Re: [xmca] Social Situation of Development.Continued

Mike,
For sure the child is part of the Social Situation of
Development (SSD), and the SSD is "both inside and outside"
the child. But this still leaves a couple of big issues.

We are not talking about a "social situation" in general,
but the child and his social relations under a very specific
concept, viz., the "situation", or "predicament" that the
child is in. In pt 2 v5 LSV on a number of cases uses the
term "emancipation." So what we have is some kind of logic
of a struggle for emancipation, which confronts a series of
"situations" or predicaments, which define the central line
of development for that age level. This "situation" is the
"essence" (in terms of The Pheneomenology, or "notion" in
terms of The Logic) of the child (i.e., as a member of a
human ensemble) at that point. The child is the subject of
this relation; it is the child which takes the active
position in every situation; without the child's
dissatisfaction with the situation and her striving to
emancipate themself from it, no development will occur; we
would have pathology.

Put in terms I have raised earlier on this list, the child's
development is a project, a subject, of which the child is
the individual, but their own body is the relevant key
artefact which is being fashioned in the process and is the
center of our conception of this project as a "system of
activity," and the relations between the way in which the
child's needs are met and the child's psychological (and
biological) capacities are the particular. "Gestalt" is the
same thing, though we have a nesting of Gestalten here, as
the child remains, also, an individual in a community, their
particular social relations within a larger division of
labour and cultural traditions, etc., and the cultural
constellation of the community mediate every relation of the
  child.

The SSD with its central line of development, does not
exhaust the multiplicity of lines of development going on at
the same time. This logical problem is the same one which
leads us to call very different countries "capitalist" or
"industrialised." LSV's thesis is that there is one
activity, at any given point in the child's development,
which leads all the others, although at the same time
resting on those others. But I think this text in Vol 5 of
his CW represents an attempt to form a coherent concept of
child development, which means getting to the essence of
just one line of development at just one age level. This
concept is the child's predicament and their striving to
emancipate themselves from it and the specific psychological
function that matures as a result of this striving.

Andy

Mike Cole wrote:
> I am responding to the thread on the concept of SSD a while back which
> was contributed to by Elina and Bella. I am unsure of how best to position
> this contribution, as a response to that thread or to continue it as a new
> note because the message string became very long (as well as worthwhile) but
> I wanted to inquire into an early part of it. So this is an attempt to short
> circuit that process and see if it leads to mischief in recovering the meaning.
>
> Andy began by asking whether LSV had in mind the use of situation in the
> sense of a problematic situation (which Bella took to mean negative, but it could
> be positive- e.g., I really want to eat a ripe apricot from the tree in back yard right
> now but its so
> juicy I would have to stop typing, but I am really anxious to get this
> thought out. Two
> haystacks, so to speak). In reply, Elina wrote:
>
> Andy:
>
>> So would I be right Elina in thinking that Vygotsky has in mind something
>> like a new relationship or arrangement of functions in the personality, a
>> kind of new "configuration" of the whole? rather than a new function or
>> ability appearing as an additional element of the whole?
>>
>
> Elina:
> I believe so, at least it is my understanding, the development of new
> psychological function leads to a QUALITATIVE transformation of the whole
> system of relationships in the previously acquired functions.
>
> Maybe "configuration" is better than "formation." There is a lot of debate
> about how best top translate the German word "Gestalt" into English, and I
> have heard people say that "Configuration" or "formation" is better than
> "whole" which is now the usual translation in psychology. This is what is
> being referred to isn't it, a new "Gestalt"?
>
> I believe Vygotsky distinguished lower and higher psychological functions
> in their origins, structure, the way of functioning and the relation to
> other psychological functions.
>
>> So would I be right Elina in thinking that Vygotsky has in mind something
>> like a new relationship or arrangement of functions in the personality, a
>> kind of new "configuration" of the whole? rather than a new function or
>> ability appearing as an additional element of the whole?
>>
>
>
> I believe so, at least it is my understanding, the development of new
> psychological function leads to a QUALITATIVE transformation of the whole
> system of relationships in the previously acquired functions.
>
> Maybe "configuration" is better than "formation." There is a lot of debate
> about how best top translate the German word "Gestalt" into English, and I
> have heard people say that "Configuration" or "formation" is better than
> "whole" which is now the usual translation in psychology. This is what is
> being referred to isn't it, a new "Gestalt"?
>
> I believe Vygotsky distinguished lower and higher psychological functions
> in their origins, structure, the way of functioning and the relation to
> other psychological functions. By origins, most of the lower mental
> functions are genetically inherited, by structure they are unmediated, by
> functioning they are involuntary, and they are isolated from other
> functions. Higher psychological function is socially acquired, mediated,
> voluntarily controlled and exists as a relationship in a system of functions
> rather than as an isolated element.
> I am not an expert in Gestalt psychology, but I believe there is a claim
> that some universal structural laws are innate for human perception. If this
> is true, then it would be wrong to use the concept of Gestalt in reference
> to higher psychological functions.
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 1. Andy-- Does your question about a "new function or ability" require and
> either/or answer? I am having trouble figure out what it would mean for
> understanding the process of change if it consisted of nothing other/more
> than rearrangements of what was already there. Perhaps the answer resides
> in the level of analysis, e.g. molecules are "nothing more" than
> arrangements of
> atoms and no new atoms have appeared (is this true?) since the big bang.
>
> Another way to come at this question would be to restrict ourselves to
> higher/
> culturally mediated, psychological functions. In that case, it seems that
> the answer
> would be "both/and." There is biological maturation (under environmental
> conditions
> that are themselves culturally conditioned) that enables the formation of
> new, higher,
> psychological functions. The acquisition of the ability to read might be
> taken as an example of this process;
> it requires both the maturation of various brain structures and culturally
> mediated practices that serve
> to coordinate them with each other and culturally evolved graphic signs so
> that they become meaningful
> in a new way resulting in and enabling new, other, higher psychological
> functions.
>
> 2. Elina -- I thought your formulation of the "natural/cultural" lines was
> really interesting and it got me to
> wondering. When you write:
> By origins, most of the lower mental
> functions are genetically inherited, by structure they are unmediated, by
> functioning they are involuntary, and they are isolated from other
> functions.
>
> I am wondering about all three parts of this nice summary. On the one hand,
> this makes me think I am simply
> repeating LSV without knowing it when I write about modularity and context,
> arguing for the interweaving of the two over the course of ontogeny. As
> ordinarily conceived, modules are isolated from each other, inherited, and
> impervious to experience. Wouldn't be odd to find Fodor and Vygotsky in the
> same configuration(so to speak)!!?
>
> 3. Andy/David et al. -- The child is part of the SSD, as I understand LSV.
> But at the same time, there is the idea of neoformations arising when a
> child is confronted with a new SSD. I feel like I need some sort of field
> reorganization to get my mind around both of these ideas at the same time!!
>
> (Apologies if this note is out of order and the answers lie somewhere in the
> mail that accumulated during my week's absence from email).
>
> mike
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-- 
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Andy Blunden http://home.mira.net/~andy/ +61 3 9380 9435 
Skype andy.blunden
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