[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
- To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
- From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei@yahoo.com>
- Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2009 11:38:18 -0800 (PST)
- Delivered-to: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
- Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=s1024; d=yahoo.com; h=Received:X-Mailer:Date:From:Reply-To:Subject:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-ID; b=DU9TTkHgSGcEAv0x2/+QoSFnV1WVICcpxRhwZ0BqqzGz7w/v136cSlxXoOaC12EB1/+4A8RSVRKZaMgsjf8xELSg8kGbU3fIHxgElJGIgFV3bvvhFJRZBu4fBXnOTkygV+1RyOsg0P+lTPavyaGTguWhnZt+IkbAhb0d3iNzSIo=;
- List-archive: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca>
- List-help: <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=help>
- List-id: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca.weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-post: <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- List-subscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=subscribe>
- List-unsubscribe: <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>, <mailto:xmca-request@weber.ucsd.edu?subject=unsubscribe>
- Reply-to: haydizulfei@yahoo.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Sender: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
Martin,
I was certain I would not write any more to you but far from what you expect from Andy , Haydi , whoever , I found your argumentation strange . [[Mental action isn't
'inside'
the organism in the same way that brain activity is inside. In my view it
isn't 'inside' at all.]]
Even now I'm thinking if I'm wrong in getting the true idea . Sarcasm maybe ?
Then why *mental* , so detached , any connotation ?
I have many messages left to read . Apologies beforehand either if I'm wrong or if others have already alluded to this point :
I began with page 19 . Copy/Paste is now impossible . The whole idea L refers to is *reductionism* and getting distanced from real scientific psychology in either of the faces of a *naivete* . Mixing-up subjective images of the objective world with the objective world/reality itself . Thinking the image we have is the thing-in-itself . Comparing the laws of consciousness with those governing the discovery of stars and planets being dissimilar .
Mixing-up brain physiology which always has the *psyche* attached to it with the *essense* of the psychic phenomena . Just above the paragraph you've given . Even L emphasizes (in small font) one day science will give the physiological details for each psychic phenomenon ; L asks if we think on that day search about psychics will exaust .
Seems you have not got the real intention of L . Then seems what you quote from him in your words' support , bounces back to yourself .
And Leontiev himself argues this point:
[[onsciousness, thinking, and mind are not reducible in
general to processes taking place in the brain, and cannot
be deduced directly from them.]]
[With this approach we thus find independent,
external reality on one side of mental phenomena, and the brain
and the nervous, physiological processes that take place
in it on the other side, i.e. we find in both cases phenomena
that are not psychic" (p. 21).]
Two paragraphs not one .
Yes , reality detached from ideality is non-psychic ; ideality (take psyche always attached to our *physiological* investigations or if we search for consciousness within the brain) detached from reality is non-psychic , too .
Again deep apologies even if correctly put .
Best
Haydi
From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wednesday, January 7, 2009, 2:17 PM
Andy, I expected something more challenging from you! Yes, I have a brain, a
stomach, etc., and interesting things happen inside my body as I act and
think. But what happens in my brain is physiological activity, not mental
action. There's physiological activity in my brain when I dig a hole in the
ground, but you would not *equate* the brain activity with my
'external'
action of digging. So why equate the brain activity that goes on when I am
thinking with some 'internal' mental action? Mental action isn't
'inside'
the organism in the same way that brain activity is inside. In my view it
isn't 'inside' at all.
And Leontiev himself argues this point:
"Consciousness, thinking, and mind are not reducible in
general to processes taking place in the brain, and cannot
be deduced directly from them. With this approach we thus find independent,
external reality on one side of mental phenomena, and the brain
and the nervous, physiological processes that take place
in it on the other side, i.e. we find in both cases phenomena
that are not psychic" (p. 21).
But although he goes on to point out that:
"It is impossible, however, to close one's eyes to the fact
that psychological science, restricted by the framework of
bourgeois philosophy, has never risen above the level of a
purely metaphysical opposing of subjective psychic phenomena
to the phenomena of the external world, and could
therefore never penetrate their real essence, and that both
here and in psychology, the clumsy cart-horse of ordinary
bourgeois thought stops every time, perplexed, at the ditch
that divides essence from appearance, and cause from effect" (p. 23).
.... later in the same book, in the pages I cited in my last message, he
seems to fall back into the ditch.
Martin
On 1/6/09 8:31 PM, "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> Even ancient "materialism", which like contemporary
> "neuropsychology" wants to reduce thought to atoms and
> neurons, does not deny that something happens in the
> organism and something in the constitution of the organism
> changes when we learn, develop, etc. Surely you don't deny
> that there is something going on inside an organism when it
> learns, thinks, perceives, etc., Martin? What do you make of
> the maxim of Paracelsus and Marx about the bee and the
> architect?
>
> Andy
>
> Martin Packer wrote:
>> OK, to keep the ball rolling, what are we to make of the discussion
around
>> page 310 of "interiorization," which Leontiev defines as
"the gradual
>> conversion of external actions into internal, mental ones"?
>>
>> On page 284 Leontiev has just praised Rubinstein for proposing that
mind is
>> *in* activity. Now he says that mental activity is the *product* of
>> 'external' activity, and furthermore that mental activity is
'internal'
>> activity. This sounds very dualistic to me.
>>
>> And here are my notes on page 311:
>>
>> "But this is circular reasoning. Interiorisation is necessary,
ANL tells us,
>> because accumulated human knowledge comes to the child as something
>> 'external.' These 'objects, verbal concepts,
knowledge' have an 'immediate
>> physical aspect' that is 'not yet refracted through the prism
of the
>> generalized experience of social practice.' But what happened to
ANL's
>> recognition that the child acts on objects always with adult guidance,
so
>> that the *immediate* contact *is* refracted through this prism (though
I'd
>> like to avoid the refraction/reflection metaphors).
>>
>> "And even if ANL were correct, why is any of this an explanation
of why
>> interiorization is necessary? If (past) human activity is
'embodied' in
>> objects, that doesn't mean that I need mental actions to act with
them. On
>> the contrary, the whole notion of 'embodiedness' began as an
*alternative*
>> to idealist psychology.
>>
>> "And 'reflection in the child's head [p.
311]'?!"
>>
>> Someone give me a monist gloss of all this, please!
>>
>> Martin
>>
>>
>> On 1/5/09 6:46 PM, "Haydi Zulfei"
<haydizulfei@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Martin,
>>> Just one quote :
>>> [[Mind arises at a certain stage of the evolution of life not
>>> by chance out of necessity.i.e. naturally . But in what does
>>> the necessity of its origin consist? Clearly, if mind is not
>>> simply a purely subjective phenomenon, and not just an
>>> 'epiphenomenon' of objective processes, [but a property
that
>>> has real importance in life] , the necessity of its origin
>>> is governed by the evolution of life itself . More complex
>>> conditions of life require an organism to have the capacity,
>>> to reflect objective reality in the form of the simplest sensa-
>>> tions. The psyche is not simply 'added' to the vital
functions
>>> of organisms, but arises in the course of their development
>>> and provides the basis for a qualitatively new, higher form
>>> of life-life linked with mind, with a capacity to reflect real-
>>> ity.
>>> This implies that in order to disclose the transition from
>>> living matter that still has no psyche to living matter that
>>> has one, we have to proceed not from internal subjective states
>>> by themselves, separated from the subject's vital activity,
>>> or from behaviour taken in isolation from mind, or
>>> merely as that through which mental states and processes
>>> are studied, but from the real unity of the subject's mind
>>> and activity, and to study their internal reciprocal connections
>>> and transformations.]]
>>> Here we read there was a time when the organism faced
*undifferentiated*
>>> flat
>>> environmet ; in his A,C,P , Leontiev also alludes to the idea of
>>> environment
>>> once having been *objectless* for the organism , then at a higher
stage
>>> having
>>> faced *object-based differentiated* environment .
>>> If I'm right in my reading , first the rustling in the
environment triggers
>>> the frog to be led then to the food direct (insect) . This is when
Leontiev
>>> says need is not sufficient clue to activity ; it must hit an
object .
>>> The other problem with your *dualism* vs *monism* is explained as
follows :
>>> Leontiev says at one time in evolution , it's not been the
case that the
>>> organism has been able to see the thing once ; the image of that
thing
>>> twice
>>> . He has seen just one . Here we face the idea of the extension of
matter .
>>> In
>>> his book Lenin says quite clearly extension , time , place ,
causality are
>>> intrinsic to the Matter . Monism says the superhuman existence is
the
>>> extension of **matter** . These are not two but one and and the
same thing .
>>> Decartes , Hume , you well know had a different problem in view .
They
>>> believed in so-called one SOULED-body . Soul having been
incarnated , as
>>> Andy
>>> says , in the Air and detachable capable of leading independent
life This
>>> is
>>> Dualism . But when you believe in *Mind* being just a *property*
of matter
>>> ,
>>> then philosophical dualism is eliminated . And here is again where
I could
>>> say
>>> when you initiate with *culture* as one agental transformative ,
we object
>>> as
>>> you placing yourselves just midway ignoring *continuity*
disconnecting
>>> culture
>>> from its whereabout/origin .
>>> Best
>>> Haydi
>>>
>>> --- On Mon, 1/5/09, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>>>
>>> From: Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu>
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Kant and the Strange Situation
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
<xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Date: Monday, January 5, 2009, 2:51 PM
>>>
>>> 'Sad' because my sense is that if one wants to avoid
dualism - crucial
>>> for
>>> Vygotsky - Lenin's writing about 'reflection'
isn't the way to
>>> go. I don't
>>> know the details well, but from what I have read Lenin assumed a
simple
>>> dualism in which mental representations 'reflect' the real
world. The
>>> 'image' may be reversed, but still it is in a realm quite
different
>>> from the
>>> real. (Bakhurst discusses Lenin's philosophy in *Consciousness
and
>>> Revolution* if I remember correctly.)
>>>
>>> I recently read through *Problems of the Development of Mind*,
which Michael
>>> and Andy generously made available (it fell down my chimney early
one
>>> morning) and was disappointed to discover how little Leontiev
seems to have
>>> avoided dualistic ways of thinking/writing. Here too the relation
of psyche
>>> to world is expressed in terms of 'reflection,' for
example:
>>>
>>> "The transition to existence in the conditions of a complex
>>> environment formed as things is therefore expressed in or-
>>> ganisms' adaptation to it taking on a qualitatively new form
>>> associated with reflection of the properties of a material,
>>> objective reality of things" (44)
>>>
>>> The sense of reflection is not very clear in this excerpt, but the
term is
>>> used repeatedly in ways that generally suggest Leontiev sees the
psyche
>>> forming subjective representations of an objective reality.
Perhaps this can
>>> be saved by drawing on Marx's use of 'widerspiegeln,'
which as
>>> Michael
>>> points out avoids the connotations of mirroring. But at least it
invites
>>> readings of CHAT which don't challenge the dualism in
contemporary western
>>> social science.
>>>
>>> By the way, although the repeated presentations of the same
notions in
>>> Leontiev's book made me suspicious along the way, it
wasn't until the
>>> very
>>> end that I discovered (from an endnote) that it is a compilation
of articles
>>> from very different dates. I'd recommend reading it in
chronological order
>>> to get a clearer sense of how his ideas developed. For instance, I
need to
>>> go back to see how his relative emphasis shifted between the
child's
>>> encounter with objects, and adult guidance of this encounter. At
times the
>>> latter is not mentioned, at others it is added on ("by the
way..."),
>>> and at
>>> times it is highlighted. But since the chapters are out of order,
I don't
>>> yet have a clear sense of the chronology of these shifts.
>>>
>>> Martin
>>>
>>> On 1/4/09 11:50 PM, "Mike Cole"
<lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> The idea that always occurs to me about reflections is that in
mirrors,
>>>> left
>>> and right are reversed.
>>>
>>> Sad? Or a reason to pause to think?
>>> Quien
>>>> Sabe?
>>> mike
>>>
>>> On Sun, Jan 4, 2009 at 7:43 PM, Andy Blunden
<ablunden@mira.net>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> Why sad?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I know, but it would be sad
>>>> to discover that Vygotsky was drawing so
>>>>> heavily
>>>>> from Lenin.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On
>>>> 1/4/09 9:42 PM, "Andy Blunden"
<ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>> I might say
>>>> as an aside, that "reflection" whatever it is in
>>>>>> Russian, has a strong
>>>> place in Russian Marxism. This is
>>>>>> because Lenin made such a powerful
>>>> attack on his
>>>>>> philosophical enemies in "Materialism and
>>>> Empirio-Criticism"
>>>>>> written in 1908. Ilyenkov still defends this books in
>>>> the
>>>>>> mid-1970s, though almost all non-Russian Marxists
would say
>>>>>> that
>>>> it is a terrible book and was written before Lenin had
>>>>>> studied Hegel, etc.
>>>> In M&EC Lenin makes reflection a central
>>>>>> category, a universal property of
>>>> matter, etc., and bitterly
>>>>>> attacks the use of semiotics of any
>>>> kind.
>>>>>> I have an ambiguous attitude to M&EC myself. Apart
from
>>>>>>
>>>> "sins of omission" perhaps, Lenin is right, but did
he
>>>>>> really have to
>>>> shout it that loud? Well, in the historical
>>>>>> context of the wake of the
>>>> defeat of the 1905 Revolution,
>>>>>> probably he did. Did all Russian Marxists
>>>> for the next 100
>>>>>> years have to follow his lead? Probably not.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I
>>>> note that in Dot Robbins' book on Vygotsky and
Leontyev's
>>>>>> Semiotics etc.,
>>>> Dot defends the notion of reflection. The
>>>>>> situation, as I see it, is that
>>>> "reflection" has a strong
>>>>>> advantage and an equally strong disadvantage in
>>>> conveying a
>>>>>> materialist conception of sensuous perception.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On one
>>>> side it emphasises the objectivity of the
>>>>>> image-making - there is nothing
>>>> in the mirror, or if there
>>>>>> is, it is an imperfectionit which distorts the
>>>> image. On the
>>>>>> other side, mirror-imaging is an entirely passive
process,
>>>> a
>>>>>> property of even non-living matter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Personally, I think
>>>> "reflection" belongs to Feuerbachian
>>>>>> materialism, not Marxism, but in
>>>> historical context, the
>>>>>> position of many Russians who use the concept,
>>>> is
>>>>>> understandable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That's how I see it anyway,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>>> Ed Wall wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It appears the
>>>> root is more or less
>>>>>>> отрaжáть
>>>> (отрaзить)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and, at least according to my dictionary, has the
>>>> sense of reflecting
>>>>>>> or having an effect. However, my qualifications
are
>>>> dated.
>>>>>>> Ed
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Jan 4, 2009, at 7:01 PM, Martin Packer
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> At the end of last year several of us were trying
to figure
>>>> out whether
>>>>>>>> 'reflection' is a good term to
translate the way
>>> Vygotsky
>>>> and leontiev
>>>>>>>> wrote
>>>>>>>> about 'mental' activity. Michael Roth
pointed
>>>> out that the German word
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> Marx used was Widerspiegeln rather
>>>> than Reflektion (see below). I don't
>>>>>>>> think anyone identified the Russian
>>>> word that was used. I still haven't
>>>>>>>> found time to trace the word in
>>>> Vygotsky's texts, English and Russian.
>>>>>>>> But
>>>>>>>> an article by Charles
>>>> Tolman suggests that the Russian term was
>>>>>>>> 'otrazhenie.' Online
>>>> translators don't like this word: can any Russian
>>>>>>>> speakers suggest how
>>>> it might be translated?
>>>>>>>> Reflection (German: Widerspiegelung;
>>>> Russian: otrazhenie)
>>>>>>>> Tolman, C.W. (1988). The basic vocabulary of
>>>> Activity Theory. Activity
>>>>>>>> Theory, 1, 14-20.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>> On 10/25/08 12:40 PM, "Wolff-Michael
Roth"
>>> <mroth@uvic.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Hi Martin,
>>>>>>>>> Marx does indeed use the term
>>>> "widerspiegeln" in the sentence you
>>>>>>>>> cite.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Das Gehirn
>>>> der
>>>>>>>>> Privatproduzenten spiegelt diesen
doppelten
>>>> gesellschaftlichen
>>>>>>>>> Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten nur wider
in den
>>>> Formen, welche im
>>>>>>>>> praktischen Verkehr, im Produktenaustausch
erscheinen
>>>> - den
>>>>>>>>> gesellschaftlich
>>>>>>>>> nützlichen Charakter ihrer Privatarbeiten
>>>> also in
>>>>>>>>> der Form, daß das Arbeitsprodukt
nützlich sein muß,
>>> und zwar
>>>> für
>>>>>>>>> andre - den gesellschaftlichen Charakter
der
>>> Gleichheit der
>>>> verschiedenartigen
>>>>>>>>> Arbeiten in der Form des gemeinsamen
>>>> Wertcharakters
>>>>>>>>> dieser materiell verschiednen Dinge, der
>>>> Arbeitsprodukte.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But the Duden, the reference work of
>>>> German language says that there
>>>>>>>>> are 2 different senses. One is
>>>> reflection as in a mirror, the other
>>>>>>>>> one that something brings to
>>>> expression. In this context, I do not
>>>>>>>>> see Marx draw on the mirror
>>>> idea.
>>>>>>>>> For those who have trouble, perhaps the
analogy with
>>>> mathematical
>>>>>>>>> functions. In German, what a mathematical
function
>>> does
>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> "abbilden," which is, provide a
projection
>>> of, or reflection,
>>>> or
>>>>>>>>> whatever. You have the word Bild, image,
picture in
>>> the verb.
>>>> But
>>>>>>>>> when you look at functions, only y = f(x)
= x, or -x
>>> gives you
>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> you would get in the mirror analogy. You
get very
>>> different
>>>> things
>>>>>>>>> when you use different functions, log
functions, etc.
>>> Then
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> relationship between the points on a line
no longer is
>>> the same
>>>> in
>>>>>>>>> the "image", that is, the target
domain.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We sometimes
>>>> see the word "refraction" in the works of Russian
>>>>>>>>> psychologists, which
>>>> may be better than reflection. It allows you to
>>>>>>>>> think of looking at the
>>>> world through a kaleidoscope, and you get all
>>>>>>>>> sorts of things, none of
>>>> which look like "the real thing."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 25-Oct-08, at 9:01 AM,
>>>> Martin Packer wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Michael,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Here's one example
>>>> from Marx, and several from Leontiev, if we can
>>>>>>>>> get into
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>> Russian too.
>>>>>>>>> "The twofold social character of the
labour of
>>> the
>>>> individual appears
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> him, when *reflected* in his brain, only
>>>> under those forms which are
>>>>>>>>> impressed upon that labour in every-day
>>>> practice by the exchange of
>>>>>>>>> products." Marx, Capital, Chapter 1,
>>>> section 4.
>>>>>>>>> " Activity is a non-additive unit of
the
>>> corporeal,
>>>> material life of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> material subject. In the narrower sense,
>>>> i.e., on the psychological
>>>>>>>>> plane,
>>>>>>>>> it is a unit of life, mediated
>>>> by mental *reflection*, by an *image,*
>>>>>>>>> whose
>>>>>>>>> real function is to
>>>> orientate the subject in the objective world."
>>>>>>>>> Leontiev,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Activity & Consciousness.
>>>>>>>>> " The circular nature of the
processes
>>>> effecting the interaction of
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> organism with the environment
>>>> has been generally acknowledged. But
>>>>>>>>> the main
>>>>>>>>> thing is not this
>>>> circular structure as such, but the fact that the
>>>>>>>>> mental
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> *reflection* of the objective world is not directly generated
by the
>>>> external influences themselves, but by the processes through
which the
>>>> subject comes into practical contact with the objective world,
and
>>>> which
>>>>>>>>> therefore necessarily obey its independent
properties,
>>>> connections,
>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>> relations." ibid
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> " Thus,
>>>> individual consciousness as a specifically human form of the
>>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>> *reflection* of objective reality may be understood only
>>>>>>>>> as the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> product of those relations and mediacies that arise in the
course of
>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> establishment and development of
society." ibid
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> Martin
>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca
>>>> mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing
>>>> list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>>>
>>>>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3
>>>> 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
>>>> Blunden:
>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca