Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

I thought there was only 1 mirror. Darn. So the mirror of nature has two
mirrors at 90 degree angles?

(It was a joke Andy. Probably didn't work because the water goes down the
drain backwards up here). At least I was only half as much in error as
usual!!

mike

On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 4:00 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> If you put two mirrors together at 90deg, Mike, you can make a
> non-inverting mirror. I don't get your point.
>
> The thing that the analogy of mirror *does* do for me is that the image a
> mirror makes is in no way in the mirror; the mirror has nothing; and if it
> does (e.g. a crack) it corresponds to distortion (pathology). But in no
> sense is a mirror image is literal copy of a thing; it produces in the
> viewer's mind a copy of what the sight of the thing produces in the viewer's
> mind. So if it's a literal copy, it is not of the thing reflected but of the
> viewer's image of the thing reflected.
>
> Andy
>
>
> Mike Cole wrote:
>
>> What seems clear beyond all the subtleties here is that a literal copy
>> theory
>> of reflection is unacceptable and is widely recognized as such.
>>
>> One thing no one has noted. The only thing we know for sure about a
>> reflection in the mirror image sense is that left and right are reversed.
>> :-))
>> mike
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 3:59 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:
>>
>>  One could use these quotes to contrast Ilyenkov as a structuralist and
>>> Marx as having poststructural tendencies. But Marx's objection to an
>>> exact picture of the world is a technical one regarding the
>>> impossibility of marshalling all of the requisite data as history
>>> continues to unfold. This is quite different from a poststructural
>>> critique which regards the presumed fixed point of view from which to
>>> view the data as fictitious.
>>> David
>>>
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>>> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
>>> Sent: Friday, January 23, 2009 8:14 PM
>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>>>
>>> Andy, thanks for adding to the height of my reading pile!  :)
>>>
>>> Until I complete the assignment (at least partly) I will merely
>>> juxtapose
>>> here two quotations whose contrast gives me pause for thought. The first
>>> from the first page of the book by Ilyenkov you've provided:
>>>
>>> "And only materialist dialectics (dialectical materialism), only the
>>> organic
>>> unity of dialectics with materialism arms the cognition of man with the
>>> means and ability to construct an objectively-true image of the
>>> surrounding
>>> world, the means and ability to reconstruct this world in accordance
>>> with
>>> the objective tendencies and lawful nature of its own development."
>>>
>>> The second from Carlos Marx himself:
>>>
>>> "The formulation on [in? MP] thought of an exact picture of the
>>> world-system
>>> in which we live is impossible for us, and will always remain
>>> impossible. If
>>> at any time in the evolution of mankind such a final, conclusive system
>>> of
>>> the interconnections within the world... were brought to completion,
>>> this
>>> would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit, and, from the
>>> moment
>>> when society had been brought into accord with that system, further
>>> historical evolution would be cut short-which would be an absurd idea,
>>> pure
>>> nonsense" (A Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 234)
>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/23/09 5:56 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>  Martin,  I have converted to PDF Ilyenkov's book defending
>>>> Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism":
>>>>
>>>> http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positivism.pdf
>>>>
>>>> I think you can agree that if such a renowned Hegel
>>>> interpreter as Ilyenkov can defend "reflection" and Lenin's
>>>> book, then there has to be something in it. The above is
>>>> much shorter and easier to read than Lenin's book, BTW.
>>>>
>>>> Sidney Hook is far from alone in the sentiments he
>>>> expresses. But you have to take Lenin and Engels and the
>>>> Russian CHAT people *as a whole* and this criticism (which I
>>>> sympathise with) of the notion of "reflection" as "passive"
>>>> is, as you have remarked yourself, constantly contradicted
>>>> by the "change the world" notes constantly and discordantly
>>>> accompanying every mention of "reflection."
>>>>
>>>> This is the point: humans change the world, but only
>>>> according to its own nature. The aeroplane actually obeys
>>>> the laws of nature as it flies across the sky. Hegel has a
>>>> great bit on this:
>>>>
>>>> "So also when someone starts building a house, his decision
>>>> to do so is freely made. But all the elements must help. And
>>>> yet the house is being built to protect man against the
>>>> elements. Hence the elements are here used against
>>>> themselves. But the general law of nature is not disturbed
>>>> thereby. The building of a house is, in the first instance,
>>>> a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as
>>>> means, the several substances required for the work - iron,
>>>> wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this
>>>> material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire,
>>>> water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc.
>>>> The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the
>>>> house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of
>>>> rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far
>>>> as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey
>>>> the law of gravity and press downwards so that the high
>>>> walls are held up. Thus the elements are made use of in
>>>> accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by
>>>> which they become constrained. In a similar way. the
>>>> passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
>>>> and their purposes in accordance with their natural
>>>> destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
>>>> they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."
>>>>
>>>> http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction.htm
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> At risk of actually killing the horse I'm flogging, I want to return
>>>>>
>>>> one
>>>
>>>> more time to the debate over 'reflection.' Mike asked me why I would
>>>>>
>>>> be sad
>>>
>>>> to hear that Vygotsky was significantly influenced by Lenin. I've
>>>>>
>>>> been
>>>
>>>> reading some of the work in the 1920s and 30s by Sidney Hook, on the
>>>>>
>>>> topic
>>>
>>>> of Marx and Hegel. I'm copying below a fairly long excerpt in which
>>>>>
>>>> Hook
>>>
>>>> takes to task both Engels and Lenin (in 'Materialism and
>>>>>
>>>> Empirio-Criticism,'
>>>
>>>> at least) for viewing ideas as "reflections" of reality - exactly in
>>>>>
>>>> the
>>>
>>>> sense of mirror images or copies. That Lenin did this was the sense I
>>>>>
>>>> have
>>>
>>>> got from reading other comments on Lenin, though I haven't read Lenin
>>>>> myself.
>>>>>
>>>>> The problem, as Hook points out, is that the reflection view treats
>>>>>
>>>> thinking
>>>
>>>> as a passive process, that solipsism and skepticism cannot be
>>>>>
>>>> avoided, that
>>>
>>>> in this view knowledge cannot be creative, and consequently knowledge
>>>>>
>>>> of the
>>>
>>>> world cannot change the world. This, as he notes, is a long way from
>>>>>
>>>> Marx.
>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>>
>>>>> The excerpt is from:
>>>>> Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. The
>>>>>
>>>> Journal
>>>
>>>> of Philosophy, 25(6), 141-155.
>>>>> [ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014691 ]
>>>>>
>>>>> "He [Engels] presents the "dialectic" as the method which
>>>>> corrects the limited and ossified character of classificatory
>>>>>
>>>> thinking
>>>
>>>> and claims that it enables one to avoid the predicament of English
>>>>> empiricism which is peculiarly addicted to this way of thinking.
>>>>> But Engels failed to understand the real weakness of English
>>>>> empiricism. Otherwise he would have realized that his uncritical
>>>>> reference to ideas as reflections, pictures, or images (Abbilder,
>>>>> Spiegelbilder) of things made him fall into an epistemological trap
>>>>> whose mazes lead into the cul-de-sacs of solipsism and nominalism-
>>>>> the very positions he was anxious to avoid. Since sensations, accord-
>>>>> ing to Engels, gave immediate knowledge, the organizing activity of
>>>>> thought becomes purely ancillary to classifying and relating sensa-
>>>>> tions. Practice and experiment, which he later says must serve as
>>>>> the criteria of truth, are introduced by a double inconsistency. For
>>>>> if our sensations are copies, we can never know anything of the
>>>>> originals or even know that there are any, while if sensations give
>>>>> immediate knowledge there is no sense in trying to check up upon
>>>>> them by experiments which only give other sensations, just as im-
>>>>> mediate. The disastrous consequences of the belief in the cognitive
>>>>> character of sensations comes to light in Lenin's fanatical
>>>>>
>>>> insistence
>>>
>>>> upon accepting every word of Engels literally. According to Lenin,
>>>>> sensation is "a copy, photograph, and reflection of a reality
>>>>>
>>>> existing
>>>
>>>> independently of it." He takes Plekhanov to task for regarding
>>>>> sensations as "signs" or "symbols" of what things are, instead of
>>>>> adhering to the crude formula, "(sensations) are copies, photo-
>>>>> graphs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 195). He adds
>>>>> further on, "the idea that knowledge can 'create' forms and change
>>>>> the primeval chaos into order, is an idealist notion. The world is
>>>>> a uniform world of matter in motion, and our cognition, being the
>>>>> highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this
>>>>>
>>>> law."
>>>
>>>> But if knowledge only "reflects" the laws of the world, how can it
>>>>> change the world? A mirror or a lake reflects the natural scene,
>>>>> but neither knows nor changes it. This is, indeed, a far cry from
>>>>> the functional and experimental theory expressed in Marx's gloss
>>>>> on Feurbach and strange words from one who believed that by "mass
>>>>> action" and the creation of new machines and forms of distribution,
>>>>> a better social system will be evolved." (p. 149-150)
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
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> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>
>
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