Re: [xmca] Dewey and Prolepsis

I put "fact" in ":" for the reasons you gesture toward, Michael. As to
forward backward, I'll for both/and not either/or. :-))
mike

On 4/30/07, Michael Glassman <MGlassman@ehe.ohio-state.edu> wrote:
>
> Yeah, one of the difficulties I have is not objectifying inquiry itself,
> which really doesn't exist outside of the attempt to find a solution to the
> problem. And yet Dewey lays out the process of inquiry in a step by step
> process. By fact are you talking about the empirical fact that comes after
> the process of inquiry (and can we equate process of inquiry with the method
> of knowing) as a solution - so that solution and fact occur
> simultaneously? Fact then reflects back on the problem, and only exists as
> fact in reference to that specific problem (but really how could it be any
> way). There are those who claim that because Dewey claimed you could find
> empirical facts in solutions to problems that there was a knowledge - I
> don't think I agree with that. I think I agree more with what Armando said
> to a point, but instead of the object of activity being defined by the
> subject of activity it is defined by the problem of activity (or perhaps
> this is what he meant by subject of activity).
>
> What I do think though is that Dewey always saw action as forward
> looking. It was always about the next problem and not about the last
> problem.
>
> Michael
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Mike Cole
> Sent: Mon 4/30/2007 1:32 PM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Dewey and Prolepsis
>
>
>
> Seems to me that inquiry is the method, Michael. No solution, until after
> the "fact" just a method of inquiry.
> mike
>
> On 4/30/07, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > That is helpful Michael. Knowledge is a process rather than an outcome?
> >
> > I will look into securing a copy of the suggested text.
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
> >
> > "Michael Glassman"
> > <MGlassman@ehe.ohio To: "eXtended
> Mind,
> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > -state.edu> cc:
> > Sent by: Subject: RE: [xmca]
> > Dewey and Prolepsis
> > xmca-bounces@weber.
> > ucsd.edu
> >
> >
> > 04/30/2007 12:17 PM
> > Please respond to
> > "eXtended Mind,
> > Culture, Activity"
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Eric,
> >
> > The way I read Dewey right now there is no method for knowledge, because
> > knowledge is something of an illusion unless kept within its confines as
> > instrument (rather than answer). Related to Mike's earlier post, I
> > think he sees knowledge as something that occurred to solve a previous
> > problem and must now serve as a jumping off point (and nothing more) for
> > the next problem. In other words knowledge does not have a special
> > place in the current problem beyond other possible instruments. I think
> > Dewey might instead talk about a method of knowing, understanding how to
> > solve the problem at hand - and of course that method is logical inquiry
> > (I would argue without the positivist implications which change the
> > whole tenor of the idea from how most people approach it). I think
> > Dewey ties this all together best in his late book "The Knowing and the
> > Known" with Bentley. I don't think it's something new he came to - in
> > many ways I see his chapters in that book as a summing up, a chance to
> > lay out a theory of knowing once and for all.
> >
> > Michael
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org
> > Sent: Monday, April 30, 2007 11:58 AM
> > To: mcole@weber.ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Dewey and Prolepsis
> >
> >
> > Mike:
> >
> > Dewey has been on my mind a lot lately, the text I have been studying is
> > "Nature and Experience". Rereading it has been an attempt to understand
> > the 'unit' of study for psychology. I like Vygotsky's use of" word" as
> > a
> > unit of measure but others have not, so I have tried a different
> > approach
> > by turning to Dewey. ON page 318 of "Nature and Experience": When it
> > is
> > denied that we are conscious of events as such it is not meant that we
> > are
> > not aware of objects. Objects are precisely what we are aware of. FOr
> > objects are events with meanings. . .so intimate is the connection of
> > meanings with consciousness that there is no great difficulty in
> > resolving
> > "consciousness". . ."
> >
> > However, I am still unclear as to what Dewey views as a method for
> > knowledge? I do know he refutes the dualism of realism but other than
> > that
> > . . .
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > "Mike Cole"
> >
> > <lchcmike@gmail. To: "eXtended Mind,
> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > com> cc: Reijo Miettinen
> > <reijo.miettinen@helsinki.fi>
> > Sent by: Subject: [xmca] Dewey and
> > Prolepsis
> > xmca-bounces@web
> >
> > er.ucsd.edu
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > 04/29/2007 03:49
> >
> > PM
> >
> > Please respond
> >
> > to mcole; Please
> >
> > respond to
> >
> > "eXtended Mind,
> >
> > Culture,
> >
> > Activity"
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Dear colleagues--
> >
> > We have often stumbled over the notion of object in our discussions of
> > activity. Yesterday, reading
> > in Dewey's Logic I came across the following passage that I found
> > particularly interesting because it
> > relates the notion of object to prolepsis, a term I did not know Dewey
> > used,
> > but which has been important
> > in my thinking. Here is the passage (p. 119).
> >
> > The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has
> > been
> > produced and ordered in settled form by
> > by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of
> > inquiry.
> > The apparent ambiguity of using "objects"
> > for this purpose (since the word is regularly applied to things that are
> > observed of thought of) is only apparent. For
> > things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously
> > determined
> > as outcomes of inquiries. When used in
> > carrying on new inquiries in new problematic situations, they are known
> > as
> > objects in virtue of prior inquires which warrant
> > their assertibility. In the new situation, they are means of attaining
> > knowledge of something else. In the strict sense, they
> > are part of the contents of inquiry as the word content was defined
> > above.
> > But retrospectively (that is, as products of prior
> > determination in inquiry, they are objects).
> >
> > This way of expressing the temporally double sided, or double
> > directionality
> > of action in activity seemed useful.
> > On a Sunday afternoon.
> > mike
> > _______________________________________________
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Received on Mon Apr 30 12:43 PDT 2007