Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation

[Derek Melser <derek.melser@gmail.com>]

Martin,

I think your summary of dualism and its pitfalls is excellent. But what is
this approach of Merleau-Ponty (that you are looking for evidence of in
Leontyev) – this viewing of mind/consciousness as 'embodied and worldly'? Is
being 'embodied and worldly' the same as being an action – something the
person does? If it is, if mind/consciousness is an ordinary action of the
person, then dualism is easily dispensed with. The concept of an action is
logically prior to both the concept of an intracranial agent or venue and
the concept of physical things (e.g., biological processes) in the world. If
mind/consciousness (thinking) is an action then it can be neither the
functioning of an intracranial (and supernatural?) entity, nor a biological
(e.g., brain) process. It is something simpler, namely, an action. And the
concept of action is logically irreducible. Actions are the ultimate
epistemological 'givens'. We have, even as newborns, a special 'innate
faculty' for perceiving them, although this intuitive faculty (it is
empathy) needs to be hugely trained up subsequently.

Unfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, if mind/consciousness/thinking is an
action, then, because our perception of others' actions always requires
empathy, and because empathy is not an acceptable observation method in the
sciences, there will never be a genuine science of
mind/consciousness/thinking. But at least we'll no longer be bamboozled by
the mind/body problem...

Derek

http://www.derekmelser.org




2009/1/14 Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>

> Haydi,
>
> Apologies for the delayed reply; I've been busy preparing for a new
> semester. Perhaps it's worth taking a step back to consider why dualism is
> an important problem. Dualism is the meta-theoretical belief or assumption
> that there are two distinct kinds of entities: mental (or spiritual)
> entities and material (or physical entities). Meta-theoretical because it
> is
> logically prior to specific theories in the social sciences, and usually
> implicit rather than stated explicitly.
>
> Many social scientists seem quite comfortable with the implications of
> dualism. These include the conclusion that each person has their own,
> private and subjective beliefs about the objective world, so that none of
> us
> can be sure whether or not our beliefs are true, and so in a sense each of
> us lives in our own private world. It's commonly said that this is an
> 'inner' realm, contrasting with the 'outer' or 'external' world.
>
> But the more philosophically inclined have recognized the problems that
> dualism gives rise to. The main problem is known as skepticism. If my
> beliefs and even my perceptions are subjective, private and personal, how
> can I even know that a real world exists? How can I ever know what other
> people are thinking and feeling? How can I even know for sure that other
> people exist?
>
> And how can any kind of scientific inquiry be possible? If each scientist
> knows only their own subjective thoughts and feelings, how can scientists
> communicate with one another, and how can they be said to have genuine
> knowledge? Social scientists ought to be more worried than they are about
> dualism, since it makes their claims to scientific knowledge very dubious,
> unless the scientists attribute to themselves a special status that the
> people they study lack.
>
> These problems have been recognized for a long time, and various moves have
> been made to try to rescue dualism from them. Descartes argued that a deity
> would hardly have created humans whose beliefs and perceptions did not
> correspond to how the world actually is. Locke argued that it is human
> nature to form ideas that conform to reality. Kant proposed that each mind
> forms representations of the external world that are based on a universal
> set of concepts or categories, so that although we can never claim to know
> things-in-themselves, our knowledge of the world still is certain. For
> Kant,
> reason dictated the laws of nature.
>
> And a certain view of language is often appealed to in an attempt to
> resolve
> the problems of dualism. The 'conduit' model sees speech as the
> 'expression'
> of the speaker's subjective thoughts and beliefs, words which are 'decoded'
> by the listener, who then has the same thoughts and beliefs 'in mind.'
>
> In 'The Historical Meaning of the Crisis in Psychology' Vygotsky placed
> central importance on dualism: he argued that dualism in psychological
> theory and practice was the central sign of a crisis in the discipline, and
> that the time was ripe to finally overcome dualism and create a psychology
> that was materialist, that eliminated any reference to mental or spiritual
> entities. In his view, the history of psychology was a series of failed
> attempts to combine an objective psychology with a subjective psychology:
> "psychology has a deeply dualistic nature which pervades its whole
> development." "Two psychologies exist - a natural scientific, materialistic
> one and a spiritualistic one. This thesis expresses the meaning of the
> crisis more correctly that the thesis about the existence of many
> psychologies." The solution - the formation of a general psychology - would
> require "a rupture" in which the idealist component (clearest in
> phenomenology, intuitionism, introspectionism, but present even in
> empiricism...) is cut away. But consciousness would still be studied as
> something material, an aspect of the mediated and real interaction between
> subject and object, rather than as something entirely on the subject(ive)
> side of an unbridgeable divide.
>
> So when I insist on the importance of avoiding dualism I feel I'm following
> Vygotsky's lead. In such a nondualistic psychology, consciousness would not
> be something 'inner.' There's a lot of potential for confusion here since
> it's reasonable to speak of the brain as being 'inside' the body, and the
> brain is obviously an important component in person-world interaction.
> That's why I keep mentioning that when Vygotsky wrote of "inner
> psychologically" he referred to a function changing from being social to
> individual, and when he wrote of "inner physiologically" he referred to a
> function changing from being partly outside the brain to being fully inside
> the brain. In neither case did a function move into an inner *mental"
> realm.
>
> So what would it look like to work from the presumption that human
> consciousness is an aspect of interaction? I agree with you that it
> shouldn't mean than mind is wandering around, or is stationary. But I am
> having difficulty following your argument that I am being dualistic in my
> criticism of Leontiev.
>
> I suppose I am looking in Leontiev's writing for some notions similar to
> the
> French philosopher and psychologist Merleau-Ponty, who also viewed
> mind/consciousness as embodied and worldlt. He distinguished three
> fundamental "organizations" of behavior – the "syncretic," the "amovable"
> and the "symbolic." Syncretic behavior is "imprisoned in the framework of
> its natural conditions" (p. 104): a toad will persist in its efforts to
> grab
> at a worm placed behind glass. At the level of amovable behavior signals
> emerge: a chicken can learn simple distinctions such as between dark and
> light corn. But in contrast the symbolic structures of behavior show
> flexibility and a "multiplicity of perspectives" (p. 122) absent from
> animal
> behavior. A chimpanzee "manifests a sort of adherence to the here and now,
> a
> short and heavy manner of existing" (p. 126), but human symbolic behavior
> is
> able to incorporate and restructure the other, simpler structures of
> behavior. This is a "third dialectic" (p. 184) in which, following Hegel,
> Merleau-Ponty proposed that the freedom to change perspectives gives a new
> dimension to the structure of behavior and makes possible a new
> "existential
> order."
>
> Sometimes I can find echoes of this kind of approach in both Vygotsky and
> Leontiev. For example, tantalizingly, in 'The Problem of Consciousness'
> Vygotsky spoke (the manuscript seems to be Leontiev's notes of an oral
> presentation), in the context of a discussion of Kohler's work with apes,
> of
> "three levels" of consciousness, but these are not further spelled out. He
> suggested that a human is distinguished from an animal not by a single
> feature, such as intellect, or will, or language, but by their "relation to
> reality."  "The animal differs from man because its consciousness is
> organized in another way. 'Man differs from the animal by his
> consciousness.'" But then at crucial times both V and L write in ways which
> I am only able to interpret as dualist. I would love to be able to
> interpret
> them differently, believe me, and the fault may well be mine!
>
> Martin
>
>
> On 1/10/09 2:38 PM, "Haydi Zulfei" <haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >
> > Martin,
> > I was certain I would not write any more to you but far from what you
> expect
> > from Andy , Haydi , whoever , I found your argumentation strange .
> [[Mental
> > action isn't
> > 'inside'
> > the organism in the same way that brain activity is inside. In my view it
> > isn't 'inside' at all.]]
> > Even now I'm thinking if I'm wrong in getting the true idea . Sarcasm
> maybe ?
> > Then why *mental* , so detached , any connotation ?
> > I have many messages left to read . Apologies beforehand either if I'm
> wrong
> > or if others have already alluded to this point :
> > I began with page 19 . Copy/Paste is now impossible . The whole idea L
> refers
> > to is *reductionism* and getting distanced from real scientific
> psychology in
> > either of the faces of a *naivete* . Mixing-up subjective images of the
> > objective world with the objective world/reality itself . Thinking the
> image
> > we have is the thing-in-itself . Comparing the laws of consciousness with
> > those governing the discovery of stars and planets being dissimilar .
> > Mixing-up brain physiology which always has the *psyche* attached to it
> with
> > the *essense* of the psychic phenomena . Just above the paragraph you've
> given
> > . Even L emphasizes (in small font) one day science will give the
> > physiological details for each psychic phenomenon ; L asks if we think on
> that
> > day search about psychics will exaust .
> > Seems you have not got the real intention of L . Then seems what you
> quote
> > from him in your words' support , bounces back to yourself .
> >
> > And Leontiev himself argues this point:
> >
> > [[onsciousness, thinking, and mind are not reducible in
> > general to processes taking place in the brain, and cannot
> > be deduced directly from them.]]
> > [With this approach we thus find independent,
> > external reality on one side of mental phenomena, and the brain
> > and the nervous, physiological processes that take place
> > in it on the other side, i.e. we find in both cases phenomena
> > that are not psychic" (p. 21).]
> > Two paragraphs not one .
> > Yes , reality detached from ideality is non-psychic ; ideality (take
> psyche
> > always attached to our *physiological* investigations or if we search for
> > consciousness within the brain) detached from reality is non-psychic ,
> too .
> > Again deep apologies even if correctly put .
> > Best
> > Haydi
> >
> >
> >
> > From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Wednesday, January 7, 2009, 2:17 PM
> >
> > Andy, I expected something more challenging from you! Yes, I have a
> brain, a
> > stomach, etc., and interesting things happen inside my body as I act and
> > think. But what happens in my brain is physiological activity, not mental
> > action. There's physiological activity in my brain when I dig a hole in
> the
> > ground, but you would not *equate* the brain activity with my
> > 'external'
> > action of digging. So why equate the brain activity that goes on when I
> am
> > thinking with some 'internal' mental action? Mental action isn't
> > 'inside'
> > the organism in the same way that brain activity is inside. In my view it
> > isn't 'inside' at all.
> >
> > And Leontiev himself argues this point:
> >
> > "Consciousness, thinking, and mind are not reducible in
> > general to processes taking place in the brain, and cannot
> > be deduced directly from them. With this approach we thus find
> independent,
> > external reality on one side of mental phenomena, and the brain
> > and the nervous, physiological processes that take place
> > in it on the other side, i.e. we find in both cases phenomena
> > that are not psychic" (p. 21).
> >
> > But although he goes on to point out that:
> >
> > "It is impossible, however, to close one's eyes to the fact
> > that psychological science, restricted by the framework of
> > bourgeois philosophy, has never risen above the level of a
> > purely metaphysical opposing of subjective psychic phenomena
> > to the phenomena of the external world, and could
> > therefore never penetrate their real essence, and that both
> > here and in psychology, the clumsy cart-horse of ordinary
> > bourgeois thought stops every time, perplexed, at the ditch
> > that divides essence from appearance, and cause from effect" (p. 23).
> >
> > .... later in the same book, in the pages I cited in my last message, he
> > seems to fall back into the ditch.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> >
> > On 1/6/09 8:31 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >
> >> Even ancient "materialism", which like contemporary
> >> "neuropsychology" wants to reduce thought to atoms and
> >> neurons, does not deny that something happens in the
> >> organism and something in the constitution of the organism
> >> changes when we learn, develop, etc. Surely you don't deny
> >> that there is something going on inside an organism when it
> >> learns, thinks, perceives, etc., Martin? What do you make of
> >> the maxim of Paracelsus and Marx about the bee and the
> >> architect?
> >>
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>> OK, to keep the ball rolling, what are we to make of the discussion
> > around
> >>> page 310 of "interiorization," which Leontiev defines as
> > "the gradual
> >>> conversion of external actions into internal, mental ones"?
> >>>
> >>> On page 284 Leontiev has just praised Rubinstein for proposing that
> > mind is
> >>> *in* activity. Now he says that mental activity is the *product* of
> >>> 'external' activity, and furthermore that mental activity is
> > 'internal'
> >>> activity. This sounds very dualistic to me.
> >>>
> >>> And here are my notes on page 311:
> >>>
> >>> "But this is circular reasoning. Interiorisation is necessary,
> > ANL tells us,
> >>> because accumulated human knowledge comes to the child as something
> >>> 'external.' These 'objects, verbal concepts,
> > knowledge' have an 'immediate
> >>> physical aspect' that is 'not yet refracted through the prism
> > of the
> >>> generalized experience of social practice.' But what happened to
> > ANL's
> >>> recognition that the child acts on objects always with adult guidance,
> > so
> >>> that the *immediate* contact *is* refracted through this prism (though
> > I'd
> >>> like to avoid the refraction/reflection metaphors).
> >>>
> >>> "And even if ANL were correct, why is any of this an explanation
> > of why
> >>> interiorization is necessary? If (past) human activity is
> > 'embodied' in
> >>> objects, that doesn't mean that I need mental actions to act with
> > them. On
> >>> the contrary, the whole notion of 'embodiedness' began as an
> > *alternative*
> >>> to idealist psychology.
> >>>
> >>> "And 'reflection in the child's head [p.
> > 311]'?!"
> >>>
> >>> Someone give me a monist gloss of all this, please!
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 1/5/09 6:46 PM, "Haydi Zulfei"
> > <haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Martin,
> >>>> Just one quote :
> >>>> [[Mind arises at a certain stage of the evolution of life not
> >>>> by chance out of necessity.i.e. naturally . But in what does
> >>>> the necessity of its origin consist? Clearly, if mind is not
> >>>> simply a purely subjective phenomenon, and not just an
> >>>> 'epiphenomenon' of objective processes, [but a property
> > that
> >>>> has real importance in life] , the necessity of its origin
> >>>> is governed by the evolution of life itself . More complex
> >>>> conditions of life require an organism to have the capacity,
> >>>> to reflect objective reality in the form of the simplest sensa-
> >>>> tions. The psyche is not simply 'added' to the vital
> > functions
> >>>> of organisms, but arises in the course of their development
> >>>> and provides the basis for a qualitatively new, higher form
> >>>> of life-life linked with mind, with a capacity to reflect real-
> >>>> ity.
> >>>> This implies that in order to disclose the transition from
> >>>> living matter that still has no psyche to living matter that
> >>>> has one, we have to proceed not from internal subjective states
> >>>> by themselves, separated from the subject's vital activity,
> >>>> or from behaviour taken in isolation from mind, or
> >>>> merely as that through which mental states and processes
> >>>> are studied, but from the real unity of the subject's mind
> >>>> and activity, and to study their internal reciprocal connections
> >>>> and transformations.]]
> >>>> Here we read there was a time when the organism faced
> > *undifferentiated*
> >>>> flat
> >>>> environmet ; in his A,C,P ,  Leontiev also alludes to the idea of
> >>>> environment
> >>>> once having been *objectless* for the organism , then at a higher
> > stage
> >>>> having
> >>>> faced *object-based differentiated* environment .
> >>>> If I'm right in my reading , first the rustling in the
> > environment triggers
> >>>> the frog to be led then to the food direct (insect) . This is when
> > Leontiev
> >>>> says need is not sufficient clue to activity ;  it must hit an
> > object .
> >>>> The other problem with your *dualism* vs *monism* is explained as
> > follows :
> >>>> Leontiev says at one time in evolution , it's not been the
> > case that the
> >>>> organism has been  able to see the thing once ; the image of that
> > thing
> >>>> twice
> >>>> . He has seen just one . Here we face the idea of the extension of
> > matter .
> >>>> In
> >>>> his book Lenin says quite clearly extension , time , place ,
> > causality are
> >>>> intrinsic to the Matter . Monism says the superhuman existence is
> > the
> >>>> extension of **matter** . These are not two but one and and the
> > same thing .
> >>>> Decartes , Hume , you well know had a different problem in view .
> > They
> >>>> believed in so-called one  SOULED-body . Soul having been
> > incarnated , as
> >>>> Andy
> >>>> says , in the Air and detachable capable of leading independent
> > life  This
> >>>> is
> >>>> Dualism . But when you believe in *Mind* being just a *property*
> > of matter
> >>>> ,
> >>>> then philosophical dualism is eliminated . And here is again where
> > I could
> >>>> say
> >>>> when you initiate with *culture* as one agental transformative ,
> > we object
> >>>> as
> >>>> you placing yourselves just midway ignoring *continuity*
> > disconnecting
> >>>> culture
> >>>> from its whereabout/origin .
> >>>> Best
> >>>> Haydi
> >>>>
> >>>> --- On Mon, 1/5/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
> >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
> >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>>> Date: Monday, January 5, 2009, 2:51 PM
> >>>>
> >>>> 'Sad' because my sense is that if one wants to avoid
> > dualism - crucial
> >>>> for
> >>>> Vygotsky - Lenin's writing about 'reflection'
> > isn't the way to
> >>>> go. I don't
> >>>> know the details well, but from what I have read Lenin assumed a
> > simple
> >>>> dualism in which mental representations 'reflect' the real
> > world. The
> >>>> 'image' may be reversed, but still it is in a realm quite
> > different
> >>>> from the
> >>>> real. (Bakhurst discusses Lenin's philosophy in *Consciousness
> > and
> >>>> Revolution* if I remember correctly.)
> >>>>
> >>>> I recently read through *Problems of the Development of Mind*,
> > which Michael
> >>>> and Andy generously made available (it fell down my chimney early
> > one
> >>>> morning) and was disappointed to discover how little Leontiev
> > seems to have
> >>>> avoided dualistic ways of thinking/writing. Here too the relation
> > of psyche
> >>>> to world is expressed in terms of 'reflection,' for
> > example:
> >>>>
> >>>> "The transition to existence in the conditions of a complex
> >>>> environment formed as things is therefore expressed in or-
> >>>> ganisms' adaptation to it taking on a qualitatively new form
> >>>> associated with reflection of the properties of a material,
> >>>> objective reality of things" (44)
> >>>>
> >>>> The sense of reflection is not very clear in this excerpt, but the
> > term is
> >>>> used repeatedly in ways that generally suggest Leontiev sees the
> > psyche
> >>>> forming subjective representations of an objective reality.
> > Perhaps this can
> >>>> be saved by drawing on Marx's use of 'widerspiegeln,'
> > which as
> >>>> Michael
> >>>> points out avoids the connotations of mirroring. But at least it
> > invites
> >>>> readings of CHAT which don't challenge the dualism in
> > contemporary western
> >>>> social science.
> >>>>
> >>>> By the way, although the repeated presentations of the same
> > notions in
> >>>> Leontiev's book made me suspicious along the way, it
> > wasn't until the
> >>>> very
> >>>> end that I discovered (from an endnote) that it is a compilation
> > of articles
> >>>> from very different dates. I'd recommend reading it in
> > chronological order
> >>>> to get a clearer sense of how his ideas developed. For instance, I
> > need to
> >>>> go back to see how his relative emphasis shifted between the
> > child's
> >>>> encounter with objects, and adult guidance of this encounter. At
> > times the
> >>>> latter is not mentioned, at others it is added on ("by the
> > way..."),
> >>>> and at
> >>>> times it is highlighted. But since the chapters are out of order,
> > I don't
> >>>> yet have a clear sense of the chronology of these shifts.
> >>>>
> >>>> Martin
> >>>>
> >>>> On 1/4/09 11:50 PM, "Mike Cole"
> > <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> The idea that always occurs to me about reflections is that in
> > mirrors,
> >>>>> left
> >>>> and right are reversed.
> >>>>
> >>>> Sad? Or a reason to pause to think?
> >>>> Quien
> >>>>> Sabe?
> >>>> mike
> >>>>
> >>>> On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden
> > <ablunden@mira.net>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>> Why sad?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> I know, but it would be sad
> >>>>> to discover that Vygotsky was drawing so
> >>>>>> heavily
> >>>>>> from Lenin.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On
> >>>>> 1/4/09 9:42 PM, "Andy Blunden"
> > <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>  I might say
> >>>>> as an aside, that "reflection" whatever it is in
> >>>>>>> Russian, has a strong
> >>>>> place in Russian Marxism. This is
> >>>>>>> because Lenin made such a powerful
> >>>>> attack on his
> >>>>>>> philosophical enemies in "Materialism and
> >>>>> Empirio-Criticism"
> >>>>>>> written in 1908. Ilyenkov still defends this books in
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>> mid-1970s, though almost all non-Russian Marxists
> > would say
> >>>>>>> that
> >>>>> it is a terrible book and was written before Lenin had
> >>>>>>> studied Hegel, etc.
> >>>>> In M&EC Lenin makes reflection a central
> >>>>>>> category, a universal property of
> >>>>> matter, etc., and bitterly
> >>>>>>> attacks the use of semiotics of any
> >>>>> kind.
> >>>>>>> I have an ambiguous attitude to M&EC myself. Apart
> > from
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>> "sins of omission" perhaps, Lenin is right, but did
> > he
> >>>>>>> really have to
> >>>>> shout it that loud? Well, in the historical
> >>>>>>> context of the wake of the
> >>>>> defeat of the 1905 Revolution,
> >>>>>>> probably he did. Did all Russian Marxists
> >>>>> for the next 100
> >>>>>>> years have to follow his lead? Probably not.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I
> >>>>> note that in Dot Robbins' book on Vygotsky and
> > Leontyev's
> >>>>>>> Semiotics etc.,
> >>>>> Dot defends the notion of reflection. The
> >>>>>>> situation, as I see it, is that
> >>>>> "reflection" has a strong
> >>>>>>> advantage and an equally strong disadvantage in
> >>>>> conveying a
> >>>>>>> materialist conception of sensuous perception.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> On one
> >>>>> side it emphasises the objectivity of the
> >>>>>>> image-making - there is nothing
> >>>>> in the mirror, or if there
> >>>>>>> is, it is an imperfectionit which distorts the
> >>>>> image. On the
> >>>>>>> other side, mirror-imaging is an entirely passive
> > process,
> >>>>> a
> >>>>>>> property of even non-living matter.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Personally, I think
> >>>>> "reflection" belongs to Feuerbachian
> >>>>>>> materialism, not Marxism, but in
> >>>>> historical context, the
> >>>>>>> position of many Russians who use the concept,
> >>>>> is
> >>>>>>> understandable.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> That's how I see it anyway,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>> Ed Wall wrote:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>       It appears the
> >>>>> root is more or less
> >>>>>>>>                        отрaжáть
> >>>>> (отрaзить)
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> and, at least according to my dictionary, has the
> >>>>> sense of  reflecting
> >>>>>>>> or having an effect. However, my qualifications
> > are
> >>>>> dated.
> >>>>>>>> Ed
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Martin Packer
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>  At the end of last year several of us were trying
> > to figure
> >>>>> out whether
> >>>>>>>>> 'reflection' is a good term to
> > translate the way
> >>>> Vygotsky
> >>>>> and leontiev
> >>>>>>>>> wrote
> >>>>>>>>> about 'mental' activity. Michael Roth
> > pointed
> >>>>> out that the German word
> >>>>>>>>> that
> >>>>>>>>> Marx used was Widerspiegeln rather
> >>>>> than Reflektion (see below). I don't
> >>>>>>>>> think anyone identified the Russian
> >>>>> word that was used. I still haven't
> >>>>>>>>> found time to trace the word in
> >>>>> Vygotsky's texts, English and Russian.
> >>>>>>>>> But
> >>>>>>>>> an article by Charles
> >>>>> Tolman suggests that the Russian term was
> >>>>>>>>> 'otrazhenie.'  Online
> >>>>> translators don't like this word: can any Russian
> >>>>>>>>> speakers suggest how
> >>>>> it might be translated?
> >>>>>>>>> Reflection (German: Widerspiegelung;
> >>>>> Russian: otrazhenie)
> >>>>>>>>> Tolman, C.W. (1988). The basic vocabulary of
> >>>>> Activity Theory. Activity
> >>>>>>>>> Theory, 1, 14-20.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>> On 10/25/08 12:40 PM, "Wolff-Michael
> > Roth"
> >>>> <mroth@uvic.ca>
> >>>>> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>  Hi Martin,
> >>>>>>>>>> Marx does indeed use the term
> >>>>> "widerspiegeln" in the sentence you
> >>>>>>>>>> cite.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Das Gehirn
> >>>>> der
> >>>>>>>>>> Privatproduzenten spiegelt diesen
> > doppelten
> >>>>> gesellschaftlichen
> >>>>>>>>>> Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten nur wider
> > in den
> >>>>> Formen, welche im
> >>>>>>>>>> praktischen Verkehr, im Produktenaustausch
> > erscheinen
> >>>>> - den
> >>>>>>>>>> gesellschaftlich
> >>>>>>>>>> nützlichen Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten
> >>>>> also in
> >>>>>>>>>> der Form, daß das Arbeitsprodukt
> > nützlich sein muß,
> >>>> und zwar
> >>>>> für
> >>>>>>>>>> andre - den gesellschaftlichen Charakter
> > der
> >>>> Gleichheit der
> >>>>> verschiedenartigen
> >>>>>>>>>> Arbeiten in der Form des gemeinsamen
> >>>>> Wertcharakters
> >>>>>>>>>> dieser materiell verschiednen Dinge, der
> >>>>> Arbeitsprodukte.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> But the Duden, the reference work of
> >>>>> German language says that there
> >>>>>>>>>> are 2 different senses. One is
> >>>>> reflection as in a mirror, the other
> >>>>>>>>>> one that something brings to
> >>>>> expression. In this context, I do not
> >>>>>>>>>> see Marx draw on the mirror
> >>>>> idea.
> >>>>>>>>>> For those who have trouble, perhaps the
> > analogy with
> >>>>> mathematical
> >>>>>>>>>> functions. In German, what a mathematical
> > function
> >>>> does
> >>>>> is
> >>>>>>>>>> "abbilden," which is, provide a
> > projection
> >>>> of, or reflection,
> >>>>> or
> >>>>>>>>>> whatever. You have the word Bild, image,
> > picture in
> >>>> the verb.
> >>>>> But
> >>>>>>>>>> when you look at functions, only y = f(x)
> > = x, or -x
> >>>> gives you
> >>>>> what
> >>>>>>>>>> you would get in the mirror analogy. You
> > get very
> >>>> different
> >>>>> things
> >>>>>>>>>> when you use different functions, log
> > functions, etc.
> >>>> Then
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> relationship between the points on a line
> > no longer is
> >>>> the same
> >>>>> in
> >>>>>>>>>> the "image", that is, the target
> > domain.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> We sometimes
> >>>>> see the word "refraction" in the works of Russian
> >>>>>>>>>> psychologists, which
> >>>>> may be better than reflection. It allows you to
> >>>>>>>>>> think of looking at the
> >>>>> world through a kaleidoscope, and you get all
> >>>>>>>>>> sorts of things, none of
> >>>>> which look like "the real thing."
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> Michael
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> On 25-Oct-08, at 9:01 AM,
> >>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> Michael,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> Here's one example
> >>>>> from Marx, and several from Leontiev, if we can
> >>>>>>>>>> get into
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>> Russian too.
> >>>>>>>>>> "The twofold social character of the
> > labour of
> >>>> the
> >>>>> individual appears
> >>>>>>>>>> to
> >>>>>>>>>> him, when *reflected* in his brain, only
> >>>>> under those forms which are
> >>>>>>>>>> impressed upon that labour in every-day
> >>>>> practice by the exchange of
> >>>>>>>>>> products." Marx, Capital, Chapter 1,
> >>>>> section 4.
> >>>>>>>>>> " Activity is a non-additive unit of
> > the
> >>>> corporeal,
> >>>>> material life of
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> material subject. In the narrower sense,
> >>>>> i.e., on the psychological
> >>>>>>>>>> plane,
> >>>>>>>>>> it is a unit of life, mediated
> >>>>> by mental *reflection*, by an *image,*
> >>>>>>>>>> whose
> >>>>>>>>>> real function is to
> >>>>> orientate the subject in the objective world."
> >>>>>>>>>> Leontiev,
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> Activity & Consciousness.
> >>>>>>>>>> " The circular nature of the
> > processes
> >>>>> effecting the interaction of
> >>>>>>>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> organism with the environment
> >>>>> has been generally acknowledged. But
> >>>>>>>>>> the main
> >>>>>>>>>> thing is not this
> >>>>> circular structure as such, but the fact that the
> >>>>>>>>>> mental
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> *reflection* of the objective world is not directly generated
> > by the
> >>>>> external influences themselves, but by the processes through
> > which the
> >>>>> subject comes into practical contact with the objective world,
> > and
> >>>>> which
> >>>>>>>>>> therefore necessarily obey its independent
> > properties,
> >>>>> connections,
> >>>>>>>>>> and
> >>>>>>>>>> relations." ibid
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> " Thus,
> >>>>> individual consciousness as a specifically human form of the
> >>>>>>>>>> subjective
> >>>>> *reflection* of objective reality may be understood only
> >>>>>>>>>> as the
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> product of those relations and mediacies that arise in the
> > course of
> >>>>> the
> >>>>>>>>>> establishment and development of
> > society." ibid
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> Martin
> >>>>>>>>>>
> > _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca
> >>>>> mailing list
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing
> >>>>> list
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> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>>>>>>
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> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>> --
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> >>>> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3
> >>>>> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
> >>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
> >>>>> Blunden:
> >>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>
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> >>>>
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> >>>>
> >>>>
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> >>>
> >>>
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> >>>
> >
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