Re: [xmca] motive/project

Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes individual
activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also helps to
understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.

Geoff

2008/12/18 Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>:
> andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive than "motive." I
> feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't "want" more to eat,
> but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
>
> We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
> Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion, but I
> missed it. In which case, just point.
>
> No need to reply right away. :-))
> mike
>
> On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>
>> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is provisional. He
>> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not have a
>> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are to continue in the
>> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need a "unit of
>> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
>>
>> Andy
>>
>>
>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>
>>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea is not that
>>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike other animals, who are
>>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans respond to
>>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature, their social
>>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves individually,
>>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs become at once
>>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history, tools, signs,
>>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems. Leontiev took his
>>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals - the ways they
>>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their needs - and
>>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal, condition/operation
>>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity concept to
>>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT, and that is kind
>>> of where we are at today.
>>>
>>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There may be
>>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of analysis' in some of the
>>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the 'molecule' and/or
>>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule and cell of natural
>>> science.
>>>
>>> - Steve
>>>
>>>
>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs directly and
>>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a truism. My problem, as you
>>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of activity, or what is *an*
>>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea that "an activity" is defined
>>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is suggested) is that problems of
>>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is x for? x is for
>>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea that human needs
>>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
>>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks and I thought that
>>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus collective problem, or
>>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an activity from an
>>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or just how to separate "an"
>>>>> activity out of many.
>>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem with the idea of
>>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that human activities are
>>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
>>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements like: the need for survival
>>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production, creating a new way to meet
>>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating many new kinds of
>>>>> needs as society developed ... different social classes have different
>>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict, including wars ... human
>>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for existence, control of
>>>>> nature, and society itself ...
>>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist sociology 101, so
>>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if "need" is not at the
>>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is? Is this a
>>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
>>>>> - Steve
>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi. As I read them, they
>>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system of activity" is defined by
>>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL does say that production
>>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new needs, but this does not
>>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept that society is either
>>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee to meet human needs, or
>>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human needs then this cannot be
>>>>>> believed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough, in fact it's a
>>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For example, take war. If we set out
>>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a human need, where does that
>>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology? Take anything - the Church,
>>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence, ... all we are going to end up
>>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be built on this foundation,
>>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a sociology.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an* activity/*a* motive?"
>>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more reading than interpretation .
>>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of *A,C,P* and collect
>>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to these questions .
>>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
>>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way but to put it in an
>>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time to have a glance at it without
>>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
>>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head here, from the
>>>>>>> psychological point
>>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the problem, as I see it, with
>>>>>>> Michael's
>>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil not know the motive of
>>>>>>> schooling,
>>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
>>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and structure and such
>>>>>>> terms, does it
>>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive' to an institution, outside of a
>>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which Leontyev lived?
>>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you are right as against
>>>>>>> David, because
>>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the sense in which Leonytev means it.
>>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose actvity", or "doing" or
>>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just physiological movement. The
>>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation* is *a* (social) activity.
>>>>>>> But what
>>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a "motive," as Monica asks,
>>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the objective, goal, or aim of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> schooling as
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is misplaced here. Motivation
>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency, doesn't it? It cannot be
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> forced from
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When trying to get an idea of
>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or become a participant in an
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her conceptual thinking we have
>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>> understand the individual's motivation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the outside as in defining the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> objective
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force participation gives us mixed
>>>>>>>> results,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual development? Isn't that the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> problem?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so far in pushing intellectual
>>>>>>>> development?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Monica
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:
>>>>>>>> xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
>>>>>>>> To: vaughndogblack@yahoo.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>> Cc: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> HI David and others,
>>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my writings that the problem lies in
>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which collapses the German Tätigkeit
>>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately, because it also gives rise to
>>>>>>> problems
>>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what children do as 'tasks'
>>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of the activity
>>>>>>> 'schooling',
>>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction (transmission...) of collective
>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the goals, in fact, because of the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the goals of the task. This is no
>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question, 'teacher, am I write so
>>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very thing that they are asked to,
>>>>>>> namely
>>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient themselves intentionally to the
>>>>>>> concept,
>>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already know it, they don't have to
>>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and he describes those things
>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche Grundlegung" (Frankfurt: Campus).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Holzkamp.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German edition of Activity,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional chapter where Leont'ev
>>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in schools, motives, etc.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the word "motive", and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in general and to child play in
>>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do not yet have "motives" in the
>>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here. Last week we had thesis
>>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a thesis which tried to
>>>>>>> ascertain
>>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning English in children by the use of
>>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild exception to these theses is
>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our department; nobody ever
>>>>>>> fails as a
>>>>>>> result.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of Chapter Seven of Mind in
>>>>>>>> Society,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks about the child's "needs"
>>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines "broadly"
>>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to act". If he were going to proceed
>>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal theory of activity, this
>>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is what drives the child to act,
>>>>>>> and action is
>>>>>>> defined by its motive.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N. (1979, 1981). The problem
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) The concept of
>>>>>>> activity in
>>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity is its object orientation. The
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is devoid of sense. Activity may
>>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but scientific investigation of it
>>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its object."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific investigation is sometimes
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of an activity (e.g.
>>>>>>> sleep, whose
>>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really understand but which will
>>>>>>> presumably
>>>>>>> be discovered some day).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or the time or the
>>>>>>>> inclination
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as sleep or language play or
>>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these activities as being without any
>>>>>>> tangible
>>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers to this everyday
>>>>>>> non-scientific
>>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are non-scientific expressions devoid
>>>>>>> of sense?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an activity emerges "in two
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent existence as subordinating
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and secondly as the mental image
>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's detecting its properties.
>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>> detection can take place only through the subject's activity."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way in which scientific
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> investigation determines the object orientation of an activity, and
>>>>>>> not the
>>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the object (which I think of as
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that participants are conscious
>>>>>>> of). But
>>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they take place through
>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof an object in mind.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All activity has a looplike structure:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make contact with the object
>>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with the help of feedback to the
>>>>>>> initial afferent image."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in some sense the archetypical
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT orientation! But it is going
>>>>>>> to mean
>>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain play, because as LSV
>>>>>>> remarks, play
>>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear their meaningful
>>>>>>> orientation away
>>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects. (Yes, Lewin and Lewin's
>>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of this, and with respect to the
>>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to Lewin than to ANL!).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL then argues that the crucial
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather that mental images are
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical activity in the world:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent agent' that directs activity
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only secondarily its image as a
>>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and assimilates its object
>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes place: the transition from
>>>>>>> object to
>>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition from activity to
>>>>>>> subjective product
>>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the process into a product takes
>>>>>>> place not
>>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it occurs more clearly from
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> point of view of the object that is transformed by human activity."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and decides to play horsie the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the point of view of the
>>>>>>> stick (or from
>>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from the point of view of
>>>>>>> the child.
>>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against LSV's portrayal of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as "anything that motivates the
>>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between desire as a precondition of
>>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that guides and regulates the
>>>>>>> agent's
>>>>>>> concrete activity in the object environment". Only the latter is the
>>>>>>> object of psychology.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can find where ANL really goes
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his book "Problems of the
>>>>>>> Development of Mind".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather startling statement that play has
>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does not constitute an
>>>>>>> activity). He
>>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is actually still distinct from the
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's activity does not determine and
>>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of its need for food warmth etc.
>>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide range of activity that
>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective result."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object" activity to differentiate human
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> from animal play!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference between animals' play activity
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we first observe in
>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that it is not instinctive
>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity which by constituting the
>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of human objects, determines the
>>>>>>> content
>>>>>>> of its play."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously like the thesis I mildly
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's attitudes are simply
>>>>>>> projected
>>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected" using Likert scales. On pp.
>>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is a substitute for the
>>>>>>> handling of
>>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL speaks of "let me" and
>>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between the adult who wants to protect the
>>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to drive a car and row a
>>>>>>> boat. This
>>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading activity which is indeed
>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>> to a neoformation without the crisis. He then returns uncomfortably
>>>>>>> to his
>>>>>>> nagging suspicion that that play is an activity without an object,
>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>> therefore not an activity at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On p. 370, he's got this: "As we have already said, play is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> characerized by its motive's lying in the process itself rather than
>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>> result of the action. For a child playing with wooden bricks, for
>>>>>>> example, the
>>>>>>> motive for the play does not lie in building a structure, but in the
>>>>>>> doing,
>>>>>>> i.e. in the content of the action. That is true not only of the
>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>> child's play but also of any real game in general. 'Not to win but to
>>>>>>> play' is the general formula of the motivation of play. In adult's
>>>>>>> games, therefore in which winning rather than playing becomes the
>>>>>>> inner motive,
>>>>>>> the game as such ceased to be play."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Contrast that with LSV's observation in Chapter Seven that children
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> do NOT like running around without any rules or goal, and in games
>>>>>>> the meaning
>>>>>>> of the game is entirely to win. Of course, we might be talking about
>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>> children: Leontiev might be talking about pre- schoolers, and LSV is
>>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>>> talking about school-age kids. But the gap is remarkable; something
>>>>>>> rather
>>>>>>> important is getting lept over.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OK—so then ANL says that in play there is a mismatch between
>>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and action, in that the operation is performed with the meaning of
>>>>>>> the stick
>>>>>>> and the action is performed with its sense. He says that this split
>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>> given in advance but only arises in play action and that children do
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> imagine play without actually playing. If this were true, of course,
>>>>>>> it would
>>>>>>> be very hard to see how children are able to plan play, read about
>>>>>>> it, or
>>>>>>> reflect upon it, much less day-dream or indulge in language play.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> No, this isn't going to work. And it gets worse. Look at this, from
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> p. 381:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Games 'with rules' i.e. like hide and seek, table games,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> etc. differ sharply from such 'role' games as playing doctor, polar
>>>>>>> explorer, etc. They do not seem to be related to one another by any
>>>>>>> genetic succession and seem to constitute different lines in the devleopment
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> children's play, but in fact the one form develops from other (sic)
>>>>>>> by virtue
>>>>>>> of a need inherent in the child's play activity itself (?), whereby
>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>> 'with rules' arise at a later stage."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So ANL explicitly denies that whole discussion (in Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Leningrad lecture) about the intrinsic link between games with roles
>>>>>>> and games
>>>>>>> with rules. (There's a pretty good account of this lecture, which I
>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>> always seen as the starting point for his elaboration of the zone of
>>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>>> development, in Chapter Seven, but it's well worth reading the
>>>>>>> original
>>>>>>> lecture, which is at
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1933/play.htm
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ANL then has to explain why there appears to be a developmental
>>>>>>>> sequence
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> linking role based play and rule-based games. For LSV this is no
>>>>>>> problem: they
>>>>>>> ARE genetically linked and in fact the child creates rule based games
>>>>>>> iteratively, by varying the roles in systematic ways. But for ANL,
>>>>>>> who denies
>>>>>>> the genetic link, this is rather harder to explain:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Why do games with rules only arise at a certain stage of
>>>>>>>> development,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> and not simultaneously with the genesis of the first role games? It
>>>>>>> depends on
>>>>>>> the difference in their motivation. Initially the first play actions
>>>>>>> arise on
>>>>>>> the basis of the child's growing need to master the world of human
>>>>>>> objects.
>>>>>>> The motive contained in this action itself is fixed in a thing,
>>>>>>> directly in its
>>>>>>> object content. The action here is the path for the child that leads
>>>>>>> it first
>>>>>>> of all to the discovery of objective reality; the human still emerges
>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>> child in its objectified form. The role of the horseman, the play
>>>>>>> action of
>>>>>>> riding, is playing at horses, the action with a block of wood that
>>>>>>> the child
>>>>>>> 'drives' from one chair to another is playing cars.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And MORE:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "But during the development of these games the human relation
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> included in their object content itself comes out ever more clearly
>>>>>>> in them.
>>>>>>> The tram driver not only 'acts with a tram' but is obliged at the
>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>> time to enter into certain relations with other people— with the
>>>>>>> conductor,
>>>>>>> the passengers, and so on. Therefore, at relatively early stages of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> development of play activity, a child finds not only man's relation
>>>>>>> to it
>>>>>>> in the object but also people's relations with one another. Group
>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>> become possible not only alongside one another but also together.
>>>>>>> Social
>>>>>>> relations already come out in these games in overt form, in the form
>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>> players' relations with one another. At the same time the play 'role'
>>>>>>> is also altered. Its content now determines not only the child's
>>>>>>> actions in regard to the object but also its actions in regard to the other
>>>>>>> players in the
>>>>>>> game. The latter also become content of the play activity, for which
>>>>>>> its motive
>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> fixed. Games are distinguished in which actions in regard to other
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> people become the main thing."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> OK--so the reason why there is no genetic link is that the child goes
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> from focussing on material objects in role play to focussing on human
>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>> in rule play? No, that's not right either, because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> p. 372: "We already know how play arises in the preschool child. It
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> arises from its need to act in relation not only to the object world
>>>>>>> directly
>>>>>>> accessible to itself but also to the wider world of adults."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Mike--it looks like we're not the only ones befuddled by
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Leontiev's "motive" applied to children; he appears to have
>>>>>>> thoroughly befuddled himself. Leontiev's "motive" applied to
>>>>>>> children is a little like the clocks that keep going off in
>>>>>>> Shakespeare's
>>>>>>> Julius Caesar, a thousand years before they were invented.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is yet another reason for prefering Andy's term
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "project" in describing play: unlike "activity" or
>>>>>>> "motive", it's a real Gestalt, in that a "project" can
>>>>>>> be, for the child, action/meaning, and for the adult, meaning/action,
>>>>>>> whence
>>>>>>> the possiblity of transforming, outside in, the one into the other!
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>> Seoul Natoinal University of Education
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>>>
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>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
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>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
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>>>>>>
>>>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>>>
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>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>> http://www.marxists.org/admin/books/index.htm
>>
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-- 
Geoffrey Binder
BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
PhD Candidate
Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
Ph B. 9925 9951
M. 0422 968 567
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