Re: subjective, objective Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics

Geoff wrote:
> So do we have a false dichotomy in object(ive)/subject(ive)? Objective
> being knowledge of a thing external to self, subjective being
> knowledge of self. (And I suppose, these may correspond.) I read an
> assertion recently that we'd be better off not talking about
> subject/object but talking about private and public, Would Deely
> agree?
>
> Cheers, Geoff
>
> On 19/09/2007, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
>
>> A very different ... almost opposite ... usage for "subjective" and
>> "objective" -- one that's highly relevant for this topic -- is offered by
>> Peirce scholar John Deely.
>>
>> Deely argues that modernism (from, say, Descartes and Locke, through
>> contemporaries like Foucault, Derrida, Jameson, Lyotard, etc. who might be
>> considered "postmodern" [Deely argues these have not escaped the crucial
>> misstep of the early moderns, and he sees Peirce as inaugurating a
>> genuine post-modern development that does offer a way out from modernism])
>> inverted the understanding of subject and object that can be excavated
>> from pre-modern Latin thinkers. Things exist objectively as objects of
>> signification. Things exist subjectively and express themselves
>> subjectively in how their qualities (characteristics of their properly
>> subjective existence, independent of their objectivization) inform (i.e.,
>> participate in the formation of) the semiosic relations in which they
>> participate as sign-elements.
>>
>> The subjective characteristics of something in nature are those
>> characteristics proper to it as an existing subject, apart from being an
>> object of knowledge, thought, perception, etc. It's objective
>> characteristics are characteristics it takes on as an object of knowledge,
>> thought, etc.
>>
>> This makes a lot of sense to me.
>>
>> My explanation mixes in some of my own language. Deely's exposition makes
>> constant use of Latin words and Latin syntax. I'm not sure how
>> comprehensible it would be to someone who has never studied Latin. (You
>> don't need to be literate in Latin to read Deely, but some elementary
>> knowledge of the language is an enormous help.)
>>
>> Plus, you need to be tolerant of, if not appreciative of, the musty
>> Scholastic aroma of Deely's sources, which infects his own style as well.
>>
>> So, if anyone on this list is up to it, I think the rest of us would
>> appreciate what you'd get out of Deely's work. For a start on these
>> topics, I'd recommend:
>>
>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50866885
>> (the second part: the "dialogue between a 'semiotist' and a 'realist'"
>>
>> and (more recent, with a critique of modernist phenomenology):
>> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/123114389
>>
>> On Tue, 18 Sep 2007, armando perez wrote:
>>
>>
>>> It s late but........of course, Bourdieu always mantein the nalitical unity
>>> between the subjectivity and the objectivity of habitus....What do you think
>>> realy about bourdieu.... In my personal feeling, I more often (not
>>> always) do what I believe I want do..... But I recognize that it is not so
>>> easy to resolve and proof any theory about the dialectics of subject and
>>> object. The last 40 years (for not move much more back) in Sociological
>>> Thought proof that.
>>> Armando
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>> Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2007 7:01 AM
>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Fair enough Geoff.
>>>>
>>>> But the problem is like this for me. I have known "experts" who claim that
>>>> their ability to raise their arm when they want to and their ability to
>>>> know when it is them that is raising their arm and not someone else, is
>>>> evidence of their agency - analytical, positivist types. I have also known
>>>> "experts" who claim that great leaders who have led revolutions which
>>>> overthrew entire states were after all only carrying out an historical
>>>>
>>> task
>>>
>>>> that someone else would have done if they hadn't, that history worked
>>>> "through" them, so to speak. Indeed, if I look back across my own life,
>>>> while I know that I made choices for better or worse in my own life and
>>>> bore the consequences, the ideas I had as a teenager, as a young adult,
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> political choices I made in my late-20s, etc., etc., although I
>>>> passionately believed in them at the time, even thought I was original, I
>>>> now know were little more than stereotypical versions of ideas that were
>>>> quite typical of the social stratum (habitus) of which I was a part. So,
>>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>>> there a line, this side of which we have agency in and the other side of
>>>> which we don't? And where the hell would that line be if our passionate
>>>> beliefs are on the far side of it? I like Bourdieu as well, and I too
>>>>
>>> think
>>>
>>>> his idea of habitus is a useful concept for dealing with this problem,
>>>>
>>> but
>>>
>>>> most people regard him as an extreme objectivist, i.e., that even our
>>>> highly personal tastes and preferences are actually "programmed" by our
>>>> social environment.
>>>>
>>>> What do you think?
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> At 03:45 PM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the welcome Andy.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, I'd agree with the idea that we adapt to and add to culture. I've
>>>>> been wrestling with the idea of agency to identify the "add to" part of
>>>>> this process. I think I want to define agency as a type of doing where
>>>>> we have to respond beyond what is already habitual (learned). This would
>>>>> range from an average driver (as far as skill is concerned) having to
>>>>> respond immediately to avoid an impending car accident, through to
>>>>> working creatively. I'm not sure if this is a valid definition of
>>>>> agency, but it's one that I've come to after thinking about innovation.
>>>>> I think Vygotsky's ZPD could be used to describe how humans live, not
>>>>> just "learn" vis a vie pedagogy. And that Vygotsky's idea that
>>>>> development is scaffolded, the new being built upon the old, seems to
>>>>> fit nicely with Bourdieu's idea of habitus, the habitus being the "old".
>>>>> (I don't have a sense of what Bourdieu's position would be on how
>>>>> habitus is added to.)
>>>>>
>>>>> I haven't give animal bahaviour a lot of thought regarding agency, but
>>>>> off the top of my head I don't think that animals are capable of agency,
>>>>> or if they are it is limited because they lack a developed culture to
>>>>> transmit what is learned and can only learn in limited contexts or
>>>>> periods, like chicks imprinting who (or what) their mums are. Non human
>>>>> animals don't seem to be able to adapt inter-generationally - one
>>>>> generation bootstrapping itself. Humans on the other hand........ :-)
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers, Geoff
>>>>>
>>>>> PS, do chicks learn a fear of hawk-like silhouettes or is it hard wired?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 08/09/07 12:40 PM >>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices.
>>>>>
>>>>> Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their environment by
>>>>>
>>>>> learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick learning
>>>>> to
>>>>> recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their
>>>>> silhouette
>>>>> is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, that our
>>>>>
>>>>> environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous
>>>>> generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process?
>>>>>
>>>>> BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-)
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas.....
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random
>>>>>> mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the adaptation.
>>>>>> What matters is the relationship between the organism and its context.
>>>>>> Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a fast
>>>>>> track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between our
>>>>>> genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural adaptations are
>>>>>> not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and cultural
>>>>>> niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst others,
>>>>>> learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things that
>>>>>> we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or respond to
>>>>>> changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers, Geoff
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 08/09/07, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Steve and Andy:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the Afterword by
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following
>>>>>>
>>>>> epigraph
>>>>>
>>>>>> (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the puzzle):
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as a
>>>>>>>
>>>>> complex
>>>>>
>>>>>> of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in which
>>>>>> apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them inside our
>>>>>>
>>>>>> heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant changes. (...) In the
>>>>>>
>>>>> eyes
>>>>>
>>>>>> of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time,
>>>>>>
>>>>> nothing
>>>>>
>>>>>> is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees the
>>>>>>
>>>>> stamp
>>>>>
>>>>>> of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing process
>>>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>> formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to higher--a
>>>>>>
>>>>>> process of which that philosophy itself is only a simple reflection
>>>>>> within the thinking brain."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well
>>>>>>>
>>>>> Andy's
>>>>>
>>>>>> question about in what sense nature can be said to be dialectical. It
>>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>>> the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be
>>>>>> dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is simply a
>>>>>> description of how change takes place.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my copy of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, pp.
>>>>>>
>>>>> 362-363):
>>>>>
>>>>>>> "The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended
>>>>>>>
>>>>> as
>>>>>
>>>>>> a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in wich
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads,
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and
>>>>>> passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality and of
>>>>>>
>>>>> all
>>>>>
>>>>>> temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in
>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>> end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the time of
>>>>>> Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this
>>>>>> generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge
>>>>>>
>>>>> this
>>>>>
>>>>>> fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail to
>>>>>>
>>>>> each
>>>>>
>>>>>> domain of investigation are two different things. If, however,
>>>>>> investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for
>>>>>>
>>>>> final
>>>>>
>>>>>> soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is always
>>>>>> conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it
>>>>>>>
>>>>> was
>>>>>
>>>>>> acquired."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of nature" in
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the transience of
>>>>>> concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! That's
>>>>>>
>>>>>> the puzzle.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position is
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the
>>>>>>
>>>>> version
>>>>>
>>>>>> in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the idea
>>>>>>
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that
>>>>>> fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this somehow
>>>>>> represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious misconception
>>>>>>
>>>>>> about the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Humans
>>>>>> "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select when
>>>>>> they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations obey
>>>>>> rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure obesity by
>>>>>> vivisection rather than by diet and self-control.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human creativity to
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too much
>>>>>> chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a trial-and-error
>>>>>>
>>>>> process
>>>>>
>>>>>> driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The Origins of
>>>>>> Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of chaos,
>>>>>>
>>>>> either
>>>>>
>>>>>> because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently random)
>>>>>>
>>>>> or
>>>>>
>>>>>> contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy and
>>>>>>
>>>>> skill
>>>>>
>>>>>> (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially banned
>>>>>>
>>>>> in
>>>>>
>>>>>> his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game of
>>>>>>
>>>>> skill).
>>>>>
>>>>>>> Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least at
>>>>>>>
>>>>> first.
>>>>>
>>>>>> But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection with
>>>>>> human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not
>>>>>>
>>>>> usefully
>>>>>
>>>>>> described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human choice has
>>>>>>
>>>>>> clearly replaced random variation and natural selection as soon as the
>>>>>>
>>>>>> process of variation itself is subject to volitional control (as soon
>>>>>>
>>>>> as
>>>>>
>>>>>> people start to generate particular language strings and not others
>>>>>>
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>> then select these).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, and that
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of
>>>>>>
>>>>> deliberate
>>>>>
>>>>>> choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural
>>>>>>
>>>>> selection.
>>>>>
>>>>>> That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak sense
>>>>>>
>>>>> of
>>>>>
>>>>>> incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic
>>>>>> creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a
>>>>>> non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the
>>>>>>
>>>>> dialectics
>>>>>
>>>>>> of nature in the human brain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Seoul National University of Education
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, explanation of
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> what you
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *mean* by "nature is dialectical"?
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> volition and
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of whether
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> "nature
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how complexity
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> theory
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent David
>>>>>>>> Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and Ken
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> Richardson
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the right
>>>>>>>> track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from CHAT in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> their
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating natural
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> and
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> social science, in ways I find both dialectical and materialist.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that nature is
>>>>>>>> dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe contributed two
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> chapters
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this concept. The
>>>>>>>> Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> Engels'
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> clearly
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous times in
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> his
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of Psychology"
>>>>>>>> (1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike mentioned
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> earlier
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> this week, Human activity - contributions to the anthropological
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> sciences
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> available
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> online at http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html .
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> This
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the philosophical
>>>>>>>> underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that level,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> but
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> disagreeing
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontiev, and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> all the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels was
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> wrong,
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not apply to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> nature
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular among
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> many
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The position I
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> lean
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view today.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of nature
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> every time
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> we try to integrate explanations across different domains of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> complexity -
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to children
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> learning to
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> speak, for example - so the question "is nature dialectical?" is
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> both an
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> epistemological
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> excellent
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious human
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> behavior
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. But if
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> we go
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> nature is
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link between
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> natural and the social, both ontologically and epistemologically,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> and how
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural science
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> (laws
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum electrodynamics,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> complexity
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more complex
>>>>>>>> activities of human society and the still even more complex and
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> chaotic
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In that
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> way, I
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in trying to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>> link the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>> explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means is it
>>>>>>>> sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated science and
>>>>>>>> general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Welcome aboard Steve.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I have always thought that the proposition that thinking is like
>>>>>>>>> computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an reflected
>>>>>>>>> projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> stupidity, and
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> neo-liberal
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that Darwin
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> imported
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the first place.
>>>>>>>>> Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists develop
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> tools
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then other
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> people
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. Generates
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> lots of
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> academic salaries and popular book sales anyway.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Although I think complexity theory and the concept of chaos are
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> very rich
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in describing
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the human mind.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> One
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> thing about the application of this theory to the mind, and this
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> is
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree concept
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> of the
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it is a fig
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> leaf
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We cannot
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> explain
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, so its
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> must be
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc.,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners should
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> be so
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> in favour of learning theories which give them no power. Perhaps
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> it is
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> because those learning theories also give them no responsibility?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> First time poster here and this may be from out of
>>>>>>>>>> left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the
>>>>>>>>>> field so forgive me if but:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among
>>>>>>>>>> others) has advanced the case that human
>>>>>>>>>> thinking/consciousness/cognition is not
>>>>>>>>>> "computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the
>>>>>>>>>> use of the term computational. He wrote a book that
>>>>>>>>>> started with this premise and then further wrote a
>>>>>>>>>> response to a chorus of influential academics, all of
>>>>>>>>>> whom issued polemics against his book and especially
>>>>>>>>>> the "non-computational" thesis.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The contents of his reply somewhat step into the
>>>>>>>>>> middle of the debate but should be perfectly
>>>>>>>>>> understandable even to someone who hasn't read the
>>>>>>>>>> book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are
>>>>>>>>>> numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and
>>>>>>>>>> 4 and then some of the later items at your own
>>>>>>>>>> discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is
>>>>>>>>>> Consciousness?" and so on.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Penrose is not really trying to answer those
>>>>>>>>>> questions, by the way, only remove them from a
>>>>>>>>>> reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical
>>>>>>>>>> properties and laws, perspective.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Might at least help center your search for how and
>>>>>>>>>> where volition fits into the puzzle.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> looking for. I need
>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> (or
>>>>>>>>>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> language teaching (which is what I do)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> volition-free approaches are
>>>>>>>>>> very
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> now
>>>>>>>>>> chaos-complexity
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _____________________________________________________________________
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Need a vacation? Get great deals
>>>>>>>>>> to amazing places on Yahoo! Travel.
>>>>>>>>>> http://travel.yahoo.com/
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>> 9435, AIM
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>>>>>
>>>>> AIM
>>>>>
>>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ---------------------------------
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>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Geoffrey Binder
>>>>>> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
>>>>>> PhD Candidate
>>>>>> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
>>>>>> Ph B. 9925 9951
>>>>>> M. 0422 968 567
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>>
>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>>>>> AIM
>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
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>>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>
>>> GRU:
>>> Servicio de correo UCLV.
>>>
>>> __________________________________________________________________
>>> Servicio de Correos del Grupo de Redes. UCLV
>>> 30 de noviembre 1952-2007 -55 Aniversario de la Universidad Central Marta Abreu de Las Villas
>>> Orgullosa de su historia, comprometida con el presente, abierta hacia el futuro
>>> - Universidad 2008 del 11 al 15 de febrero del 2008.
>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana. Cuba. http: //www.universidad2008.cu
>>> - II Taller internacional -Vitualización en la Educación Superior-, del 11 al 15 de febrero de 2008
>>> Palacio de Convenciones. La Habana, Cuba. http://virtual-es.uclv.edu.cu
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>
>>>
>> Tony Whitson
>> UD School of Education
>> NEWARK DE 19716
>>
>> twhitson@udel.edu
>> _______________________________
>>
>> "those who fail to reread
>> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
>> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
I like Vygotsky's concept of perezshivanie as it captures both sides of
this dichotomy and places it into a dialectic.

-- 
Dr. M. Cathrene Connery
Assistant Professor of Education
607.274.7382
Ithaca College
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