LSV is one of
>>> >>>> the
>>> >>>> key issues in my argumentation, connected to the hypotheses about
>>> >>>> epistemological break between LSV II and III. Somebody read my >>>>
>>> thesis
>>> >>>> as a statement about the priority on supremacy of semiosis / sign
>>> >>>> mediation. What I actually said, was that Vygotsky always related
>>> >>>> different forms of mediation to each other, and that inside this
>>> >>>> methodological frame his point of view moved from instrumental
>>> >>>> approach to a semiotic one. I agree with most of David's remarks on
>>> >>>> this question, but this point requires some clarifications, too.
>>> >>>> - In some comments were seen missing contexts in my analysis. No
>>> >>>> discussion about Leibnitz, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Kant,
>>> >>>> Hegel, Goethe and other key figures in Western philosophy (Andy). I
>>> >>>> agree, absolutely. The focus of my paper is in the conceptual
>>> >>>> development in Vygotsky's work, not in the history of philosophy.
>>> >>>> And
>>> >>>> the distinction between traditional and non-traditional, or >>>>
>>> Cartesian
>>> >>>> and post-Cartesian comes not from Althusser but is a common >>>>
>>> statement
>>> >>>> in Vygotskyan traditon (classical and non-classical in Asmolov,
>>> >>>> Elkonin etc). What I try to do is make sense of this distinction ,
>>> >>>> to
>>> >>>> conceptualize it someway. Can we do this without a reference to the
>>> >>>> long perspective of philosophy, is a good question, anyway.
>>> >>>> - One other missing context seen in my paper is Vygotsky's relation
>>> >>>> to Marxism and dialectical materialism. It is not possible to
>>> >>>> understand Vygotsky outside the Marxian frame, is claimed. This
>>> >>>> problem is in brackets, just like the philosophy question, but it is
>>> >>>> worth to debate. Some people (f.e. Elhammoumi) really see Vygotsky
>>> >>>> as
>>> >>>> a Marxist per excellence, but I think this is a too limited approach
>>> >>>> to Vygotsky. He was not a Marxist at all, if we take Marxism in the
>>> >>>> form as it exist in Vygotsky's life time. In my interpretation
>>> >>>> Vygotsky took a Marxian position, which was incompatible with the
>>> >>>> Marxist-Leninist state-ideology of the USSR  This argument requires
>>> >>>> a
>>> >>>> discussion about the concept of dialectical materialism as a
>>> >>>> methodology, about Marx and Marxism, even about "the Stalinist
>>> >>>> machine" and Marxist philosophy. I'm not sure how many would be
>>> >>>> interested in this, but I'm ready to go on this, too.
>>> >>>> - The concept of CHAT was also touched.  Should we talk about CHAT,
>>> >>>> or about CH/AT, or even about CHP vs AT? Or maybe CH?AT would >>>>
>>> express
>>> >>>> best way the state of art ?
>>> >>>> - The was also the question of the actual history of cultural
>>> >>>> historical school in Russia, the developments after Vygotsky's dead
>>> >>>> and so on. My paper is focused on texts only, but can read Vygotsky
>>> >>>> without understanding of the context of his work? In brackets, I
>>> agree.
>>> >>>> - And I could add here for example the inconsistent way I used
>>> >>>> Foucault, which nobody, for some strange reasons, mentioned.
>>> >>>> I picked up topics above fast without any deep reflection.  I guess
>>> >>>> any of these topics would be worth of  discussion. Before to going
>>> >>>> on
>>> >>>> my own comments, I clarify a little the background and the >>>>
>>> motivation
>>> >>>> of my paper.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> 2.
>>> >>>> It seems to me that some of the comments are based on too fast
>>> >>>> reading of my paper, resulting in misunderstanding of what I am
>>> >>>> trying to do. My paper is not meant to be an exhaustive description
>>> >>>> of all aspects and contexts in LSV's thinking. Many things are
>>> >>>> consciously put in brackets to make the problematic I am interested
>>> >>>> in, more focused and clear. I am interested in Vygotsky semiotics.
>>> >>>> But how I became interested in this topic, then?
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> One motivation to start a journey through the Collected Works was my
>>> >>>> dissatisfaction about the way we express our tradition. Some people
>>> >>>> are talking about Socio-cultural research, some others
>>> >>>> Cultural-historical psychology. In nowadays Russia they have >>>>
>>> cultural
>>> >>>> psychology debating with activity theory. Other labels can be,
>>> >>>> possibly, found out. And then we have the Mike's way to talk about
>>> >>>> Cultural-historical-activity theory. I agree with David's evaluation
>>> >>>> "that Mike and other founders of CHAT founded it as a loose
>>> >>>> federation between two rather incompatible Vygotskies, the Vygotsky
>>> >>>> of mediated action and the Vygotsky of word meaning, with the
>>> >>>> assumption that a common tradition and a set of common practices
>>> >>>> would hold it together." I understand, somehow, the motivation >>>>
>>> behind
>>> >>>> the label CHAT. It can be understood as an umbrella like
>>> >>>> construction, as a space for discussion and for practices. What's
>>> >>>> the
>>> >>>> problem, then?
>>> >>>> If you take a look at the footnotes of my paper, you can realize I'm
>>> >>>> writing in Finnish context. At least in Finland the CHAT tradition
>>> >>>> is
>>> >>>> very strong in empirical investigations, but theoretical
>>> >>>> contributions are rare. Especially works on the history of "CHAT"
>>> >>>> are
>>> >>>> missing, and the possible contradictions between the founders of the
>>> >>>> tradition are almost taboos.   Consequently CHAT is presented as a
>>> >>>> coherent theory, in a way which makes discussion about some
>>> >>>> methodological problems - semiotic mediation for example - difficult
>>> >>>> or even impossible.
>>> >>>> When involving in ISCRAT I realized the fragmented state of the
>>> >>>> tradition. In Finland we have one coherent conception (CHAT), on the
>>> >>>> international plane there are plenty of school and interpretations.
>>> >>>> The strange thing was, that everybody seemed to claim to be the real
>>> >>>> Vygotskians. After that impression, it was easy to ask the most
>>> >>>> simple question: is there something in the founding what could - at
>>> >>>> least to some extent - explain the situation. And now I have my
>>> >>>> hypothesis: there are not one, but three Vygotskies, giving
>>> >>>> possibilities to different theoretical discourses.
>>> >>>> If now go back to the CHAT concept, we can see what it problematic
>>> >>>> in
>>> >>>> it. On one hand it is meant to be an umbrella type concept bringing
>>> >>>> together different parts of the common tradition. But on the other
>>> >>>> hand it is presented as a research theory, as a tool for empirical
>>> >>>> research (at least in Finland). We have a common tradition which
>>> >>>> prefers the idea of mediation. But the interpretations of the nature
>>> >>>> of cultural mediation are incompatible. So it could be reasonable to
>>> >>>> talk about cultural-historical approach divided into different -
>>> >>>> partly compatible, partly competitive - research theories, having
>>> >>>> their own objects and research interests. I will not continue this
>>> >>>> discussion about the two levels of methodology. I simply state that
>>> >>>> it is impossible to combine semiotic and instrumental mediation
>>> >>>> concepts although it is possible to have a dialogical relation
>>> >>>> between them. Thus: CH?AT instead of CHAT.
>>> >>>> The difference between a tradition (as a form of discoursive praxis)
>>> >>>> and a research theory (as a tool) was not clear for me when I >>>>
>>> started
>>> >>>> my project. Anyway, I was sure that by reading Vygotsky (and
>>> >>>> Leontyev) from a new angle I could produce some insights explaining
>>> >>>> the fragmented situation of CH tradition. To make the moves in
>>> >>>> Vygotsky's thinking as visible as possible I concentrated just in
>>> >>>> one
>>> >>>> aspect where the chances are most evident - in the conception of
>>> >>>> sign
>>> >>>> mediation. And I think that the focus of the debate should be about
>>> >>>> here - in this question. Of course this problem opens up new
>>> >>>> questions and problematics, as have been shown in this discussion,
>>> >>>> which are all extremely interesting, too.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> 3.
>>> >>>> Above I have only given a list on some topics touched in the
>>> >>>> discussion, and clarified a little bit  the background on my
>>> >>>> argumentation. There are many important points to comment. I hope I
>>> >>>> can do it soon. From practical point of view I can only say, that I
>>> >>>> am an extremely slow reader and ever slower writer (that's why I
>>> >>>> love
>>> >>>> Italy, the beautiful country of slow food!). Because of that I will
>>> >>>> concentrate on one topic at time: probably first the question of
>>> >>>> Vygotsky's behaviorism, after that the question of semiotics and
>>> >>>> maybe after that - if the Lord of Research gives me some time - the
>>> >>>> Vygotsky Marxism problematic contextualized in the actual history of
>>> >>>> cultural historical tradition.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Thanks for everybody for thought provoking and inspiring comments -
>>> >>>> it's a great pleasure to read this discussion. Hope it continues....
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> JusSi
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> >
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> > Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435
>>> > Skype andy.blunden
>>> > Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>> > http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ------------------------------
>>> >
>>> > Message: 2
>>> > Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 20:32:16 -0800
>>> > From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
>>> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Behaviourism
>>> > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> > Message-ID:
>>> > <30364f990902042032n3d5363dbj79636d60c73657a2@mail.gmail.com>
>>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
>>> >
>>> > There is a russian phrase, which, loosely translated, means
>>> > "assholes are everywhere."
>>> > and so
>>> > it
>>> > goes
>>> > m
>>> >
>>> > On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >> Apologies all. :( In typical fashion, after declaring ignorance of >>
>>> this
>>> >> topic, I try to "correct" others, then have to "correct myself", then
>>> >> withdraw my correction, and now want to correct myself again. :( >>
>>> "Shoot
>>> >> first, answer questions later!"
>>> >>
>>> >> I have always based my understanding of Vygotsky's entrance into the
>>> >> world
>>> >> of psycholgy on Mike's Introduction to "The Making of Mind" referring
>>> >> to
>>>
>>> >> the
>>> >> speech at the 2nd Congress of blah blah blah in January 1924. That was
>>> >> why I
>>> >> objected to the claim that Vygotsky started out as a "social
>>> >> behaviourist"
>>> >> or *any kind* of behaviourist.
>>> >>
>>> >> Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for >>
>>> behaviourism"
>>>
>>> >> I
>>> >> found the style of presentation a bit confusing at times, and then I
>>> read
>>> >> the translator's (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the
>>> speech
>>> >> which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet another
>>> >> document.
>>> >> So I think to myself "I have been wrong all along!" So I tracked down
>>> the
>>> >> speech and transcribed it:
>>> >>
>>> >> http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm
>>> >>
>>> >> Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the "Consciousness is
>>> >> a
>>> >> problem ..." one.
>>> >>
>>> >> So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the two >>
>>> documents
>>> >> is
>>> >> an academic nicety (from where I'm coming from.)
>>> >>
>>> >> So I just want to ask teh advocates of Vygotsky I, II and III a couple
>>> of
>>> >> questions to help me understand:
>>> >>
>>> >> (1) By "social behaviourist" do you mean a follower of GH Mead? Or do
>>> you
>>> >> mean someone thinking along the lines to which GH Mead would come? Can
>>> >> you
>>> >> define the central idea?
>>> >>
>>> >> (2) The idea of construction of self (I) via Other (me) is not
>>> sufficient
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
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>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>> End of xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 24
>> ************************************
>>
>>
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