The theoretical section at the beginning of the
paper is entitled "What Are Artifacts and Tools?"
and argues that there is little agreement among
cultural-historical psychology theorists over the
relation of "tools" and "artifacts." I
disagree. There is plenty of agreement over this
relationship, especially amongst the principal writers cited.
Wartofsky, for example, in a quote the authors
provide, says: "Tools and language, then, become
the basic artifacts by means of which the human
species differentiates itself from its animal
forbears." This is a clear statement that tools
and language are kinds of artifacts. The authors
offer no actual evidence that anyone in the CHAT
community thinks otherwise. To my knowledge, no one does.
The authors also err in their interpretation of
Vygotsky's diagram, depicted on p 54 of Mind in
Society (1978). They call the diagram a
"triangle", but all Vygotsky is doing in this
picture is explaining that signs and tools are
two different forms of mediated activity. The
point LSV is making is that in this respect,
tools and signs are similar and not
different. By characterizing this diagram as a
"triangle", the authors imagine tools and signs
are being counterposed, and miss out on the
actual concept being promoted that tools and
signs are both forms of mediated activity.
The concept that tools and signs are kinds of
artifacts, and are also two forms mediated human
activity, is to my knowledge ubiquitous among the
originators and contemporary theorists of CHAT.
The authors misinterpret Mike Cole from pg 117 of
Cultural Psychology - the same page Mike quoted
from in his post. They make it sound like Mike
was saying it was "easy to assimilate the concept
of artifact into the category of tool" when in
fact Mike was criticizing the
"artifact-as-object" notion frequently found in
anthropology for making this error.
These kinds of misinterpretations signal that
something is wrong. What is going on?
One guess is the authors hold a fundamental
position that is in direct opposition to the
materialist view of CHAT on the nature of
artifacts - but aren't fully aware of their
opposition. Hence, they see confusion and
differing opinions where general unity among CHAT
theorists actually exists because they are
looking to find confirmation of their own
opposing thesis - but are not finding it. They
incorrectly interpret this void as being a lack
of agreement among CHAT thinkers, when the
reality is, it is they that are in fact apparently in disagreement.
They reveal their fundamental thesis most clearly
in their final paragraph on page 125, which
captures the essential idea of their paper. What
is most important to note here is how they
distinguish "mental artifacts" from "material
artifacts." The asterisks are mine for emphasis.
"Although this study of artifacts as tools used
in three classroom events is basically an account of
trying to grapple with the issues involved, it
did demonstrate the complexity of any “serious study of
artifacts” in classrooms, and showed common
features in the function of material objects. All the artifacts
carried a meaning, including messages about their
use. In each event, the participants recognized
these messages. What varied was mode of response,
which depended, in the examples cited,
on the power and knowledge composition of the
groups. The effectiveness of an artifact on the functioning
of learners depends on the development of
**mental artifacts** of the kind identified by
Wartofsky (1979), mediated in turn by **material
artifacts**, and by the actions of fellow students."
If one concludes that artifacts come in two
essential varieties, mental and material, as the
authors of this paper do, then one could easily
have difficulty understanding how Vygotsky,
Luria, Wartofsky, Engestrom, Cole, and others see
eye to eye on the relation of artifacts to tools
and signs, or have a common concept of how the
mental and material interact in human activity or
in terms of human artifacts. Since none of these
writers hold to the traditional dualist
bifurcation of reality into the physical and
mental (body vs. mind, natural vs. supernatural,
material vs. mental, etc.), it would indeed be
difficult to detect common agreement among them in this regard.
The essential idea that these writers share about
artifacts, including tools and signs, is that all
artifacts have both materiality and meaning
(ideality). Each individual artifact and class
of artifacts has a unique and specific form and
combination of these two essential components of
artifactuality. Note, for example, the sentences
Mike quoted in his post about a table and the
word "table." They are both artifacts, but the
two differ in terms of "the relative prominence
of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds
of coordinations they afford."
At the same time, while artifacts are similar in
that they are all some combination of materiality
and meaning, and they are similar in that they
each have specific natural and cultural
properties, there are also important differences
between major classes of artifacts. For example,
Vygotsky emphasizes there are important
differences between tools and signs that must be
understood. Wartofsky, applying this kind of
reasoning, discusses certain fundamental
differences between three kinds of artifacts
(roughly, tools and signs for producing,
instructions for using tools and signs and
engaging in processes, and imagined objects and
processes). When surveying CHAT-oriented
theorists, from Vygotsky to Ilyenkov to Cole -
and allowing oneself to abandon the mechanical
materialist and vulgar idealist notion of natural
objects and human artifacts as inherently being
either physical or mental - one is struck by the
common theme that all human artifacts - tools,
signs and otherwise - insofar as they interact
with a mediate human activity - are constructed
of both materiality and meaning, of both the physical and the mental.
As I see it, this dialectical view of how human
consciousness and natural physicality are
interwoven in all the objects, including both
tools and signs, that humans psychologically and
socially interact with, is a great improvement
over much older, mechanical notions of a dual
world divided between material and mental
entities. Eric suggests the latter outlook
provides a better fulcrum for comprehending
things like classroom artifacts and how students
interact with them. I see it differently. As I
see it, the former outlook, first clearly
formulated by Marx and elaborated by Vygotsky,
and later Ilyenkov, and most recently by major
writers who identify with CHAT, is a major step
forward toward creating a scientific
understanding of human activity. This outlook
sees all artifacts, of both the tool and language
variety, as simultaneously both consciously used
physical entities *and* embodiments of human
consciousness - and not one *or* the other. I
believe the classroom research described in the
paper would be enhanced, not inhibited, by this
theory of the dual nature of artifacts.
That we find ourselves discussing and debating
these issues in MCA and on xmca is a good thing.
The dual nature of artifacts is one of CHAT's
most important and far reaching ideas and can
only be preserved and advanced by struggling to
understand its importance, debating its merits, and applying it to human life.
- Steve Gabosch
At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, Mike Cole wrote:
>Hi Eric et al--
>
>I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature overview. I
>especially find it
>disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the role
>of non-material
>cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>them to be of two kinds,
>material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>frequent reading). In this regard,
>in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in citing my
>views, I wrote:
>
> According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to the
>ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and Marx, an
>artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the
>history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue of the
>changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>*. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human actions. They
>are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation
>in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>mediate in the present.
>
>Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal force
>whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms
>of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>table is the relative
>prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements, writing,
>or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>thinking human beings
>------------------------------
>
><#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
> ---------------------
>
>I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones, among
>others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for me is
>the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>
>In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>
>Perhaps others can help out here.
>mike
>
>On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the separation
> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being able to
> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
> > they
> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students refered
> > to
> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not dismiss
> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to concretely
> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
> >
> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three examples
> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no clear
> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
> > gained
> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
> >
> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological aspect
> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I tend to
> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
> >
> > what do you think?
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
At 02:00 PM 1/14/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>Hi Eric et al--
>
>I actually had difficulty with this article and its literature overview. I
>especially find it
>disorienting when people refer to my work and make references to "the role
>of non-material
>cultural artifacts". Or, refer to my writing about artifacts and declare
>them to be of two kinds,
>material and ideal (the former occurs in this article, the latter is a
>frequent reading). In this regard,
>in Chapter 5 of Cultural Psychology to which the authors refer in citing my
>views, I wrote:
>
> According to the view presented here, which bears a close affinity to the
>ideas of John Dewey and also traces its genealogy back to Hegel and Marx, an
>artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the
>history of its incorporation in goal directed human action. By virtue of the
>changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts
>are*simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and material
>*. They are manufactured in the process of goal directed human actions. They
>are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation
>in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they
>mediate in the present.
>
>Defined in this manner, the properties of artifacts apply with equal force
>whether one is considering language/speech or the more usually noted forms
>of artifacts such as tables and knives which constitute material
>culture.[1]<#_ftn1>What differentiates the word "table" from an actual
>table is the relative
>prominence of their material and ideal aspects and the kinds of
>coordinations they afford. No word exists apart from its material
>instantiation (as a configuration of sound waves, hand movements, writing,
>or neuronal activity), whereas every table embodies an order imposed by
>thinking human beings
>------------------------------
>
><#_ftnref1> [1] For a discussion of language as a system of artifacts
>and the homology between words and what we usually think of as material
>artifacts, see Rossi-Landi (1983, p. 120ff)
> ---------------------
>
>I could, of course, be totally wrong and I believe the Peter Jones, among
>others, does not share my views. But a major point of departure for me is
>the primal fusion of the ideal and material in mediated human action and
>their differentiation only in bracketed ways for specific purposes.
>
>In a similar way, I find it disorienting to have a semiotic triangle
>referred to as a tertiary artifact citing Wartofsky.
>
>Perhaps others can help out here.
>mike
>
>On 1/11/06, ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org <ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Great article! Especially good in its overview of the literature that
> > defines tools and artifacts. The authors tend to side with the separation
> > of psychological and material artifacts for the purpose of being able to
> > study how groups conduct a learning exercise. My understanding of why
> > they
> > did this was so they could reference how many times the students refered
> > to
> > the 'flip chart", the puzzle or the textbook. The authors do not dismiss
> > spoken language as artifact but rather there intention was to concretely
> > determine how many references to the artifact were made per session.
> >
> > Big question raised by the authors is even though in all three examples
> > there is movement towards a completed lesson: getting the book read,
> > completing the puzzle or learning the english language there is no clear
> > method of knowing to what extent individual student's in each lesson
> > gained
> > knowledge or "learned" anything.
> >
> > I have always respected Engstrom's approach that the psychological aspect
> > of an artifact cannot be separated from the material object but I tend to
> > agree with the authors that this approach does not provide much of a
> > folcrum for studying how artifacts facilitate the learning process.
> >
> > what do you think?
> >
> > eric
> >
> >
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