Re: subjective, objective Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics

So do we have a false dichotomy in object(ive)/subject(ive)? Objective
being knowledge of a thing external to self, subjective being
knowledge of self. (And I suppose, these may correspond.) I read an
assertion recently that we'd be better off not talking about
subject/object but talking about private and public, Would Deely
agree?

Cheers, Geoff

On 19/09/2007, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:
> A very different ... almost opposite ... usage for "subjective" and
> "objective" -- one that's highly relevant for this topic -- is offered by
> Peirce scholar John Deely.
>
> Deely argues that modernism (from, say, Descartes and Locke, through
> contemporaries like Foucault, Derrida, Jameson, Lyotard, etc. who might be
> considered "postmodern" [Deely argues these have not escaped the crucial
> misstep of the early moderns, and he sees Peirce as inaugurating a
> genuine post-modern development that does offer a way out from modernism])
> inverted the understanding of subject and object that can be excavated
> from pre-modern Latin thinkers. Things exist objectively as objects of
> signification. Things exist subjectively and express themselves
> subjectively in how their qualities (characteristics of their properly
> subjective existence, independent of their objectivization) inform (i.e.,
> participate in the formation of) the semiosic relations in which they
> participate as sign-elements.
>
> The subjective characteristics of something in nature are those
> characteristics proper to it as an existing subject, apart from being an
> object of knowledge, thought, perception, etc. It's objective
> characteristics are characteristics it takes on as an object of knowledge,
> thought, etc.
>
> This makes a lot of sense to me.
>
> My explanation mixes in some of my own language. Deely's exposition makes
> constant use of Latin words and Latin syntax. I'm not sure how
> comprehensible it would be to someone who has never studied Latin. (You
> don't need to be literate in Latin to read Deely, but some elementary
> knowledge of the language is an enormous help.)
>
> Plus, you need to be tolerant of, if not appreciative of, the musty
> Scholastic aroma of Deely's sources, which infects his own style as well.
>
> So, if anyone on this list is up to it, I think the rest of us would
> appreciate what you'd get out of Deely's work. For a start on these
> topics, I'd recommend:
>
> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/50866885
> (the second part: the "dialogue between a 'semiotist' and a 'realist'"
>
> and (more recent, with a critique of modernist phenomenology):
> http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/123114389
>
> On Tue, 18 Sep 2007, armando perez wrote:
>
> > It s late but........of course, Bourdieu always mantein the nalitical unity
> > between the subjectivity and the objectivity of habitus....What do you think
> > realy about bourdieu.... In my personal feeling, I more often (not
> > always) do what I believe I want do..... But I recognize that it is not so
> > easy to resolve and proof any theory about the dialectics of subject and
> > object. The last 40 years (for not move much more back) in Sociological
> > Thought proof that.
> > Armando
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Sent: Saturday, September 08, 2007 7:01 AM
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Natural vs. Human Dialectics
> >
> >
> >> Fair enough Geoff.
> >>
> >> But the problem is like this for me. I have known "experts" who claim that
> >> their ability to raise their arm when they want to and their ability to
> >> know when it is them that is raising their arm and not someone else, is
> >> evidence of their agency - analytical, positivist types. I have also known
> >> "experts" who claim that great leaders who have led revolutions which
> >> overthrew entire states were after all only carrying out an historical
> > task
> >> that someone else would have done if they hadn't, that history worked
> >> "through" them, so to speak. Indeed, if I look back across my own life,
> >> while I know that I made choices for better or worse in my own life and
> >> bore the consequences, the ideas I had as a teenager, as a young adult,
> > the
> >> political choices I made in my late-20s, etc., etc., although I
> >> passionately believed in them at the time, even thought I was original, I
> >> now know were little more than stereotypical versions of ideas that were
> >> quite typical of the social stratum (habitus) of which I was a part. So,
> > is
> >> there a line, this side of which we have agency in and the other side of
> >> which we don't? And where the hell would that line be if our passionate
> >> beliefs are on the far side of it? I like Bourdieu as well, and I too
> > think
> >> his idea of habitus is a useful concept for dealing with this problem,
> > but
> >> most people regard him as an extreme objectivist, i.e., that even our
> >> highly personal tastes and preferences are actually "programmed" by our
> >> social environment.
> >>
> >> What do you think?
> >> Andy
> >>
> >> At 03:45 PM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> >>> Thanks for the welcome Andy.
> >>>
> >>> Yes, I'd agree with the idea that we adapt to and add to culture. I've
> >>> been wrestling with the idea of agency to identify the "add to" part of
> >>> this process. I think I want to define agency as a type of doing where
> >>> we have to respond beyond what is already habitual (learned). This would
> >>> range from an average driver (as far as skill is concerned) having to
> >>> respond immediately to avoid an impending car accident, through to
> >>> working creatively. I'm not sure if this is a valid definition of
> >>> agency, but it's one that I've come to after thinking about innovation.
> >>> I think Vygotsky's ZPD could be used to describe how humans live, not
> >>> just "learn" vis a vie pedagogy. And that Vygotsky's idea that
> >>> development is scaffolded, the new being built upon the old, seems to
> >>> fit nicely with Bourdieu's idea of habitus, the habitus being the "old".
> >>> (I don't have a sense of what Bourdieu's position would be on how
> >>> habitus is added to.)
> >>>
> >>> I haven't give animal bahaviour a lot of thought regarding agency, but
> >>> off the top of my head I don't think that animals are capable of agency,
> >>> or if they are it is limited because they lack a developed culture to
> >>> transmit what is learned and can only learn in limited contexts or
> >>> periods, like chicks imprinting who (or what) their mums are. Non human
> >>> animals don't seem to be able to adapt inter-generationally - one
> >>> generation bootstrapping itself. Humans on the other hand........ :-)
> >>>
> >>> Cheers, Geoff
> >>>
> >>> PS, do chicks learn a fear of hawk-like silhouettes or is it hard wired?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 08/09/07 12:40 PM >>>
> >>> Welcome Geoff. It's good to hear new voices.
> >>>
> >>> Many animals are intelligent though, and respond to their environment by
> >>>
> >>> learning. Whatever "agentive" means, I don't think that a chick learning
> >>> to
> >>> recognise and a avoid a predator by learning the shape of their
> >>> silhouette
> >>> is thereby "agentive". Surely it's what you mention in passing, that our
> >>>
> >>> environment is cultural, that is, we adapt to products of previous
> >>> generations and create more cultural artefacts in the process?
> >>>
> >>> BTW, what *do* you mean by "agentive"? :-)
> >>>
> >>> Andy
> >>> At 11:50 AM 8/09/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> >>>> Hi I'm new here and feeling my way through these ideas.....
> >>>>
> >>>> On natural selection, while a driver might be chaos and random
> >>>> mutation, the important thing is not the mutation but the adaptation.
> >>>> What matters is the relationship between the organism and its context.
> >>>> Human learning is not best described in these terms but as a fast
> >>>> track (non genetic) form of adaptation. The difference between our
> >>>> genetic and cultural adaptations is that our cultural adaptations are
> >>>> not random but responsive (agentive) to the physical and cultural
> >>>> niches that we are adapted to via our abilities to, amongst others,
> >>>> learn and, importantly to forget. Our practices, those things that
> >>>> we've already learned, underpin our ability to learn and or respond to
> >>>> changes in our relationships to our physical/cultural world(s).
> >>>>
> >>>> Cheers, Geoff
> >>>>
> >>>> On 08/09/07, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>>>> Steve and Andy:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Here's a puzzle. On p. 120 of "Mind in Society", the Afterword by
> >>>> Vera John-Steiner and Ellen Souberman begins with the following
> >>> epigraph
> >>>> (pardon the long quote, but it's necessary to explain the puzzle):
> >>>>>
> >>>>> "The great basic idea that the world is not to be viewed as a
> >>> complex
> >>>> of fully fashioned objects but as a complex of processes in which
> >>>> apparently stable objects, no less thatn the images of them inside our
> >>>
> >>>> heads (our concepts) are undergoing incessant changes. (...) In the
> >>> eyes
> >>>> of dialectical philosophy, nothing is established for all time,
> >>> nothing
> >>>> is absolute or sacred. On everything and in everything it sees the
> >>> stamp
> >>>> of inevitable decline; nothing can resist it sav the unceasing process
> >>> of
> >>>> formation and destruction, the unending ascent form lower to higher--a
> >>>
> >>>> process of which that philosophy itself is only a simple reflection
> >>>> within the thinking brain."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> You can see that this quote, if accurate, answers quite well
> >>> Andy's
> >>>> question about in what sense nature can be said to be dialectical. It
> >>> is
> >>>> the same sense in which dialectical philosophy can be said to be
> >>>> dialectical, and for the one and same reason: dialectics is simply a
> >>>> description of how change takes place.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> But IS the quote accurate? Here's the SAME passage from my copy of
> >>>
> >>>> Marx and Engels' selected works (Moscow: Progress, 1970, Vol. 3, pp.
> >>> 362-363):
> >>>>>
> >>>>> "The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended
> >>> as
> >>>> a complex of ready-made things but as a complex of processes, in wich
> >>> the
> >>>> things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads,
> >>> the
> >>>> concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and
> >>>> passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentality and of
> >>> all
> >>>> temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in
> >>> the
> >>>> end--this great fundametnal thought has, especially since the time of
> >>>> Hegel, so throughly permeated ordinary conscousness that in this
> >>>> generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge
> >>> this
> >>>> fundamental though in words and to apply it in reality in detail to
> >>> each
> >>>> domain of investigation are two different things. If, however,
> >>>> investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for
> >>> final
> >>>> soclutions and eternal truth ceases once and for all; one is always
> >>>> conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of
> >>>>> the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it
> >>> was
> >>>> acquired."
> >>>>>
> >>>>> NOTHING here about the "reflection of the dialectics of nature" in
> >>>
> >>>> the thinking brain--only the much weaker idea that the transience of
> >>>> concepts is reflected in the limited nature of human knowledge! That's
> >>>
> >>>> the puzzle.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'm sorry if I sounded flippant in my last post--my position is
> >>>> rather like that in the SECOND version of Engels' quote (not the
> >>> version
> >>>> in Mind in Society), and it's quite serious. I think that the idea
> >>> that
> >>>> Jews are a particularly intelligent race (and also the idea that
> >>>> fertility and intelligence are inversely correlated, and this somehow
> >>>> represents a threat to human survival) is a very serious misconception
> >>>
> >>>> about the relationship between ontogenesis and phylogenesis. Humans
> >>>> "choose"; nature "selects", and for humans to "choose" to select when
> >>>> they cannot even manage to make economic and social relations obey
> >>>> rational will is a little like a lay person trying to cure obesity by
> >>>> vivisection rather than by diet and self-control.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Right now, I think that the attempt to reduce human creativity to
> >>>> chaos/complexity is flawed in the opposite direction; not too much
> >>>> chutzpah but too little. It reduces learning to a trial-and-error
> >>> process
> >>>> driven by random variations. Lorenz's wonderful book "The Origins of
> >>>> Chaos" points out that MOST games are not good producers of chaos,
> >>> either
> >>>> because they are really random (and chaos is only apparently random)
> >>> or
> >>>> contrariwise, because they are subject to deliberate strategy and
> >>> skill
> >>>> (he gives the marvelous example of pinball, which was initially banned
> >>> in
> >>>> his hometown as a game of chance, but then legalized as a game of
> >>> skill).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Natural selection really is random and bottom up, at least at
> >>> first.
> >>>> But it gives rise to humans, and these replace natural selection with
> >>>> human choices, at least in the terrain of ideas. Learning is not
> >>> usefully
> >>>> described in chaos/complexity terms; the principle of human choice has
> >>>
> >>>> clearly replaced random variation and natural selection as soon as the
> >>>
> >>>> process of variation itself is subject to volitional control (as soon
> >>> as
> >>>> people start to generate particular language strings and not others
> >>> and
> >>>> then select these).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Amongst humans, at the level of culture, language, games, and that
> >>>
> >>>> great cultural language game we call philosophy, the idea of
> >>> deliberate
> >>>> choice is clearly more powerful than the principle of natural
> >>> selection.
> >>>> That is why I think nature is dialectical, at least in the weak sense
> >>> of
> >>>> incompletable (if you will pardon a bit of volitional linguistic
> >>>> creativity) indicated by Engels.But dialectical philosophy is a
> >>>> non-natural selection rather than a natural reflection of the
> >>> dialectics
> >>>> of nature in the human brain.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> David Kellogg
> >>>>> Seoul National University of Education
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> >>>>> Steve, could you give a simple, 2 or 3 lines maybe, explanation of
> >>>
> >>>> what you
> >>>>> *mean* by "nature is dialectical"?
> >>>>> Andy
> >>>>> At 09:23 AM 7/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> >>>>>> This is a dense but not too long post on this discussion of
> >>> volition and
> >>>>>> complexity theory. I think we bump into the question of whether
> >>> "nature
> >>>>>> is dialectical" in thinking about the question of how complexity
> >>> theory
> >>>>>> can figure into the study of consciousness. Yesterday I sent David
> >>>>>> Kellog some links to Ethel Tobach (integrative levels) and Ken
> >>> Richardson
> >>>>>> (levels of self-regulation), two authors I find to be on the right
> >>>>>> track. Both Tobach and Richardson use important ideas from CHAT in
> >>> their
> >>>>>> theorizing, and have a strong leaning toward integrating natural
> >>> and
> >>>>>> social science, in ways I find both dialectical and materialist.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Vygotsky was a strong advocate of Engels' position that nature is
> >>>>>> dialectical, as was of course Marx, who I believe contributed two
> >>> chapters
> >>>>>> to the book Anti-Duhring, where Engels develops this concept. The
> >>>>>> Dialectics of Nature by Engels, a manuscript never published in
> >>> Engels'
> >>>>>> lifetime, was first published in Russia in the 1920's and is
> >>> clearly
> >>>>>> influential on Vygotsky, who quotes it favorably numerous times in
> >>> his
> >>>>>> manuscript "The Meaning of the Historical Crisis of Psychology"
> >>>>>> (1927). But this is a minority viewpoint today, it seems.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I found myself spending some time browsing the book Mike mentioned
> >>> earlier
> >>>>>> this week, Human activity - contributions to the anthropological
> >>> sciences
> >>>>>> from a perspective of activity theory by Benny Karpatschof,
> >>> available
> >>>>>> online at http://informationr.net/ir/12-3/Karpatschof/Karp00.html .
> >>> This
> >>>>>> book is a rich and highly worthy exploration of the philosophical
> >>>>>> underpinnings of CHAT, one of the best I have seen on that level,
> >>> but
> >>>>>> Benny adopts the position that nature is not dialectical,
> >>> disagreeing
> >>>>>> sharply with Engels - and therefore, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontiev, and
> >>> all the
> >>>>>> classical Marxists on this question. This idea that Engels was
> >>> wrong,
> >>>>>> that nature is not dialectical, that dialectics does not apply to
> >>> nature
> >>>>>> (Karpatschof allies with Sartre on this), is quite popular among
> >>> many
> >>>>>> dialectical thinkers today, all around the world. The position I
> >>> lean
> >>>>>> toward, that nature is dialectical, is a minority view today.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I think we bump into this question of the dialectics of nature
> >>> every time
> >>>>>> we try to integrate explanations across different domains of
> >>> complexity -
> >>>>>> from the behavior of atoms, to genes, to embryos, to children
> >>> learning to
> >>>>>> speak, for example - so the question "is nature dialectical?" is
> >>> both an
> >>>>>> ontological question (what is the nature of reality) and
> >>> epistemological
> >>>>>> (how do we know anything). I think Andy's remarks offer an
> >>> excellent
> >>>>>> basis for a critique of the incorrect view that conscious human
> >>> behavior
> >>>>>> (volition) can be reduced to the laws of complexity science. But if
> >>> we go
> >>>>>> the route Benny Karpatschof suggests and reject the thesis that
> >>> nature is
> >>>>>> dialectical altogether, I think we can lose a vital link between
> >>> the
> >>>>>> natural and the social, both ontologically and epistemologically,
> >>> and how
> >>>>>> we can use, as Engels began to, the discoveries of natural science
> >>> (laws
> >>>>>> of mechanics, chemistry in his time, quantum electrodynamics,
> >>> complexity
> >>>>>> theory, etc. in our time) to understand how the even more complex
> >>>>>> activities of human society and the still even more complex and
> >>> chaotic
> >>>>>> actions and operations of the human individual, emerge. In that
> >>> way, I
> >>>>>> think complexity theory is very much a powerful tool in trying to
> >>> link the
> >>>>>> explanatory laws of nature and society, although by no means is it
> >>>>>> sufficient. That will require a new level of integrated science and
> >>>>>> general psychology along the lines that Vygotsky envisioned.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> - Steve
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> At 04:18 PM 9/7/2007 +1000, you wrote:
> >>>>>>> Welcome aboard Steve.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I have always thought that the proposition that thinking is like
> >>>>>>> computation is so barren, so stupid and so obviously an reflected
> >>>>>>> projection, that to argue against it is to enter into the
> >>> stupidity, and
> >>>>>>> I would rather not. It's similar to people finding proof of
> >>> neo-liberal
> >>>>>>> economics in Darwinian biology, overlooking the fact that Darwin
> >>> imported
> >>>>>>> liberal economic ideas into his view of Nature in the first place.
> >>>>>>> Computers are the latest thing, and information scientists develop
> >>> tools
> >>>>>>> for humans to use by emulating human activity, and then other
> >>> people
> >>>>>>> discover that people think like computers. Upside-down. Generates
> >>> lots of
> >>>>>>> academic salaries and popular book sales anyway.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Although I think complexity theory and the concept of chaos are
> >>> very rich
> >>>>>>> and interesting ideas, I think they are out of place in describing
> >>> the
> >>>>>>> working of such a "well-oiled machine" (he, he) as the human mind.
> >>> One
> >>>>>>> thing about the application of this theory to the mind, and this
> >>> is
> >>>>>>> David's issue I believe, is that it is a radically unfree concept
> >>> of the
> >>>>>>> human condition. Allied with the concept of emergence, it is a fig
> >>> leaf
> >>>>>>> to cover a lacuna in positivist knowledge of the mind. We cannot
> >>> explain
> >>>>>>> how a few bits of flesh can be so creative and so clever, so its
> >>> must be
> >>>>>>> emergence, complexity, chaos, etc., etc.,
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I am intrigued also by David's question as to why learners should
> >>> be so
> >>>>>>> in favour of learning theories which give them no power. Perhaps
> >>> it is
> >>>>>>> because those learning theories also give them no responsibility?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Andy
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> At 09:41 PM 6/09/2007 -0700, you wrote:
> >>>>>>>> First time poster here and this may be from out of
> >>>>>>>> left field, I'm not sure. I am not active in the
> >>>>>>>> field so forgive me if but:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Roger Penrose, a prominent asttrophysicist, (among
> >>>>>>>> others) has advanced the case that human
> >>>>>>>> thinking/consciousness/cognition is not
> >>>>>>>> "computational". Here he follows Kurt Goedel in the
> >>>>>>>> use of the term computational. He wrote a book that
> >>>>>>>> started with this premise and then further wrote a
> >>>>>>>> response to a chorus of influential academics, all of
> >>>>>>>> whom issued polemics against his book and especially
> >>>>>>>> the "non-computational" thesis.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The contents of his reply somewhat step into the
> >>>>>>>> middle of the debate but should be perfectly
> >>>>>>>> understandable even to someone who hasn't read the
> >>>>>>>> book or the scathing reviews. The Contents are
> >>>>>>>> numbered and I recommend especiallyr reading #s 3 and
> >>>>>>>> 4 and then some of the later items at your own
> >>>>>>>> discretion, evocatively titled "Free Will", "What Is
> >>>>>>>> Consciousness?" and so on.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Penrose is not really trying to answer those
> >>>>>>>> questions, by the way, only remove them from a
> >>>>>>>> reductive, emergent from matter, reducible to physical
> >>>>>>>> properties and laws, perspective.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Might at least help center your search for how and
> >>>>>>>> where volition fits into the puzzle.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> This is a wonderful list by the way, thanks guys
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> It's a good read too, but it wasn't what I was
> >>>>>>>> looking for. I need
> >>>>>>>> some
> >>>>>>>>>> way of integrating complexity theory and VOLITION
> >>>>>>>> (or
> >>>>>>>> CONSCIOUSNESS). In
> >>>>>>>>>> language teaching (which is what I do)
> >>>>>>>> volition-free approaches are
> >>>>>>>> very
> >>>>>>>>>> popular (nativism, subconscious acquisition, and
> >>>>>>>> now
> >>>>>>>> chaos-complexity
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> _____________________________________________________________________
> >>>
> >>>> _______________
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> >>>>>>>> http://travel.yahoo.com/
> >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
> >>> 9435, AIM
> >>>>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>>> xmca mailing list
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> >>>>>
> >>>>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> >>> AIM
> >>>>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
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> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
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> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> --
> >>>> Geoffrey Binder
> >>>> BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
> >>>> PhD Candidate
> >>>> Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
> >>>> Ph B. 9925 9951
> >>>> M. 0422 968 567
> >>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>> xmca mailing list
> >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>>
> >>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> >>> AIM
> >>> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
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> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> xmca mailing list
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> >>
> >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> >> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >>
> >
> >
> >
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>
> Tony Whitson
> UD School of Education
> NEWARK DE 19716
>
> twhitson@udel.edu
> _______________________________
>
> "those who fail to reread
> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
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-- 
Geoffrey Binder
BA (SS) La Trobe, BArch (Hons) RMIT
PhD Candidate
Global Studies, Social Sciences and Planning RMIT
Ph B. 9925 9951
M. 0422 968 567
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