Re: [xmca] Re: the Strange Situation

Here is a url for paper and harel, which may have been the correct ref any
way.
Lots more where this came from
mike

http://www.papert.org/articles/SituatingConstructionism.html

On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 1:10 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:

> Mike, do you have the reference for Papert & Terkel?
>
>
> On 10/30/08 12:26 PM, "Mike Cole" <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I agree with you Martin that it is important realize that terms are used
> > with somewhat different meanings in different academic discourses. Papert
> > and
> > Terkel have an article, apropos of computers as media of instruction, of
> > constructivism "versus" constructivism that so far as I can tell does not
> > make
> > contact with the work you refer to at all.
> >
> > Dewey is back!! Wow.
> > mike
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 30, 2008 at 8:22 AM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >
> >> Eric,
> >>
> >> The labels vary. Yes, Gergen calls his approach constructionism. Anyone
> who
> >> wants to explore the debate over Gergen's approach in particular could
> do
> >> worse than look at the two issues of Theory & Psychology on this topic
> in
> >> 2001 and 2003. There, Nigel Edley draws a distinction similar to the one
> >> I've made, saying that:
> >>
> >> ³social constructionism is not best understood as a unitary paradigm and
> >> that one very important difference is betweenŠ [what Edwards (1997)
> calls]
> >> its ontological and epistemic forms. I argue that an appreciation of
> this
> >> distinction not only exhausts many of the disputes that currently divide
> >> the
> >> constructionist community, but also takes away from the apparent
> radicalism
> >> of much of this work² (Edley, 2001, p. 433)
> >>
> >> But Edley, having made this important distinction, makes a mistake, in
> my
> >> view, by arguing *against* the ontological kind of constructionism. In
> his
> >> view Gergen's social constructionism is not as controversial as it
> seems,
> >> because it avoids ontological claims. I agree with him the Gergen's
> >> constructionism is not controversial, because it merely claims that
> >> knowledge is constructed. This is clearly the case. But what Gergen
> >> apparently fails to appreciate is that to construct a representation of
> >> reality is not to construct reality. Human reality, too, is constructed,
> >> but
> >> in practice, not by making representations (either mental, as for Kant,
> >> Husserl, Piaget, and others, or linguistic, as for Gergen and others).
> >>
> >> And in the second issue of T&P Ian Burkitt examines the various
> ontologial
> >> positions within constructionism. He points out the problems and
> >> contradictions in Gergen's efforts to be "ontologically mute" and argues
> >> for
> >> "a more fundamental ontology," drawing in part from Merleau-Ponty's
> >> emphasis
> >> on human embodiment in the world:
> >>
> >> ³Gergen is right to say that as soon as we attempt to articulate what
> there
> >> is we enter the world of discourse, history and culture, but it is a
> shame
> >> that he feels this renders constructionism ontologically muteŠ. The
> >> relationship between language and the sensible, then, is a constant
> >> dialectic with no ending because language can never capture the mute
> world
> >> of the sensibleŠ. Here we find the crux of the structuration between
> >> perception and articulation, the sensible structure and the structure of
> >> language. In eradicating the sensible and perceptual element of this
> >> dialectic, constructionists present to us only the constant interchange
> of
> >> language without the silent source of the dialogue; the attempt to
> >> articulate the perceptual faith, the desire to say what there is²
> (Burkitt,
> >> 2003, p. 331)
> >>
> >> This notion of a "dialectic... between language and the sensible" in
> which
> >> human knowledge is not distinct from reality but part of it takes us
> back
> >> to
> >> Vygotsky's exploration of thinking, perceiving, and speaking.
> >>
> >> Martin
> >>
> >> Burkitt, I. (2003). Psychology in the field of being: Merleau-Ponty,
> >> ontology and social constructionism. Theory & Psychology, 13(3),
> 319-338.
> >>
> >> Edley, N. (2001). Unravelling social constructionism. Theory &
> Psychology,
> >> 11(3), 433-441.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 10/30/08 9:53 AM, "ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org" <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>> Martin:
> >>>
> >>> I believe you are referring to constructionism. Constructivism is
> >> Latour's
> >>> theory of scientific communities.
> >>>
> >>> eric
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Martin Packer
> >>> <packer@duq.edu> To: "eXtended
> Mind,
> >>> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >>> Sent by: cc:
> >>> xmca-bounces@web Subject: Re: [xmca] Re:
> >> the
> >>> Strange Situation
> >>> er.ucsd.edu
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> 10/29/2008 03:33
> >>> PM
> >>> Please respond
> >>> to "eXtended
> >>> Mind, Culture,
> >>> Activity"
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Dewey,
> >>>
> >>> I was sketching with broad strokes, and obviously a lot of detail could
> >> be
> >>> added, and nuance.
> >>>
> >>> But I stand by my main point, that there have been two kinds of
> >>> constructivism. The first considers the construction of knowledge. It
> is
> >> an
> >>> epistemological construction: it maintains that we construct
> >>> "representations" of reality, mental or linguistic. When we examine the
> >>> ontological assumptions of this kind of constructivism they are
> generally
> >>> dualist. The key sign is the claim that it is impossible to know the
> >> world
> >>> outside these representations, and so one must be "ontologically mute"
> >> (as
> >>> Gergen put it). Kant said this, as did Husserl, and von Glasersfeld.
> >>>
> >>> The other kind of constructivism starts from a non-dualistic ontology,
> >> and
> >>> considers the construction of objects and subjects. It tends to view
> >> social
> >>> relations or practices as prior to individuals. It tends to emphasize
> >> non-
> >>> or pre-representational forms of knowledge. And it tends to point out
> >> that
> >>> language is a form of action before it is a form of representation.
> >>>
> >>> Martin
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> On 10/29/08 4:32 PM, "Dewey Dykstra" <ddykstra@boisestate.edu> wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> On Oct 26, 2008, at 11:12 AM, Martin Packer wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> Andy, David,
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I agree that Kant has to receive some credit. ...
> >>>>>
> >>>>> What this kind of constructivism is unable to do is answer the
> >>>>> question that
> >>>>> Kant tried, but failed, to answer: how can we have adequate
> >>>>> knowledge and
> >>>>> ethics? These constructivists (Piaget, Berger & Luckmann, Gergen)
> >>>>> remain
> >>>>> trapped in skepticism (about real objects and other minds) and
> >>>>> relativism
> >>>>> (about both truth and values). They focus on the individual outside
> of
> >>>>> social relations, and they privilege theoretical reflection over
> >>>>> practical
> >>>>> activity. They privilege representation over practical know-how.
> >>>>> ...
> >>>>
> >>>> It appears from the paragraph above, the problem is that one is not
> >>>> satisfied until one has some absolute basis for absolute ethical
> >>>> stances, hence the word "trappped" when referring to skepticism and
> >>>> relativism. This position privileges realism over skepticism without
> >>>> ever answering the fundamental question of skepticism.
> >>>>
> >>>> The distinction here is apparently between a realist stance with
> >>>> respect to ethics and a non-realist stance. Someone who can never
> >>>> step outside of the realist stance will never understand a position
> >>>> taken in a non-realist paradigm and vice versa. Obviously, the
> >>>> likes of Piaget, Gergen, etc. and other constructivists such as von
> >>>> Glasersfeld, Maturana, Varela, von Foerster did/do not see themselves
> >>>> as trapped, but in a sense as freed. Yet, if you read what they have
> >>>> to say about things like ethics you will find reasoned, specific
> >>>> positions taken with respect to ethics. With that freedom comes
> >>>> responsibility--an ethical stance, it seems to me. Take for example:
> >>>> Maturana, H. (1988) 'Reality: The search for objectivity or the quest
> >>>> for a compelling argument', The Irish Journal of Psychology, 9(11):
> >>>> 25-82.
> >>>>
> >>>> It is repetition of false impressions to repeat the claim that Piaget
> >>>> did not attend to social relations merely because his work in this
> >>>> area was not translated into English until well after his death.
> >>>> Better to actually carefully study what has been translated at this
> >>>> point. I am also mystified why the claim is made that Gergen's focus
> >>>> is on the individual outside of social relations. One might disagree
> >>>> with another's operating explanatory model for a particular area, but
> >>>> is this grounds for making the claim that the other's work had no
> >>>> focus in the area?
> >>>>
> >>>> Finally, it strikes me that the claim that these authors privilege
> >>>> theoretical reflection and representation over practical activity and
> >>>> know-how is unfounded if one makes a careful study of the work of
> >>>> these authors. Practical is inextricably merged with reflection in
> >>>> the construction of the world.
> >>>>
> >>>> The choice, as Buddhists might put it, is not between essentialism
> >>>> and nihilism. Instead there is another way. Essentialism and
> >>>> nihilism are opposite poles of a single continuum, realism to
> >>>> solipsism. These authors are talking about an entirely different
> >>>> dimension, which includes neither essentialism nor nihilism, hence
> >>>> not realism. The two continua, thought of as straight lines in
> >>>> space, are neither parallel nor do they intersect. The Buddhist
> >>>> answer is called the Middle Way, but it seems that the Middle Way is
> >>>> not a point on the continuum between essentialism and nihilism. The
> >>>> Middle Way is incommensurate with the continuum of essentialism to
> >>>> nihilism, realism to solipsism. The version of non-realism espoused
> >>>> in various ways by these authors is a non-realist stance with many
> >>>> similarities to the Buddhist Middle Way. (For more about The Middle
> >>>> Way, check out Jay Garfield's commentary in The Fundamental Wisdom of
> >>>> the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (1995, can be found
> >>>> on Amazon)).
> >>>>
> >>>> Dewey
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>>
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Received on Thu Oct 30 13:57:22 2008