Re: [xmca] Re: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Nice to have your chronological clarifications, Nikolai.
I believe the initial word you were looking for in your greeting was
discussant, althought at times
it may seem difficult to tell the difference!

I hope you will join us in voting for an article to discussion from MCA and
joint the discussion.
mike

On Mon, Feb 9, 2009 at 7:53 AM, <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:

>
> Nikolai:
>
> Very concise and thoughtful summary.  I count myself as among the ignorant
> who have always equated reflexology and behaviorism.  Now that you have set
> this record straight I am interested in your view of the difference.  I
> look forward to your reply.
>
> eric
>
>
>
>                      "Nikolai
>                      Veresov"                 To:      <
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>                      <nikolai.veresso         cc:
>                      v@oulu.fi>               Subject: [xmca] Re: xmca
> Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>                      Sent by:
>                      xmca-bounces@web
>                      er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>                      02/09/2009 01:14
>                      AM
>                      Please respond
>                      to "eXtended
>                      Mind, Culture,
>                      Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Good day to all highly respected disputants
>
> As you know I am not actively involved in this discussion list, but I read
> it carefully. I made my mind to interrupt highly respected participants
> because of two reasons. First, it seems to me that before doing conclusions
>
> the researcher should investigate the topic as deep as possible. Second, my
>
> name was mentioned in Andy's message, which gives me right to reply, not in
>
> defence, but in respect to make things clear.
>
> As A. Pushkin wrote: Mislead me please, since I am glad to be misled.
>
> Andy wrote:
>
> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for behaviourism"
> I
> > found the style of presentation a bit confusing at times, and then I read
> > the translator's (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the speech
> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet another
> document.
> > So I think to myself "I have been wrong all along!" So I tracked down the
> > speech and transcribed it.
> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the "Consciousness is a
> > problem ..." one.
> >
> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the two documents
> is
> > an academic nicety (from where I'm coming from.)
>
> The papers of Vygotsky (1) "The methods of..." based on his presentation
> made at 1924 Congress in Petrograd and (2) "Consciousness as a problem"
> reflect different periods of his scientific evolution. I mean the
> transition
> from reflexological model to behaviouristic one. What can mislead the
> reader
> of this paper is only the radical lack of academic knowledge of what is the
>
> difference between reflexology and behaviourism. It is true, that the
> papers
> are connected. But what is also true, that there is a deep difference in
> approaches in these two papers. I made the comparison of them in my book,
> no
> need to repeat it here, but let us just take two places from each. In the
> first paper, criticising the dualism of psychology, he argued the necessity
>
> to combine "subjective psychology" and reflexology on the basis of "an
> objective" method of study of the human consciousness. In the second one he
>
> rejected the idea of any reflexological explanation of consciousness: "we
> should beware of any direct transportation of reflexological laws into
> psychology" (Vygotsky 1982, p. 83). There is a number other places in the
> both papers, which show the differences between them - what is needed to
> see
> them, is just to open your eyes.
>
> There is one more point here, which cannot be missed. These two papers
> belong to two periods and it means that they must be analysed together with
>
> the other papers made during the same period. I mean, particularly, that
> the
> "Methods of..." is the result of Vygotsky's work in Gomel (definitely
> before
> 1924). It means, that Vygotsky was working in the psychology not in 1924
> but
> long ago (he himself wrote that he started his studies in psychology in
> 1917). "Pedagogical psychology" was written also in Gomel, and this book is
>
> reflexological, at least it is NOT behaviouristic (social behaviouristic).
> Even more, it could be a surprise to Andy, that at Petrograd Vygotsky made
> not one presentation, but three (the Program of the Congress is available
> in
> the Internet and in the book of Gita Vygodskaya). If we take all these
> papers together we will see very clear, that there is absolutely nothing
> about social behaviourism in them, including "The methods...". On the
> contrary,  Vygotsky called himself than a bigger reflexologist than Pavlov
> (Vygotsky, 1982c, p. 58; Vygotsky, 1994, p. 40). Of course, his reflexology
>
> was not Pavlovian, it was in search for the objective method of study of
> subjective phenomena. This important period of Vygotsky's work is missed in
>
> Jussi's paper, which is very sad since it completely destroys his overall
> construction.
>
> On the other hand, "Consciousness as a problem..." also was not a lonely
> paper made from nothing. It reflects the period when LSV was working in
> Moscow in a field of defectology (1924-19245), particularly with deaf and
> dumb children. In his experimental studies he went to the conclusion that
> the concept of reflex is not valid to explain the point and it is needed to
>
> search for another concept. Here again to understand the point we have not
> to separate the "Consciousness as a problem..." from the other works of
> that
> period. I doubt whether Andy knows LSV papers made during that period
> (1924-1925), whereas they ALL reflect the movement of Vygotsky from
> reflexology to behaviourism. Behaviouristic model was not satisfactory and
> LSV had to reject it very soon, but this is another story I have no time to
>
> discuss. I just want to say, that before comparing papers and made
> conclusions that the "only difference is their academic nicety" one have to
>
> investigate all the matters, which are behind and which are clear for those
>
> who have academic background. Otherwise the analysis will remain
> superficial. A golden ring and a wooden wheel also look similar, and so
> what?
>
> Nikolai
>
>
> From: <xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
>
>
>
> To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2009 6:32 AM
> Subject: xmca Digest, Vol 45, Issue 13
>
>
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> > than "Re: Contents of xmca digest..."
> >
> >
> > Today's Topics:
> >
> >   1. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Andy Blunden)
> >   2. Re: Vygotsky and Behaviourism (Mike Cole)
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2009 15:29:57 +1100
> > From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Behaviourism
> > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Message-ID: <498A6B45.2050109@mira.net>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
> >
> > Apologies all. :( In typical fashion, after declaring
> > ignorance of this topic, I try to "correct" others, then
> > have to "correct myself", then withdraw my correction, and
> > now want to correct myself again. :( "Shoot first, answer
> > questions later!"
> >
> > I have always based my understanding of Vygotsky's entrance
> > into the world of psycholgy on Mike's Introduction to "The
> > Making of Mind" referring to the speech at the 2nd Congress
> > of blah blah blah in January 1924. That was why I objected
> > to the claim that Vygotsky started out as a "social
> > behaviourist" or *any kind* of behaviourist.
> >
> > Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for
> > behaviourism" I found the style of presentation a bit
> > confusing at times, and then I read the translator's
> > (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the speech
> > which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet
> > another document. So I think to myself "I have been wrong
> > all along!" So I tracked down the speech and transcribed it:
> >
> > http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm
> >
> > Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the
> > "Consciousness is a problem ..." one.
> >
> > So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the
> > two documents is an academic nicety (from where I'm coming
> > from.)
> >
> > So I just want to ask teh advocates of Vygotsky I, II and
> > III a couple of questions to help me understand:
> >
> > (1) By "social behaviourist" do you mean a follower of GH
> > Mead? Or do you mean someone thinking along the lines to
> > which GH Mead would come? Can you define the central idea?
> >
> > (2) The idea of construction of self (I) via Other (me) is
> > not sufficient basis for calling someone "social
> > behaviourist" is it? Whether you track this idea to Hegel
> > (1807), Mead (1932), Kojeve (1937), or elsewhere?.
> >
> > (3) Do you agree that Vygotsky's January 1924 speech is a
> > full-on attack on Behaviourism, which was at that time the
> > dominant creed at the Congress? He also attack the otehr
> > speakers at the Congress.
> >
> > (4) Do you think it makes sense to call someone engaged in a
> > critique of all existing views, who knows they do not yet
> > have an adequate theory and are just at the beginning of
> > their critique, any "ism" ?
> >
> > Serious questions. I'm trying to understand where you guys
> > are coming from.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Andy Blunden wrote:
> >> Mmmm. After re-reading this material myself, I have to now put myself
> >> into a "Don't Know" basket. Interesting material, but I withdraw my
> >> attempts to make any claims about it.
> >> Andy
> >> Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>> On the question of Vygotsky as a "social Behaviourist before 1929", I
> >>> have scanned two pages From the Introduction to Б─°Mind in Society,Б─²
> >>> by
> >>> Mike Cole and Sylvia Scribner, pp 4-6
> >>>
> >>> POSTREVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY IN RUSSIA
> >>>
> >>> In the early decades of the twentieth century psychology in Russia, as
> >>> in Europe, was torn between contending schools, each of which offered
> >>> partial explanations of a limited range of phenomena. In 1923 at the
> >>> first all-Russian psychoneurological congress K. N. Kornilov initiated
> >>> the first major organizational and intellectual shift in psychology
> >>> following the revolution. At that time the prestigious Institute of
> >>> Psychology in Moscow was headed by G. I. Chelpanov, an adherent of
> >>> Wundt's introspective psychology and a foe of behaviorism. (He had
> >>> published the sixth edition of his book, The Mind of Man, a critique
> >>> of materialist theories of the mind, in 1917, just before the
> >>> revolution.) Chelpanov assigned a restricted role to Marxism in
> >>> psychology, asserting it could help explain the social organization of
> >>> consciousness but not the properties of individual consciousness. In a
> >>> talk entitled "Contemporary Psychology and Marxism" Kornilov
> >>> criticized Chelpanov both for the idealistic basis of his
> >>> psychological theory and for the restricted role he assigned to
> >>> Marxism in psychology. Kornilov, who called his own approach
> >>> reactology, sought to subsume all branches of psychology within a
> >>> Marxist framework that used behavioral reactions as the basic data.
> >>>
> >>> Kornilov's critique of Chelpanov in 1923 won the day. Chelpanov was
> >>> removed as director of the Institute of Psychology and was replaced by
> >>> Kornilov, who immediately brought together a corps of young scientists
> >>> dedicated to formulating and promoting a *behavioral, Marxist theory
> >>> of psychology*.
> >>>
> >>> Vygotsky must have produced quite a sensation one year later at the
> >>> second psychoneurological meeting when he gave a talk entitled
> >>> "Consciousness as an Object of the Psychology of Behavior." Whatever
> >>> else one extracted from Kornilov's reactological approach, it quite
> >>> clearly did not feature the role of consciousness in human activity,
> >>> nor did it accord the concept of consciousness a role in psychological
> >>> science.
> >>>
> >>> Vygotsky was *dissenting* from newly established authority. He was
> >>> not, however, promoting a return to the position advocated by
> >>> Chelpanov. In his initial speech and a series of subsequent
> >>> publications, he made it clear that in his view none of the existing
> >>> schools of psychology provided a firm foundation for establishing a
> >>> unified theory of human psychological processes. Borrowing a phrase
> >>> from his German contemporaries, he often referred to the "crisis in
> >>> psychology" and set himself the task of achieving a synthesis of
> >>> contending views on a completely new theoretical basis.
> >>>
> >>> For Vygotsky's Gestalt contemporaries, a crisis existed because
> >>> established theories (primarily Wundt's and Watsonian behaviorism)
> >>> could not, in their view, explain complex perceptual and
> >>> problemsolving behaviors. For Vygotsky, the crisis went much deeper.
> >>> He shared the Gestalt psychologists' dissatisfaction with
> >>> psychological analysis that began by reducing all phenomena to a set
> >>> of psychological "atoms." But he felt that the Gestalt psychologists
> >>> failed to move beyond the description of complex phenomena to the
> >>> explanation of them. Even if one were to accept the Gestalt criticisms
> >>> of previous approaches, a crisis would still exist because psychology
> >>> would remain split into two irreconcilable halves: a "natural science"
> >>> branch that could explain elementary sensory and reflex processes, and
> >>> a "mental science" half that could describe emergent properties of
> >>> higher psychological processes. What Vygotsky sought was a
> >>> comprehensive approach that would make possible description and
> >>> explanation of higher psychological functions in terms acceptable to
> >>> natural science. To Vygotsky, explanation meant a great deal. It
> >>> included identification of the brain mechanisms underlying a
> >>> particular function; it included a detailed explication of their
> >>> developmental history to establish the relation between simple and
> >>> complex forms of what appeared to be the same behavior; and,
> >>> importantly, it included specification of the societal context in
> >>> which the behavior developed. Vygotsky's goals were extremely
> >>> ambitious, perhaps unreasonably so. He did not achieve these goals (as
> >>> he was well aware). But he did succeed in providing us with an astute
> >>> and prescient analysis of modern psychology.
> >>>
> >>> A major reason for the continued relevance of Vygotsky's work is that
> >>> in 1924 and the following decade he constructed a penetrating critique
> >>> of the notion that an understanding of the higher psychological
> >>> functions in humans can be found by a multiplication and complication
> >>> of principles derived from animal psychology, in particular those
> >>> principles that represent the mechanical combination of
> >>> stimulus-response laws. At the same time he provided a devastating
> >>> critique of theories which claim that the properties of adult
> >>> intellectual functions arise from maturation alone, or are in any way
> >>> preformed in the child and simply waiting for an opportunity to
> >>> manifest themselves.
> >>>
> >>> In stressing the social origins of language and thinking, Vygotsky was
> >>> following the lead of influential French sociologists, but to our
> >>> knowledge he was the first modern psychologist to suggest the
> >>> mechanisms by which culture becomes a part of each person's nature.
> >>> Insisting that psychological functions are a product of the brain's
> >>> activity, he became an early advocate of combining experimental
> >>> cognitive psychology with neurology and physiology. Finally, by
> >>> claiming that all of these should be understood in terms of a Marxist
> >>> theory of the history of human society, he laid the foundation for a
> >>> unified behavioral science.
> >>>
> >>> --------------------------
> >>>
> >>> The text referred to above and  described on this list as I understand
> >>> it, as evidence of Vygotsky's adherence to a variety of behaviourism,
> >>> is at:
> >>>
> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/consciousness.htm
> >>>
> >>> Nicolai Veresov's commentary on it claims errors in Mike Cole's
> >>> narrative; but whether Vygotsky's article belongs to 1924, 1925 or
> >>> 1926, it is all within what has been spoken of as his "social
> >>> behaviourist" phase:
> >>>
> >>>
> http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> For my part, I read this material as documenting that behaviourism was
> >>> declared to be the Marxist Psychology in 1923 (coincident with the
> >>> death of Lenin and the rise of Stalin to leadership of the USSR) and
> >>> in the eyes of the vast majority of "Marxists", within and outside the
> >>> USSR, remains so to this day.
> >>>
> >>> As I see it, the counter claim begins from Vygotsky's speech in 1924
> >>> (or 1925 or 1926).
> >>>
> >>> Andy
> >>>
> >>> Jussi Silvonen wrote:
> >>>> Hi everybody!
> >>>>
> >>>> First, I'd like to thank Jonna for introducing my paper and starting
> >>>> the discussion.  I'm sorry about the delay of my comments - sometimes
> >>>> there is life also outside the academy (luckily not too often, as you
> >>>> know), which keeps us out of the office for few days.
> >>>> There are already too many issues in this ongoing and extremely
> >>>> interesting discussion to comment in one e-mail. So I will simply
> >>>> start by listing some of the issues mentioned so far. After that I
> >>>> try to a little bit clarify my motivations and point of view, to
> >>>> focus the discussion.
> >>>>
> >>>> Before that, anyhow,  I have to make confession. I don't know Russian
> >>>> and read Vygotsky only in English and in German. I compiled a
> >>>> bibliography of English translations of LSV's works I know so far
> >>>> (=102), which shows the textual base of my paper. You can find it on
> >>>> my site:
> >>>>
> >>>> http://joyx.joensuu.fi/~jsilvone/papers/Vygo_bibliography.pdf
> >>>>
> >>>> (I added original dates of LSV's papers in the references and
> >>>> cross-referenced overlapping versions of  translations, hope this
> >>>> could help those not having the Collected Works in their library).
> >>>> Comments on the bibliography are welcomed, too. Those reading LSV in
> >>>> Russia can probably tell, if something (or what) essential sources,
> >>>> related to my arguments, are missing.
> >>>>
> >>>> 1.
> >>>> Reading very fast the comments so far, at least following topics or
> >>>> arguments were represented:
> >>>> - The question of periods in Vygotsky's work. According to David
> >>>> there would be almost a consensus about three Vygotskies ( LSV I, II,
> >>>> III), but this point was questioned. My special contribution to this
> >>>> debate, however, is not the statement of three periods as such, but
> >>>> the opinion that Vygotsky was committed to behaviorism in one moment
> >>>> of his thinking. This point obviously requires more discussion, as
> >>>> Steve and others remarked.
> >>>> - The question of the tools by which we should conceptualize the
> >>>> (possible) periods in LSV. My suggestion was that we could integrate
> >>>> some ideas / concepts from Althusser and Foucault to our attempt to
> >>>> understand critically and self-reflective way the development (or
> >>>> non-development) of our tradition. Some agreed to some degree, but
> >>>> the idea was strongly criticized, too (at least Andy).
> >>>> - The problem of semiotics or semiotic mediation in LSV is one of the
> >>>> key issues in my argumentation, connected to the hypotheses about
> >>>> epistemological break between LSV II and III. Somebody read my thesis
> >>>> as a statement about the priority on supremacy of semiosis / sign
> >>>> mediation. What I actually said, was that Vygotsky always related
> >>>> different forms of mediation to each other, and that inside this
> >>>> methodological frame his point of view moved from instrumental
> >>>> approach to a semiotic one. I agree with most of David's remarks on
> >>>> this question, but this point requires some clarifications, too.
> >>>> - In some comments were seen missing contexts in my analysis. No
> >>>> discussion about Leibnitz, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Kant,
> >>>> Hegel, Goethe and other key figures in Western philosophy (Andy). I
> >>>> agree, absolutely. The focus of my paper is in the conceptual
> >>>> development in Vygotsky's work, not in the history of philosophy. And
> >>>> the distinction between traditional and non-traditional, or Cartesian
> >>>> and post-Cartesian comes not from Althusser but is a common statement
> >>>> in Vygotskyan traditon (classical and non-classical in Asmolov,
> >>>> Elkonin etc). What I try to do is make sense of this distinction , to
> >>>> conceptualize it someway. Can we do this without a reference to the
> >>>> long perspective of philosophy, is a good question, anyway.
> >>>> - One other missing context seen in my paper is Vygotsky's relation
> >>>> to Marxism and dialectical materialism. It is not possible to
> >>>> understand Vygotsky outside the Marxian frame, is claimed. This
> >>>> problem is in brackets, just like the philosophy question, but it is
> >>>> worth to debate. Some people (f.e. Elhammoumi) really see Vygotsky as
> >>>> a Marxist per excellence, but I think this is a too limited approach
> >>>> to Vygotsky. He was not a Marxist at all, if we take Marxism in the
> >>>> form as it exist in Vygotsky's life time. In my interpretation
> >>>> Vygotsky took a Marxian position, which was incompatible with the
> >>>> Marxist-Leninist state-ideology of the USSR  This argument requires a
> >>>> discussion about the concept of dialectical materialism as a
> >>>> methodology, about Marx and Marxism, even about "the Stalinist
> >>>> machine" and Marxist philosophy. I'm not sure how many would be
> >>>> interested in this, but I'm ready to go on this, too.
> >>>> - The concept of CHAT was also touched.  Should we talk about CHAT,
> >>>> or about CH/AT, or even about CHP vs AT? Or maybe CH?AT would express
> >>>> best way the state of art ?
> >>>> - The was also the question of the actual history of cultural
> >>>> historical school in Russia, the developments after Vygotsky's dead
> >>>> and so on. My paper is focused on texts only, but can read Vygotsky
> >>>> without understanding of the context of his work? In brackets, I
> agree.
> >>>> - And I could add here for example the inconsistent way I used
> >>>> Foucault, which nobody, for some strange reasons, mentioned.
> >>>> I picked up topics above fast without any deep reflection.  I guess
> >>>> any of these topics would be worth of  discussion. Before to going on
> >>>> my own comments, I clarify a little the background and the motivation
> >>>> of my paper.
> >>>>
> >>>> 2.
> >>>> It seems to me that some of the comments are based on too fast
> >>>> reading of my paper, resulting in misunderstanding of what I am
> >>>> trying to do. My paper is not meant to be an exhaustive description
> >>>> of all aspects and contexts in LSV's thinking. Many things are
> >>>> consciously put in brackets to make the problematic I am interested
> >>>> in, more focused and clear. I am interested in Vygotsky semiotics.
> >>>> But how I became interested in this topic, then?
> >>>>
> >>>> One motivation to start a journey through the Collected Works was my
> >>>> dissatisfaction about the way we express our tradition. Some people
> >>>> are talking about Socio-cultural research, some others
> >>>> Cultural-historical psychology. In nowadays Russia they have cultural
> >>>> psychology debating with activity theory. Other labels can be,
> >>>> possibly, found out. And then we have the Mike's way to talk about
> >>>> Cultural-historical-activity theory. I agree with David's evaluation
> >>>> "that Mike and other founders of CHAT founded it as a loose
> >>>> federation between two rather incompatible Vygotskies, the Vygotsky
> >>>> of mediated action and the Vygotsky of word meaning, with the
> >>>> assumption that a common tradition and a set of common practices
> >>>> would hold it together." I understand, somehow, the motivation behind
> >>>> the label CHAT. It can be understood as an umbrella like
> >>>> construction, as a space for discussion and for practices. What's the
> >>>> problem, then?
> >>>> If you take a look at the footnotes of my paper, you can realize I'm
> >>>> writing in Finnish context. At least in Finland the CHAT tradition is
> >>>> very strong in empirical investigations, but theoretical
> >>>> contributions are rare. Especially works on the history of "CHAT" are
> >>>> missing, and the possible contradictions between the founders of the
> >>>> tradition are almost taboos.   Consequently CHAT is presented as a
> >>>> coherent theory, in a way which makes discussion about some
> >>>> methodological problems - semiotic mediation for example - difficult
> >>>> or even impossible.
> >>>> When involving in ISCRAT I realized the fragmented state of the
> >>>> tradition. In Finland we have one coherent conception (CHAT), on the
> >>>> international plane there are plenty of school and interpretations.
> >>>> The strange thing was, that everybody seemed to claim to be the real
> >>>> Vygotskians. After that impression, it was easy to ask the most
> >>>> simple question: is there something in the founding what could - at
> >>>> least to some extent - explain the situation. And now I have my
> >>>> hypothesis: there are not one, but three Vygotskies, giving
> >>>> possibilities to different theoretical discourses.
> >>>> If now go back to the CHAT concept, we can see what it problematic in
> >>>> it. On one hand it is meant to be an umbrella type concept bringing
> >>>> together different parts of the common tradition. But on the other
> >>>> hand it is presented as a research theory, as a tool for empirical
> >>>> research (at least in Finland). We have a common tradition which
> >>>> prefers the idea of mediation. But the interpretations of the nature
> >>>> of cultural mediation are incompatible. So it could be reasonable to
> >>>> talk about cultural-historical approach divided into different -
> >>>> partly compatible, partly competitive - research theories, having
> >>>> their own objects and research interests. I will not continue this
> >>>> discussion about the two levels of methodology. I simply state that
> >>>> it is impossible to combine semiotic and instrumental mediation
> >>>> concepts although it is possible to have a dialogical relation
> >>>> between them. Thus: CH?AT instead of CHAT.
> >>>> The difference between a tradition (as a form of discoursive praxis)
> >>>> and a research theory (as a tool) was not clear for me when I started
> >>>> my project. Anyway, I was sure that by reading Vygotsky (and
> >>>> Leontyev) from a new angle I could produce some insights explaining
> >>>> the fragmented situation of CH tradition. To make the moves in
> >>>> Vygotsky's thinking as visible as possible I concentrated just in one
> >>>> aspect where the chances are most evident - in the conception of sign
> >>>> mediation. And I think that the focus of the debate should be about
> >>>> here - in this question. Of course this problem opens up new
> >>>> questions and problematics, as have been shown in this discussion,
> >>>> which are all extremely interesting, too.
> >>>>
> >>>> 3.
> >>>> Above I have only given a list on some topics touched in the
> >>>> discussion, and clarified a little bit  the background on my
> >>>> argumentation. There are many important points to comment. I hope I
> >>>> can do it soon. From practical point of view I can only say, that I
> >>>> am an extremely slow reader and ever slower writer (that's why I love
> >>>> Italy, the beautiful country of slow food!). Because of that I will
> >>>> concentrate on one topic at time: probably first the question of
> >>>> Vygotsky's behaviorism, after that the question of semiotics and
> >>>> maybe after that - if the Lord of Research gives me some time - the
> >>>> Vygotsky Marxism problematic contextualized in the actual history of
> >>>> cultural historical tradition.
> >>>>
> >>>> Thanks for everybody for thought provoking and inspiring comments -
> >>>> it's a great pleasure to read this discussion. Hope it continues....
> >>>>
> >>>> JusSi
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> > --
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435
> > Skype andy.blunden
> > Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> > http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >
> >
> >
> > ------------------------------
> >
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2009 20:32:16 -0800
> > From: Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Vygotsky and Behaviourism
> > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Message-ID:
> > <30364f990902042032n3d5363dbj79636d60c73657a2@mail.gmail.com>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
> >
> > There is a russian phrase, which, loosely translated, means
> > "assholes are everywhere."
> > and so
> > it
> > goes
> > m
> >
> > On Wed, Feb 4, 2009 at 8:29 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> >> Apologies all. :( In typical fashion, after declaring ignorance of this
> >> topic, I try to "correct" others, then have to "correct myself", then
> >> withdraw my correction, and now want to correct myself again. :( "Shoot
> >> first, answer questions later!"
> >>
> >> I have always based my understanding of Vygotsky's entrance into the
> >> world
> >> of psycholgy on Mike's Introduction to "The Making of Mind" referring to
>
> >> the
> >> speech at the 2nd Congress of blah blah blah in January 1924. That was
> >> why I
> >> objected to the claim that Vygotsky started out as a "social
> >> behaviourist"
> >> or *any kind* of behaviourist.
> >>
> >> Then when I turned to read "Consciousness is a problem for behaviourism"
>
> >> I
> >> found the style of presentation a bit confusing at times, and then I
> read
> >> the translator's (Veresov's) claim that this was in fact *not* the
> speech
> >> which caused such a shock in January 1924, which was yet another
> >> document.
> >> So I think to myself "I have been wrong all along!" So I tracked down
> the
> >> speech and transcribed it:
> >>
> >> http://marx.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1925/reflexology.htm
> >>
> >> Of course it is almost word-for-word the same as the "Consciousness is a
> >> problem ..." one.
> >>
> >> So Mike was not misleading me. The difference between the two documents
> >> is
> >> an academic nicety (from where I'm coming from.)
> >>
> >> So I just want to ask teh advocates of Vygotsky I, II and III a couple
> of
> >> questions to help me understand:
> >>
> >> (1) By "social behaviourist" do you mean a follower of GH Mead? Or do
> you
> >> mean someone thinking along the lines to which GH Mead would come? Can
> >> you
> >> define the central idea?
> >>
> >> (2) The idea of construction of self (I) via Other (me) is not
> sufficient
>
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