Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

What seems clear beyond all the subtleties here is that a literal copy
theory
of reflection is unacceptable and is widely recognized as such.

One thing no one has noted. The only thing we know for sure about a
reflection in the mirror image sense is that left and right are reversed.
:-))
mike

On Sat, Jan 24, 2009 at 3:59 AM, David H Kirshner <dkirsh@lsu.edu> wrote:

> One could use these quotes to contrast Ilyenkov as a structuralist and
> Marx as having poststructural tendencies. But Marx's objection to an
> exact picture of the world is a technical one regarding the
> impossibility of marshalling all of the requisite data as history
> continues to unfold. This is quite different from a poststructural
> critique which regards the presumed fixed point of view from which to
> view the data as fictitious.
> David
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On Behalf Of Martin Packer
> Sent: Friday, January 23, 2009 8:14 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>
> Andy, thanks for adding to the height of my reading pile!  :)
>
> Until I complete the assignment (at least partly) I will merely
> juxtapose
> here two quotations whose contrast gives me pause for thought. The first
> from the first page of the book by Ilyenkov you've provided:
>
> "And only materialist dialectics (dialectical materialism), only the
> organic
> unity of dialectics with materialism arms the cognition of man with the
> means and ability to construct an objectively-true image of the
> surrounding
> world, the means and ability to reconstruct this world in accordance
> with
> the objective tendencies and lawful nature of its own development."
>
> The second from Carlos Marx himself:
>
> "The formulation on [in? MP] thought of an exact picture of the
> world-system
> in which we live is impossible for us, and will always remain
> impossible. If
> at any time in the evolution of mankind such a final, conclusive system
> of
> the interconnections within the world... were brought to completion,
> this
> would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit, and, from the
> moment
> when society had been brought into accord with that system, further
> historical evolution would be cut short-which would be an absurd idea,
> pure
> nonsense" (A Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 234)
>
> Martin
>
>
> On 1/23/09 5:56 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
> > Martin,  I have converted to PDF Ilyenkov's book defending
> > Lenin's "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism":
> >
> > http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positivism.pdf
> >
> > I think you can agree that if such a renowned Hegel
> > interpreter as Ilyenkov can defend "reflection" and Lenin's
> > book, then there has to be something in it. The above is
> > much shorter and easier to read than Lenin's book, BTW.
> >
> > Sidney Hook is far from alone in the sentiments he
> > expresses. But you have to take Lenin and Engels and the
> > Russian CHAT people *as a whole* and this criticism (which I
> > sympathise with) of the notion of "reflection" as "passive"
> > is, as you have remarked yourself, constantly contradicted
> > by the "change the world" notes constantly and discordantly
> > accompanying every mention of "reflection."
> >
> > This is the point: humans change the world, but only
> > according to its own nature. The aeroplane actually obeys
> > the laws of nature as it flies across the sky. Hegel has a
> > great bit on this:
> >
> > "So also when someone starts building a house, his decision
> > to do so is freely made. But all the elements must help. And
> > yet the house is being built to protect man against the
> > elements. Hence the elements are here used against
> > themselves. But the general law of nature is not disturbed
> > thereby. The building of a house is, in the first instance,
> > a subjective aim and design. On the other hand we have, as
> > means, the several substances required for the work - iron,
> > wood, stones. The elements are used in preparing this
> > material: fire to melt the iron, wind to blow the fire,
> > water to set wheels in motion in order to cut the wood, etc.
> > The result is that the wind, which has helped to build the
> > house, is shut out by the house; so also are the violence of
> > rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire, so far
> > as the house is made fire-proof. The stones and beams obey
> > the law of gravity and press downwards so that the high
> > walls are held up. Thus the elements are made use of in
> > accordance with their nature and cooperate for a product by
> > which they become constrained. In a similar way. the
> > passions of men satisfy themselves; they develop themselves
> > and their purposes in accordance with their natural
> > destination and produce the edifice of human society. Thus
> > they fortify a structure for law and order against themselves."
> >
> > http://marx.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/introduction.htm
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > Martin Packer wrote:
> >> At risk of actually killing the horse I'm flogging, I want to return
> one
> >> more time to the debate over 'reflection.' Mike asked me why I would
> be sad
> >> to hear that Vygotsky was significantly influenced by Lenin. I've
> been
> >> reading some of the work in the 1920s and 30s by Sidney Hook, on the
> topic
> >> of Marx and Hegel. I'm copying below a fairly long excerpt in which
> Hook
> >> takes to task both Engels and Lenin (in 'Materialism and
> Empirio-Criticism,'
> >> at least) for viewing ideas as "reflections" of reality - exactly in
> the
> >> sense of mirror images or copies. That Lenin did this was the sense I
> have
> >> got from reading other comments on Lenin, though I haven't read Lenin
> >> myself.
> >>
> >> The problem, as Hook points out, is that the reflection view treats
> thinking
> >> as a passive process, that solipsism and skepticism cannot be
> avoided, that
> >> in this view knowledge cannot be creative, and consequently knowledge
> of the
> >> world cannot change the world. This, as he notes, is a long way from
> Marx.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> The excerpt is from:
> >> Hook, S. (1928). The Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism. II. The
> Journal
> >> of Philosophy, 25(6), 141-155.
> >> [ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2014691 ]
> >>
> >> "He [Engels] presents the "dialectic" as the method which
> >> corrects the limited and ossified character of classificatory
> thinking
> >> and claims that it enables one to avoid the predicament of English
> >> empiricism which is peculiarly addicted to this way of thinking.
> >> But Engels failed to understand the real weakness of English
> >> empiricism. Otherwise he would have realized that his uncritical
> >> reference to ideas as reflections, pictures, or images (Abbilder,
> >> Spiegelbilder) of things made him fall into an epistemological trap
> >> whose mazes lead into the cul-de-sacs of solipsism and nominalism-
> >> the very positions he was anxious to avoid. Since sensations, accord-
> >> ing to Engels, gave immediate knowledge, the organizing activity of
> >> thought becomes purely ancillary to classifying and relating sensa-
> >> tions. Practice and experiment, which he later says must serve as
> >> the criteria of truth, are introduced by a double inconsistency. For
> >> if our sensations are copies, we can never know anything of the
> >> originals or even know that there are any, while if sensations give
> >> immediate knowledge there is no sense in trying to check up upon
> >> them by experiments which only give other sensations, just as im-
> >> mediate. The disastrous consequences of the belief in the cognitive
> >> character of sensations comes to light in Lenin's fanatical
> insistence
> >> upon accepting every word of Engels literally. According to Lenin,
> >> sensation is "a copy, photograph, and reflection of a reality
> existing
> >> independently of it." He takes Plekhanov to task for regarding
> >> sensations as "signs" or "symbols" of what things are, instead of
> >> adhering to the crude formula, "(sensations) are copies, photo-
> >> graphs, images, mirror-reflections of things" (p. 195). He adds
> >> further on, "the idea that knowledge can 'create' forms and change
> >> the primeval chaos into order, is an idealist notion. The world is
> >> a uniform world of matter in motion, and our cognition, being the
> >> highest product of nature, is in a position only to reflect this
> law."
> >> But if knowledge only "reflects" the laws of the world, how can it
> >> change the world? A mirror or a lake reflects the natural scene,
> >> but neither knows nor changes it. This is, indeed, a far cry from
> >> the functional and experimental theory expressed in Marx's gloss
> >> on Feurbach and strange words from one who believed that by "mass
> >> action" and the creation of new machines and forms of distribution,
> >> a better social system will be evolved." (p. 149-150)
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >>
>
>
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